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Abstract 
This dissertation analyses the research funding resource allocation mechanism 
(the Research Assessment Exercise) in England to assess its viability as a 
resource allocation tool and a performance control measure, to form a view on 
both the internal consistency of the exercise and to explore possible unintended 
consequences. 
Case study interviews were carried out with university administrators to 
investigate the institutional impact. The academics' behaviour was researched 
by a questionnaire survey. A survey of journal editors was also carried out. 
Logistic regression was applied to the survey of academics to analyse the data. 
The RAE has resulted in a "publication culture", where academics are 
concentrating on research that produces early publishable results and a tendency 
to publish as many papers, as possible, from the same research project. 
The impact of the RAE on academics was not independent of their characteristics. 
The level of self-assessed research activity was a significant predictor variable. 
The `middle-tier' academics were the most influenced by the RAE "four-paper" 
effect. 
Overall, the RAE lacked coherence and consistency as a resource allocation 
methodology, and had unintended consequences as a performance measure. 
CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
Chapter 1: Introduction page 1 
PERFORMANCE MEASURES AND RESOURCE ALLOCATION: THE 
BEHAVIOURAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE UNIVERSITY RESEARCH 
ASSESSMENT EXERCISE IN ENGLAND 
CHAPTER ONE 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this thesis is to analyse the research funding resource allocation 
mechanism (the Research Assessment Exercise) in England' for its efficacy as a 
resource allocation tool and a performance evaluation measure from the 
perspectives of the relevant stakeholders. The analysis relies on the underlying 
concepts and theories of resource allocation and performance evaluation from 
economics, accounting and management literature. This thesis examines the 
Research Assessment Exercise (RAE) for its internal consistency, and explores 
any incongruity and consequences that have arisen and could arise. 
An important public policy issue is the funding and support of scholarship and 
scientific enquiry. Across nations, there is some diversity in the form in which 
this policy is implemented. A key issue is the extent to which research is 
supported through universities, as opposed to being supported through research 
institutions independent of universities. The support of research through 
1 Though all UK universities are subject to the Research Assessment Exercise, different funding 
quantum and funding implications would arise depending on which part of the UK a university is 
located in. There is a separate funding body for each of the four nations in the UK. This thesis 
examines the English RAE. 
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universities leads to further key questions, namely how much funding should be 
provided and, crucially, which 'mechanism should be used for allocating the 
funds, and what are the possible consequences (intended and unintended) of any ' 
implemented allocation mechanism. 
Public funds for research in England are provided under the dual support system. 
The Higher Education Funding Council for England (HEFCE) contributes to the 
salaries of permanent academic staff, premises and central computing costs 
largely according to a set of formulae. The Research Councils provide for direct 
project costs and make a contribution to indirect costs largely in response to 
competition between research proposals. Research Council funding is tied to 
specific projects unlike the funds provided by HEFCE for research, which is 
distributed as a block grant-and Universities are free to distribute internally as 
they see fit. The formula for the HEFCE "research grant" is a function of the 
quality of the research undertaken (as measured by the RAE) and the volume 
(largely the number of submitted research active staff) for each Unit of 
Assessment (UoA), i. e., subject areal. 
1.2 MOTIVATION FOR STUDY 
Over the past two decades, there have been significant developments in the 
management of funds for higher education. Australia and South Africa, for 
example, have introduced methodologies for the allocation of resources that 
differ markedly from the RAE, while Hong Kong has a similar allocation device 
as the RAE. 
2A detailed description of the funding process is in Chapter Four. 
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This is the `ripple' effect of public policies. It is a widely held view by 
comparative policy analysts that policymakers draw considerable inspiration 
from the action of their counterparts in other jurisdictions (Bennett 1997). When 
policy decision-makers are confronted with the need to solve a problem, there is 
a tendency to search for ready-made solutions adopted in other jurisdictions 
(Rose 1993). The RAE is (potentially) a "ready-made" solution for resource 
allocation in the higher education sector of other jurisdictions. Indeed, in an 
interview with the author, the HEFCE confirmed that a number of countries have 
inquired about the workings of the RAE. This thesis could prove useful to policy 
makers in other jurisdictions considering adopting the RAE with view to 
improvement. 
`New Public Management' emphasizes the importance of accountability and 
performance evaluation. Performance indicators have become fashionable in the 
public sector as, in theory, it provides the opportunity for government to retain 
firm control over departments by exercising a strategy of "hands-off' rather than 
"hands-on" control (Carter 1994). Universities can be regarded as public 
institutions because they serve the public through teaching, research and other 
services, and their management may be regarded as public administration 
because public revenues primarily fund them. As universities provide distinct 
and partially fee-based services, university practices should offer insight into the 
use of performance models associated with the new public management (Harris 
1998). Thus, one motivation for this thesis is to explore the use of performance 
models and goal setting in universities as a means for gaining insight into the use 
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of similar performance approaches in the broader context of the new public 
management. 
The use of the university setting is also to highlight the contingency theory 
aspect that the control designs will "fit" organisations but not others. The 
contingency factors influencing the "fit" will differ between the different public 
administration organisations, and care needs to be taken in imposing a standard 
new public management approach "across the board". Early researchers using 
contingency theory have emphasized the need for research regarding the 
influence of contextual variables on the effective design of Management 
Accounting Systems (MAS) (e. g. Waterhouse and Tiessen, 1978). The adoption 
of contingency theory in management accounting is based on the belief that there 
is a need to identify situations where specific control designs would fit some 
organisational and environmental features better than others. Major contingency 
variables that have been studied for their effects on the "fit" between MAS 
design and managerial performance include perceived environmental uncertainty, 
task uncertainty, societal cultural values, technological complexity, 
organisational structure and organisational strategy (for example see Abernethy 
and Guthrie, 1994; Ouchi 1979,1980; Mia and Chenhall, 1994; Chong, 1996; 
Kirsch, 1996; Otley, 1980). It is useful to investigate if the RAE is an appropriate 
management control tool for the university enviromnent, and if personal 
characteristics of academics have any bearing on the behavioural consequences. 
Furthermore, the RAE is a resource allocation mechanism with research 
performance measures as the basis for the allocations. The RAE can be viewed 
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as a management control tool, though it is more aptly described as an outcome 
control. According to the Kirsch model3, academics apply "self-control". The 
RAE and academics provide an interesting subject area to investigate the 
behavioural implications of imposing an outcome control in an environment that 
is more suited to self-control. 
Universities have a long tradition of academic freedom and autonomy. The RAE 
is a budget allocation compromise between autonomy and accountability. The 
contradiction in formula based allocation of funds in the higher education sector 
is, on the one hand, to achieve accountability for public funds (in that they are 
applied efficiently to achieve national policies and goals), but at the same time to 
maintain academic freedom and autonomy for universities to set their own 
priorities. Has the RAE -been successful in steering universities towards 
achieving national goals? 
After the McNay (1997) study on the impact of the 1992 RAE, the HEFCE 
expressed concerns about the cumulative effect of successive exercises (HEFCE 
M 6/97): 
"it would be sensible, therefore, if the RAE is repeated, to continue 
monitoring effects and take steps to mitigate negative effects" 
(HEFCE M 6/97,1997: p. 23). 
It is timely to undertake this thesis as institutions and academics are more 
familiar and have intimate experiences with the RAE for which the impacts and 
effects can now be measured, understood and critiqued. 
See Chapter Two for details of the model. 
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1.3 RELEVANCE OF THESIS 
As a budgeting tool, the RAE' allocates resources on the basis of centrally 
assessed research performance. The research performance Units of Assesment 
(UoA) is measured by the quality of the research output of the staff in the unit. 
Therefore, the RAE is viewed by the academic staff as a performance 
measurement and management control device, although a partial one, because it 
takes into account only the research aspects of the job and not the teaching 
duties. For this reason, RAE is regarded as an output control apparatus. The 
RAE as a performance measure mechanism or a management control tool raises 
two issues. The first is traced to Goodhart's Law (Goodhart, 1975), which 
suggests that once a performance indicator is identified, those whose 
performance is being evaluated will seek to improve his4 position on just those 
indicator(s) that have been revealed, most often at the expense of the unmeasured 
activities. The second issue pertains to the control of professionals and how the 
RAE fits as an outcome control imposed on academics vis-ä-vis the Ouchi and 
the Kirsch models of control. 
There has been an increased interest in the widespread dissemination of outcome 
performance data to secure enhanced strategic control of public sector 
organisations. Much energy has been expended on the development of outcome- 
related performance' measures in the public sector, although the behavioural 
impact of such measures has not been widely researched (Smith, 1993). 
Nevertheless, the literature is replete with studies of the impact of performance 
measures and of the potentially resultant dysfunctional behaviour in the private 
4 For ease of expression, the male gender also refers to the other. 
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sector (e. g., Hartmann, 2000; Briers and Hirst, 1990; Merchant, 1998; Van der 
Stede, 2000; Otley, 1978; Laverty, 1996). This thesis examines if such 
behavioural distortion from performance measures is applicable to the higher 
education sectors. 
Furthermore, the RAE is an incomplete budgeting tool. The budget allocation is 
determined by the research performance of the UoA, typically the departments 
within a university. The department's research performance is practically the 
aggregation of the research performance of the academic staff in that department. 
The budget is allocated to the university as a block grant. There is no 
requirement that the budget is internally distributed in accordance with the 
methodology in which it is earned. This is partially to preserve the university 
autonomy in setting its own priorities. This inconsistency between the earning of 
the resources and the internal distribution of the resources means it is not 
necessarily that the person or unit whose performance is measured is directly 
rewarded for it. The disparity between performance measures and direct rewards 
warrants a study of the behavioural implications of RAE. 
Overall, the findings and discussion in this thesis could prove to be useful to 
policymakers in England and elsewhere, and to researchers on performance 
measures and management control, and formula based budget allocations. 
1.4 ORGANISATION OF THE THESIS 
This thesis examines the differential impacts and consequences the RAE has on 
the various stakeholders such as policymakers, tertiary education institutions, 
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academics, and journal editorss. Apart from investigating the (general) impact 
and consequences of the RAE on the different stakeholders, we also adopt a 
management control perspective on the RAE. Hence, the thesis is based on two 
inter-locking foundations. The first is RAE and its impact. The other is viewing 
the RAE in light of management control and goal setting literature. The study 
approach adopted is summarised in Figure 1.1. 
Chapter Two reviews the literature on motivation, goal setting and management 
control - particularly the Ouchi `clan control' and Kirsch's `self control' models. 
They help to frame the reactions of tertiary institutions and academics to the 
RAE. The research design, survey methodology, research questions and 
hypotheses, and format for the empirical analysis are presented in Chapter Three. 
In Chapter Four, the historical background of the RAE provides the setting for 
the thesis. The historical background is crucial in appreciating that the RAE was 
(partly) introduced as a result of funding constraints decided upon by the 
government. Chapter Four also discusses the national policies and goals expected 
of the RAE. 
s Other stakeholders not directly addressed in this thesis include research institutions, industry, 
students, particularly research students, and the general public. 
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FIGURE 1.1: THE STUDY'S APPROACH 
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Chapter Five analyses the submission of strategies available to the departments 
and develops a maximisation model. Some illustrative data are applied to a 
simulation to show the anomalies in the value per point and to highlight the 
"choice of panel" decision. 
With findings from case studies, Chapter Six investigates the RAE consequences 
on institutional behaviour. The interview sample includes "old" and "new" 
universities to extract the different strategies that each group adopts and the 
associated behavioural changes due to the RAE. 
Given that journal editors are in a unique position to assess the impact the RAE 
had on publications and its management, Chapter Seven reports and interprets the 
survey of journal editors for their views and reactions on (1) publication quantity 
and quality, (2) the management of publications by academics, (3) the refereeing 
process, and (4) proliferation of journals. 
Chapter Eight and Chapter Nine report and analyse the findings of the survey of 
academics. As the RAE focuses on research activities and requires the 
measurement of a scholar's research performance, it has induced behavioural 
changes including gaming and shunning of activities that have little or no bearing 
on the RAE rating. Chapter Eight also compares some of these findings to the 
McNay study (1997). In Chapter Nine, the survey responses are classified into 
distinct groups of subjects, based on personal characteristics of the respondents. 
The last chapter, Chapter Ten, summarises the key findings, draws some 
significant conclusions, and provides some suggestions for future research. 
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1.5 CONCLUSION 
The management of research output is a significant consequence of the RAE. 
The most noticeable consequence is the rush to publish just prior to the RAE 
deadline, resulting in premature attempts at publishing. The RAE has shifted 
the research focus to research output publication. This has resulted in 
academics concentrating on research that produces early publishable results, and 
avoiding projects that will take a long time to complete. There also is a 
tendency to publish as many papers as possible from the same research project. 
The impact of the RAE on academics was not independent of their characteristics. 
The thesis' result findings indicate that the younger academics were adopting 
more dysfunctional behaviours as a result of RAE. The level of self-assessed 
research activity was also a significant predictor variable. The average researcher 
was the most influenced by the RAE to practise gaming. Academics' age group, 
department RAE ratings and experience were also significant characteristics 
influencing gaming practices. 
Overall, the RAE lacked coherence and consistency as a resource allocation 
methodology, and had unintended consequences as a performance measure. The 
results and findings are detailed in the body of the thesis and are discussed briefly 
in the final chapter.. 
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List of Research Procedures Adopted: 
The following are the procedures undertaken in this study, listed under the 
chapter number. 
Chanter 2: 
1. A review of the management control literature. 
2. A review of the motivation theories with emphasis on goal setting theory. 
3. A review of the RAE literature. 
Chapter 3: 
4. The survey design and methodology explained. 
5. The econometric (logit regression) model explained. 
Chapter 4: 
6. RAE analysed from a policy perspective and formula based funding 
reviewed. 
7. Outcome of RAE 1996 analysed for BMS UoA to investigate if policy 
objectives are reflected. 
8. The "ceiling effect" analysed. 
Chapter 5: 
9. RAE submission strategies modelled into a maximisation formula. 
10. Submission strategies analysed including the value per point effect. 
11. Value of mentor researchers assessed. 
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Chanter 6: 
12. Impact of RAE on institutions investigated by case study approach. 
13. Interviews with university administrators conducted to investigate impact of 
RAE on strategies adopted by universities. 
Chapter 7: 
14. Perspective of journal editors investigated by a survey. 
15. Survey results analysed. 
16. Survey of editors compared with academics' survey, for collaborative 
evidence. 
Chapter 8: 
17. The academics survey descriptive results were presented and analysed. 
18. Sample size was explained and comparing mean responses of late returns 
with the rest of returns tested non-response bias. 
19. The independence and association of the response variables and the 
characteristic variables were tested. 
20. The survey results were compared with the results of the McNay study. 
Chapter 9: 
21. We classified the respondents into groups based on the characteristics of the 
respondent and applied ANOVA to test if the response means of the groups 
were significantly different. 
22. We then tested the extent of the impact of RAE on behaviour changes. Three 
levels of impact were defined based on significance of proportion of 
respondents agreeing to behaviour changes. 
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23. We developed a model for predicting behaviour response, with the individual 
characteristics as predictor variables. CATREG was applied and results 
presented. 
24. The results of the association measures, ANOVA and CATREG were 
compared. 
25. Responses were collapsed into dichotomous variables and logistic regression 
applied. 
26. Factor analysis was applied to test validity of the measure constructs. 
27. Reliability was tested by cronbach measure. 
28. Logistic regression model was tested. 
Chanter 10: 
29. The study findings and conclusions are discussed in this chapter. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE MANAGEMENT CONTROL PERSPECTIVE 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter draws on motivational, behavioural, management control, clan 
control, self control and goal-setting theories and research to frame the role and 
effects of the Research Assessment Exercise (RAE) and other consequences 
brought about by the exercise. This chapter highlights the motivational and 
behavioural effects the Research Assessment Exercise might induce on 
academics. 
2.2 CONTROL AND THE RESEARCH ASSESSMENT EXERCISE 
Researchers and practitioners have long recognised the benefits and need for 
control mechanisms to help steer organisations in their goal seeking activities. 
Control Theory and Goal Congruence are attempts to explain how one person or 
group in an organisation can ensure that another person or group collaborate 
toward common organisational goals. Whereas management control is the 
process by which managers influence other organisational members to 
implement the company's strategies, control systems refer to measurement 
systems that influence behaviour of members whose activities are being 
measured. A perennial concern in the design of control systems has been if the 
induced behaviour is consistent with the company strategy. In this research, the 
interest is to analyse the behavioural consequences of control systems. This 
arises from the idea that in exercising control over a person or group, the 
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controller is taking some action in order to regulate or adjust the behaviour of the 
subjects (Kirsch, 1996). 1 
Empirical research has shown that task characteristics and organisational 
environments influence the types of organisational controls. The modes of 
control have been identified as behavioural, outcome, clan and self. Kirsch 
(1996) has integrated the different theorisations to predict the circumstances 
under which each type of control would be chosen. 
The control procedures and processes of complex organisational tasks are issues 
and problems in organisational theory that are not well understood (Flamholtz et 
al, 1985; Merchant, 1988; Snell, 1992). In the case of the management and 
organisation of research staff responsible for scientific and academic activities, 
these concerns are amplified as their endeavours result in outcomes that are non- 
routine, creative and often non-predictive. In this respect, the Research 
Assessment Exercise (RAE) represents a management control process installed 
by the funding council in order to regulate or adjust the behaviour of academics 
(i. e., the controlled), thereby presenting an excellent case to demonstrate the 
difficulties and issues associated with structuring control mechanisms for 
complex tasks. 
The RAE can be regarded as serving two purposes, viz., as a management control 
tool for performance evaluation, and as a device for resource allocation where 
higher allocations are given to the universities with superior performances. In a 
sense the RAE can be viewed as merely a resource allocation defence 
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mechanism; which can allocate funding cuts "objectively" so as to neutralise 
contention (a surrogate for policy judgements). As the RAE seems to be an 
incomplete resource allocation mechanism, it provides the opportunity for an 
investigation. Figure 2.1 shows the research assessment and funding process for 
which this thesis investigates the behavioural consequences of the RAE and the 
implications for scholarly activities and output. 
Figure 2.1 
Research º RAE rating Resource allocated 
(financial reward) 
to university 
-Reward to Departme tun ed fined 
What are Implications? 
Behavioural consequences? (link to rewards 
at department or individual level is not 
clear) 
2.3 FORMAL AND INFORMAL CONTROLS 
The two broad categories of control in the organisational literature are formal and 
informal. Among the widely researched types of formal controls are behaviour- 
based and outcome-based (see Thompson, 1967; Ouchi 1979). Formal controls 
tend to focus on performance evaluation strategies where behaviours or outcomes 
are measured, evaluated and rewarded (Eisenhardt 1985). In Ouchi's 
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conceptualisation, the choice of a control strategy would depend on `knowledge 
of the transformation process' and ' the ability to measure outputs'. The Ouchi 
model is described in detail in the next section. 
Cont of 
Formal 
Behaviour controls Outcome Conti 
Clan control 
One type of informal control is to use clans to control behaviours of individuals 
by combining the effects of selection processes and social mechanisms (Ouchi, 
1979). A clan is any group of individuals, such as a profession or a labour union, 
with common goals and who are dependent on one another. When knowledge of 
the transformation process is imperfect and outcomes are difficult to measure, 
then it is likely that clan control would be instituted (Ouchi, 1979). For instance, 
in the case of a research lab where it would be difficult to require the precise 
behaviours that, if followed, would lead to scientific breakthroughs, and where it 
would difficult to identify outcomes that provide meaningful or timely 
Informal 
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measurements of the scientists' works, the alternative to organisational control is 
to institute clan control by the systematic selection of individuals with desired 
professional training, socialization of members to goals and values of the clan 
(i. e., group or organization), and rewarding contributions in clan-approved rituals 
such as, in the case of the academic community, participation at conferences and 
publication of articles. 
A second type of informal control is self-control. This concept is consistent with 
self-management wherein an individual sets his own goals, monitors his own 
work, and rewards or sanctions himself in a meaningful way (Manz et al, 1987; 
Erez and Kanfer, 1983). While the key to clan control is the selection and 
socialisation process, the impetus for appropriate behaviour for self-control is the 
individual's role objectives and standards (Jaworski, 1988). Such self-control are 
appropriate for tasks that demand a high amount of autonomy, creativity, or 
intellectual activities that would make it difficult for controllers to identify and 
enforce the desired behaviours (Greenberger and Strasser, 1986). 
The c haracteristics oft he four m odes of control i dentified in the literature are 
summarised in Table 2.1. 
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TABLE 2.1: Characteristics of four modes of control. 
Behaviour: 
Behaviours that transform inputs to outputs are known. 
Controller monitors and evaluates controllee's behaviours 
Explicit link exists between extrinsic rewards and following behaviours. 
Outcome: 
Desired task outcomes are known and measurable. 
Controller evaluates whether outcomes were met. 
Explicit link exists between extrinsic rewards and producing outcomes. 
Clan: 
Task-related behaviours and outcomes are not pre-specified. 
Goals are determined by clan and evolve during the task period. 
Clan identifies and reinforces acceptable behaviour. 
Rewards are based on acting in accordance with clan's values and attitudes. 
Shared experiences, values, and beliefs among the clan members. 
Members exhibit strong commitment to the clan. 
Self: 
Controllee sets own task goals and procedures. 
Controllee is intrinsically motivated. 
Crontrollee engages in self-monitoring and self-evaluation. 
Rewards are based partly on Controllee ability to self manage. 
(source: Kirsch (1996) p 4. ) 
2.4. OUCHI'S FRAMEWORK FOR ORGANISATIONAL CONTROL 
A significant issue that has a direct impact on the management control 
environment is the task and/or process that the manager is expected to perform 
(Ouchi 1979). Thompson and Tuden (1959) produced a model for decision 
making based on "beliefs about outcomes" and "beliefs about objectives". 
(Table 2.2) 
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Preferences about possible outcomes 
Table 2.2 
Certain uncertain 
Certain decision by decision by 
Beliefs computation (1) compromise (2) 
about 
objectives uncertain decision by decision by 
judgement (3) inspiration (4) 
From Thompson & Tuden's concern with the interconnections among our beliefs 
about goals, process and the approach to decision making, Perrow (1970) turns 
the focus from the intersection of the elements of management to the task itself. 
Perrow argues that the organisation's response to the planning and control 
process is related to (1) the extent to which the task is a nalysable and (2) the 
degree to which the activities in the process are homogenous among different 
performance of the task (which he calls exceptions). This is shown in Table 2.3. 
Table 2.3 
Few exceptions Many exceptions 
High analysability Routine (1) Engineering (2) 
Low analysability I Craft (3) Non-routine (4) 
Chap 2: Literature Review page 22 
Viewed together, Thompson & Tuden and Perrow suggest a relationship between 
task and control. Ouchi took -these models further to develop his model 
concerned with control processes rather than decision process. 
Ouchi (1979,1980) classified modes of organisational control along two 
dimensions: (i) the extent of ambiguity in output measurement and (ii) the extent 
of knowledge of the transformation process. He invoked a transactions-cost 
perspective, according to which the attributes of different control modes with 
respect to the above two dimensions determine their relative efficiency. 
Efficiency is measured in terms of minimisation of transaction costs. In the 
transaction-costs approach, the organisation is treated as a network of exchanges, 
which should be regulated by control modes in the most economic manner. 
Different control modes have different characteristics, which are associated with 
costs arising from the structure of property rights in organisations. Equity, or 
reciprocity, in the terms of exchange between the parties involved is a 
fundamental notion. Transaction costs are intertwined with reciprocity. These 
costs arise when the goods or services to be exchanged do not lend themselves to 
easy and precise evaluation. To preserve equity in such cases, experts (third 
parties) tend to be called upon to value the goods or services subject to exchange. 
This leads to greater transaction costs. This is manifest in the RAE panels. This 
high transaction cost can be a deterrent for less developed nations to implement a 
similar research assessment exercise (Lim 1999). 
Three fundamentally different mechanisms for control predominate in the 
organisation literature: markets, bureaucracies or hierarchies, and clans (Ouchi, 
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1979). The market mechanism handles control issues through its ability to 
measure and reward individual contributions. Bureaucracies rely on a 
combination of close evaluation and the socialised acceptance of common 
objectives. The clan mechanism operates through a socialisation process that 
effectively eliminates goal incongruence among individuals. These three 
approaches can be distinguished along two dimensions: underlying normative 
and informational requirements. Normative requirements refer to the basic social 
agreements shared by the exchange parties in order to minimise transaction costs. 
Table 2.4 summarises the normative and informational requirements necessary to 
operate each control mode. 
TABLE 2.4: TYPE OF CONTROL 
TYPE OF SOCIAL INFORMATION 
CONTROL REQUIREMENT REQUIREMENT, 
Market Norm of Reciprocity Prices 
Bureaucracy Norm of Reciprocity Rules 
Legitimate Authority 
Clan Norm of Reciprocity Traditions 
Legitimate Authority 
Shared Values & 
Beliefs 
The social requirements refer to the set of agreements between people which 
form the basis for control. Reciprocity engenders equity and fairness in 
exchange, and if widely held would result in minimising transaction costs. A 
market control cannot exist without a norm of reciprocity, but it requires no 
social agreements beyond that. In an arms-length transaction, the reciprocity 
norm assures t hat ifo ne p arty attempts toc heat the other, t hen the c heater, if 
discovered, would be punished not just by the victim and his partners, but also by 
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all members of the social system. Thus, the severity of the punishment would 
exceed the damage, effectively deterring future cheaters. If honesty cannot be 
taken for granted in market transactions, then to avoid being cheated, each party 
has to incur the high combined costs of surveillance, complete contracting and 
enforcement. These costs can amount to an extent that the market control mode 
fails. The RAE appears to be an attempt to create a "quasi market" for research 
activity and output, but trying to establish a market mechanism with "enforced" 
pricing by creating an artificial quasi market does not seem appropriate for 
academic research. 
When markets fail or are not suitable, the bureaucratic or hierarchical form of 
control is often adopted. In addition to the reciprocity norm, this mechanism 
requires an agreement or understanding on the superior's legitimate authority, 
ordinarily of the legal-rational structure. The employee relinquishes autonomy 
and freedom in some areas to his superiors thus permitting them to direct his 
work and monitor his performance. This is possible only if employees accept the 
legitimate right of their superiors to command, audit and monitor them. 
The clan mode of control requires not only the norm of reciprocity and the 
concept of legitimate authority (mostly of the "traditional" rather than 
"legal/rational" form); but also social agreements on a broad range of values and 
beliefs. Although a clan does not have the semblance of the explicit price 
mechanism of the market or the explicit rules of the bureaucracy, this approach 
of control implies an intimate level understanding among members on what 
constitutes acceptable behaviour. It requires a high level of commitment on 
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every member to the socially prescribed behaviours, and can be an effective 
means of eliciting the appropriate behaviours. For professionals and academic 
researchers, the clan control can be a useful device. In fact, the internal staff 
development and training programs, and to a large extent university PhD 
programmes, achieve or introduce a relatively high degree of indoctrination to 
the organization and its culture. 
The clan mode of control is similar to the tribal code of practice and the concept 
of assabiyah developed by the Arab scholar Ibn Khaldoun (AD 1332-1406). 
Derived from the Arabic root word asab, which means "to bind, " assabiyah 
refers to the force which binds humans in their group life. It instils a sense of 
solidarity among group members based on the fact that they share a common 
origin, culture, ethics and values. In the political context, assabiyah is similar to 
patriotism, and in the modem management context, it is represented by common 
sets of values and beliefs. In an analogous sense, organisations share values that 
are codified. These shared values can be implicit or explicit as in published 
codes of ethics for professional bodies. Just as with tribes or clans, any 
infringement of the codes of practice may be punished with the severe 
punishment being disowned by the tribe. Professional associations such as the 
Accountancy bodies have occasionally expelled errant members who commit 
acts deemed highly disreputable by their codes of behaviour and practice. 
Following Ouchi (1979), the relationships among the three control modes (viz., 
markets, hierarchies, clans) are formed by the two dimensions - Knowledge of 
the Transformation Process, Ability to Measure Output - as shown in Table 2.5. 
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TABLE 2.5 
KNOWLEDGE OF THE TRANSFORMATION 
PROCESS 
Perfect Imperfect 
ABILITY High 1. Behaviour or Output 2. Output Measurement 
TO Measurement 
MEASURE Low 3. Behaviour Measurement 4. Ritual and Ceremony: 
OUTPUT Clan control 
If the ability to measure output is high but knowledge of the transformation 
process is imperfect, output control mechanisms are most appropriate. Thus, 
markets are the more effective control mechanism as there is little need for , 
writing detailed and costly contracts as with hierarchies. Furthermore, there is 
not much need for extensive internal monitoring and mediation by third parties. 
If the ability to measure output is low but knowledge of the transformation 
process is perfect, the attention shifts from output measurement to behaviour 
measurement. When the ability to measure output is high and knowledge of the 
transformation process is perfect it would be possible to measure both behaviour 
and output. In this case, decision makers have the choice between behavioural or 
output controls. As markets and hierarchies can perform these functions, the 
choice would depend'on the cost of each alternative. 
If the ability to measure output is low and knowledge of the transformation 
process is imperfect, neither markets nor hierarchies would be tenable, thereby 
supporting the case for control through clans and corporate culture (Ouchi, 
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1979). In essence, clan control is possible when there is a high degree of 
discipline developed through the dedication of each individual to the interests of 
the group as a whole. The behaviour of clan members is regulated through 
mutual monitoring using symbols and norms not readily susceptible to precise 
translation into performance measures. 
Under the circumstances where there is weak ability to measure output and an 
imperfect knowledge of the transformation process, the strategy is to carefully 
select candidates to ensure the employment of an able and committed set of 
people, followed by the use of rituals and ceremonies which serve to reward 
those who exhibit the underlying attitudes and values that further organisational 
success. 
2.5 KIRSCH MODEL 
Agency theory has contributed much to the development and understanding of 
corporate governance. In particular, agency theorists (e. g., Mitnick, 1982; 
Arrow, 1985) have developed reasoning for behaviour-oriented contracts as basis 
for rewarding employees (i. e., agents) for their desirable outcome-oriented 
behaviours. This is because outcomes are a function of the agent's effort level 
and uncertainties in the task environment. Moreover, where Ouchi proposes that 
behaviour-based controls are suitable for cases where knowledge of the 
transformation process is perfect, agency theorists argue that behavioural 
contracts can be structured when knowledge is imperfect if principals or 
controllers invest in information systems in order to observe or monitor the 
actions of agents. In this sense, as suggested by agency theory, an organisation's 
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control mechanism is also dependent on "behaviour observability". 
It has been argued that monitoring is an information system that makes behaviour 
observable, while evaluations and rewards moderate the way in which actions are 
regulated (Eisenhardt, 1985). The process of obtaining information on a 
controlled b ehaviour is not the s ame as acting on t hat information in order to 
change the behaviour. Eisenhardt integrates Ouchi's theory of control with 
agency theory into one model that predicts the choice of control strategy. From 
Ouchi, she notes that "outcome measurability" and "knowledge of the 
transformation process" are predictors of control strategy, and from agency 
theory, she includes "behaviour o bservability" and "uncertainty" as predictors. 
This integrated model is empirically tested with retail sales compensation data, 
with "Knowledge of the transformation process" represented by "task 
programmability" defined as the degree to which appropriate behaviour can be 
specified in advance. The results suggest that when behaviours are measurable 
(observable), behaviour control is implemented, and when the cost of outcome 
measurement is low, or outcome uncertainty is low, outcome control is used. 
Govindarajan and Fisher (1990) further refined Eisenhardt's and Ouchi's models. 
They modified Ouchi's model to include the behaviour observability construct 
from Agency theory, and they retained the notion of task programmability from 
Eisenhardt's work. Govindarajan and Fisher's model suggests that behaviour 
observability, outcome measurability, and task programmability are antecedents 
of types of control strategy. Kirsch (1996) further refined Govindarajan and 
Fisher's model by replacing "task programmability" with "controller's 
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knowledge of the transformation process" as an antecedent. Table 2.6 shows the 
Kirsch integrated model that suggests academics fit into Cell 8 and self-control is 
all that is required. But, it can be argued that academics fit between Cell 7 and 
Cell 8 since their behaviour may not be fully observed by the superiors while 
observation, rating and pressure by peers are common in academia. 
TABLE 2.6: KIRSCH MODEL 
Controllers Knowledge of 
Transformation process 
High Low 
High Outcome High behaviour Cell 1 Cell 5 
Measurability observability Behaviour Outcome 
Low Behaviour Cell 2 Cell 6 
observability Outcome Outcome 
Low Outcome High behaviour Cell 3 Cell? 
Measurability observability Behaviour Clan 
Low Behaviour Cell 4 Cell 8 
observability Self Self 
2.6 THE "PROFESSIONAL-BUREAUCRATIC" CONFLICT 
2.6.1 Is the RAE an appropriate control? 
The organisational structure has been the traditional form of control where the 
challenge has been in designing mechanisms and systems that permit a degree of 
rational and ordered behaviour among employees. A guiding paradigm is 
contingency theory. Ouchi adopts contingency theory when he draws the 
important distinction between behavioural controls and outcome controls. 
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Research on task uncertainty and professional culture as contingency variables 
has yielded the professional-bureaucratic conflict ("the clash of cultures"). In a 
study on management control over professionals in Public Accounting firms, it is 
observed that control, often residing in individual professionals as a consequence 
of long term socialisation and the imposition of formalised, structured techniques 
of control, may cause professional-bureaucratic conflicts that lead to 
dysfunctional behaviour (Dirsmith et al, 1997). 
The management of professionals has always been a challenge. A study was 
undertaken in a large teaching hospital in Australia to examine the effects due to 
the implementation of formal administrative controls, encompassing both 
behavioural and output controls, on professionals (Abernethy and Stoelwinder, 
1995). This attempt to understand the circumstances that would lead to adverse 
consequences finds conflicts between professional and bureaucratic norms and 
values are reduced when individuals with high professional orientation are averse 
to an environment of control where output controls dominate as it restricts them 
in their self regulatory activities (ibid, p. 13). In this regard, the RAE, if viewed 
as a form of output control, is incompatible for university academics since there 
is great tendency toward high professional orientation. 
Based on Perrow's model to explore the influence of task characteristics on the 
effectiveness of accounting, behaviour and personnel forms of control, research 
is conducted to examine the role of accounting and non-accounting controls in an 
R&D setting. It finds that non-accounting controls, particularly personnel 
controls, contribute to o rganisation effectiveness where task characteristics are 
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not well suited to accounting based controls (Abernethy and Brownell, 1997). 
Birnberg et al (1983) discuss behaviour that can arise when a control system 
inappropriately assumes a Cell 1 (per Ouchi cell classifications) world. (".. one 
of the methods by which managers will exploit the cell 1 world when it is 
inappropriate is through the accounting information system" (Bimberg et al, 
1983: p. 119). The RAE is a form of output control; which according to Ouchi is 
a control only appropriate for a Cell 3 (or Cell 1) world but not for a Cell 4 
world. Birnberg et al categorised dysfunctional behaviours arising from 
"inappropriate" controls into six broad categories: 1) smoothing; 2) biasing; 
3) focusing; 4) gaming; 5) filtering; and 6) illegal acts. 
1. Smoothing 
Some managers are able to affect the flow of data without altering the actual 
activities of the organisation. Such smoothing behaviour could result in sending 
a message in the present period, when in reality, the event does not occur until 
some future period. Conversely, the manager may delay the sending of a 
message to a future period even though the event has occurred in the current 
period. The common smoothing practice is that of shifting of a revenue or 
expense item from one period to another. The shifts may arise from the need to 
hold down costs or increase revenue to meet targets or budgets. Sometimes, the 
smoothing act serves to prevent reported performance from appearing to be too 
superior in one period in order to ease the future workload, resulting in budget 
slacks. Academics, too, can game or smooth their publication flows across RAE 
exercises. 
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Birnberg et al felt that the absence of observability of the process, lack of 
analysability and heterogeneity all limit the ability of the superior to detect 
smoothing behaviour. These are characteristics of academia. 
2. Biasing 
When a manager selects from a set of possible messages a signal that is likely to 
be accepted and is most favourable to him, biasing is said to occur. The 
permissibility of submitting a selected set of staff as research active for the RAE 
provides a venue for such dysfunctional behaviour (Talib and Steele, 2000). 
3. Focusing -- 
Focusing occurs when certain aspects of the information set are either enhanced 
or degraded. Focusing, smoothing and biasing are strategies intended by the 
sender tom anipulate the recipient by affecting the set ofd ata available to the 
recipient. The sender however has not altered his behaviour. 
4. Gaming 
When there are attempts to alter job-related behaviour, employees will act in 
ways to maximise the payoffs. In an ideal world, where the superior has set the 
rules properly and the right performance measure is used, the subordinate when 
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maximising his payoffs would also maximise the superior's payoffs. However 
the risk exists where the superior uses a surrogate measure of performance. The 
subordinate while attempting to maximise the surrogate measure may reject 
courses of action more (or also) desirable for the superior. More precisely, 
gaming of a performance measure is said to exist when the subordinate 
knowingly selects his activities so as to achieve a more favourable measure on 
the surrogate used by the superior for evaluation, at the expense of selecting an 
alternative course of action that would result in a more desirable level of 
performance, as far as the superior's true goal is concerned. 
Birnberg et al were of the view that outside of Cell 1, it is not obvious how the 
superior can be sure of avoiding such behaviour. The subordinate will select his 
action with the aim of sending the superior the m essage the superior wants to 
receive and the message will be credible to the superior. This has been called the 
"moral-hazard" issue in agency literature. An example of this behaviour in 
academia could be in the form of concentration on research activities at the 
expense of teaching and other duties. 
5. Filtering 
Filtering and focusing are closely related. Filtering occurs where the more 
desirable elements of the data are communicated and the less desirable are not. 
Filtering strategies include over-collection, over-presentation and aggregation. 
Over-collection involves obtaining much more information than required. Over- 
presentation occurs when one inundates receivers with vast quantities of 
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information to confuse the recipient. Another strategy is to aggregate the 
information to a high level so that the critical aspects are lost. By doing this, the 
subordinate may effectively eliminate attention-directing information from the 
report. 
6. Illegal acts 
An illegal act is one that violates a private law such as organisational rules or a 
public law. Unethical acts in academia such as the violation of codes of ethics 
for publication can be considered illegal acts. An example of unethical practices 
under the auspices of the RAE would be submissions of the same paper to 
different journals. 
_ 
2.6.2 How does RAE affect Research in Universities? 
One of the basic tenets of professionalism is the notion that a professional is 
highly accountable to his peers (Carter, 1988: p. 216). Professionals have largely 
been averse to towards centralised authority. If a member perceives the superior 
as exercising centralised authority and the subordinate holds negative feelings 
towards centralised authority, then dysfunctional behaviour would arise from 
budgetary emphasis (Taylor, 1996). 
An increasing trend in the public sector is the use of explicit performance 
indicators. Smith (1993) infers seven ways in which excessive use of "outcome- 
related performance indicators" (ORPI) in the public sector might influence 
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behaviour. These are: 
1. Tunnel vision: Concentration on areas included in the ORPI to the ý 
exclusion of other important areas. (Functional fixation). 
2. Suboptimisation: The pursuit by managers of their own objectives (Agency 
theory) 
3. Myopia: Short-termism. 
4. Convergence: An emphasis on not being exposed as an outliner on any 
ORPI, rather than a desire to be outstanding. 
5. Ossification: A disinclination to experiment with new and innovative 
methods. 
6. Gaming: Altering behaviour. 
7. Misrepresentation: Including creative accounting and fraud. 
Examples of behaviours resulting from tight controls and a budgetary emphasis 
include job-related tension, poor relations with superiors and peers, data 
manipulation (Hopwood, 1972), short-term view, seeking "safe" decisions, 
budget slack (Anthony & Govindarajan 1995), increased motivation (Merchant, 
1981; Argyris, 1952; Hofstede, 1968). The behavioural outcomes have been 
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classified into two main groups: (a) Data manipulation - behaviour affecting the 
reported results without altering performance behaviour; and (b) Performance 
behaviour - altering job related acts. These effects can be mapped to the higher 
education sector as shown below in Table 2.7. 
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TABLE 2.7 
BEHAVIOUR MANIFESTED IN HIGHER 
EDUCATION BY 
A. DATA MANIPULATION 
1. Biasing "strategic submission" of research 
2. Focusing "research active" staff 
3. Filtering 
B. PERFORMANCE ALTERING 
BEHAVIOUR 
1. Smoothing smoothing research output 
2. FunctionalFixation concentrating on research output 
(Tunnel vision) at the expense of other activities 
3. Short-term view (Myopia) short-termism 
Avoiding risky investments and avoiding "risky" research 
Ossification / Convergence 
4. Gaming smoothing, research topic choice 
specialisation, hiring strategies 
2.7 MOTIVATION THEORIES 
2.7.1 Relation to Organisational Analysis 
The concept of motivation is central to organisational theory. When an 
individual is motivated, he is driven to act or do something. An unmotivated 
person would be one who has no impetus or inspiration to perform. In 
motivation research, the pursuit is to understand the factors and forces that would 
energise the individual to satisfy a need, and concomitantly, to understand how 
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behaviour is energised, directed and sustained. For managers, the objective is to 
direct behaviour and channel the workforce's energy toward the organisational 
ends. 
Understanding human behaviour is fundamental to understanding how 
organisations function, whether they are profit making enterprises or government 
agencies intended to serve the "public interest". The usefulness of any model of 
human nature depends on its ability to explain a wide range of social phenomena; 
the test of such a model is the degree to which it is consistent with observed 
human behaviour. A basic human behaviour we all understand, for example, is 
that people are willing to make trade-offs among things that they want. Therefore 
models that specify individuals as never willing to substitute some amount of 
goods for another amount of goods are inconsistent with observed behaviour 
(Jensen and Meckling 2000 p4). 
There are numerous theories that try to unravel the complexities of human 
behaviour and motivation. One of the earliest treatises on motivation is the field 
theory research by the psychologist Kurt Lewin. According to field theory, 
behaviour is a function of factors related to the person and the environment. 
While other research relies on different assumptions, they seem to isolate 
motivation as a unitary phenomenon as if motivation is a characteristic that can 
be measured along a continuum anchored with "little" and "great" at its ends. 
However, motivation is more complex than a unitary phenomenon. Individuals 
exhibit not only different levels but also different kinds of motivation (Ryan and 
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Deci, 2000: p. 54). 
Motivation theories are demarcated by whether the orientation is content or 
process. Content theories attempt to identify different kinds of needs or motives 
that are capable of driving behavicurs, rather than the processes in which 
behaviour is energised, directed, and sustained. Examples of such `content 
theories' include Need-Hierarchy theory, Achievement Motivation theory, and 
Motivation-Hygiene theory. While content theories are criticised for the lack of 
guidance on the specific actions that may result in higher levels of motivation 
and productivity, process theories examine only the mechanics of motivation. 
Process theories, exemplified by Equity theory, Expectancy theory, and goal- 
setting theory, outline the dynamics that are important, the links that must be 
created and maintained, and the factors to be considered to achieve higher levels 
of motivation and productivity. Jensen and Meckling (2000) suggest the 
Resourceful, Evaluative, Maximising Model (REMM) as a behavioural model 
that addresses the failings of other behavioural models used in the social 
sciences. 
2.7.2 Needs-Hierarchy Theory 
The Needs-Hierarchy propounded by Maslow (1943,1954) is one of the earliest 
and most widely referred-to theories in motivational research. According to the 
theory, there are different levels of needs that influence behaviour. These needs 
are generic and they include, in ascending order, physiological needs (e. g., food 
and drinks), safety and security needs (e. g., shelter and protection), social needs 
(e. g., group membership and affiliation), ego needs (e. g., personal prestige and 
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self-esteem), and self-actualisation (i. e., fulfilling one's potential and 
aspirations). Figure 2.3 shows the `hierarchy of prepotency' in which the five 
levels of needs are arranged. Physiological needs are the most pre-potent and 
hence the most b asic. In ana scending order, once a need 1 evel is satisfied it 
ceases to motivate. The individual then shifts his attention to the immediate 
higher level. As anticipated, by and large, the hierarchy of needs holds in most 
cases, but it does not necessarily apply to every individual, since some 
individuals may never aspire for higher needs when their lower needs are 
satisfied, and many never attain the self-actualisation phase. 
Figure 2.3 Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs 
In addition to these five needs, Maslow classifies three other needs that are 
seldom referenced. These include the desire to know and understand (cognitive 
needs) aesthetic needs (desire for beauty in one's surroundings), and need for 
growth and avoidance of deficiency and deprivation (i. e., self-preservation and 
avoidance of pathological states). Much of the post-Maslow research focuses or 
extends the needs hierarchy formulation. For example, Alderfer (1972) re- 
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arranges the five basic needs into three categories: existence (physiological, 
material and safety needs), relatedness (interpersonal safety, esteem and love 
needs) and growth (self-confirmed esteem and self-actualisation needs). 
Jensen and Meckling (2000) referred to Maslow's model as the psychological 
model of human behaviour, which they regarded as a step up the revolutionary 
ladder from the sociological model. In contrast to REMM, in Maslow's hierarchy 
of needs model the individual is unwilling to give up any food for any amount of 
safety until his or her food needs are satisfied. What Maslow and his followers 
have done is to confuse two entirely different issues: how an individual allocates 
resources among alternative goods at a given level of wealth, and how that 
allocation pattern varies as an individual's wealth rises. 
Maslow himself, in the latter part of his famous article, qualifies his early 
statements that deny substitution. He argues that he did not mean that literally 
100% of a person's food had to be satisfied in order for him or her to begin to 
satisfy the safety needs and so on. This qualification brings Maslow more 
towards the notion of substitution and the income elasticity of demand. 
2.7.3 Achievement Motivation Theory 
This theory proposed-by McClelland (1961,1962,1975) identifies three major 
needs which impact upon motivation and behaviour: (a) achievement need 
(desire to accomplish some goal or task more effectively); (b) affiliation needs 
(desire to have close, amenable relations with others); and (c) power needs 
(desire tobe influential and to have an impact ona group). F or a chievement 
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itself to be desired, work situations must have characteristics and features that are 
meaningful and possible for an individual to assume responsibility and to obtain 
credit, even if only intrinsic, for the performance. Moreover, achievement 
situations are those with realistic levels of difficulty, since easy tasks and too 
difficult tasks are not motivators. 
McClelland's power motivation concept can be described in a hierarchy of four 
stages. First, power is derived through association with powerful people. Next, 
the source of personal power emanates from the self. The third stage is the 
exercise of power over people. The last stage is where the emphasis shifts from 
oneself to some common goal, and thus power derives from influencing people 
to attain such a goal. McCllelland distinguishes between two forms of power - 
personalised and socialised. Personalised power relates to personal dominance 
and aw ill to win. S ocialised power combines both motivation and inhibition 
where the main concern is with group goals and motivation. 
Strong affiliation is held to induce negative consequences on managerial 
performance, since it could lead a manager to make exceptions for inefficient 
performance by subordinates. McClelland concludes that managers with high 
need for power and self-control, but low need for affiliation, are typically the 
more successful leaders. 
This theory provides guidelines for explaining observed human behaviour. By 
identifying an individual's level of achievement motivation, the stage of power 
motivation, and the extent of affiliation motivation, the individual's behaviour 
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may be predicted and understood. In addition, according to Attribution Theory, 
an individual may attribute success and failure, in varying degrees, to his ability, 
his effort level, the task difficulty or luck (Weiner, 1972). Individuals with high 
need for achievement are likely to attribute their failure not to inability but to not 
trying hard enough, whereas those with low need for achievement will attribute 
failure to their inherent inability. 
2.7.4 Motivation-Hygiene Theory 
Developed by Hertzberg (1966,1976) to address how far job satisfaction affects 
motivation, the theory postulates that (1) factors causing positive job attitudes are 
different from factors causing negative attitudes; and (2) factors and personal 
effects associated with sequences of job events differ according to whether such 
events are long term or short term. 
Hertzberg identifies several factors (motivators) that are expected to lead to job 
satisfaction. These were achievement, recognition, challenging nature of the 
task, responsibility, and advancement (promotion). The provision of these 
factors are expected to lead to positive feelings and better performance. Job 
dissatisfaction, however, result from different (hygiene) factors which are 
categorised as company policies and practises, interpersonal relations, physical 
working conditions, job security, benefits and salary. As the theory lays, 
satisfaction and dissatisfaction are not opposite ends of the same continuum but 
are different phenomena. The presence of good job content factors (motivators) 
leads to satisfaction and the absence of good job context factors (hygiene factors) 
leads to dissatisfaction. Furthermore, although the absence of good hygiene 
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factors causes employees to be dissatisfied, their presence are not necessarily 
satisfying and does not motivate, people to work hard. By contrast, when 
workplace motivators are lacking, employees will not be satisfied or motivated, 
but will also not be dissatisfied. 
The major contribution of the Herzberg theory is the observation that 
improvements in hygiene factors may not necessarily enhance motivation. They 
are necessary but not sufficient for superior performance. The key to enhanced 
performance is to apply motivators such as those pertaining to job content. The 
traditional and Herzberg's approaches to satisfaction/dissatisfaction are depicted 
below in Figure 2.4. 
FIGURE 2.4: TRADITIONAL AND HERZBERG PERSPECTIVES ON 
SATISFACTION AND DISSATISFACTION 
TRADITIONAL PERSPECTIVE 
Dissatisfactio 
-4 , Satisfaction 
HERZBERG PERSPECTIVE 
Dissatisfaction Hygiene factors i No 
Dissatisfaction 
Motivators 
No Satisfaction 
Satisfaction 
2.7.5 Equity Theory. 
An outgrowth of motivation-hygiene theory is that job dissatisfaction is 
frequently reported to be due to feelings of unfairness. Adams (1963) articulates 
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this observation in the context of social exchange relationships between 
individuals. In an exchange, an individual gives something (input) in return for 
something (output). If input is not recognised as relevant or not appropriately 
valued . 
by the other party, then inequity may result. Perceived inequity breeds 
dissatisfaction, as manifested in the feelings of anger (unfavourable inequality) 
or guilt (favourable inequality). 
As a result of inequity tension emerges as a motivating force that aims to reduce 
and remove the inequity. Methods of reducing inequity include altering or 
distorting inputs and outcomes, changing the reference source and, in extreme 
cases, job transfers, absenteeism or resignation. 
The theory, however, has several limitations. For example, when multiple 
reference sources exist, it is not clear which source will be selected. It is not 
intuitive if an individual would compare his effort and rewards with a co-worker 
in the same department, across the entire organisation, or with his peers in other 
organisations. There is also not enough evidence to suggest which equity- 
attaining strategy will be selected or the sequence in which they will be pursued. 
Further, it has been criticised that empirical research on equity theory is static in 
the sense that it does not take into account the time dimension of inequity 
(Vecchio, 1982). Another weakness is that the theory does not factor in 
transaction costs of the equity-attaining strategies. Individuals experiencing 
inequity might find the costs of a strategy, such as resignation, too high. This is 
of critical relevance to academia across the world where a change of university 
usually means geographical relocation. The older individuals might find 
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themselves locked in since relocation costs are high to them and their families. 
2.7.6 Expectancy Theory 
As expected, an individual's behaviour is influenced by his subjective 
perceptions of the internal and external forces (Lewin, 1951). This is 
incorporated in expectancy theory that determines the forces that drive the 
individual towards a particular goal whereas others constrain his progress 
towards that goal. The theory essentially assume that an individual chooses his 
behaviour on basis of two variables. One is that the expectation that his 
behaviour will lead to a specific outcome, and the other is that the strength of the 
individual's performance or personal utility, for a given outcome, from his effort 
(the sum of the valences). 
Vroom (1964) suggests that in preferring one outcome out of several alternatives, 
an individual would anticipate experiencing feelings of satisfaction (valence) that 
would arise if the preferred outcome occurs. These valences can be positive or 
negative. An individual will behave in such a manner that the outcomes with 
positive valences are maximised while those with negative valences are reduced. 
Integral in the theory is the role of expectancy or the probability that the choice 
of a particular alternative action will lead to a desired outcome. Together, 
expectancies and valences produce a force that motivates the individual towards 
a particular action. Galbraith and Cummings (1967) suggest that there are two 
types of valences: intrinsic and extrinsic. Intrinsic valences relate to goal- 
directed behaviour such as feelings of competence and it is motivational because 
it leads to satisfaction. Extrinsic valances are those associated with the 
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consequences of behaviour, such as reward that is contingent on work-goal 
accomplishment. 
Porter and Lawler (1968) extend Vroom's concept of motivational force by 
incorporating a larger number of variables into the model and by introducing 
various feedback loops to present a more complete model of motivation. The 
model is summarised in Figure 2.5. 
Actual performance in a job is determined principally by expended effort, but it 
is also influenced by an individual's ability to do the job and by his perceptions 
of the required tasks. Performance is seen as leading to intrinsic rewards (such 
as sense of accomplishment) and extrinsic rewards. These rewards lead to 
satisfaction. What the individual sees as a fair reward for effort will affect the 
satisfaction derived. Likewise, the actual value of rewards will be influenced by 
satisfaction. The model is more dynamic over time. The feedback loop operates 
in two ways. Firstly, to the extent that performance leads to reward, the 
perceived effort-reward probability is increased. Secondly, as satisfaction occurs 
after receiving a reward, it influences the future value of that reward. Effort is a 
function of the value of reward and the effort-reward probability. 
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Figure 2.5: Porter and Lawler model. 
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In management accounting research, Ronen and Livingston (1975) develop an 
expectancy theory model expressed as follows: 
n 
M =1Ye+Pi(IVa+ýP2iEVl) 
where; 
M= motivation to work 
IVb = intrinsic valence associated with goal - directed behaviour 
IVa = intrinsic valence associated with succesful performance of task. 
EV = extrinsic valences associated with the ith extrensic reward 
contingent on work - goal accomplishment, i =1,2 .... n. 
A= the expectancy that goal - directed behaviour will accomplish the work - goal. 
P2! = the expectancy that work - goal accomplishment will lead to 
the ith extrinsic reward. 
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In this model, motivation to work depends upon the individual's subjectively 
determined values of intrinsic and extrinsic valences and on relevant 
expectancies (probabilities). Specifically, these include: (i) expected intrinsic 
valence associated with goal directed behaviour, independent of actual 
achievement; and (ii) expected intrinsic and extrinsic valences associated with 
work-goal attainment. 
But, the above model is restrictive as it implies that, associated with any work- 
goal, there is but one outcome perceived by the individual. In most cases, 
especially in academia, there are a number of plausible outcomes and the 
individual may seek any of them (Rockness, 1977). With each of these 
alternative outcomes there will be an associated level of effort to be exerted by 
the individual and associated intrinsic and extrinsic rewards. Allowing for these 
possibilities, Rockness (1977) extends the basic expectancy model into the 
following multiple-goal multiple-outcome expectancy model: 
nn 
Fi = 1: IVeffortj + Pi(j: IVoutcomek +Z P2iEVi) 
J-i k-l i-l 
where : 
Fr = force toward a particular work outcome i. 
IVeffortj = the intrinsic rewards directly associated with effort 
to achieve a particular outcome. 
IVoutcomek = the intrinsic rewards directly related to achieving 
a particular performance outcome. 
EVi = the extrinsic rewards which are dependant on a 
particular performance outcome. 
P2 = the expectancy that effort will lead to a particular 
performance outcome. 
Pi, = the expectancy that achieving a particular performance 
outcome will lead to extrinsic rewards EM. 
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According to the revised Rockness model, increases in the expected rewards lead 
to greater force towards performance which in turn leads to higher levels of 
performance. Alternatively, the individual may perform at a specified level for 
which the force is. strongest. The rewards recognise the cost of effort required to 
achieve the specific level of performance. Given the trade off between expected 
rewards and the cost of effort, the individual is assumed to direct his maximum 
effort towards the performance level that would lead to the maximum net 
expected rewards. Thus, in a budgetary setting, with other variables remaining 
the same, higher performance can be attained by increasing rewards offered 
across the budget continuum. Moreover, the model offers an explanation for 
why an individual may be motivated to attain a given budget level but lacks 
motivation to achieve another budget level. For a given reward structure, 
increases in budget level may_ lead to increase in performance until the point is 
reached where the expected rewards do not justify the incremental effort. In 
essence, as the budget difficulty increases, the cost of the effort increases, the net 
expected rewards decreases, and satisfaction decreases. 
2.7.7 Goal Setting Theory 
Another approach to motivating staff is via goal-setting where the motivation is 
to achieve goals. It focuses on the external situation to guide performance and 
does not focus on the needs and beliefs of people. A common goal setting 
technique is the budget which serves to instil motivation, behaviour, and task 
performance. The motivational process, based on the expectancy theory, is 
usually represented by Figure 2.6 (Krafft, 1999). The motivational level 
influences the effort or behaviour, which leads to some level of achievement on 
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one or more dimensions of job performance (outcome). The performance is 
rewarded with one or more rewards (e. g., compensation, recognition). The 
rewards lead to increased motivation, which again influences behaviour, and so 
forth. 
FIGURE 2.6: MOTIVATIONAL PROCESS CIRCLE 
Control Philosophy 
Behaviour based 4 P, Outcome-based 
Motivation Level of Job Rewards 
effort Performance 
The effects may be negative or positive depending on the characteristics of 
budget goals, viz., specificity and difficulty of the goals. Specific budget goals 
are t hose expressed in quantitative t erms such a s" sell Xu nits of Product Y ", 
whereas non-specific or general goals are qualitative expressions such as "sell as 
many units of Y as possible". With this formulation, the RAE as a budget goal is 
intermediate between specificity and difficulty since the goals for an academic 
are specific in that he is given a target of up to four publications of a high quality 
within the RAE time period. The goal is non-specific because the quality is 
subjective. There is moreover task uncertainty in achieving the goals. The 
difficulty of the goal is represented by the level of performance needed to 
accomplish the objectives. Therefore, goal difficulty is contingent on the 
individual's normal level of performance. 
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The relation between goal setting and performance is described in Figure 2.8 
(Hirst 1987), showing the hypothesised sequence of activities that connect goal- 
related stimuli with task performance. Goal related stimuli are followed by a set 
of cognitive activities; interpretation of goals, search for valid plans or strategies 
and selection of valid strategies. Valid plans should include only relevant 
activities. 
Figure 2.8 also depicts the moderating influence of task uncertainty. Goal setting 
has positive impacts on the direction, level and duration of effort. When goals 
are accepted, the attention is on relevant activities and effort will be directed to 
accomplish the goals. More difficult goals translate into a greater level of effort 
(Locke et al, 1981). If goals are difficult or appear unattainable, it could result in 
less effort being made to achieve the goal. Goals are also assumed to trigger the 
cognitive activity of developing effective strategies to attain the goal (ibid). 
However, a negative relation is likely to exist between task uncertainty and task 
knowledge (Hirst 1987; Hirst and Yetton; 1999) and the positive effects of goal 
setting are likely to be conditional on the completeness of task knowledge. If 
there is incomplete task knowledge, goal setting can have a negative effect on 
performance and even cause dysfunctional behaviour (Hirst, 1987). Otley (1978) 
argues t hat rigid b udgetary controls do not 1 ead to increased 1 evels ofb udget- 
related tensions and finds mixed support for its associated dysfunctional 
behaviours, in contrast to Hopwood (1972). 
Goal setting focuses attention on certain task activities and makes behaviour 
selective. Selective behaviour can be functional or dysfunctional. The focus on 
relevant activities to the exclusion of irrelevant and presumably non-productive 
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activities is functional. However, action plans could include dysfunctional plans 
such as gaming. 
Dysfunctional selective behaviour also occurs where goal setting induces the 
exclusion or reduction of previously performed relevant activities. In the 
university environment, the relevant and important behaviours that could suffer 
are teaching, public service and voluntary academic work. A measurement 
system that is linked to performance would create pressures for increased 
activities in areas that are being measured at the expense of unmeasured or 
unmeasurable areas (Puxty et al, 1994). Thus, an unintended consequence of the 
RAE would be academics shunning voluntary activities and involvement with 
public policy issues. 
Managers might protect themselves from missing budget targets by limiting their 
exposure to risky or long-term projects (Van der Stede, 2000: p. 610). In the 
same way, the goals set by the RAE for some staff might result in the avoidance 
of risky, speculative and exploratory projects, especially those that may require a 
long time to complete. This argument is consistent with Otley's (1978) finding 
that managers who are subject to rigid budgetary controls tend to devote a 
smaller proportion of their time to long-term planning. 
A basic rule of goal setting is that "there is a linear relationship between 
perceived goal difficulty and performance" (Locke and Latham, 1990: p. 27). 
The more difficult the goal is perceived, the higher the performance 
improvement (Chow 1983; Hirst and Lowy; 1990). The closer one's current 
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performance is to the targets, the lesser the effect on the performance. Hirst 
(1987), however, argues that where task uncertainty is high, setting budget goals 
are less effective in promoting task performance than where task uncertainty is 
low. 
The level of difficulty of a set goal is evaluated or determined by the person 
performing the tasks, and consequently different individuals would not improve 
their performance by the same amount under the goal setting approach. In 
reality, the relationship between (perceived) goal difficulty and level of increased 
difficulty is not linear. The more demanding the goal the greater the effort that is 
needed to achieve the goal. Conversely, simpler goals require considerably less 
effort. If the goal attainment is below the current performance, the effort could 
decrease. However, a high emphasis placed on meeting the budget can lead to 
budgets being more closely met (Otley, 1978). 
In the past, the research output and quality goal was as general as requiring 
academics to produce as many high quality papers as they could, but with the 
RAE the goal for each staff is to generate four papers of high quality. For the 
very active researchers, this could well be below their current performance with 
the possibility that it may reduce the normal effort. One, however, should not 
underestimate the importance of intrinsic motivation for academics. As 
articulated by Bailey (1994) on the issue of researcher commitment: 
"Intrinsic motivation seems to be much less important than 
extrinsic drives...... over-regulation, the use of incentives, 
restrictions on the freedom of researchers to choose topics 
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and the use of tenure and promotional encouragement are less 
appropriate mechanisms to , 
increase research productivity in 
a university than encouraging researcher's intrinsic interest 
in the process and outcomes of research ". ' 
At the other extreme, if the goal is unattainable, it could have de-motivating 
effects. The relationship between perceived goal difficulty and improved 
performance is depicted in Figure 2.7. 
FIGURE 2.7: RELATION BETWEEN GOAL DIFFICULTY AND IMPROVED 
PERFORMANCE 
An individual may increase his performance to match the difficulty of the goal, 
but if it is perceived as too difficult, the level of improved performance will drop. 
If the goal is perceived as unattainable, then the goal can have de-motivating 
effect and negative improved performance. In the case of the RAE, it would 
seem that the average researchers would exhibit the highest positive response. 
The effect could be negative on the non-active researchers, and could have a 
negative or marginal effect on the very active type. 
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The setting of goals promotes performance by increasing motivation as well as 
stimulating the search for and use of task strategies (Earley et al 1989, Locke & 
Latham 1990). In context of the RAE, task strategies can take the form of 
managing the output of the research and/or managing the choice of research 
topics. 
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Figure 2.8 
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(Source: Hirst, 1987: p. 778) 
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2.7.8 RESOURCEFUL, EVALUATIVE, MAXIMISING MODEL: REMM 
One way of capturing the notion of resourcefulness is to think about the effects 
of newly imposed constraints on human behaviour. According to REMM, the 
response to new constraints is to begin searching for substitutes for what is now 
constrained. The search is not restricted to existing alternatives; REMMs will 
invent alternatives that did not previously exist. 
REMM implies that there is no such thing as a need. The fallacy of the notion of 
needs follows from the proposition that the individual is always willing to 
substitute. 
The foundation of the model is based on the following four postulates (Jensen & 
Meckling 2000 p 5). _ 
Postulate 1: every individual care, he or she is an evaluator. 
The individual cares about almost everything and is always willing to make 
trade-offs. Furthermore, valuation is relative in the sense that the value of a unit 
of any particular good decreases as the individual enjoys more of it relative to 
other goods. Individual preferences are transitive - that is if A is preferred to B, 
and B is preferred to C, then A is preferred to C. 
Chap 2: Literature Review page 59 
Postulate 2: each individual's wants are unlimited. 
Individuals prefer more "goods" to less. He or she always wants more of some 
things. 
Postulate 3: each individual is a maximizer 
Each individual acts so as to enjoy the highest level of value possible. The notion 
of an opportunity set provides the limit on the level of value attainable by any 
individual. The opportunity set is usually regarded as something that is given and 
external to the individual. Though economists tend to represent the opportunity 
set as a wealth or income constraint and a set of prices at which an individual can 
buy goods, the notion can be generalised to include the set of activities one can 
perform in a 24 hour day or in a lifetime. 
Postulate 4: the individual is resourceful. 
Individuals are creative. They are able to conceive of changes in their 
environment, foresee the consequences thereof and respond by creating new 
opportunities. Individuals engage in resourceful, creative activities that expand 
their opportunities in various ways. 
In the nature of man M. Jensen and WH Meckling (2000) define REMM in large 
part by showing how it addresses the failings of the other behavioural models 
used in the social sciences. 
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The Economic model is a reductive version of REMM. The individual, under the 
economic model, is an evaluator and maximiser who has only one want: money 
income. The economic model reflects a short-run money m aximiser who does 
not care for others. The economic model is, of course, not very reflective of 
human behaviour. From the economic model, REMM takes the assumption that 
people are resourceful, self-interested maximisers but rejects the notion that they 
are interested only in money income or wealth. In the sociological model 
individuals are viewed as the product of their cultural environment. Under this 
model humans are not evaluators; they are conventional and conformists, and 
their behaviour is determined by the taboos, customs and traditions of the society 
in which they were born and raised. In this model, individuals are also viewed as 
social victims. By contrast, REMM is an evaluator. The REMM model 
recognizes that customs do serve as important constraints on human behaviour, 
and people who violate them incur costs in many forms. But REMMs compare 
the consequences of alternate courses of action, including those that involve 
flouting social norms and consciously choose actions that will lead (in their 
view) to the preferred outcome. Social norms and culture are important 
determinants of action but not the sole force. There is a crucial distinction 
between the REMM model's recognition that cultural factors are reflected in 
human behaviour and the sociological model's assertion that cultural factors 
determine human behaviour. If behaviour is completely determined by 
acculturation as the sociological model suggests then choice, purpose and 
conscious adaptation are meaningless. Indeed if humans are endowed with little 
originality, have no ability to evaluate, and simply imitate what they see and do 
what they are told, it is not clear how any social change could take place. The 
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REMM model, in contrast, explains the evolution of customs and mores as the 
reflection in habits, unquestioned beliefs, and religion of behaviour patterns that 
reflect optimal responses to the costs and benefits of various actions. When the 
underlying costs and benefits of various actions change, individuals are faced 
with a conflict between new optimal forms of behaviour and culturally accepted 
but inefficient forms. In this situation there will be social conflict. And if the new 
behaviour patterns are indeed optimal, the population will gradually 
accommodate the new behaviour in the culture (Jensen and Meckling p11). 
Hence REMM does assume that society imposes costs on people for violating 
social norms, which in turn influences behaviour. REMM, however, also 
assumes that individuals will depart from such norms if the benefits are 
sufficiently great. 
Under the Political Model the individual is a perfect agent seeking to maximise 
"the public good" rather than his or her own welfare. From the political model 
REMM takes the assumption that people have the capacity for altruism. They 
care about others and take their interests into account while maximising their 
own welfare. REMM, however, rejects the notion that people are perfect agents. 
REMM regards individuals as resourceful, evaluative maximisers who respond 
creatively to the opportunities the environment presents to them, and work to 
loosen any constraints that prevent them from doing what they wish to do. The 
individual cares about not only money but almost everything for example 
respect, honour, power, love and the welfare of others. Under REMM, academics 
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will attempt to maximise their welfare by responding to the RAE in resourceful 
and creative ways. 
. 
2.8 PREVIOUS STUDIES ON THE RAE 
There are survey studies on the impact o`the RAE. For example, McNay (1997) 
examines the impact of the 1992 RAE on institutions and individuals. Although 
another survey of academics has been conducted, the analysis is not on 
characteristics of the academics or on research activity level. This thesis builds 
on the McNay study and uses a similar methodology involving case studies and 
surveys. The survey instrument employs the same scales from the McNay study 
so that a comparative analysis can be made. The contribution of this research is 
to develop the theoretical underpinnings and use of econometric methodologies 
that are not undertaken by the McNay study. 
After surveying individuals in 14 geography departments, Jenkins concludes that 
the RAE has greater impacts than the Teaching Quality Assessments (TQA), and 
that the RAE has significant negative impacts on the organisation of teaching, the 
priority to teaching, and some impact on aspects of teaching quality (Jenkins, 
1995a, 1995b). 
Humphrey et al (1995) notes that "Instead of talk of academic freedom of 
thought, an open exchange or sharing of ideas and the need to build a sound, 
scholarly basis for a university career, research selectivity is promoting the 
language of self-interest, marketing and entrepreneurship. There is talk of 
individuals not being encouraged to work with people outside of their own 
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institutions, for fear that it will dilute subsequent research ratings ". The authors 
also comment that academic staff could be discouraged from refereeing for 
journals, participating in seminars, or even seek to set up their own journals so as 
to provide an outlet for departmental publications. According to the McNay 
(1997) report, charities and professional associations are concerned that time 
pressures on academic staff as a result of the RAE initiative has made it difficult 
for them to obtain assistance from academics. Elton (2000) gives an overview of 
possible unintended consequences of the RAE. 
Glass et al (1996) notes that the manner in which the RAE has been used to 
allocate funding has introduced scope for gaming. According to the HEFCE, the 
increased transparency in the 1996 RAE makes it more difficult to conduct 
assessment exercises without -them becoming instruments of policy (HEFCE 
Report M6/97, May 1997: p. 7). Johnston (1994) illustrates the financial 
outcome of varying strategies with respect to the classification of staff as 
`research active' by using tabulation. Different strategies by individual 
departments regarding classification would result in different levels of funding. 
The strategic trade off decision between quality and quantity of research active 
staff s ubmission is also analysed byT alib and Steele (2000) and r educed toa 
maximisation formula. ' 
Glass et al (1995) suggest that returns to scale are reducing for higher rated 
universities. The top rated departments are faced with a "ceiling effect"2. Talib 
(2001) analyses the ceiling effect and how the changes in RAE 1996 and the 
' See Chapter Five. 
2 See Chapter Four for analysis of the ceiling effect. 
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introduction of 5-star rating is an attempt to abate the effect. 
There are also a number of institutional case studies reporting effects of the RAE 
(e. g., Green (1995) on University of Leicester; McVicar (1994) and Selway 
(1995) on the University of Portsmouth; and Schmidt et al (1994) on Manchester 
Metropolitan University). A detailed review of the literature on the institutional 
impact of the RAE is summarised in Chapter Six. 
2.9 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The literature review undertaken in this chapter has assembled the theoretical 
basis for understanding the behavioural effects and implications for the Research 
Assessment Exercise (RAE). The theories and studies reviewed for this purpose 
include motivation, management control, clan control, and goal-setting. A brief 
overview of some previous studies and critiques of the RAE is also undertaken. 
It reveals that previous RAE studies do not differentiate the impacts for different 
classifications of academics, and also do not present behavioural implications of 
the RAE based on theoretical or empirical analysis. The thesis fills this crucial 
gap and lays out a future research agenda. 
CHAPTER THREE 
THE STUDY: 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND METHODOLOGY 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE STUDY: 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND METHODOLOGY 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
The methodologies for the surveys and the analyses are addressed in this chapter. 
Section 3.2 explains the design of the questionnaire for the academic, and 
Section 3.3 describes the research questions for this thesis. As respondents 
choose between "agree" and "disagree" to answer the survey questions, this 
chapter also explains the use of the logistic regression to model the dichotomous 
responses and the associated explanatory variables. 
3.2 THE ACADEMIC SURVEY DESIGN 
The study's objectives and overall approach were outlined in chapter one. This 
dissertation investigates the RAE from the perspective of the relevant 
stakeholders; namely policy makers, universities, academics and journal editors. 
To investigate the consequences and impact of the RAE on academics behaviour, 
a survey research instrument was used'. A postal questionnaire was mailed in 
1998 to a random sample of 1000 academics2 in various disciplines across the 
English universities. A covering letter accompanied the survey as well as a note 
clarifying some questions/terms. A reply paid envelope was provided for replies. 
The covering letter, the questionnaire and the accompanying note are attached in 
Appendix 3-A of this chapter. 
1 The survey questionnaire was modelled on the survey instrument used by McNay (1997). 
2 The sample size is explained in chapter Eight. 
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The McNay (1997) questionnaire was modified to gather data to use for 
calibrating the econometric model developed for this thesis. As the McNay 
study uses the survey methodology to investigate the impact of the RAE on the 
behaviour of academic staff, basing our model on the 1997 study allows for a 
comparative analysis to be made3. McNay's 6-point Likert scale, anchored at its 
ends with "1" for "strongly agree" and "6" for "strongly disagree" is reused in 
the thesis' survey to facilitate such a comparison. 
The questionnaire is designed to investigate these two main propositions: 
PROPOSITION 1: That the RAE influences behaviour. 
PROPOSITION 2: That the RAE increases staff mobility. 
There are two categories of behavioural effects: (1) Research Fixation; and (2) 
Gaming. The gaming construct itself is comprised of a range of behaviour 
effects. One aspect of gaming is the reduction of inter-disciplinary research 
(Q16 in the Questionnaire) because academics might be inclined to de-emphasise 
inter-disciplinary research as the RAE panels are discipline specific. A study4 
undertaken for the funding councils regarding the effects of the RAE on 
interdisciplinary research reports that 14% of researchers and 17% of the 1996 
RAE panel members * concur that the RAE strongly inhibits interdisciplinary 
research. 
3 The comparison is in Chapter Eight. 
4 "Interdisciplinary Research and the Research Assessment Exercise", April 1999, HEFC RAE 
1/99. 
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The gaming construct is further decomposed into three other separate measures. 
The first is behaviour resulting from the time-cycle effect. This is then split into 
choice of topic and smoothing research output. The ability of the RAE to 
influence one's choice of research topics is considered an encroachment of 
academic freedom. For this purpose, the questionnaire statements dealing with 
the choice of research topics and premature publications are the measures for 
such an encroachment. In the same manner, the questions for smoothing - Q17, 
Q18, and Q22 - are combined to generate the smoothing construct. 
Thus, there are a total of six measures: mobility, research fixation, gaming, 
smoothing, academic freedom and time-cycle effect. These measures are 
discussed in detail in Chapter Eight. The diagram in Figure 3-1 shows the 
linkages between the constructs and the survey questions. In addition to the 
questions in Figure 3 -1, the survey has 13 additional b ehavioural questions to 
obtain perceptions rather than to record behavioural changes. The control 
questions -QI and Q3- requested respondents to discriminate b etween extra 
time spent on research and teaching, and the extra time spent as a result of the 
RAE. The other questions sought views on the RAE that would be compared to 
the findings in the McNay study. An additional two questions enquire about the 
increase in the number of research students. 
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Figure 3-1: Behaviour measures constructs. 
Behavioural effect of RAE 
Research Fixation Gaming Mobility 
(Questions: 2,4,5,6,8,26) (Questions: 25,29,30,31) 
(Questions: 13,14,16,17,18,19,20,21,22) 
Academic Freedom 
(Questions: 13,14,17,19,20 & 21) 
Time Cycle 
(Questions: 17,18,19,20,21 & 
22) 
Smoothing 
(Questions 17,18 & 22) 
The above constructs and opinions are needed to examine the extent to which the 
RAE has resulted in some behavioural changes and patterns among the 
academics. These can be captured in conceptual models as follows: 
Behaviour =f (motivation, behavioural fixation) 
and 
Motivation =f (RA, PE, JS, Age) 
Behavioural fixation =f (socialisation, age) 
Therefore, 
Behaviour = f(RA, JS, Age, Socialisation, PE) 
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where: 
1. RA = level of research activity (Q 45) 
The goal setting literature suggests that the behavioural consequences of goal 
setting in a task complex environment are dependent on the subject's self 
assessed performance level. 
2. JS =job security 
Two proxy measures are considered as measures for job security (however 
research activity level is also pertinent): 
a) is position permanent 
b) years in post 
(Q42) 
(Q 35) 
However, from the case studies of universities and interviews with senior 
academics and administrators, the above two proxies are not suitable proxies for 
job security. This is because universities are increasingly hiring contract staff, 
and in many instances, encouraging tenured staff to take up early retirement. 
These personnel policies are greatly influenced by the RAE (see Chapter Six). 
Hence, based on initial preliminary findings, we feel that research activity (Q45) 
is a better proxy for job security. Thus, Q42 and Q35 are dropped from the 
analysis. 
3. Age = older staff are less likely to alter behaviour (Q44) 
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As older individuals are more risk-averse in endeavours that are probabilistic 
(Enomoto, 1999), they have less motivation to modify their behaviour. They 
would have developed behaviour fixation over the years. As they are also 
nearing retirement, they have less likely to change their ways. Furthermore, new 
behavioural strategies have different and usually higher transaction costs for 
older individuals5. Younger and newer staff have lower behaviour transaction 
costs, but may be full of enthusiasm and tend to be reluctant to adopt 
"dysfunctional" strategies. 
4. Socialisation = indoctrination 
Those who are "socialised" (i. e. have strong clan orientation) would generally 
resist changing their behaviour. This is represented by qualification (Q43), years 
of experience (Q34), and position (Q41). 
An individual's level of professionalism can be measured by his length of 
academic training (PhD) and socialisation process (experience) (Hage and Aiken, 
1967). 
5. PE = perceived emphasis on research 
The emphasis placed on research in the academic's external environment will 
influence his motivation and behaviour. If an academic's work environment 
places a high level of emphasis on research, then the academic could associate 
5 See Chapter Two. 
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future rewards (extrinsic valances) with research performance. This, in 
accordance with the expectancy theory, will motivate him. Furthermore, under 
the equity theory of motivation, if the environment the academic works in 
emphasizes research and his peers are performing well in research, then the poor- 
performing academic might feel a sense of inequity. This feeling of inequity 
might motivate the academic to balance the inequity by adopting strategies to 
enhance his research output. These strategies could be functional, such as higher 
research productivity, or they could be dysfunctional, such as gaming activities 
and/or a concentration on research at the expense of other activities that are 
integral to academia. 
The following proxies measure the perceived emphasis on research: 
a) Department status within University (department ranking 
compared to the University's average ranking) (Q38) 
b) Institution type (Q40) 
c) Department's RAE rating (Q37) 
For ease of comprehension, Figure 3-2 shows the flow of the above arguments. 
Chapter 3: The study _ 
page 72 
Figure 3-2 RAE 
(output 
control) 
Staff mobility 
Socialisation Age RA PE JS Age 
Behavioural 
Fixation 
Motivation 
Behaviour 
Rime-tinnal Svntinn 
Managing 
a waav ýavaawa aaaýwavaa 
Research 
Gaming Concentration 
on research at 
expense of 
Represented other activities 
by 
Smoothing research Topic choice Short-termism 
Output ' (ACADEMIC Low risk convergence 
(SMOOTHING) FREEDOM) (TIME-CYCLE 
Chapter 3: The study. page 73 
3.3 THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND ISSUES INVESTIGATED 
The questions and issues for this study are classified under four major headings, 
and briefly explained in this section. 
3.3.1 THE MAJOR QUESTIONS OR PROPOSITIONS 
3.3.1.1 POLICY LEVEL IMPACT 
The intended and unintended consequences of the RAE are important to policy 
decision-makers. The success of any public policy tool lies in its effectiveness in 
achieving the objectives and desired outcome. The RAE was introduced partly 
because of the research funding constraints that were imposed in the 1980s. It is 
likely that the main policy objective of introducing the RAE is to impose budget 
cuts with minimal political costs6. An explicit objective of the RAE is to reward 
excellent research, wherever it is found. The HEFCE categorically denies that 
the policy is to create centres of excellence7. However, the establishment of 
centres of excellence may have been a subsequent objective (Talib, 2001). This 
is elaborated in Chapter Four and leads to the first research question. 
RESEARCH QUESTION 1: Does the RAE outcome reflect policy objectives? 
Methodology: 
An analytical review of the RAE mechanism and the RAE 1996 outcome for the 
Business and Management Studies (BMS) UoA is carried out in Chapter Four. 
6 See Chapter Four for a discussion on this point. 
7 An earlier version of Talib (2001) has been reviewed by the HEFCE and those comments are 
made by the reviewer. 
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3.3.1.2 ACCOUNTABILITY AND VISIBILITY VIS-A-VIS 
AUTONOMY (The Institutional Effect) 
Funding from the RAE is allocated to universities on a block basis and there is 
no explicit requirement for the universities to distribute the funds in accordance 
with the formulae used by the awarding body. This partially helps to preserve 
the university's autonomy. Ia order for the RAE to strengthen the centres of 
excellence, the funds need to be distributed in accordance with the formulae. 
Otherwise the link between a department's research performance and its funding 
is broken. 
RESEARCH QUESTION 2: What is the RAE's impact on the Institutions' 
behaviour and strategies? 
Mcthodclogy 
Case studies. 
3.3.1.3 THE LABOUR MARKET EFFECT 
The research rating is based on the output of research staff in post at a particular 
date, irrespective of his location or when the research is produced and published. 
In some sense, universities are being rewarded for their efficiency in recruiting 
star or prolific researchers. This could lead to a "transfer market" for active 
researchers. It is also anticipated that universities, to attract and/or retain staff, 
will use reward incentives. 
RESEARCH QUESTION 3: What are the RAE effects on the labour market? 
Methodology: 
The institutions' recruitment strategies will be investigated by case studies. The 
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survey of academics is used to analyse if academics believe that there are indeed 
pay premiums for star researchers. 
3.3.1.4 HOW DOES THE RAE AFFECT THE MANAGEMENT OF 
RESEARCH? 
As discussed in the literature review in Chapter Two, dysfunctional behaviours 
may arise if outcome controls are imposed ona cademics who would bem ore 
suited to clan or self-control, and the potential behavioural effects from goal 
setting. Control effects could be measured by examining an academic's 
allocation of time to different activities or by the strategies that are applied 
(Krafft, 1999). 
RESEARCH QUESTION 4: What are the behavioural consequences as a result 
of the RAE? 
Methodology: 
The methodology adopted is a triangular approach of questionnaire, interviews 
and collaborative anecdotal evidence. Abernethy & Stoelwinder (1995) adopted 
the questionnaire methodology. A combination of interviews and questionnaires 
was adopted by Abernethy & Brownell (1997) and McNay (1997). In this study, 
in an attempt to limit the limitations of the survey methodology if adopted 
singularly, case study interviews and a survey of journal editors were also 
undertaken to support the results of the survey of academics. 
3.3.2 FURTHER CONSEQUENTIAL QUESTIONS AND ISSUES 
The four major research questions in Section 3.3.1 lead to a number of further 
issues for investigation. Most of the questions investigated are reproduced and 
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discussed in the "relevants8 chapters, and hence are not explained in detail here. 
For ease of reference, the questions are reproduced in Appendix 3-B with cross- 
referencing to the locations in the thesis in which they are detailed. 
3.3.2.1 POLICY LEVEL IMPACT 
As pointed out in Chapter One, several stakeholders are relevant with respect to 
the functioning of the RAE. Among these, policymakers have a critical role. 
Chapter Four discusses whether the RAE outcomes reflect the objectives of these 
decision makers. The analysis discusses the ceiling effect and whether the 
introduction of the 5* rating abates this effect. 
3.3.2.2 INSTITUTIONAL EFFECT 
It is proposed t hat the RAE impacts institutional b ehaviour and strategies, not 
least of which are the submission strategies. The institutional impact of the RAE 
is probed with case studies of universities that are described in Chapter Six. 
The impact and consequences of the RAE on institutions might differ between a 
university's departments and the university as a whole. Three areas of 
consequential impact are proposed. These are the RAE submission strategies, 
the allocation of RAE funding, and the hiring strategies. The objectives under 
each of these areas are further broken down into short-term objectives and long- 
term objectives that might also differ between the departments and the university. 
Table 3.1 displays these objectives. 
a For example, the questions relating to the institutional effect are discussed in Chapter Six that 
deals with the impact of the RAE on institutional behaviour. 
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Table 3.1: Short-term and long-term objectives. 
Department objectives University objectives 
1. Submission strategy. 
a) Short-term Funding level 
Reputation 
b) Long-term and staff morale. Reputation 
2. Allocation of RAE 
fundin 
a) Short-term To maximise benefits. 
Not applicable (marginal 
(distribution decision implications) 
taken at university level) 
b) Long-term 
Equitable distribution 
and enhancement of 
reputation, in 
particular strategic 
areas. 
3. Hiring strate ies. 
a) Short-term To fulfil teaching duties Teaching needs and 
inclusion in RAE 
submissions. 
b) Long-term Teaching duties and Teaching duties and 
research output, to enhance research performance 
department reputation. to enhance university 
reputation. 
The RAE submission strategies favoured by departments may not necessarily be 
the same ones favoured by the university. The departments have two potentially 
conflicting objectives. The first is to achieve a high rating to enhance the 
department's reputation. The logical outcome would be to trade-off the quantity 
of submissions for quality. Moreover, the other objective is staff morale. To 
achieve this objective, departments would prefer to submit all or most of their 
staff as research active. The achieved rating, on the other hand, also influences 
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morale. T he c ompromise objective would seem tobe achieving a high rating 
with as high a submission as possible. 
The university's objective for the RAE submission differs between the short-term 
and the long-term. In the short-term view, they would like to garner as much 
funding as possible. The maximisation of funding is the core of the model 
developed in Chapter Five. In a sense, the formulation does not take into account 
either the long-term objectives for the university or the department's objectives. 
The case studies in Chapter Six investigate if institutions attempt to maximise 
research funding by "strategic submissions". 
Furthermore, the multidisciplinary nature of many departments creates a need for 
another strategic level of analysis for the submissions of the RAEs. This is the 
where decision, referring to which UoA to submit under (Talib, 1999). This is 
discussed in detail in Chapter Five. There is also the perception that higher 
grades are accorded to research that the RAE panel members are more familiar 
with (Martin and Skea, 1992). This "choice of panel" decision is investigated by 
interviews with university administrators. 
A university's long-term objective must be to enhance its reputation, by 
achieving high ratings-across all departments. The quest to achieve this objective 
raises certain questions with their attendant consequences. What does a 
university do with a department that is achieving an RAE rating that is below the 
university average? Does it cross subsidise the department to improve its 
ratings? Does it go out and hire researchers with a track record to boost the 
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department's image? Or does it close down the department? These are questions 
addressed in Chapter Six. 
Universities receive the RAE research funding as block grants and have the 
liberty to allocate the funds as they wish. One dilemma they face is whether to 
reciprocate the departments that earn the funds in the first place, or to support the 
weaker departments. If the objective is to maximise the benefits of the funds in 
the short term, they may support the weaker departments because of the better 
marginal benefits as a consequence of the operation of the law of diminishing 
returns. As Mace (1993: p. 19) comments, universities seem: 
"... to see the law of diminishing returns applying if resources are 
allocated to already highly rated cost centres ". 
As the RAE research funding is "earned" by departments or UoA's, universities 
may start to devolve their budgets, something that they may be encouraged to do 
by the RAE. The long-term objective of allocating the RAE funding could be to 
achieve equitable distributions and to avoid sentiments of inequity and resultant 
de-motivational effects9. Another long-term objective would be to maintain and 
enhance the reputation of the university, especially their areas of strength or 
niches. This could be the strategy for the "new" universities, as they would have 
difficulty competing with the established universities. Thus, the case studies of 
the universities attempt to reveal if the RAE leads to "niche" concentration by 
institutions. 
9 See Equity Theory in Chapter Two. 
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The "new" universities have traditionally been teaching institutions. Research 
was not of paramount significance during their former polytechnic status. The 
RAE has essentially brought these ex-polytechnics into direct competition for the 
limited funds with the more established "old" universities. The research 
performance of these former polytechnics has to match that of the "old" 
universities to secure funding. This new challenge for the ex-polytechnics might 
require strategies that are different from the ones adopted by the "old" 
universities. Thus, this thesis investigates whether the ex-polytechnics as a 
consequence of the RAE differ from the ones adopted by the "old" universities. 
The RAE formula includes the number of research students in the volume 
measure. Furthermore, research students increase the research culture in 
institutions. This leads us to investigate if research student numbers have 
expanded as a result of the RAE. 
3.3.2.3 LABOUR MARKET EFFECT 
The RAE has fostered many changes in the management of human resources 
(Talib and Steele, 2000: p. 80). Institutions are focusing on whom they should 
recruit for research, and how they should reward and retain existing staff. The 
McNay (1997) survey of academics showed that 12% of the recent appointees (or 
those who are less than one year in post) acknowledge the RAE as the dominant 
factor in their employment, while 30% deem it a significant factor. 
The RAE assesses institutions on the basis of the performance of the staff in post 
on the census date. It is thus crucial who is in post on that date. This accelerated 
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a frenzy in the transfer market during the run-up to the 1996 RAE1°. Hence, this 
leads to the proposition that the RAE influences staff mobility. 
The immediate and significant objective of hiring staff is no doubt to fulfil 
teaching requirements. The long-term objective has always included research 
output as well (see Table 3.1). The RAE has introduced an additional dimension 
to the short-term hiring objective, that of whom to include in the submission. As 
apparent from Table 3.1, the objective is to hire excellent teachers who are also 
excellent researchers. The problem is that there are only a few who are good in 
both aspects, and that it is no trivial task to recruit them. In the world of the 
RAE, it is not clear-cut who a university would choose: an excellent teacher or 
an excellent researcher. Would the RAE result in categorising academics as 
researchers and teachers? Would the excellent teachers who under-perform in 
research be hired as teaching-only staff with no research output expectation in 
exchange for a higher teaching load, to relieve researchers from teaching? The 
various strategies that universities adopt are discussed in Chapter Six. 
Talib and Steele (2000) highlighted the value of the mentor "star" researchers. 
That coupled with the "snapshot" approach of the RAE, could lead to institutions 
hiring "star" researchers with a proven track record who can double as mentors. 
While this "head-hunting" effort could be complimented with premiums being 
offered to candidates, at the other extreme, unproductive (research) staff could be 
persuaded to retire early or be given higher teaching and administrative loads. 
10 The Economist (August 20,1996) raises the issue of the transfer market for academics that is 
analogous to the football market. 
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The hiring strategies adopted by institutions are investigated by the case studies. 
Apart from the hiring strategies actually adopted, we wanted to investigate the 
belief among academics on staff mobility. This belief was investigated by the 
survey of academics and furthermore, we tested if this belief among academics is 
dependent on the academics' characteristics. 
3.3.2.4 ACADEMICS' BEHAVIOURAL EFFECT 
The survey questionnaire, similar to McNay (1997), is used to collect data on the 
changes to behaviour due to the 1996 RAE. Besides comparing the findings with 
the McNay study that was based on the 1992 RAE, the objective is to extract the 
changes that have occurred during the interim. 
Based on the contingency theory and work-related subject's characteristics as a 
contingent factor, the effect of the RAE on a subject's behaviour is hypothesised 
to depend on the subject's characteristic. From this proposition, we developed 
secondary propositions and raised further questions to investigate. We first 
tested for independence between the response variable and the characteristic 
variable. The statistics used to test the null hypothesis of independence and the 
results are described in Chapter Eight. 
The mean responses of the groups, segmented by characteristics, are found to be 
statistically different though the analysis of variance method (ANOVA)l 1 in 
Chapter Nine. 
11 The results of the ANOVA and Kruskal-Wallis tests were found not to be significantly 
different. Hence, we felt it was appropriate to use ANOVA. 
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The behavioural impact of the RAE on academics also suggests a number of 
other questions such as: 
" Is the impact of the RAE on academics in the ex-UFC sector 
different from the impact on academics in the ex-PCFC sector? 
" Do the more experienced academics exhibit less behavioural 
changes attributable to the RAE? 
Academics in the departments that are rated lower than the average departmental 
rating for the university experience peer pressure to increase their RAE ratings. 
This pressure also applies to departments having low ratings. This pressure 
could result in dysfunctional behaviour and raises the following questions: 
" Do academics in the departments that are rated lower than the 
average departmental rating for the university have higher research 
fixation and practise more gaming? 
" Do academics in the lower rated departments practise more 
gaming? 
" Do academics in the higher rated departments have higher research 
fixation? 
Chapter Two has already explained that age and qualifications are significant 
contributing factors to motivation. Thus, we investigated if older academics are 
more resilient to changes and whether those with PhD qualifications practise less 
gaming. 
Brinn et al (1998) argue that senior and non-senior staff would in general tend to 
have different responses to research and publication and to the RAE in particular. 
Junior staff may be anxious to build and develop their publication records in 
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order to develop their research competencies to enhance their career prospects. 
As the senior staff would not be subject to the same concerns (ibid: p. 315), they 
are not likely to practise gaming in publication management. 
The RAE sets a goal of four published outputs per RAE cycle. Goals can 
promote performance by increasing the motivation and also stimulate the search 
for strategies to attain the goals (Locke et al, 1981; Earley et al, 1989; Locke and 
Latham, 1990). In the context of the RAE, task strategies can take the form of 
managing the output of the research and/or managing the choice of research 
topics. This leads to the investigation if the behavioural consequences of the 
RAE on an individual's research and publications management are dependent on 
the expected level of research performance. The RAE essentially defines 
research as published work, thereby intensifying an academic's focus on 
publications. The goal for academics is published research not research per se. 
Thus, the strategies to enhance the published output are scrutinized by the survey 
of academics. As shown in Figures 3.1 and 3.2, these publication strategies are a 
part of the gaming construct. Additional input is sought from the survey of 
journal editors in Chapter Seven. This survey of journal editors studies the 
following propositions: 
" Academics in their attempt to increase publications have placed 
emphasis on quantity rather than quality. 
" Academics will increase collaboration with colleagues to increase 
publication output. 
" The RAE deadlines and requirement of four publications will 
result in a rush of submissions just prior to the 1AE deadlines. 
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" Academics will attempt to extract as many papers as possible from 
the same research project. 
" Academics will be reluctant to devote time for refereeing papers 
for journals. 
" The RAE has resulted in a proliferation of journals. 
" The emergence and proliferation of "in-house" journals is 
attributed mainly to the RAE. 
" The RAE has potential unintended consequences on publishing 
ethics. 
We have listed in this section the questions addressed and tested in this thesis, 
grouped under the four headings. They are expanded in more detail in the 
relevant chapters , 
for a better appreciation. 
3.4 ECONOMETRIC METHODOLOGY 
This section explains the use of the logistic regression model for dichotomous 
variables as the primary tool for analysing the academic survey data. The 
discussion commences with the linear probability model and leads to the logistic 
regression model. 
Respondents to the survey questionnaire are requested to indicate their levels of 
agreement or disagreement on a scale of 1 through 6, where 1,2 and 3 are for 
agreement, and 4,5 and 6 for disagreement. The responses can be, more 
generally, collapsed into two groups: (1) agrees, or (2) disagree. Since they 
provide qualitative responses, the logistic regression model is used to model the 
formulation of their choices. 
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3.4.1 DICHOTOMOUS VARIABLE MODELS 
The logistic regression model is considered appropriate because the dependent 
variable is dichotomous and E(Y; I X; ), the conditional expectation of Y given X 
is the conditional probability that the event will occur given X. The event is the 
agreement that certain behaviours exist. The academics respond to the survey by 
agreeing or disagreeing to the survey statements. The model then estimates the 
probability that an academic with a given set of attributes will make ac ertain 
choice. 
The simplest procedure to estimate the regression model where the dependent 
variable is dichotomous is the usual least squares method. This is the linear 
probability model (LPM), described in Section 3.4.2. An alternative method 
takes the position that there is an underlying or latent variable y* which is not 
observable (Maddalla, 1992). What can be observed is y =1 if y* > 0, and y =0, 
otherwise. This is the central idea behind the Logit and Probit models. 
3.4.2 THE LINEAR PROBABILITY MODEL (LPM) 
In linear probability models (LPM), the equation expresses the dichotomous 
dependent variable Y as a linear function of the explanatory variable(s) X as 
follows: 
Yt = ßt + ß2 Xi +µi 
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The conditional expectation of Y given X. E(Y1 I X; ), can be interpreted as the 
conditional probability that the event will occur given X. The t1 are the 
disturbances. 
Assuming E (µ; ) = 0, to obtain unbiased estimators, we get 
E(YjjX1) = ßi + P2 Xi 
Now letting P; = probability that Y; =1 (i. e., the event occurs) and 1- P; = 
probability that Y; =0 (i. e., the event does not occur), the variable Y; has the 
following distribution: 
Y; Probability 
0 1- P; 
1 Pi 
Total 1 
Therefore E(Y; I X; ) = 0(1- P; ) +I (Pi) 
And E(Yj I X. ) =01+f32 Xi = Pi 
The probability (P) must lie between 0 and 1. 
3.4.3 THE PROBLEMS WITH LPM 
The fundamental problem with the LPM is that it is not a logically attractive 
model because it assumes that P; = E(Y = 1IX) increases linearly with X, that is, 
the marginal or incremental effect of X remains constant throughout. This linear 
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relation does not represent the relationship of the variables in the dataset. Thus, 
among other reasons discussed below, the LPM is not pursued. 
3.4.3.1 NON-NORMALITY OF THE DISTURBANCE µ, 
The ordinary least squares (OLS) method of estimation assumer, that the 
disturbances (µ; ) are normally distributed. However, for LPM the µ; only takes 
two values and has a binomial distribution. 
Ili =Y; -ß, - ß2 X; 
and when Y; =1 µ; =1 - ß, - 02 X; 
and when Y; =0 µ; =- 01 -ß2X; 
The non-adherence to the normality assumption may not be critical as the OLS 
point estimators remain unbiased (Gujarati, 1995: p. 543). Furthermore, 
according to the central limit theorem, as the sample size increases, the OLS 
estimators tend to be normally distributed generally (Malinvaud, 1966: pp. 195- 
197)12. If the regressors are deemed stochastic and are jointly normally 
distributed, the F test can still be used even though the disturbances are non- 
normal. Therefore, in large samples the statistical inference of the LPM will 
follow the usual OLS procedure under the normality assumption. 
3.4.3.2 HETEROSCEDASTIC VARIANCES OF THE DISTURBANCES 
The variance of pi is heteroscedastic because it depends on the conditional 
expectation of Y;, which, of-course, depends on the value taken by X. Thus, 
ultimately the variance of µ; depends on X and is thus not homoscedastic. In the 
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presence of heteroscedasticity, the OLS estimators, although unbiased, are not 
efficient; that is, they do not have minimum variance. This problem, however, is 
not insurmountable (Gujarati, 1995: Chapter 11 provides methods to deal with 
the heteroscadisticity). 
3.4.3.3 NONFULFILLMENT OF E(Y1 IX 1) LIES BETWEEN 0 AND 1 
There is no assurance that the estimator of E(Y; I Xi) will necessarily lie 
between 0 and 1, and this is a significant problem with the OLS estimation of 
LPM. The logit and probit models guarantee that the estimated probabilities will 
indeed lie between the logical limits 0 and 1. 
3.4.4 REQUIRED FEATURES IN PROBABILITY MODEL 
It is essential to develop a probability model that has these two features: (a) as X; 
increases, P; = E(Y = 1IX) increases but never steps outside the 0-1 interval, and 
(b) the relationship between P; and X; is non-linear, that is "one which 
approaches zero at slower and slower rates as X; gets small and approaches 1 at 
slower and slower rates as X; gets very large". The model should have a 
cumulative distribution function (CDF) as shown in Figure 3.3 (Gujarati, 1995; 
Maddala, 1992). 
12 If P; takes particular values in relation to the sample size. 
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Figure 3.3: A cumulative distribution function 
The CDFs used to represent the 0-1 response include (1) the logistic distribution- 
giving rise to the logit models, and (2) the normal distribution giving rise to the 
probit model. 
The probit model assumes that the errors µ; in the regression model follow a 
normal distribution while the logit assumes a logistic distribution. Since the 
cumulative normal and the logistic distributions are very close to each other 
except at the tail end, we are not likely to produce different results with the probit 
or the logit methods (Maddala, 1992: p. 328). However, the estimates of the 
parameters ß; from the two methods are not directly comparable. The logit 
estimates need to be multiplied by 0.625 to be comparable to the estimates 
obtained from the probit model (Amemiya; 1981). 
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Therefore, for dichotomous dependent variables, the two models are essentially 
the same (Altman et al, 1981) ' and the choice between them is one of 
convenience (Gujarati, 1985). For this reason, and because the logistic 
regression is used for this study, the probit model is not described here. The next 
section explains the logistic regression model. 
3.4.5 THE LOGISTIC REGRESSION 
For this model, the first step is to define P;, the probability that the ith respondent 
chooses the first option or answer, as given in equation (3-1) below: 
P; = E(Y =1 1X; ) =1 [3.1] 
1+e-(B 1+B2xi) 
Equation [3.1] is the logistic distribution function and can be written as 
Pi= 1 
1+e-Z. 
[3.2] 
If P; is the probability of a YES (agree) response, then (1-Pi), the probability of a 
NO (non-agreement) response is: 
1-Pi= 
.1 1+ezý 
[3.3] 
where Z; = ß, +D'X; e=2.71828 
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and ß' X; is a vector of variables; where Z; = ß, + p2X2i + ß, X + +ß,, X1; and 
where the subscript i refers to the ith respondent. The Xs represent the 
characteristics of the individual, which determine P;. 
As Z approaches +oo, e -Z' tends to zero, as Z approaches -oo, e -Z' increases 
indefinitely. Therefore P; ranges between 0 and 1 and is nonlinearly related to Z; 
(i. e. X; ), thus satisfying the two requirements mentioned earlier. P; is non-linear 
not only in X but also in the ß's as can be seen from the logit model. 
This function is monotonic, with P(x) 1'0 or P(x) T1 as (x) Too depending on 
whether ß <0, or (3> 0. It takes the value P(x) = /2 at x= -cc/ß , and the curve has 
a steeper r ate of increase a round that value asß increases. W hen ß> 0, this 
curve is the distribution function of the logistic random variable having mean - 
a/ß and standard deviation [P/(3ß)'n]. 
Therefore, from equation 3-2 and 3-3 we can write: 
P; / (1-P; ) = 1+ e Z' =e z' [Equation 3.4] 
1+e-Z' 
Now P; /1-P; is simply the odds ratio in favour, of agreement; the ratio of the 
probability of "agree" to the probability of "not agree". Thus if P; = 0.8, it means 
that odds are 4 to 1 in favour of agreement. 
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If we take the natural log of [Equation 3.1] we obtain L, the log of the odds ratio. 
L; = In (P; /1-P; ) = Z; _= ßI + ß2X; 
L is called the logit and is not only linear in X but also linear in the parameters. 
It is this linearity in the parameters that is crucial. 
The logistic regression, therefore, transforms a dependent variable having 
inherent non-linear relationships with a set of independent variables into a 
dependent variable having a linear relationship with a set of independent 
variables. Logit models estimate the linear determinants of the logged odds or 
logits rather than the non-linear determinants of probabilities. Therefore, in 
linearising the non-linear relationship, logit models shift the interpretation of 
coefficients from changes in probabilities to the less intuitive changes in logged 
odds. The loss of interpretability however is balanced by the gain in parsimony; 
the linear relationship with the logged odds can be summarised with a single 
coefficient, but the non-linear relationship with the probabilities cannot be so 
simply summarised. 
Logit models also have the following features: 
1. Although L is linear in X, the probabilities themselves are not. This 
property is in contrast with LPM model where the probabilities increase 
linearly with X. 
i. As P goes from 0 to 1, the logit L goes from - oo to +oo. That is although 
the probabilities (of necessity) lie between 0 and 1, the logits are not so 
bounded. 
3. The interpretation of the logit model is as follows: P2, the slope, measures 
the change in L for a unit change in X. This tells how the log-odds in 
favour of agreeing, change as the dependent variable (X) changes by a 
unit. The intercept ßI, is the value of the log-odds in favour of agreeing if 
the independent variables are zero. 
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4. Whereas the LPM assumes that P is linearly related to X, the logit model 
assumes that the log of odds ratio is linearly related to X. 
3.5 THE LOGISTIC REGRESSION MODEL 
This section describes the application of the logistic regression model we applied 
to the dataset from the survey of academics. The empirical results from the 
model are developed in Chapter Nine. We first delineate the variables in the 
model and that is followed by a discussion of the model. 
The responses of the survey are grouped into "agree" and "non-agree". Hence, 
our response (dependent) variable was dichotomous. The dependent variable is 
the dummy variable =1 if behaviour exists (agreement) and 0 if there is no 
agreement that behaviour exists (as result of the RAE). The model estimates the 
probability that an academic is-Adopting (or has increased) a specific behaviour. 
The explanatory (predictor) variables in the model are: 
Discipline: A set of dummy variables for discipline: 
1 Science 1 if respondent in a Science related discipline, and 
0 otherwise 
2 Physics 1 if respondent in Physics UoA, and 
0 otherwise 
3 Engn "1 if respondent in Engineering, and 
0 otherwise 
4 BMS 1 if respondent in Business & Management UoA, 
and 0 otherwise 
5 Liberal 1 if respondent in a Liberal Arts, and 
0 otherwise 
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6 EDUC 1 if respondent in Education, and 
0 otherwise 
7 BUZ 1 if respondent in a Business related discipline, and 
0 otherwise 
Reference Category: Others disciplines 
The respondents are grouped into seven classifications based on discipline and 
into an eighth classification for other disciplines (the control reference category). 
Academics from different UoAs but cognate disciplines are allocated to the same 
classification. The disciplines grouped under each classification with the 
frequencies in each group are shown in the Appendix of Chapter Nine. 
Experience (EXP): A set of dummy variables for level of years of experience: 
1. < 10 years experience 
2.10 -15 years experience 
3.15 -20 years experience 
Reference category: over 20 years experience. 
Department Rating (DR) 
A set of dummy variables for department rating: 
1 Department rated 5* 
2 Department rated 5 
3 Department rated 4 
4 Department rated 3a. 
5 Department rated 3b 
Reference category: non-funded rating (1 and 2). 
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Average This measures if the department rating is below or above 
Rating (AVR) average compared to the other departments in the 
university. 
This measure is a proxy for level of research emphasis and 
level of peer pressure. 
1 Higher than university average 
2 Lower than university average 
Reference category: department rating is about average of 
university. 
Inst. Type Dummy variable for Institution type: 
1= ex- UFC 0= ex-PCFC 
PhD Dummy variable for PhD: 
1 =no PhD O= PhD 
Post A set of dummy variables for academic post: 
"1 Professor. 
2 Reader. 
3 Principal lecturer. 
4 Senior lecturer. 
Reference category: lecturer 
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Age group A set of dummy variables for age group: 
1 Below 40 years old. 
2 Age between 40 and 50. 
Reference category: over 50 years old 
Research Activity (RESACT) 
A set of dummy variables for self assessed level of 
research activity: 
1. Moderate activity 
2. Quite active 
3. Very Active 
Reference category: inactive. 
The model reference category is: An academic in "other" discipline, with over 20 
years academic experience, in a department rated 1 or 2 in an ex PCFC 
institution where the average rating for the departments is 1 or 2, has a PhD, is 
over 50 years old and is still a lecturer who is inactive in research. 
The resultant model is: 
Pi = Fl i=I 
IXiý =1 
1+ezi 
where: 
P; is the probability of agreement to a behaviour (i. e. the conditional probability) 
And 
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Z; _ 01 + ß2(Discp) + ß, (EXP) + (3, (Dept Rating) + ßs (AVR) + (36 
(INST) + p7 (PhD) + ß8 (POST) + ß9 (AGE) +P 10 (RESACT) 
A number of the variables are represented by a set of dummy variables. 
Therefore, those variables are decomposed into a number of dummy variables. 
Each dummy variable has its own coefficient; resulting in a total of 29 
coefficients, including the constant, for the model. The coefficients and the 
resultant models are provided in Chapter Nine. 
Age and academic experience are treated as categorical, instead of continuous, 
data. This treatment of age and academic experience as continuous variables has 
the implicit assumption that both variables have linear relationships with the 
probability. Older academics also have less motivation to alter their behaviour as 
they would have developed behaviour fixation over the years. The young new 
academics are more enthusiastic and may be reluctant to adopt "dysfunctional" 
strategies. Non-senior staff may be concerned to build and develop their 
publication record in order to demonstrate a research reputation, so as to enhance 
their promotion prospects. As a consequence one might expect non-senior staff 
to be particularly concerned with strategies, which might damage their reputation 
(Brinn et all 1998 p 315). We therefore expected that academics in the middle 
range of age and experience to have the highest behavioural impact from the 
RAE. 
Furthermore, the data collected for these variables are not of a strictly 
"continuous" nature; respondents are asked to indicate which age group and 
experience group they belong to. Nevertheless, if the relationship were linear, it 
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would be identifiable from the results even when the variable is treated as 
categorical. Therefore, the categorical classification with a set of dummy 
variables would be more informative for the identification if the probability is 
higher for any particular group. 
3.5.1 INTERPRETATION OF THE MODEL 
There are three possibilities for interpreting the results of the logistic model. 
First, the slope (coefficient) can be used to indicate the expected change in the 
logit for a unit change in X. The difficulty with this is that it has little intuitive 
meaning. Second, the coefficient can be transformed to indicate the change in 
the odds (rather than the log odds) for a unit change in X. Third, the effects can 
be described in terms of probabilities. 
The logistic regression coefficient shows the change in the predicted logged odds 
of experiencing an event or having a characteristic, such as agreement in this 
case, for a one-unit change in the independent variables. It has exactly the same 
interpretation as the coefficients in classical regression except that the units of 
the dependent variable represent the logged odds. For dummy explanatory 
variables, a change in one unit implicitly compares the indicator group to the 
reference group. These coefficients, however, reveal little about the relationship 
and do little to explain the substantive results (Pampel, 2000). 
The effects of the independent variables on the logged odds are linear and 
additive - each X has the same effect on the logged odds regardless of its level or 
the level of other X variables - but the units of the dependent variable, logged 
odds, have little intuitive meaning. The effects of the independent variables on 
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the probabilities has intuitive meaning, but are non-linear, and non additive - 
each X variable has a different effect on the probability depending on its level 
and the level of the other independent variables. Despite the interpretable units, 
the effects on probabilities cannot be summarised in the form of a single 
coefficient. For this reason, a table of probabilities for various combinations of 
levels of the independent variables is produced. A more meaningful 
interpretation comes from the odds ratio. The coefficients ((3) are transformed so 
that the independent variables affect the odds rather than the logged odds of the 
dependent variable. The interpretation of the effects of the independent variables 
on the odds offers a compromise between logged odds (p3) and probabilities. The 
odds have more intuitive appeal than the logged odds (ß), and can express effects 
in a single coefficient. The effects on odds are multiplicative rather than 
additive, but still have a straightforward interpretation. 
3.6 CLOSING REMARKS 
The research design adopted for this dissertation was briefly described in Chapter 
One. This was amplified on this chapter. The research questions and 
propositions investigated in the thesis were detailed in section 3.3. For ease of 
reference, we listed the investigated questions and propositions in Appendix 3-B 
cross-referenced to the location in the thesis where they are discussed in more 
detail. 
The (academics) survey design was explained and rationalised in section 3.2. 
The econometric methodology and procedures adopted for analysing the data 
from the survey of academics was explained in the chapter. We explained in 
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section 3.4, the logistic regression methodology and proceeded to explain, in 
section 3.5, the model we applied to our data set. 
The remaining chapters have been structured, to a large extent, to be independent 
self-explanatory chapters. The linkages between the various chapters of this 
thesis have been detailed in Chapter One and this chapter. 
Appendix 3-A 
The Questionnaire 
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Dear Colleague, 
X4%V 
E RS 
I am undertaking a research project on the impact, and the `perceptions' of 
academics of the impact, of the Research Assessment Exercise (RAE). 
I am seeking your help in this research project and would be extremely grateful 
if you could spare the time to complete the questionnaire and then return it in the reply 
paid envelope provided 
The questionnaire does not request the identity of respondents. All information 
provided in the returned questionnaire will be treated as confidential and will only be 
used in aggregate form in combination with all other responses. 
I do hope that you will be able to participate in the survey and would be 
grateful if you could complete and return the questionnaire as soon as possible. 
If you have any queries please do not hesitate to call me at (01926) 31302 I or at 
(0467) 621644 or email me at: ameentalib@msn. com 
I thank you for your assistance. 
Yours sincerely, 
Ameen Talib 
RESEARCH ASSESSMENT EXERCISE QUESTIONNAIRE. 
ALL RESPONSES WILL BE TREATED AS CONFIDENTIAL. THE SUCCESS OF 
THIS STUDY IS DEPENDANT ON YOUR RESPONSE; I EXPRESS MY 
GRATITUDE FOR THE TIME SPENT. 
Please answer questions 1 to 32 on basis of how strongly you agree or 
disagree with the statements describing your individual behaviour/belief. The answers 
are on a scale of I to 6. Boxes 1 to 3 are for agreeing and boxes 4-6 for disagreeing. 
Please tick box [11 if you i strongly agree, box [21 if you strongly agree, box [3] if 
you agree but less strongly and box 161 if you i strongly disagree. The scale is in 
order of strength of agreement; where box [11 represents the strongest agreement and 
box [61 represents the strongest disagreement. 
1.1 now spend more time on research than 6 years ago. 
ID 203 fl 4E5 E1 6 ED 
2.1 now spend more time on research than 6 years ago as a resuh of the RAE_ 
1 020 30405 E] 6EI 
3.1 now spend leas time in teaching preparation than 6 years ago. 
10203040 51: 1 60 
4. I now spend less time in teaching preparation than 6 years ago as a result 
of the RAE pressure on research. 
1El 2E13c14ED sED 6ED 
S. I now give less time than 6 years ago to `voluntary' academic activities- e. g. 
referring for journals. 
1203 EI 40506 El 
I 
6.1 now give less time to activities given no or low recognition by RAE. 
I L1 2 Fl 3 El 4 L1 5 E1 6E 
7. The RAE has had a positive effect on my research output. 
1 EI 2304 L1 56Q 
8. Because of RAE, I now spend less time in voluntary academic work. 
I L1 2 El 3Q4L506p 
9.1 am feeling more pressure to publish due to the RAE. 
ID 2E71 3F -] 4 LI 5 171 6 
10. I now (try to) collaborate more with researchers overseas to demonstrate 
international excellence. 
IQ2L3E: l 4 E: l 5 El 6 F-I 
11. I now collaborate less (in research) with academics from other English 
universities. 
1 Ll 23405b0 
12.1 now collaborate more (in research) with colleagues in my department. 
112 3U 456 EI 
13. Perceived research preferences of RAE panels have affected my choice of 
research topic. 
I EI 2 E] 30 4E: l 5 E1 6 E] 
14. The balance of my research has moved away from the `applied' end of the 
spectrum towards more basic, `pure' research. 
1 EI 2E34 EI 5Q6 EI 
15. In my view, RAE has a negative effect on inter-disciplinary research. 
ID2 EI 3 fl 405 1-1 60 
2 
16. 
10203 E1 40 5' 06 El 
17. 
18. 
19 
20. 
21 
ýý 
I now do less inter-disciplinary research than 6 years ago. 
Because of the RAE time-scales I have published some outputs at an earlier 
stage than I would prefer. 
I0203 El 4 1-1 5060 
Because of the RAE time-scales I have deferred the publications of some 
research output. 
I2034506E 
My research topics or projects are influenced by the RAE time-scale. 
10203 EI 405 LJ 60 
Because of the RAE time-scales I have avoided some research topics or 
projects because they would have taken a long time to complete. 
Ia2a34a5a60 
Because of the RAE time-scales I have avoided some research projects because 
they were speculative in nature (more risky in relation to security of output). 
I0203 E1 4 17 5 El 6 El 
22.1 now manage my research publications by `smoothing' it over the RAE time 
cycle (i. e. in trying to ensure sufficient publications for the RAE I publish early 
if [ do not have enough publications and/or I defer publication if I have 
published sufficiently so as to ensure enough publications in the next round of 
RAE) 
I02 71 3 E1 4056 
23. The RAE has increased my stress level. 
I2 3a4Fl 5ED 6ED 
13 
24. The RAE has improved the quality of research conducted in Universities. 
1023 E] 4 E1 5 ED 6 El 
25.1 believe RAE increases staff mobility between institutions. 
1 EI 203045 [1 6 
26. I now spend less time on consultancy work (including `external' lecturing) to 
concentrate on research. 
1 El 2 E1 304 El 5 E1 6 El 
27. My department have expanded research student numbers beyond the capacity 
to supervise as well as we wish. 
1a2 71 3 71 4 EJ 5 71 6a 
28. I believe that the expansion in research student numbers is due to the RAE 
funding formula. 
2ý3ý 4ý 5ý6 1 Ell 
29. University appointments are now driven by the RAE. 
1 Ll 2 Eý 3 El 4 L1 56 
30. Universities are now paying a `premium' to attract `star' researchers. 
I El 2 F-I 3 F-I 4 F-I 5 F-I 6 El 
31. Academic researchers pay has increased due to the recognition earned from the 
RAE. 
I 2El 3El 4a506EJ 
ýý' J. L: 
. 
ý': a ýýý 
4 
ash r 
1ý 
r 
^ 
ýJS .ý. n +nMy v,.. 
ßs3 N_I 
32. (a) The RAE four year time cycle is not appropriate for my subject area research. 
12 E] 30456 
EI 
(b) What, in your view, will be an appropriate RAE time cycle for your subject 
area? 
2 years 
El 4 yrs 
ED 6 yrs 
F-I 8 yrs 
E] Other (specify) 
33. What is your Primary department? (i. e. what unit of assessment, per HEFCE 
classification, would you fall under? ). 
34. How many years have you been in academia? 
5 years 5-10 years 
M 10-15 years 
0 15-20 0 over 20 years 
1-1 
35. How long have you been in current post? 
2 years 
0 2-5 years 
F-l 5-10 years 
0 
over 10 years 
36. Were you included in the submission as research active staff? 
Definite Yes Probably Yes F-I Probably No 0 
Definite No 0 Not sure 
0 
37. What was your department's rating in RAE 1996? 
5*540 3a El 3b El 201 El 
38. Was your department research rating higher or lower than the average rating 
for your institution? 
Higher Lower El About average 
El Not sure 
0 
5 
39. What proportion of staff were submitted by your department (subject area) in 
the RAE 1996? 
A (95-100%) 0B (80-94%) El C (60-79%) 0 
D (40-59%) ED E (20-39%) 0F (less than 20%)E-1 
Not sure 
40. Is your institution ex-UGC ('old) or ex- PCFC ('new )? 
Old New L] 
41. Post Held. 
Professor Reader Principal Lecturer 0 Senior Lecturer 0 
Lecturer Li Other (please spec) 
42. Are you in a `permanent' position? 
Yes 0 No 0 
43. Please tick the box against the gwlification/degree you have. (tick as ma"Y 
boxes as relevant). 
PhD MSc. /MBA Ci Professional Qualification BSGJBA 
44. What is your age group. 
under 30 years 30-39 
0 40-49 0 over 50 years 
LI 
45. How would you rank yourself as a researcher? 
Not at all active 
EI Quite inactive E-1 Moderately active 
0 
Quite active 
0 Very active 
0 
'. rxr 7 
6 
- 
yý., 
If you have any comments that you would like to make regarding any of the 
items on this questionnaire and/or the Research Assessment Exercise, please 
write them in the space below or attach a separate sheet. 
THANK YOU FOR YOUR PARTICIPATION IN THIS STUDY. 
When complete, please return the questionnaire in the reply paid envelope 
provided to: 
Ameen Talib 
Warwick Business School 
University of Warwick 
Coventry 
CV4 7AL 
All comments will be treated as anonymous. All information provided in this 
questionnaire will be treated as confidential and will only be used in aggregate form in 
combination with all other responses. 
7 
RESEARCH ASSESSMENT EXERCISE QUESTIONNAIRF EXPLANATORY 
OTC 
`Voluntary academic work' (Q5 & 8) refers to unpaid work undertaken by 
academics on voluntary basis. An example is refereeing papers for journals. 
2. Question (6) refers to acti,, ities such as teaching and refereeing; which are not 
directly rewarded under the RAE mechanism. 
3. Question (11): English universities should read British universities. 
4. The term 'Department' in the questionnaire also refers to 'division', `subject 
area' or 'unit of assessment' as appropriate. 
5. `Current post' in question (35) refers to the number of years in the same post 
(i. e. lecturer, senior lecturer etc. ) . 
This should be the total number of years in 
the same current post at present and previous institutions. 
6. Question (36) refers to the 1996 RAE submission. The answer is expected to 
be a definite yes or a definite no. However if you are not informed about your 
inclusion in the submission you have a choice of three responses. A `Probably 
Yes' indicates your belief that you should have been included based on your 
research output and the department rating. 
7. Question (39) refers to the proportion of full-time equivalent (FTE) staff 
submitted for assessment as described in the published ratings 
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APPENDIX 3-B 
THE RESEARCH QUESTION. 
The table below lists all the questions and propositions investigated in this study, 
referenced to the location where they are discussed. 
QUESTION / PROPOSITION METHODOLOGY REF. 
RAE outcome reflects policy Logical analysis. 
objectives. 
RAE leads to concentration of Analysis of BMS hap. 4 
research funding. UoA outcome of 
1996 RAE. 
A "ceiling-effect" exists. 
RAE allows scope for strategic 
submission. 
Mathematical Chap. 5 
RAE increases the value of ` Analysis. 
star' researchers, particularly the 
`mentor' type. 
RAE influences institutional 
behaviour and strategies 
Universities preserve their 
autonomy in the internal 
resource allocation over 
accountability and visibility and 
Cross-subsidy between 
departments exist. 
Case study of Chap. 6 
RAE encourages devolved Universities. 
budgeting. 
RAE leads to `niche' 
concentration by institutions. 
New universities strategies differ 
from the old universities 
Chap 6 
Research student numbers are Case study and and 
expanded as result of RAE. survey chap 8 
Institutions attempt to maximise 
research funding by `strategic Case study Chap 6 
submissions'. 
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QUESTION /PROPOSITION METHODOLOGY REF 
Institutions do consider the RAE 
panel unit of assessment to 
submit staff under, to maximise 
funding outcome. 
RAE influences staff mobility 
Case study Chap 6 
RAE influences hiring strategy; 
`star' researchers are headhunted 
and inactive encouraged to 
taking early retirement. 
Academics believe RAE Survey of hap 8 
influenced mobility and pay. academics. 9 
The belief in mobility effect is Logit model. 
dependent on academics' 
characteristics. 
The RAE effect is developing Comparing means of Chap 8 
over time. survey with the (8-5) 
McNay study. 
RAE influences academics' Z score tested if Chap 9 
behaviour proportion agreeing (9-3) 
to behaviour change 
exceeds a level. 
The behavioural effect of the Measures of Chap 8 
RAE is dependent on academics' association, and 9 
characteristics. CATREG and 
logistic regression 
The academics characteristics Tests of Chap 8 
are independent of the response. independence 
The response means are different ANOVA Chap 9 
for groups based on 
characteristics. 
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QUESTION / PROPOSITION METHODOLOGY REF 
Impact of RAE is dependent 
on: 
Institution type CATREG Chap 9 
Experience And 
Department rating Logistic regression 
Age (and measures of 
Qualification association) Chap 8 
Post 
Research Activity level 
RAE influences research Survey of academics Chap 8, 
publication management And and 9 
Survey of journal Chap 7 
editors 
Trivial quantity exists 
Academics will increase 
collaboration with colleagues to 
increase publication output. 
The RAE deadlines and 
`requirement' of four 
publications will result in a rush 
of submissions just prior to the 
RAE deadline. 
Survey of Journal Chap 7 
Academics will attempt to `milk- Editors 
out' as many papers as possible 
from same research project. 
Academics will be reluctant to 
devote time for referring papers 
for journals. 
The RAE resulted in a 
proliferation of journals. 
Emergence/ proliferation of `in- 
house' journals is attributed 
mainly to the RAE. 
RAE has potential unintended Analytical review Chap 7 
consequence on publishing 
ethics. 
CHAPTER FOUR 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
FORMULA BASED ALLOCATION OF PUBLIC FUNDS AND THE RAE' 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter offers insights on the impact the Research Assessment Exercise 
(RAE) has on behaviours and strategies of academics in universities from a 
policy perspective. It discusses if outcomes of the RAE reflect policy objectives. 
The chapter begins with a brief description of the formula funding in the context 
of the RAE. The rationale for adopting formula funding is stated in Section 4.3. 
A brief historical background of the RAE is outlined in Section 4.4 for a better 
appreciation of the developments of the research selectivity exercise. The RAE 
1996 and Quality-Related Research funding is detailed in Section 4.5. A 
discussion of the RAE vis-ä-vis formula funding is in Section 4.6. The Business 
and Management Unit of Assessment is used to illustrate the ceiling effect in 
Section 4.7. 
4.2 INTRODUCTION TO FORMULA FUNDING MODELS 
Formula funding models in the public sector are traditionally regarded as 
1 This chapter has been published as A. Talib "Formula Based Allocation of Public Funds: The 
case of Higher Education Research Funding" PUBLIC MONEY & MANAGEMENT Vol. 21 
(1), January-March 2001, pp 57-64. 
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instruments of empowerment rather than of control (Heald and Geughan, 1994). 
However, the contemporary purpose of formula funding differs from its 
traditional application since the current emphasis seems to be on cost reductions 
(ibid, p. 267). The emphasis is also on refining central control by simulated 
markets as a means of disciplining public service providers. This thesis examines 
in detail this control aspect of formula funding, in particular, the RAE. The key 
topics are the behavioral consequences of institutions and academics arising from 
adoption of the RAE and the associated funding distribution model. A basic 
appreciation of formula funding models and some of the issues involved 
(particularly those specific to the RAE) is essential for understanding the 
behavioral consequences of institutions. 
The allocation of public funds by a formula funding model can be defined as a 
mechanism for the transfer of resources from the government to recipient bodies 
via an explicit distribution methodology. The amount of resources to be 
transferred is contingent upon certain measured characteristic(s) of the recipient. 
The formula funding mechanism in Higher Education depends on relativity. The 
"resource-earning" power of a particular characteristic such as the quality of 
research depends not just upon the absolute value for a particular recipient but 
also upon the values of that characteristic for all recipients. As the distribution 
formula is explicit, formula funding models are transparent up to the level of the 
formula, where the transparency takes the form of adherence to a set of rules. 
Complete transparency is achieved if both the formula weights and institutional 
characteristics are in the public domain. The formula funding for higher 
education is a clean slate, whereby present resources are functionally 
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independent of past resources, though there may be correlations between the 
present and past levels if the relevant characteristics are stable. 
Formula funding models can serve policy objectives with a hands-off approach 
in that they are used to achieve wide-ranging objectives while preserving the 
recipients' autonomy to make decisions within a broad framework. In order to 
avoid transfers becoming a complex web of specific grants, formula funding 
models can incorporate a veil of ignorance that permits the recipient to spend the 
resources on a pattern different from the one on which they are earned (Heald 
and Geaughan, 1994). However, formula-funding models can have as much or 
as little prescription, regulation and control as one wants. The extent to which 
the formula is used to prescribe certain outcomes is contingent upon the 
regulatory framework that surrounds it. 
The Research Selectivity Exercise, through the mechanism of the RAE, in 
England is one such model. The broad public policy objectives are to reward 
excellence in research. A consequent objective would seem to concentrate 
resources in excellent research departments to create "Centres of Excellence". 
However, there is no requirement that the funds earned by one unit of assessment 
(UoA) need to be distributed to that unit. The funds are distributed to the 
institutions as a block. grant and each institution has the freedom to distribute it to 
the various departments as they desire. Under specific instructions from the 
government and having received the commissioned Coopers and Lybrand (1993) 
report on Research Accountability, funding councils, however, have begun to 
inquire whether research money is being spent on research broadly in accordance 
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with the cost centre pattern on which it was earned. 
From the university perspective, however, a policy of allocating the RAE 
research funding to reflect the manner in which it was earned might not be 
optimal. The marginal utility of the allocated fund is higher if it is allocated to 
lower rated departments. The actual allocations of funds by universities could 
reflect their strategic goals that take precedence over individual departments. 
But, economics would suggest the allocation of funds based on the utility 
maximisation of resources. Therefore, universities should allocate the extra unit 
of resource to the department that yields the highest payoffs. If V is the 
aggregate welfare (payoff) and R, is the resource allocation for a department i, 
then the optimum allocation strategy would be when öV/öR, is maximised. This 
would mean additional funds would be allocated to 5-star departments only if the 
volume measure could be increased. The funding council's student quotas, 
however, also drive the volume measure. One method for expanding the volume 
measure is to increase the number of research students and research assistants. 
An additional ten research assistants or six research students are equivalent to an 
additional full-time equivalent staff in the RAE submissions. The allocation 
methods used by universities are examined in Chapter Six. 
The achievement of the policy objective of concentrating resources in excellent 
departments to create centres of excellence is, therefore, contingent on the 
behaviour of the recipient of the fund. For the institutions' behaviour to reflect 
the objectives of the formula funding model, the resources earned by a unit of 
assessment (UoA) need to be allocated to that UoA to allow for the concentration 
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of resources in centres of excellence. The RAE is a budget allocation 
compromise between autonomy and public accountability. The veil of ignorance 
in the RAE is designed to protect the University's autonomy. This autonomy, 
though significant for academic freedom, can lead to behaviour that contradicts 
policy objectives. An example of such behaviour is the cross-subsidy between 
departments. 
The variables to be used in any allocation formula will no doubt influence the 
strategies and behaviours adopted by the recipient bodies. This chapter addresses 
the use of the formula funding as a policy tool by analysing the impact of the 
RAE with the Business and Management Studies (BMS) as the UoA in order to 
shed light on whether the outcomes are consistent with the policy objectives. 
4.3 RATIONALE FOR THE ADOPTION OF FORMULA FUNDING 
MODELS 
Formula funding models can have multiple objectives (Heald and Geaughan, 
1994). First, formula funding models provide objectivity, or perceived 
objectivity, in the distribution of funds. This assists in the acceptance of the 
distribution by the respective recipients. These models divert arguments into the 
basis of distribution, away from an exclusive focus on the outcome of the 
distribution. They allow particular outcomes to be defended on the grounds that 
the rules and procedures are fair. The distribution can therefore be defended both 
within the policy community and with the public and media on the basis of fair 
procedures using objective indicators. Although the process workload may be 
substantial, it is more manageable than bilateral bargaining. In addition, the 
funding bodies can avoid becoming bogged down by specific cases. 
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Secondly, the adoption of formula funding models detaches the distribution 
decisions from the aggregate decisions, enabling the decisions to be taken on 
different timetables. It is also important that ministers and public officers who 
make decisions at the aggregate level are able to distance themselves from the 
responsibility for the impact of the aggregate constrained distributions. Formula 
funding models reduce the political costs of budget cuts. The responsibility for 
the distribution impacts, even if it arises from budget cuts, can be shifted to the 
funding body instead of the politician making the budget cut decision. 
Thirdly, formula funding can abolish history and cancel accumulated 
entitlements. This gives the fund provider the flexibility to reduce and to 
reassign the allocations. In contrast, recipients may have ongoing commitments 
that they cannot breach. The universities are a classic example in which this 
dilemma arises. The contractual obligations with their employees, especially 
tenured staff, constrain their flexibility. As a result, some universities offer part- 
time and short-term contracts. Universities are also constrained by obligation to 
students to continue providing the courses and the academic staff for them. 
Bankruptcy, as a tactical means of disowning contracts, is not an option available 
for universities. 
Fourthly, formula funding models constitute a mechanism whereby a distinction 
can be made between purchaser and provider. The funding body has the 
alternative of directly funding providers or of funding purchasers who contract 
with providers. 
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4.4 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
During the 1980s, the University Grant Committee (UGC) and Polytechnics 
Colleges Funding Council (PCFC) allocated government funds to universities 
and polytechnics in the U. K., respectively. Since 1992, this binary divide has 
been abolished when the Higher Education Funding Councils (HEFC) was 
created for the four nations - England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland2. 
The former polytechnics in England, previously funded by the PCFC, attained 
university status and receive funds from the Higher Education Funding Council 
for England (HEFCE), and are eligible for research money. Although the 
decision to abolish the binary divide was independent of the selectivity exercise, 
it nevertheless had a significant impact on the RAE, as will be discussed later. 
The decision to abolish the binary divide was because the government wanted to 
increase the level of university education in the U. K. and because the U. K. 
polytechnics were perceived as equivalent to foreign universities. The then Vice- 
Chancellor of Warwick University, Sir Brian Folett, also expressed this view in 
interviews held with him over a two-day period. This chapter, in particular this 
section, has benefited from the discussions held with Sir Brian. 
The initial impetus for the UGC's involvement in the RAE derived, not from a 
concern for research improvement but, from the public funding cuts applied to 
Higher Education during the early 1980s (see Jones 1986; Jones, 1994; Sizer, 
1989). The budget cuts made it clear that it would be difficult to sustain research 
at the same level in all departments and in all universities. The 1980s also 
experienced the rise in the notion of accountability in the public service. 
2 Namely, HEFCE, Scottish Higher Education Funding Council, Higher Education Council for 
Wales, and Department of Education Northern Ireland, respectively. 
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Members of parliament questioned the value of research money allocated to 
universities. Therefore, some thought went into an assessment of research to 
demonstrate the output from the research money3. It was also thought desirable 
to separate research and teaching for funding purposes, to achieve more 
accountability for research funding4. 
The 1981 cuts in university funding were a watershed for both the universities 
and for the structuring of relationships between government and the higher 
education sector. On various estimates, these cuts amounted to a loss of resources 
of between 11% and 15% in the periods of 1979-80 and 1983-84 (Heald and 
Geaughan, 1994: p. 2 71). C aught b etween the conflicting pressures of `equal 
misery' or `selectivity', the UGC opted for the latter. Key decision-makers in the 
university sector perceived the needs of the university system at the lower level 
of funding to be the achievement of certain procedural goals (notably, to make 
the grant allocation publicly defensible) and of certain substantive goals (notably, 
to protect excellence on research from the effects of this sharp reduction). Once 
the budget cuts were acknowledged as irreversible, there was no disagreement 
between the UGC and the government. There was congruency between the 
government's limited objective of public expenditure constraint and the desire of 
academic policy-makers to protect excellence. Just as the 1981 cuts 
demonstrated that the government regarded itself as entitled to suddenly and 
unilaterally withdraw resources, so there was a willingness to allow universities 
make their own adjustments within the constrains of the reduced funding so their 
autonomy is preserved. 
3 Comment made by Sir Brian. 
4 Ibid. 
Chapter 4: The policy perspective page 110 
As the UGC administered the funds for both teaching and research, and given the 
fall in the real value of total annual funds, it was publicly stated that the selective 
funding of research was a viable method for protecting quality of both teaching 
and research. Selective funding was also a political means of objectively 
defending the cuts given the need to avoid the thinned spreading of resources. 
The UGC carried out its first research assessment in 1986, where it required 
universities to complete a four-part questionnaire covering various aspects of 
their research income and expenditure, research planning, priorities and output. 
Based on the responses, four rating scales were used: excellent, above average, 
average and below average. The UGC was reported as saying that the research 
rating was based on published research work and the amount of outside funding 
received. Apart from these general criteria, however, the UGC did not specify 
how the ratings were arrived at (Humphrey et al, 1996: p. 144). 
In 1989, the UGC conducted its second assessment that incorporated several 
changes in response to criticisms made on the first exercise. The second exercise 
requested far more information concerning research activities than the 1986 
exercise. It focused explicitly on UoA rather than university-wide data. Some of 
the information sought included details of up to two publications per staff, data 
on research students, external research income, and research planning and 
priorities. Table 4.1 shows the 5-point rating scale for the assessment. 
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TABLE 4.1: RATING SCALES FOR ASSESSMENT 
RATING DEFINITION 
5 international excellence in many areas, 
national excellence in all areas 
4 national excellence with some evidence 
of international excellence 
3 national excellence in majority of areas 
or limited international excellence 
2 national excellence in up to half of areas 
1 little or no national excellence 
Following the 1989 exercise, greater importance was placed on research ratings 
as a basis for allocating research funds. The funding body created a new formula 
in which the total block recurrent grant is determined through allocations across 
the three categories: teaching (T), research (R) and, special factor (S). The 
allocation of funds for research is made up of money for direct research (DR), 
contract research (CR), staff research (SR), and judgmental research (JR). The 
money a university received through DR and CR is related directly to non- 
funding body sources. The SR figure is dependent on the total number of U. K. 
weighted students while JR is influenced by the product of weighted student 
numbers and research rating of the UoA. Therefore, while research ratings are an 
explicit revenue determinant, the use of student multipliers means that 
universities can, in theory compensate for any reduction in research income due 
to poor ratings by merely expanding the student population. 
After the 1989 exercise, the binary divide was abolished and the former 
polytechnics became universities. As a result, the following assessment exercise 
/ 
was brought forward to 1992. Differing significantly from previous exercises, 
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the 1992 exercise was the first one under the HEFCE and heralded the start of the 
current system. It was a snapshot approach since it was based on staff in post at 
the time of the exercise, and institutions are permitted to submit only research 
active staff. 
The 1992 exercise also introduced several changes to the funding formula. The 
number of research active staff was now used as a volume multiplier. Units with 
ratings of "1" were not funded. The rating score was converted to a weighting 
score of "rating less one". If a university were to include more staff in its 
submission, it would be gambling as it could reduce its rating score. 
Submissions are becoming a strategic trade off between quality and quantity. 
These changes have resulted in gaming behaviour and strategic submissions. 
These are described and analysed in Chapter Five (also see Talib and Steele, 
2000). 
The 1996 assessment exercise is similar to the one conducted in 1992 except for 
minor modifications and the change in the funding formulae. The 1996 exercise 
is described in the next section. 
4.5 THE QUALITY-RELATED RESEARCH FUNDING5 
Each year the Higher Education Funding Council for England (HEFCE) 
advises the Secretary of State for Education and Employment on the funding 
needs of higher education. T he final total funding for higher education is 
decided by the government and approved by the Parliament. 
S This section is drawn from interviews held with the RAE manager at HEFCE, and from the 
HEFCE publication, "Funding Higher Education in England, " November 1998/67. 
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Formulae are used to determine how most of the money is allocated between 
institutions. After the amount of funding is determined, it is provided in the 
form of a block grant for which institutions are free to allocate according to 
their own priorities within broad guidelines. The institutions are not expected 
to model their internal allocations on the funding council's own funding 
method. 
The Higher Education Institutions (HEIs) are accountable to the Higher 
HEFCE through which they are ultimately accountable to Parliament for use 
of the council funds. The HEIs are independent bodies and are free to raise 
money from other sources. This provides them with scope to pursue 
activities alongside those for which they receive council funds. 
Figure 4.1 details the main sources of funding for the HEIs and shows that 
they receive funding from different public and private sources. 
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Figure 4.1: Main Sources of Funding for HEIs in 1996-97. 
Department for Education and 
Employment 
A 
LEA fees 
£1,049M 
12% 
Other Research income 
£617M 
6.7% 
Council Funding 
£3,502M 
38% 
Office of Science and 
Technology 
Research Councils 
£439M 
5% 
UNIVERSITIES AND COLLEGES 
TOTAL INCOME 
£9,103M 
Charities Residences and 
£310 M catering 
3% £637 M 
Overseas students fees 
£482 M 
5% 
Other income 
£2,067 M 
23% 
SOURCE: "Funding Higher Education in England', HEFCE, November 99/67, p. 
4. (The percentages represent the proportion of total income. ). 
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The HEFCE is the largest single source of income for the institutions of 
higher education. E ach year the total funds are divided b etween teaching, 
research and special funding. The proportions are roughly the same from 
year to year. Table 4.2 shows the breakdown for 1998-99. 
TABLE 4.2: BREAKDOWN OF HEFCE FUNDING IN 1998-99 
Teaching £2,689M 
Research £824M 
Special funding £334M 
Transitional funding and flexibility margin £6M 
TOTAL £3,853M 
The Office of Science and Technology also provides public funds for 
research in universities and colleges. The research councils distribute these 
funds to support research projects and some postgraduate students. 
Public research funds are provided under a dual support system. While the 
HEFCE provides funding towards the cost of the salaries of permanent 
academic staff, premises and central computing costs, the Research Councils 
provide funding for direct project costs and contribute to indirect project 
costs. 
The general funds provided by the HEFCE contribute to the cost of research 
training and provide for `blue sky' type research, which is academia driven 
and rarely supported from industry. The allocation of funds in a block grant 
allows for academic freedom in deciding what research should be pursued 
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and what new lines of research should be initiated. 
The total funding for research in 1998-99 was £824 million and was allocated 
to two main headings: 
" quality-related research (QR) funding - £804 million 
" generic research (GR) funding - £20 million. 
Generic research (GR) funding r ecognises t hat c ollaborative research does not 
have a single beneficiary. Allocations are made in proportion to the institutions' 
GR qualifying incomes. The qualifying income is the total sum received from 
users of research for joint projects where the institution retains the intellectual 
property and publication rights to the research. 
In 1998-99, the QR funding of £804 million was 97.6% of the total research 
funds provided by HEFCE. The total QR fund is divided among subject areas, 
also known as units of assessment (UoA). Each subject is assigned to one of 
three cost weights (see Table 4.3) and these are multiplied by the volume of 
research in UoA to arrive at the total funding for that UoA, ( also called the total 
vote). 
TABLE 4.3: COST WEIGHTS 
WEIGHT 
A high cost laboratory and clinical subjects 1.7 
B intermediate cost subjects 1.3 
C others 1.0 
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The volume of research for each UoA is measured along five separate 
components. These volume components are weighted in this manner: 
" research active academic staff: 
1x "number of full time equivalent (FTE) research active 
academic staff funded from general funds in departments rated 
3b or above, selected for assessment in the RAE". It is up to 
the institution to decide which staff to enter in the RAE. 
" research assistants: 
0.1 x "number of FTE research assistants". 
" research fellow: 
0.1 x "number of FTE research fellows". 
" postgraduate research students: 
0.15 x "number of weighted head-counts of postgraduate 
research students in their second and third years of full-time 
study, or third to sixth years of part-time study. 
research income from charities 
0.25/25,000 x "average of last two years' income from 
charities". Income from charities is divided by £25,000 (a 
researcher's average salary) to obtain a person equivalent. 
The number of research active academic staff is the most important measure 
of volume because it accounts for about two-thirds of the total value. The 
subject totals are distributed to institutions within each subject, in proportion 
to the amount of research multiplied by the quality of research in the subject 
for each institution. 
Funding is proportional to Volume x Quality 
The quality of research is peer reviewed in a RAE conducted periodically. The 
RAE carried out in 1996 informed funding decisions until 2001-02. The 
methodology for the 1996 exercise was similar to that of 1992; the research 
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submitted was peer reviewed by panels of subject specialists, using evidence 
supplied by the assessed groups on standard forms6. Institutions have the 
freedom to submit a proportion of their staff as research active and panels are 
instructed to disregard the work of staff not submitted. 
In RAE 1996, each institution was awarded a rating, on a scale of 1 to 5*, for 
the quality of its research in each UoA for which it made a submission. Table 
4.4 shows how these ratings are related to the funding. 
Table 4.4: RAE ratings converted into funding weights for each UoA 
Funding weights in QR model Funding weights in QR model 
1 0 
2 0 
3b 1 
3a 1.5 
4 2.25 
5 3.375 
5* 4.05 
The funding of research is highly selective because ratings 1 and 2 attract no 
funding, while a rating of 5* attracts approximately four times as much funding 
as a rating of 3b for the same volume of research activity. For 1998-99,75% of 
the HEFCE research fund was granted to only 26 HEIs. 
The amount allocated to each institution within each UoA is proportionate to its 
relative funding score as follows: 
6The 
process is described in the HEFCE circular, "1996 Research Assessment Exercise: 
Guidance on Submissions, " November 1995, (Ref RAE96 2/95) 
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n 
MU :, -l(PU/ P;; )*Vj 
where M ij 
Piu 
vi 
n 
J 
And where: 
(1) 
is the money allocated to University i in UoA j. 
is the funding score for University i in UoA j. 
is the total Vote (money allocated) for UoA j. 
is the number of universities graded in UoA; 
is the university. 
is the subject area. 
Py = G; *[M- +Q I RA; +Q I RR+ Q15 RSj +Q 25 (Q; /25000)] (2) 
Where A is the fiuxling score for University i UoAj 
G is the'rating score' achieved by University, in UoA; 
RAS; is the number of subn itted'research active staff in University; in UoAj 
RA;; is the number of research assistants employa3 by University i in üoAj 
RF is the ninnber of research. fellows employed by University i in UoA> 
RS-j is the number of postgraduate research students in university i in UoA; 
Qf is the average of last two years' income from charities by University i in UoA; 
The number of research active staff should include only those funded from the 
institution's general fund. The detailed rulings on classifications of research 
active staff are in the Funding Councils circular "1996 Research Assessment 
Exercise: guidance on Submissions" (RAE 96 2/95, November 1995) and 
"Research Assessment Exercise 2001: Guidance on submissions" (RAE 2/99, 
May 1999). 
4.6 FORMULA FUNDING AND THE RAE 
The "New Public Management" emphasises the importance of Accountability 
and Performance Evaluation. Accountability for Public expenditure became 
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more stringent and "value for money" was the aim in public management. The 
restriction of resources made available for the education sector meant that the 
allocation of these limited resources had to be more selective. Formula funding 
was introduced to give transparency and objectivity to the selectivity of resource 
allocation. One of the advantages of budget allocations based on formulae is that 
it allows budget cuts and the redistribution of budget allocations with minimal 
political costs. The recipients can see the redistribution (and the budget cuts) as 
being objectively arrived at. 
Incentive funding, in particular formula funding, can be established to reward 
movements in specific directions that embody policy goals of the central funding 
agency. Maassen and Vught (1994) noted the shift towards the use of financial 
incentives in the public sector to provide a broad steer towards government 
objectives. One of the objectives of introducing research assessments in 1986 was 
to maintain the policy of funding research at universities. During the early 1980s, 
the government was of the view that universities did not produce sufficient high 
quality research and considered supporting research at the civil service level 
instead7. The funding council implemented the formal assessment of research 
output by the universities to defend the support of academic research in the 
universities at the national level. This objective has been achieved although the 
funding levels have been reduced. 
The RAE has two major functions: (a) basis for resource allocation and (b) 
accountability for public funds. From the national perspective, formula funding 
7 Personal interview with Sir Brian Folett. 
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allows budget cuts with minimal political costs. The objective is to reward 
research excellence and to develop centres of excellence. The accountability 
objective would be served if excellence in research could be demonstrated. This 
. also means that 
financial support may be withdrawn if departments do not meet 
the required standards. Consequently, through the RAE, financial incentives are 
used to reward excellence in research. 
The policy objective of creating centres of excellence implies that universities 
should concentrate effort and funds in their respective areas of strength. 
However, as discussed in Section 4.2, the marginal utility of the additional funds 
is greater if support is given to weaker departments. Furthermore, there is the 
issue of the ceiling effect discussed in Section 4.7. While the avowed policy 
objective is to achieve research excellence, the RAE actually measures research 
output. Academics may focus on the quantity of output rather than quality of the 
research. These issues are examined in this dissertation. 
The introduction of a policy factor into the funding method would allow the 
amount provided for each subject (the subject quanta) to be weighted to reflect 
the nation's relative international strength, or national need, in different subjects. 
If research capability is effectively matched to the demands of the project fund 
providers, the introduction of a policy factor may be unnecessary. However, if 
there are areas where the capability of the higher education sector is significantly 
out of line with demand from project fund providers, then the introduction of a 
policy factor might be thought desirable. On consultation with Higher Education 
Institutions, the funding council (HEFCE) decided to include the policy factor but 
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maintained it at a factor of one for the meantime. This policy factor can always 
be activated when required. 
The 1990s were a transition period. Significant changes took place in the 
funding of Higher Education Institutions in 1992. The Binary divide was 
abolished and higher education institutions previously funded almost wholly for 
teaching by the Polytechnic and the Colleges Funding Council (PCFC) became 
eligible for research funding. T he n umber of staff who could attract r esearch 
funding almost doubled overnight, but there was no proportionate expansion in 
funds for research. Selective allocation became more crucial. These 
developments prompted a change in thinking about how to measure the volume 
of research conducted in institutions. Before 1992, when the `old' universities 
were being funded for both teaching and research, the underlying assumption 
was that all academic staff were involved in both teaching and research. Hence, 
the volume of staff could be regarded as a measure of research volume. It was 
the full-time equivalent of the funded student load that was used to determine the 
allocation. Institutions were allowed to recruit as many students as they wished, 
but the funded student number remained constant. The funded student number in 
any particular subject was regarded as a reasonable proxy for the relative 
distribution of research active staff within subjects and between institutions. 
The assumption that all academic staff carried out teaching and research was not 
sustainable post 1992 mainly as a result of the disproportionate increase of 
number of staff attracting funding and the level of funds available. The 
allocation of research funds had to be selective to avoid it being diluted and to 
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ensure that it is allocated to institutions that carried out research. It was decided 
that, instead of total volume of staff, the volume of research active academic staff 
was to be used as part proxy for research volume. The 1992 RAE allowed 
institutions the choice of selective submissions. The volume of research active 
staff submitted under the RAE was used as a part proxy for volume. The former 
PCFC- funded institutions experienced an immediate benefit from the abolition 
of the binary divide. They received a total of only £8 million of research funding 
in the academic year 1992-1993 under the o Id regime. This increased to£ 42 
million in the academic year 1993-1994 after the abolition of the binary divide. 
During this period, the immediate focus was on allocating research funds to 
institutions that were active in research and were achieving the objective of 
research improvement. Institutions that did not improve their relative research 
quality were expected to receive fewer funds. Thus, the funding gap between the 
highly rated institutions and the low rated ones would increase. 
The autonomy and freedom of behaviour given to institutions enables them the 
flexibility of concentrating resources in areas that have the potential to be centres 
of excellence. As only a few institutions have the capability to achieve research 
excellence inm any areas, itiso my r ealistic for the 1 arge majority oft hem to 
focus on fewer disciplines. However, universities have strong traditions and 
values that may differ with this expectation. The situation is a much more 
complex web of contrasts. Apart from barriers to entry in some research areas, 
some universities regard that it is important to have a wide range of disciplines 
and a wide range of research activities because research can have positive effects 
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on teaching. Universities value academic freedom highly and the arrival of 
selective funding for research can be seen as an intrusion on their academic 
freedom and autonomy. 
The outcomes of the 1992 RAE and the 1996 RAE show a predictable gap in 
research performance between the old and the new universities. It is unlikely 
that the new universities will have the necessary funding and skilled researchers 
to achieve research excellence across a range of subject areas (McKenna, 1996). 
In competing for selective funding, a viable strategy for new universities is to 
develop a small number of centres of excellence. 
A strategic behaviour elicited by the transparent RAE funding formulae is that of 
the attempts to shadow the formula (Whittington, 1997) in order to establish the 
financial implications of their decisions in allocating resources between 
departments. Some universities (Bourn 1994a; 1994b) have adopted devolved 
budgeting systems. Interviews with university administrators reveal that a 
number of institutions are adopting devolved budgeting and departments are 
allocated the total amount earned from the RAE exercise after `top slicing' for 
central expenses8. Other universities have internal formulae for distributing the 
RAE block grant to the various departments with the RAE rating achieved by the 
department as a contributing variable. 
If research performance generally improves, then universities with the highest 
ratings would receive a progressively smaller share of the available research 
8 See Chapter Six for details. 
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funds (Williams, 1993). This is accentuated by the ceiling effect (see Section 
4.7). H owever, to concentrate resource allocation inc entres of excellence, it 
would be necessary to progressively increase the proportion of funds allocated to 
the "top tier" universities. Williams' assertion will hold if the funding scale 
remains constant, i. e., if the 1996 funding scale was the same as the 1992 funding 
scale. To illustrate, assume the scenario where the total funds available for 
distribution by the HEFCE is fixed at the same level for a period straddling two 
RAEs, and where the funding methodology and formulae are unchanged. 
Suppose also that the number of staff in the UoA and the level of research 
volume are constant, and the only change is in the quality of research, which is 
increasing. As the total funds to be allocated to a subject area would be based on 
research volume and not the quality, then each area would receive the same total 
amount, i. e., the vote, over the two RAE periods. The RAE research funding is 
allocated to departments based on a point system. The RAE rating is converted 
into a score (see Table 4.5) that is multiplied by the volume measure to arrive at 
the total points for the department (i. e., UoA), that is the quality-weighted 
volume. For example, a department with a rating of 5 in the 1992 exercise would 
have that rating converted to a score of 4 (the score for a rating of 5 in the 1996 
exercise was 3.375). If a department submitted 60 FTE as research active, then 
the q uality-weighted volume for the d epartment would be2 40 (= 4 x60). T he 
quality-weighted volume for each department under that subject area would then 
be aggregated. Thus, if the total funds allocated to the subject area is 
£2,000,000, and the total value of the weighted volume measure for all the 
departments for that subject area is 2000; the value per point is £1000 
£2,000,000-2000). The hypothetical department will receive £240,000 (_ 
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£1000x240). 
Suppose the research active department also achieves a rating of 5 in 1996 RAE 
and, the ratings and score of RAE 1996 are not different from that for 1992. If it 
does not increase its volume measure, then the relative amount of funds it 
receives would decline. Further, assume that the total allocation to the subject 
area remains at £2,000,000, all the departments' volume measures were held 
constant, and the only change is in the quality of the other departments. Suppose 
three departments improved their 1992 ratings of 3 to ratings of 4 in 1996, and 
the other two departments improved from 4 in 1992 to "5" in 1996, and each 
department had a volume measure of 40 FTE staff. These five departments 
would account for a total quality weighted volume in 1992 that is equivalent to 
480 (= 3[2x40] + 2[3x40]). As a result of their improved ratings in 1996, they 
would have a combined total quality weighted volume of 680 (= 3[3x40] + 
2[4x40]) that is an increase of 200 points. Since the total quality weighted 
volume would have increased from 2000 to 2200, the value per point would be 
£909 (= £2,000,000-2200). The hypothetical department would then receive 
only £218,160 (= 240x909). Thus, if the rating scores are unchanged, the 
departments with the highest rating would have lost out in subsequent funding 
distributions resulting in what is termed here as the ceiling effect (see Section 4.7 
for an elaboration). 
4.7 THE RATING SCALE AND THE CEILING EFFECT 
A significant change in RAE 1996 was the rating scale, which rates institutions 
on a scale of 1 to 5*. Table 4.4 shows the conversion of these ratings to funding 
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scores, and Table 4.5 provides a comparison with the 1992 funding scale. A 
rating of 1 or 2 would not attract any funding in the 1996 exercise, while the 
rating of 2 was eligible for funding in the 1992 exercise. The intent seems to be 
to withdraw funds from the low rated departments and to intensify the support 
for centres of excellence. For a particular volume of research activity, the rating 
of 5* attracted 20% more funding than the rating of 5. This new rating rewards 
research improvements as centres of excellence that do not improve. 
Table 4.5 Comparison between 1996 funding scale and 1992 funding 
scale 
Rating 96 Score 96 increase Rating92 Score 92 increase 
5* 4.05 20% NA 
5 3.375 50% 5 4 33% 
4 2.25 50% 4 3 50% 
3a 1.5 50% 3 2 100% 
3b 1 NA NA 
2 0 NA 2 1 NA 
1 0 NA 1 0 
The scale for the 1992 funding score was not proportionate. For example, for the 
same volume of research activity, the funding difference between a2 rating and a 
3 rating is one-fold or 100% more funding for the "3" rating, while the increase 
in funding from a4 rating to a5 is only 33%. The scale for 1996 was more 
proportionate in that for every increase in rating the funding increased by 50%, 
except when the increase was from the 5 rating to the 5* which then earned only 
20%. In 1992, the highest rated department received 4 times the amount of funds 
that was accorded to the lowest funded department for the same volume of 
Chapter 4: The policy perspective page 128 
research activity, while in 1996 they obtained 4.05 times more. According to a 
HEFCE, the 20% for the 5* rated departments is intended for maintaining centres 
of excellence in research (HEFCE Circular 4/97, February 1997, para. 37). This 
was to compensate the highest rated departments since it is not possible to 
increase ratings beyond the upper limit. If the funding scale remains stagnant, 
then the only way for the highest rated departments to get more funds would be 
to increase their research volumes. The difficulty is exaggerated when we 
consider that the competitors will endeavour to increase ratings. Hence, the 
denominator in equation (1) [the summation of institutions' funding score] will 
increase, reducing the value per point. This is what we termed the ceiling effect. 
To illustrate this point further, we examined the fund allocation in Business and 
Management Studies resultant from the RAE 1996. The quality related research 
(QR) funding distribution for 1997 - 1998 under the RAE 1996 funding scale and 
simulated under the 1992 funding scale is depicted in Table 4.6 at end of this 
chapter. The simulated distribution using 1992 funding scale is to enable us to 
postulate what the funding distribution would have been like had the funding 
scales not changed in the 1996 RAE. 
For RAE 1996, there were eight institutions rated 5 and 5* that shared 
£8,404,269, or 46.22%, of the total £18,184,901 allocated for Business and 
Management studies. These were institutions with research quality that were 
equal to international standards in at least some sub-areas of activity and 
attainable levels of national standards in virtually all other areas. The 13 
institutions rated 4 shared 33% (£5,942,619), 12 institutions rated 3a shared 13% 
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(£2,325,756), and 11 institutions rated 3b shared the remaining 8% (£1,512,257). 
Table 4.6 displays what the budget distribution might have been under the 1996 
RAE results had the 1992 RAE funding scale been maintained. The higher rated 
institutions would have received a lower share. The funds per unit of quality- 
weighted volume would have decreased from £4,8029 to £3,48610 due to the 
increase of the quality-weighted volume to 5217.19. The London Business 
School (LBS), for example, would have received only £1,165,300 (83.57x4x 
3486) in 1997-98 as opposed to the current level of funding of £1,615,781 (only 
72%). It is similar with the other 5* institutions. However, a department rated 5 
would experience a different effect. For example, Warwick Business School 
would have received £1,505,210 which is 86% of current funding. The 
differences for the other levels of ratings are shown in Table 4.6. 
This variance is basically due to the difference in the funding scale and the funds 
per unit of quality-weighted volume as follows: 
Difference (%) = (3486 -- 4802)11 x (1992 funding scale -- 1996 funding scale) 
If the 5* rating had not been introduced, i. e., if the same 1992 funding scale were 
retained, the 5* rated institutions would have obtained only 72% of the current 
funding due to the better performance of the competitors (even though they 
would still be the leaders in the field). This ceiling effect is contrary to the 
policy objectives of the formula allocation. It would seem that to overcome this 
18,184,901+3786.89 
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dilemma the ceiling imposed is a moving ceiling. The 20% premium given to 
departments rated 5* is explicitly to reward top rated departments that improve 
their research excellence. 
The HEFCE have been cognisant in changing the funding scale. The new 
funding scale re-directed £2,120,37312 from the lower rated to the higher rated 
institutions. Of this amount, £77,073 (3.6%) was passed on to the 3a rated 
departments, £192,886 (9.1%) to the 4 rated institutions, £512,947 (24.2%) to 
institutions rated 5; and the remaining £1,337,468 (63%) to institutions rated 5*. 
This re-allocation of funds, leading to further concentration of funds in centres of 
excellence, was achieved through the changes in the funding scale. Funds were 
withdrawn from institutions that had a2 rating. The funding scale was 50% 
lower for 3a, 25% lower for 3b and 4,15.6% lower for 5, but 1.25% higher for 
institutions rated 5*. The lower the institution's rating, the higher the reduction 
in the funding scale, thereby leading to a higher concentration of funds in the top 
end of the rating scale. 
4.8 CONCLUDING REMARKS. 
The ceiling effect illuminates the need for continual increase in the multiplier gap 
between the high ratings and the low ratings to achieve the policy objective of 
creating and supporting centres of excellence. In response, the HEFCE has 
introduced the eventual 5* category and amended the ratings funding scale. 
The points raised in this chapter are relevant to formula based allocation of 
18,184,901+5217.19 
The ratio of the value per point. 
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public funds in general, where the variables in the formula will determine 
strategies adopted by the recipient bodies. Through the formula funding 
mechanism, viz., the research selectivity exercise, research funds are being 
concentrated in a relatively small number of departments for each discipline to 
develop into centres of excellence. Nevertheless, the HEFCE asserts that the 
objective is to fund excellence in research wherever it flourishes, and that the 
intention is not to lead to the concentration of research into a limited number of 
centres of excellence. The official position is that that formula funding is 
essential for establishing transparency and objectivity. But, modification of the 
funding scale with effect from the 1996 RAE has resulted in a greater 
concentration of the funds in the high rated departments. This is accentuated 
with the introduction of the 5* rating in the 1996 RAE that was meant to sustain 
the centres of excellence by alleviating the restrictive ceiling effect to ensure that 
the flow of funds is not prejudiced. Ultimately, it is likely that the greater 
portion of the quality related research (QR) research funding would be 
designated for a small number of institutions. 
To steer research towards national needs and priorities, a policy factor has been 
introduced to influence the allocation of research funds. Currently, the HEFCE 
sets it at a level of one so that it is neutral for the time being. Universities 
opposed the use of the Policy factor, as it would impinge on their tradition of 
academic freedom and autonomy in determining priorities for funding and 
research. 
12 (1439437 + 2193193) - 1512257 [see Table 4.4]. 
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Though this thesis is concerned mainly with the quality related research (QR) 
funds from HEFCE, which is the dominant stream of funding, t here are other 
streams distributed by HEFCE d esigned toe ncourage/reward specific kinds of 
research activity. These non-QR research streams are smaller and are set-up for 
specific goals. 13 Alongside most systems of formula funding of large amounts of 
money, there are sub-streams of funding designed to meet specific policy goals. 
These marginal sub-streams of funding affect the sector in a disproportionate 
way. 
Policy makers, in pursuit of accountability for public funds, attempt to ensure 
that public funds are efficiently utilised in line with national policies and 
objectives. They would want the variables included in formula based allocation 
of public funds to influence institutional and individual behaviours and strategies 
in line with national policies and objectives. Universities have traditionally had a 
number of other value-related traditions that may conflict with the view that 
`national policies and objectives' are primarily, if not exclusively, the ones that 
should be followed. The most significant of these goals is academic freedom and 
autonomy to determine their own priorities. Another is that research and in 
particular `blue sky' research is important for all universities and academics to 
pursue. Universities have also traditionally held the view that research and 
teaching are linked, 'and innovation and freedom to carry out research is not 
necessarily best confined to a few monopoly centres of funding. 
The paradox in formula based allocation of funds in the higher education sector 
13 Some of these streams are described in the I-IEFCE publication, "Funding higher education in 
England, " November 1998/67. - 
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is to achieve accountability for public funds (including their application to 
achieve national policies and goals), and to maintain universities' freedom and 
autonomy to set their own priorities. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE RESEARCH ASSESSMENT EXERCISE: 
STRATEGIES AND TRADE-OFFS' 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter explains the strategies institutions can adopt when making their 
RAE submissions. For instance, choosing which staff to submit as research 
active in the RAE submissions is a strategic trade-off between quantity and 
quality. The chapter develops a theoretical model for RAE submissions that 
would yield an optimum funding strategy. It also discusses the resultant impact 
on human resource management issues. 
Our submission strategy model has the maximisation of funding as the sole 
objective, although in practice, such a funding maximisation principle would not 
be the sole objective for universities or their departments. As discussed in 
Chapter Three (see Table 3.1), the RAE ratings that the recipient obtains are 
important since it is also vital for attracting and retaining staff and students. 
Nevertheless, the immediate objective in the model is the funding. The inclusion 
of subjective variables such as reputation would muddle or dilute the objectivity 
1 Substantial parts of this chapter have been published in two papers: A. Talib & A. Steele "The 
Research Assessment Exercise: Strategies and Trade-offs ", Higher Education Quarterly, Vol. 54 
(1) January 2000, pp 68-88; and A. Talib "Simulations of the Submission Decision in the 
Research Assessment Exercise: the 'who' and 'where' decision'; Education Economics. Vol. 7 
(1), 1999 pp 39-51. 
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and reliability of the model. 
The RAE is a budgeting tool that allocates funds to eligible recipients (units of 
assessment) based on their past performances that are benchmarked against the 
other units of assessment (UoA). The UoAs are permitted to selectively submit 
their past performance. This gives scope for biasing and filtering. Biasing is the 
result of choosing from a set of possible messages the one that is likely to be 
accepted and is most favourable to the sender. Filtering occurs when the data are 
filtered such that the more desirable elements are communicated and the less 
desirable are omitted. The procedures of the budget allocation for higher 
education allow for some discretion. For example, the university can decide on 
the number of staff to submit. This biasing behaviour in submitting just the 
optimal staff list is a creative submission that is analogous to creative 
accounting. 
There are two decisions in the submission strategy in order to achieve the 
optimal or maximum funding. The first decision - the who decision - is the 
quality vs. quantity trade-off that involves the number of staff to be submitted as 
research active. The second decision - the where decision - entails to which 
UoA panel to submit. The two choices are interactive since the who influences 
the where, and vice-versa. 
This chapter formulates a theoretical basis for some of the issues discussed in the 
case study interviews (see Chapter Six). The next section of this chapter 
provides a brief description of the research funding process and the research 
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funding formula. Section 5.3 crafts an argument for an optimum strategy of 
coalition formation. The marginal analysis is in Section 5.4. Section 5.5 
discusses some human resource management strategies relevant to the RAE, in 
particular the value of a mentor. The where decision - the choice of panel to 
submit under - is in Section 5.6. The last section offers some concluding 
remarks. 
5.2 RESEARCH SELECTIVITY AND FORMULA FUNDING 
Although many articles and papers have been published on the RAE, the 
majority of them have been descriptive. Only the Johnston study (1994) 
explicitly dealt with submission strategies by evaluating the financial 
consequences of the interaction between volume and grade for the Politics 
departments. In order to derive an optimal submissions strategy, this chapter 
extends Johnston's trade-off matrix for various scenarios of grade and research 
active staff coalition. 
The funding process is characterised below: The total sum, or vote, is first 
allocated to each subject area also known as UoA. The amount for each 
institution within each subject area is proportionate to its relative funding score 
as follows (see also Chapter Four): 
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R 
MU -(PY/2: P;; )*Vj (1) 
where M ij is the money allocated to University; in UoA j. 
P ij is the funding score for University i in UoA 
V; is the total Vote (money allocated) for UoA j. 
n is the number of universities graded in UoA; 
i is the university. 
j is the subject area. 
And where: 
Pif = G> * [RAS; + 0.1 RAU + 0.15 RS;; + 0.05 (CI; /25000)] [2] 
Where P;; is the funding score for Univeisity i UoAj 
Gi j is the'rating score' achieved by University i UoAj 
RAS; is the number of submitted 'research active staff in University i UoAj 
RAS is the number of research assistants employedby University i UoAj 
RSj is the number of postgraduate research students in university i UoAj 
CI, "j is the volume of research money obtained from charities by University i UoAj 
The rating score Gy of university i in unit of assessment (UoA)j is a function of 
the ratings achieved in the research assessment exercise (RAE). The rating score 
corresponding to each rating is summarised in Table 5.1. The rating grades of 
the RAE 1996 themselves correspond to a 7-point scale. For example, a 5* 
rating has a rating score [Gy] of 4.05 and a scale value of 7. The procedures for 
classifications of research active staff are in the circular from the Funding 
Councils, "1996 research assessment Exercise: guidance on Submissions" 
(RAE96,2/95, November 1995). 
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TABLE 5.1: 
1996 RAE Grade Scale 1996 Rating Score ** 1992 Rating Score ** 
5* 7 4.05 (5 *) 4 (5) 
5 6 3.375 (5) 3 (4) 
4 5 2.25 (4) 2 (3) 
3a 4 1.5 (3a) not applicable 
3b 3 1 (3b) 1 (2) 
2 2 0 (2) 0 (1) 
1 1 0 (1) not applicable 
The terms in brackets are the grading codes adopted by the HEFCE. In financial terms the Code 
2 in 1992 is the same as the Code 3b in 1996; Code 1 in 1992 is the same as Code 2 in 1996 and 
so forth. 
G in Equation [2] is the rating score that has been determined by an aggregation 
process. The assessment procedure, according to HEFCE2, is not as 
automatically algorithmic as in this characterisation, but the aim of simplification 
is to be instructive. The assessment process that involves subjective judgements 
is s ummarised h ere inam anner t hat is analogous to the E xamination Boards' 
classification of degrees as these are a combination of rules and subjective 
judgement (also see Whittington [1997] for criteria and procedures employed by 
the Accountancy Assessment Panel). It is emphasised that the assessment 
process described here is an idealisation of the rating process so that the strategy 
can be modelled mathematically. The model is a proxy for the approach used in 
the RAE. Johnes and Taylor (1992) noted that the quantity of research output is 
not ignored since the requirement in RAE 1996 of up to four publications by 
each member of staff implied that a minimum number of research publications 
were expected of all submitted staff. Therefore the spread of research output 
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across individuals in each department is taken into account. This was 
unmistakable for the 1989 exercise (Johnes and Taylor, 1992). The basis for the 
1989 5-point scale is as follows: 
Rating Attainable levels of 
Point national excellence 
reached by: 
Proportion of department 
none Up to 50% Majority All 
1+ 
2+ 
3+ 
4+ 
'S + 
Source: UFC (1989) as reported in Johnes and Taylor (1992). 
Attainable levels 
international excellence 
reached by: 
Proportion of department 
None Some 
Furthermore, the HEFCE has solicited comments on complementing peer review 
by quantitative indicators (RAE 2/97 para. 31) and expresses this optimism: 
"And it would be novel if performance of individuals became the 
explicit focus of assessment" (ibid, para. 34) 
The Assessment Process 
Each academic staff m ember submits upto four pieces ofp ublished work for 
assessment. The assessor's task is to categorize and describe the quality of the 
work. The works are to be categorised A, B or C. Category A is equivalent to 
work published in international refereed and reputable journals. Category B is 
2 
HEFCE "1996 Research Assessment Exercise: Guidance on Submissions" 2/95, November 
1995, (para. 5). 
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equivalent to papers published in nationally ranked journals. All other 
submissions fall into Category C. -It is noted that the Accountancy Panel avoids 
listing the approved or ranked journals, though the members of the panel 
deliberate on the relative quality of the journals (Whittington, 1997: p. 184). 
The grade for each academic is the summary of the percentage work in each 
category. This descriptive summary may not be applicable to disciplines where 
assessment of quality is based on measurement units other than journal articles as 
in the case of the Performing Arts. Disciplines in most social sciences would fit 
the process explained. T able 5 -2 illustrates how summary grades are mapped 
from categories of the papers. This mapping is not necessarily how the 
assessment panels actually assessed the ratings but is offered as an example of 
the proxy process presented-here. The process summarises the attempts to 
substitute the subjective judgement with objectivity that can be captured in a 
mathematical model. 
TABLE 5.2: 
No of category A 
payers 
4 5* 
35 5* RAE grade 
2 3a 55 
12 3a 44 
012 3b 3a 4 
01234 
No. of category B papers 
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The feedback from academics who served on RAE panels is that the algorithm is 
too stark, and that qualitative judgements have played a larger role than merely 
producing a summary statistic as a description. The attempt here is to idealize 
the rating ]process in order to surmount the criticism that different panels using 
different assessment criteria and the associated subjectivity have resulted in non- 
uniformity in awarding the ratings. It is an issue that has also been raised by the 
HEFCE in the Research Assessment Consultation Document', which seeks 
responses on the inclusion of quantitative aspects in the assessment. 
The non-uniformity in standards of assessment by different panels is crucial 
because some academic groups, e. g., Business Schools and Engineering, have a 
choice of panes under which to make their submissions. Thus, an Accounting 
group in a Business School can choose to submit either under the Business and 
Management (BMS) panel or under the Accountancy panel It is worth noting 
that the Accountancy Panel advises the BMS Panel on all accounting 
submissions (Whittington 1997). 
The rating that a UoA achieves can be viewed as a descriptive summary statistic 
describing the percentage of work in each category. A UoA would submit n 
number of staff with each staff submitting four pieces of work. This submission 
generates a table of 4xn matrix for assessment as follows: 
3 HEFCE, "Research Assessment: Consultation, " ref. RAE 2/97, Nov. 1997 (para. 31, Question 
16). 
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X11k X124 
.. "-"X1.4 
X21k X22k 
.... 
x2. k 
X114 X32k 
.... 
i3n4 
Lt* X42* 
.. -. 
Xlnk 
Where X; * represents the publicatim i(i =1... 4) of academic i in a unit of assessmentk. 
Through their judgement, the assessors categorise the papers as either A, B or C. 
At this stage, the submission is reduced to a2xn matrix: 
X1 X2, 
----- 
Ykna 
XIb X2b 
--- 
Xnb 
where X,, and X, b are the simple counts of the number of papers in 
Categories A and B. Based on the number of papers in Categories 
A and B, a grade is allocated to each staff using the conversions in 
Table 2, further reducing the matrix to a1xn matrix: 
[gi g2 g3 i... gn 
] 
where g= grade per member of staff 
The overall grade for the UoA is then a summary of this vector. 
The gj's are sorted into rank order and the RAE grade for the u nit is G';; the 
median of g;. If G'; is the grade for a sub-unit, then the grade for the UoA (G; ) 
will be the median of G';. The assessments are based on the median values to 
develop a mathematical model that can represent the RAE process. This is a 
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reasonable proxy given that the rating scale descriptions make frequent reference 
to the majority of work being classified at a particular level. (see Whittington, 
1997, Appendix A: p. 192). In the presentation in this thesis, the limitation from , 
oversimplification of the rating process is counteracted by the need to integrate a 
reasonably objective and quantifiable proxy for the subjective element of the 
assessment process. 
Equation [2] is the total funding score for a UoA in a university. The sum of the 
terms in the square brackets is the volume measure (Vo). The most significant 
influence on the volume measure is the number of research active staff that is 
submitted. The volume measure is the only item that is not re-computed annually 
for funding purposes. The total funding that a UoA receives is therefore a 
function of the relative rating and volume measure. The inclusion of weaker 
researchers as research active staff may decrease the median grade and hence the 
funds. This is acknowledged by the HEFCE when it states: 
"The great majority of staff informer UFC institutions will have 
entered employment as both teachers and researchers. In 1992, 
most of these were returned to the exercise. In many instances, 
the quality of research will not be even across a group or unit, 
and the inclusion of "weaker" researchers may bring down the 
grade and hence the funds. Overall, it appears that UFC 
institutions have been more selective, as a result, in returning 
stafffor the 1996 exercise" (M6/97, p. 143) 
5.3 A SUBMISSION STRATEGY 
As pointed out in Section 5.1, funding may not be the most important factor for a 
department or university when making this submission. Nevertheless, the model 
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presented hereafter focuses on the strategy of maximising the financial outcome, 
viz., the funding allocation. It is worthwhile to point out the differences between 
the optimum long-term strategy and optimum submission strategy. The optimum 
objective in the long run is obviously to attain the highest rating with 
submissions of the highest number of research active staff, i. e., maximum 
volume of full time equivalent, staff (FTE). This objective cannot be achieved 
overnight except with the massive hiring of 5* researchers by the institution. 
For an institution, the variables influencing its share of the funds are the total 
vote for each UoA, research active staff that it and other institutions submit 
(volume), and the RAE ratings of the institution and that of the other institutions 
(quality measure). The total vote affecting the aggregate level is a political 
decision and. beyond the jurisdiction of any institution. As the staff submissions 
and ratings of other institutions are exogenous to the model, the optimum 
strategy for an institution would be to maximise its funding score (see Equation 
[2]). Except for the research active staff, the variables in the volume measure 
(Vo) are updated annually for funding purposes. The number of staff submitted 
for the assessment continues to be used as the volume measure until the 
following round of assessment. The focus in this analysis on the strategic 
submission of research active staff is motivated by the constant staff 
measurement, the internal decision on which staff to be classified as research 
active, and the high weight (viz., weight of one) given to research active staff in 
relation to the other volume measures. 
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Assuming that the rating achieved by the UoA is the median of the ratings 
achieved by that UoA, the optimum submission level can be determined with this 
maximisation function. 
MAX [G x Vosj] [3] 
Subject to the following constraint : 
Vor; <_[2Voy -1] S Vor 
Where : 
Gy is the grade score for a rating by university i in UoA j. 
Vor is the number of research active staff submitted by university i in UoA j. 
Vor; is the number of research active staff at univ i in UoA j rated Z G; . 
Vor; * is the total number of staff available in university i in UoA j. 
The variable Gain Equation [3] being the grade score attached to the numerical 
rating (4.05 for a 5*, 3.375 for a5 rating, and so on) has only one of six possible 
values (see Table 5.1). 
It is easy to enumerate the possible outcomes and arrive at the optimum coalition 
of research active staff. Define G,; * as the grade score attainable if all the staff in 
UoAjwere submitted as research active by university i. This represents the initial 
solution. The only feasible moves from this initial solution is to reduce staff size 
submitted as research active (the volume measure) to see if a higher grade (the 
quality measure) is achieved, and if it improves the overall funding. This process 
of eliminating the tail ends of staff is repeated until the optimal coalition is 
obtained. 
The volume measure (Vo) in Equation [3] pertains only to research active staff. 
It differs from the volume measure in Equation [2] that includes research 
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assistants, research students and research money received from Charities. Voj is 
the optimum size of research active staff submission by university i in UoAj, 
given their current staff distribution in terms of research quality. 
The data requirements for applying Equation [3] are the total staff rating 
distribution. Institutions may be able to judge relative quality of individuals with 
some reasonable certainty but may find it difficult to make ex-ante judgements of 
absolute quality with the same level of certainty. Making judgements of relative 
quality and then applying sensitivity analysis to evaluate submission strategies 
can resolve this dilemma. The evidence in the M cNay study (1997) suggested 
that many institutions pursue internal evaluations of research performance. In 
some institutions, group or departmental reviews are held with full cross- 
institutional representation. These reviews aimed to identify research strengths 
for input into the funding decisions and for planning future assessment exercises. 
The objective to be maximised in Equation [3] is the total funds to be obtained 
from the selective funding exercise. The equation does not take into account 
other hidden costs and benefits of a low-rating or high-rating in research such as 
reputation halo effects in student and staff recruitment. The constraint in the 
optimisation arises from the fact that as the staff submitted as research active 
increases, the median rating changes. At some point when the research active 
staff submission is increased by a number of weak-rated staff who are below the 
current median, the overall rating attained and hence the grade score will drop. 
The best combination of grade score and volume must be one that is feasible 
under the prevailing scenario. To ensure that the volume is feasible for a 
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particular grade then the majority of the submissions must at least be of that 
grade's quality level. Based on the median as a summary measure, at least half 
of the submissions must be rated at a score equivalent to Gy or higher. 
5.4 MARGINAL ANALYSIS 
The two strategies for institutions to increase funding are: (1) decrease research 
active staff who are full time equivalent (FTE) for an increase in rating; or (2) 
increase FTEs at the cost of a reduced rating. These strategies are discussed 
below. 
5.4.1 Case 1: Reduced Submission and Increased Rating 
One strategy to increase the funding would be to reduce the number of staff 
submitted to achieve a higher rating. The increase in the funding multiple from a 
higher rating is shown in Table 5-1. For example, submissions by the University 
of Warwick and London School of Economics (LSE) under Business and 
Management Studies for RAE 1996 were rated 5 overall. They could have 
obtained the same level of funding had they been rated S* with just 83.3% of the 
staff size submitted. In this case, any coalition that is greater than 83.3% would 
have secured more funds. It was noted that the 20% premium for a5* rating was 
not made known before the submissions. Moreover, at the time of the 1996 RAE 
submissions, universities were under the impression that ratings of 5 and 5* 
would attract equal funding. 
The strategy of increasing the rating by one point by reducing the size of 
research active staff submitted would result in higher funding only if the revised 
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submission size is higher than the minimum submission size required. This 
minimum is the submission size that would achieve the same level of funding at 
the higher rating as the present level of funding at the current rating. 
To sustain the same level of funding for an incremental rating, the following 
Equation [4] must hold: 
Sn=S"Y 
where 
[4} 
g is the rating score of the current rating (i. e., 4.05,3.375, and so forth. ). 
n is the size of the current submission (FTE). 
g^ is the rating score at the rating one point higher than current rating. 
y is the size of submission at the new rating (g^ ). 
g^ can also be expressed as : 
g^_[l+p]g 
where : 
p is the premium in the rating score. (i. e., 20% for 5* and 50% for the rest). 
Equation [4] can be re-stated as Equation [5] below to obtain the minimum 
submission size required for maintaining the current funding level. 
y= gn /[l + p]g [s] 
Therefore 
1 
y_n l+p 
where 
y is the minumum submission size. 
g is the rating score. 
n is the size of the current submission 
p is the premium in rating score on increasing the ratings one level from current rating. 
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The premium (p) is 20% for a point increase from 5 to P. The other one point 
increases have a 50% premium. The minimum submission size (y) is therefore a 
percentage [1/(1+p)] of the current submission size. The percentages for each 
rating point increase are as follows: 
5 to 5* [1/(1+0.2)] = 83.3% 
4 to 5 [1/(1+0.5)] = 66.67% 
3a to 4 [1/(1+0.5)] = 66.67% 
3b to 3a [11(1+0.5)] = 66.67% 
1 or 2 to 3b any submission (as it moves from a position of no 
funding to funding) 
5.4.2 Case 2: Increased Submission and Reduced Rating 
Another strategy to increase funding would be to increase the number of staff 
submitted at the expense of a lower rating. This strategy is feasible only if the 
revised submission size is higher than the minimum submission size required. 
This minimum is the submission size that would result in the same level of 
funding at the lower rating as the present level of funding at the current rating. 
Institutions r ated 3bdo not have t his option, as any reduction int heir ratings 
would result in them losing their funding. 
The minimum staff submitted is the inverse of Equation [5], i. e., y= n(1+p). 
A 5* rated department that aspires to increase its funding by increasing its 
submission at the expense of lowering its rating to 5 would need to submit an 
increase of at least of 20% of staff. A department rated 5 or below can only 
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increase its funding level at a one point lower rating if its submission size is 
increased by a minimum of 50%. Therefore a 5* rated department can adopt this 
strategy if, and only if; its current submission size is less than 83.34% of total 
staff size4. A department rated 5 or below can adopt this strategy only if their 
present submission size is less than 66.67% of total staff, since they need to 
increase the submission by 50%. 
5.5 HUMAN RESOURCE STRATEGY 
An area of great changes in institutions affected by the RAE is the management 
of human resources. This has been anticipated by the HEFCE: 
"Possibly the most traumatic human resources effect linked to the 
RAE is the requirement for institutions to decide upon, and return 
to the exercise, research active staff. " 
(HEFCE report M 6/97: para. 82) 
The evidence in McNay (1997) and this thesis show that institutions are 
concerned over who they recruit for research, and how they should reward and 
retain existing staff. 
The RAE assesses institutions on the performance of the staff in post at the 
census date. The institutions are then funded for the ensuing four years based on 
that assessment and the submitted staff numbers. It is critical then, who were in 
post at that date. This is one explanation for the frenzied transfer market in the 
run-up to the 1996 RAE. Using an analogy from the football industry, the 
Economist made references to the transfer market for academics (August 24th, 
4Since the submission needs to be increased by 20%. If the current submission is 83.34% of total 
staff, the minimum submission required to sustain funding level would be 100% of total staff. 
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1996). The hiring of star researchers could influence four to five years of 
funding. One direct benefit of hiring a particular staff member is his potential in 
contributing to the formula for funding. As an illustration, each staff member in 
a grade 5B usiness S chool would account for an extra funding of£ 13193 p er 
annum s. This is valid only if the new staff member is submitted as research 
active. To raise an institution's rating the staff member's rating has to be at least 
equal to the institution's present rating. Of course, the median could be 
maintained or increased by tangible quality improvements of research by the 
existing staff. Another viable strategy is to appoint staff to undertake an 
increased teaching load so as to free research-intensive staff from teaching 
duties. This would give the research active staff more time to concentrate on 
research to help improve the institution's ranking. The submission of an 
additional staff in Business and Management Studies can result in total extra 
funding for the four years' of £63,330 for a 5* rated department, £52,772 for a5 
rated, £35,183 for a4 rated, £23,455 for 3a rated, and £15,637 for 3b rated. 
The value of hiring a staff member who does not reduce the median can be 
expressed as: 
xji = (gi) (. f)(t) [6] 
Where : 
x;, is the extra funding from one staff member hired by a department rated i in UoAj. 
gi is the multiplier (score) for rating i. 
f, " is the funding volume per (FTE) point for UoAj. 
t is the time period in years for which the volume measure is used (ie. 4). 
S 
6 
Based on a value per point for BMS of £3909 for RAE 1996. 
This is the resultant funding that does take the staff cost into account. 
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Equation [6], however, is not the full story. Based on the median concept, an 
appointment of a 5* calibre staff has a gearing effect. It allows the current 
optimum coalition to expand by two without changing the rating. The 
appointment of a new staff who is rated equal or higher than the department's 
rating enables the department to expand its submission due to that staff and 
another staff member who was not previously submitted as research active. If 
the appointment is of a 5* mentor who is expected to assist in upgrading some 5 
staff to 5* and as a result increase the median, then the value of the appointment 
is greater still. To account for the additional value from a mentor, Equation [6] is 
re-expressed as: 
A) Non - Mentor Appointment : 
xi, = 2[gi x f; ] [7] 
Where : 
xi is the additional funding per annum. 
gi is the score for rating i. 
ji is the value per point for UoA j 
B) A Mentor Appointment 
x;; =z[gix f; ] 
and where : 
z= 2[1 + cr] 
[8] 
Where : 
x is the extra funding obtained per annum. 
ci is the number of staff members converted by the'mentor'to rate i. 
i is the current rating for the institution. 
ji is the value per point for UoA j. 
gi is the score for rating i. 
The additional advantage of a mentor appointment can be incorporated. The new 
staff member's individual quality rating has to be equal to or higher than the 
current rating for the UoA of the institution. Equations [7] and [8] show the 
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extra annual funding obtained. Several hypothetical applications c an be made 
with the model. For example, the value of hiring a 5* academic in Business and 
Management studies can b: " demonstrated. Warwick Business School (Warwick) 
could have attained the same funding with a coalition of 48 staff at 5* and 46.17 
at grade 5 or below (i. e., a submission of 94.17 FTE). By appointing an 
additional 5* staff, Warwick can increase the FTE by another grade 5 or below. 
Hence, the additional funding would have been £31,665 per annum (= 
2x4.05x3909). In theory, this is the maximum premium Warwick would be 
willing to pay for the 5* appointee. If the appointment is a 5* mentor who is 
expected help convert two grade 5 staff to grade 5t then the, value of the 
appointment is more. In the case of Warwick that would mean having 51 staff at 
grade 5*' and the coalition expanded to 101 (where 50 would be of grade 5 and 
below). That is, six FTE more (the new three in grade 5* allow an additional 
three non-5* to be included). It can be demonstrated that there are differential 
values of academic researchers in Business Schools. For instance, the additional 
funding that would accrue from the appointment of 5* mentor is a total of 
£94,988 per annum', or about 6% of current research funding. This amount is an 
upper bound of the premium over the normal teaching salary scale that could be 
justified. Similarly, a grade 5 department that appoints a grade 5 mentor staff 
will result in the coalition expanding by six hence worth £79,157 per year in the 
Business and Management studies (BMS) UoA. A grade 4 mentor staff would 
7 
the original 48 +I new appointment +2 converts. 
a 6x4.05 x 3909 9 
6x 3909 x 3.375 
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be worth £52,77210. A non-mentor staff is only worth £31,665 (5*) £26385 
(grade 5) and £17590 (grade 4)11. 
A prospective staff below the institution rating could have zero marginal value 
12 
in terms of research funding. There is a marginal value if the staff member is 
hired to take over a large teaching load in order to allow research active staff to 
concentrate on research. More and more universities are finding ways to relieve 
their research active staff from teaching (see Chapter Six). Universities, 
including Warwick University (which prides itself as a research-led institution), 
are considering the recruiting of staff to undertake only teaching assignments. 
The employment of a staff member below the institution's rating is justifiable if 
the marginal return obtained from that staff are above some threshold and from a 
different source such as executive training courses. The valuation above is also 
based on the institution rating not being influenced by the new appointment but 
only the size of the coalition is influenced. Institutions that have the capacity to 
increase their ratings could gain even more (but only in exceptionally borderline 
circumstances). 
In the near future, changes in universities will include different premium 
schemes, pay rises" or even multiple appointments for academic researchers. 
Some researchers could be appointed to serve as mentors. International 
I0 6x 3909 x 2.25 
2non-mentors 
would only increase the coalition by 2 
113 
possibly even negative value if that staff is included in the coalition and reduces the median. 
It is reported in THES (Feb 5th 1999) that Sir Keith Peters, Head of Cambridge University 
Medical School, told the House of Commons Science and Technology Committee that the pay of 
university professors should be doubled. ("about £80,000 a year seems appropriate") 
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researchers could be offered visiting (research) positions for research 
collaboration with staff members. . 
The employment conditions of academic staff are likely to be a major 
management issue (Wilson, 1993). The emphasis on quality research has already 
increased the pressure on academics to spend time on research (McNay, 1997). 
This has reduced the time available for consultancy and outside earnings. Some 
writers have other observations: 
"a reduction in the amount of committed time required from 
academic accountants might be sufficient compensation to some 
individuals who were making a direct trade-off between outside 
earnings and promotion, but it would tend to reduce the research 
output of accounting departments at a time when universities are 
sensitive about their overall research ratings. " 
(Arnold and Sherer, 1988: p. 270). 
This paradox could ultimately lead to an increase in academic salaries and/or 
multiple posts; particularly for mentor-type researchers. 
5.6 THE "CHOICE" OF UNIT OF ASSESSMENT (UoA) DECISION 
Besides the trade-off decision between volume and quality, a number of 
university departments have to make a UoA decision. The increased 
multidisciplinary approach to higher education produces such departments as the 
norm rather than the exception. Clear examples would include the Business 
Schools, Engineering and Economics. The dilemma Engineering Schools face, 
for example, is whether they should submit under the General Engineering panel 
or enter individual groupings under Electronics, Computing, Mechanical and 
Aeronautical, or Civil. To illustrate this dilemma, the example of Business 
Schools is used. The issues raised from the analysis, however, are not specific to 
Chapter 5: RAE Submission Strategies page 157 
Business Schools but a general problem existing in most disciplines. 
The conventional UoA for the Business Schools is UoA number 43 - Business 
and Management Studies. A typical Business School, would cluster academics 
in various disciplines such as Accountancy, Statistics, Operational Research, 
Economics, Public Policy, and Social Policy. Universities have to decide 
whether or not their business schools staff are to be submitted under the 
Management and Business Studies (BMS) UoA or under their respective subject 
areas. A criticism of the 1996 RAE is that some panels in closely related 
subjects, adopted significantly different assessment methods, and that there was 
no provision for moderation of the marking standards1'. 
According to the Jones report (1989) the same principle was adopted for all 
UoAs in 1989 in order to achieve consistency between subjects. In the case of 
submissions by accounting and finance sub-areas within BMS, the assessments 
were performed by the Accountancy Panel on the same basis as if they had all 
been Accountancy submissions (Whittington, 1997: p. 184). Thus, the same 
assessment standards are applied regardless of whether the submissions fell 
under the general coverage panel or the specialist panel. This is in contrast to the 
belief that general coverage panels apply less rigorous standards compared to 
"specialist" panels. Whittington (1997), however, acknowledges that institutions 
might have taken strategic decisions to include high quality accounting groups in 
BMS submissions tog ear up the B MS submissions to achieve a higher rating 
over a1 arger n umber of staff. C onversely, weaker accounting groups may be 
14HEFCE document RAE 2/97, November 1997 para. 44. 
Chapter 5: RAE Submission Strategies page 158 
hidden amongst large groups of competent researchers in a BMS submission. 
The issue of whether the BMS should submit as a group or as sub-areas may not 
be easy to resolve. The problem is compounded by the absence of the value per 
point at the time the decision is made. The value per point for BMS (£3,909) is 
lower than the value per point for Accountancy (£4,169), Economics and 
Econometrics (£5,148), Social Policy and Administration (£4,517), and Statistics 
and Operational Research (£8,863). Therefore if the inclusion or exclusion of the 
BMS sub-areas would not have influenced the rating of BMS and the sub-areas 
would have obtained the same rating under their respective subject area panels, it 
would have been more beneficial to submit each group under their respective 
panels. This seems unlikely because the exclusion of a subject group from the 
BMS submission would affect the BMS rating, and the group could obtain a 
different rating than if submitted under their panel as an integral group. 
Suppose there is a business school department that wishes to submit 40 full time 
employed staff (FTE). Further assume it has 10 staff in Statistics and 
Operational Research (SOR), 10 in Accountancy, five in Economics, and five in 
Social Policy, and the remaining 10 in other disciplines for which their own 
UoA, such as Marketing do not exist. If the department submits under the BMS 
Panel it will get a rating of grade 4. An option the department has is to submit 
the sub-areas under their respective Panels. Let's further assume a scenario 
where the Accountancy group consists of excellent researchers who would have 
obtained a 5* rating had they been submitted separately under the Accountancy 
panel, and the Statistics and Operational Research group were weaker and would 
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have only obtained a 3a rating. The Economics group would have got a4 rating 
while the social policy would have got a grade 5 and the remainder submitted 
under BMS would have only got a grade 3a. Under this hypothetical scenario, 
what. would have been the cost/benefit of submitting the sub-areas to the BMS 
panel? 
A submission of 40 staff obtaining a grade 4 in BMS would have earned a 
funding of £351,810. If the 40 staff were submitted under their various subject 
panels, the resultant funding would be different. The 10 staff submitted under 
Accountancy on 5* would have earned £168,845. The five in economics on 
grade 4 would have obtained £57,915. The five staff in Social Policy on grade 5 
would have obtained £76,224, the 10 staff in statistics and operational research 
on grade 3a would have obtained £132,945, and the remaining 10 in BMS on 
grade 3a would have obtained £58,635. The total funding generated by the 
business school staff (i. e., the 40 research active staff) would then have been 
£494,564 (= 168845 + 57915 + 76224 + 132945 + 58635), yielding an extra 
£142,754. For the hypothetical BMS with the 40 FTE, it would have been more 
advantageous if the sub-area groups were submitted under their own panels. It 
should be noted that the objective function is to maximise the funding awarded. 
There are, of course, other goals such as reputation from high ratings and high 
submission bands. 
Following the above scenario, simulations of various combinations can be 
performed as illustrated in Table 5.3. Referring to this table, it would be optimal 
to submit submission Scenario 13. In the illustrative example, the inclusion of 
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the high rated Accounting group in the d epartment under the B MS p anel was 
able to increase the BMS rating to grade 5 and also allowed for including the tail 
end of the Statistics and Operational Research (SOR) group. This allowed a 
higher rating to be obtained by SOR benefiting from the high value per point. 
(The higher rating for the five staff submitted under SOR achieved a higher 
funding than including all 10 staff under SOR panel). The simulations can be 
further extended. Table 5.3 does not take into account the possibility of choosing 
not to submit the tail end under any panel. There can be the case where a lower 
selective submission size obtains higher funding because of higher ratings. 
There are manifold combinations but a simulation program can arrive at the 
effect of each feasible combination. 
The choice decision is made more difficult by the uncertainty on the value per 
point for each subject area. Departments have to rely on historical data and 
prevailing policies to place an estimate on the value per point. Universities and 
their departments are increasingly being run like businesses with the associated 
market risks (Johnston 1994) and so, it could be argued that the uncertainties in 
the trade-offs and the choice set are not substantively different from those 
encountered by businesses. 
5.7 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Johnston (1994) illustrates the financial outcome of varying strategies with 
respect to the classification of staff as "research active" by using a tabulation. 
Different strategies by individual departments regarding classification would 
result in different levels of funding. This chapter develops a submission strategy 
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based on the maximisation principle, and by the reductionism view of the panel's 
assessments in the RAE, viz., the median concept. There are, nevertheless, 
difficulties in evaluating the probability of the grade increase when some staff 
are excluded from the research active staff submitted. 
The RAE is destined to remain as a feature of university funding in the UK for 
the near future. However, it is fraught with issues regarding the manner in which 
it is viewed and adhered to. On the one hand, because of some uncertainties 
inherent in the RAE, there is some scope for gaming (Glass et al, 1996) and 
strategic management of the RAE submissions. On the other hand, the HEFCE's 
introduction of more transparency in RAE 1996 has made it more difficult to 
conduct assessment exercises without them becoming instruments of policy 
(HEFCE Report M6/97, May_ 1997: p. 7). The HEFCE is also cognizant of the 
risk that the process of assessment may change the behaviours being assessed. In 
a funding climate dominated by RAE grades and the number of submitted staff, 
departments have to invariably make trade-off decisions; between size and grade, 
and also between funding and prestige. The mathematical model developed in 
this chapter addresses only the direct financial benefits, thus it ignores the 
possibility that departments do evaluate the relative importance of the prestige of 
a high grade and the funds received by entering more staff for a lower grade. To 
maximise returns from the RAE submission, departments have to evaluate: 
(1) Their likely grade and funds received if all staff were 
entered as research active. 
(2) The probabilities of obtaining a higher grade if some staff 
were omitted from the submission. 
(3) The financial outcomes for different coalitions of staff. 
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(4) The financial costs and benefits of hiring top-notch 
researchers, and the difference between mentors and non- 
mentors. 
(5) The consequential impact of the submission, in the short- 
term and the long-term. 
(6) The university's strategic goals and objectives and the role 
of the submission strategy in achieving them. 
In the endeavour for maximum funding, the trade-off decision between quality 
(or ratings) and quantity (or submission size) is crucial. Feasible strategies are 
analysed and built into a model. These strategies for the RAE will impact the 
way academic staff are hired, managed and compensated. For example, the 
hiring process can deliberately include the need to boost ratings for the sake of 
gaining more research funding. This can be done by recruiting academics who 
can mentor lower-rated staff to achieve higher ratings. Such mentor-type 
academics and star researchers will inevitably command premia. In a recent 
report, it is known that over 275 academic staff earn over £100,000 a year and 
the fact that only 12 universities have 10 or more staff earning over £100,000 
(THES, February 5t', 1999). 
Using the specific example of the business school, the choice of the UoA panel 
can also complicate the trade-off decision between submission size and grade. 
The value per point for each panel can vary significantly. Nevertheless, 
departments can examine the trade-off matrix tables of all the UoA that their staff 
can submit under so that a feasible and optimum coalition is submitted. 
This chapter explores some strategies for the trade-off decisions for the RAE. 
Not unusually, departments need to decide which staff should be submitted as 
research active and which should be excluded. Besides this who decision 
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business schools and other departments also faced the where decision - the 
assessment panel choice decision. As Glass et al (1996) note, the scope for 
gaming is significant, and universities will take up strategic positions and play 
the game. As advised by Johnston (1994): 
"... if you play it well, you may at least maintain equilibrium, and 
you could just, if you were very clever, come out as a winner... " 
b0 
C 
4 
if N M M C) O Of CD O CD a 
'p N a O) 
eý 
Of 00) 
Co 
a 
Co 
0_ 
r 
C 
Co 
) 79 N 11t fi 
N 
c le C) C) Co Co Co r_ CY) V) 0 (0 CD KO M U) 0 U) N) K 4. 7 1 U) U) U) Co -e Co 
O 
H 
O O O O 0 O O O 0 O 0 O O 
üc tao} u) lt 
1A 
9 
1A 
a 
1A 
a 
U) 
ý 
1f) 
ý 
U) 
0 
C) 
0 
M M 
1) 
M 
_ kD Qi a ) i i i i n % Iti Ici 
OC 
N N N N 
M 
N N 
M 
N 
M 
N 
1 
O 
O 
cf 
a 
o) Of 
V! LL 
r r r 
r r r 12 r 
r Z 
d 
12 
Om 
13 
L2 c'O) M Pß', in in r) M 
M le O O O 
00 
N 
W 
h- O O O O O 0 O O O U) O N O 
LL 
y 
C N N N N N N N N z 
CO N Co 0 
C N N N N N DO N N W N 
E .° Co rs r- fD (0 A 
.0 LL 
z 
z 
9m ca r- «cl 
ö z a C 
A 1A to t() to 0 U) (D O M U) 1A M In 
u LL 
e? N 
N N N N N N N N N 
ä e ö» 0) ö) C) ö ( (n oc i. ' r O L Li ) Un in Un u) U) 40 Un in ji L C a, y 40 -0 Gn 
a v v v v v v v v v p 
a) 
E 
w 
0 
o c ýn uý o 0 o vý o in vý n uý uý z o 0 
W 
ti 
t2 C 
f0 
O 
f0 CO 
} ;W M 
M t0 
O c6 c6 r O "- . - U. in 
c 
m c 
7ä 
0 L° its v) in ü) in U) U) 
uO Q 
O 0 0 N 0 gn N n O 
r- cm r) V) C, 4 ýi COO 9 0 O O dC CD C) C) C) Co 0 0 C) C) i O i O CO 
E 
N 00 vi " of V) ) of v ai ri l P. P- vi of = N 90 M N 
M 
C 
C') 
N 
M 
t` 
ý 
t0 
N 
0 
N 
Co CO N 
- 
N 
LL N r 7 . M 
C 
A 
m 
CV 
12 M u% -f IA N LO jA O IA M tf M 
N 
N 
N 
d 
NW O O N N O UY O 0 O lA IA 0 e 
7t - N - N M N M N N - - N N 
"C 
C 
r N M 'sf U) CO N 00 O r r r 
fA 
h 
u 
ö 
Cý 
CHAPTER SIX 
INSTITUTIONAL BEHA VIOURAL IMPACT 
OF THE RAE 
/ý'. 
Chapter 6: The Institutional perspective page 165 
CHAPTER SIX 
INSTITUTIONAL BEHAVIOURAL IMPACT OF THE RAE 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter investigates the impact of the Research Assessment Exercise (RAE) 
on the behaviour of institutions, in particular their strategic behaviour as a result 
of the RAE. For this purpose, interviews are conducted with senior 
administrators in 13 universities, focusing on four primary areas: (1) their 
internal allocation of research funding; (2) their submission strategies; (3) their 
labour market effect; and (4) their research management. The sample of 
universities chosen consists of "old" and "new" universities' with different levels 
of research excellence in order to uncover any systematic differences in 
strategies adopted between the two institutional types. 
The chapter is organised as follows: Section 6.2 reviews the previous studies on 
the institutional impact of RAE. Section 6.3 discusses the issues investigated by 
this study. The methodology (interviews) is explained in Section 6.4. After 
presenting the interview findings in Section 6.5, the concluding remarks are 
stated in the final section. 
1 The term "new" universities refer to the former polytechnics that were previously funded by the 
Polytechnics and Colleges Funding Council (PCFC), while "old" universities refer to those 
previously funded by the Universities Grants Committee (UGC). 
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6.2 PREVIOUS STUDIES 
The effect of formula based funding on teaching and research has been studied 
by Mace (1996). Two "old" universities form the study's sample - one is ranked 
high and the other is ranked low in the research selectivity exercise - to observe 
any systematic differences between them, in their responses. The Mace study 
consists of interviews and a questionnaire distributed to staff of the two 
universities. The questionnaire part of the study is carried out in late 1992 and 
1993, while the interviews are conducted in 1994 and 1995. The questionnaire is 
designed to elicit the staffs perceptions of changes in their teaching and research 
responsibilities since 1986, the first year of the funding changes. The interviews 
reveal that staff with a low research output are encouraged to leave. While some 
staff who are good teachers but are unproductive in research had been retained, 
the prevailing recruitment policy in both the universities is one of recruiting and 
retaining only staff members with good research records. In that study, both 
universities actively engaged in the recruitment and headhunting of individuals 
with good research and publication records to improve their institutional ratings. 
This careful targeting has increased the average age of recruitment and could 
lead to a great deal of untapped potential (Mace, 1996: p. 27). One conclusion 
that may be drawn from the study is that funding methodology is capable of 
determining teaching, appointments, retirement and research. The pressures 
within institutions to. adhere to the HEFCE prescriptions also intensify when 
institutions understand and react to the funding formula. 
Another study based on interviews with senior staff in 16 universities examines 
changes in the funding of higher education (William, 1991). A key finding is 
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that in all the universities except those with the highest research ratings, the new 
funding policies had a considerable. impact on the extent, nature and organisation 
of research activities. Many universities have since undertaken the following 
initiatives: 
" Early retirement of less productive senior staff and recruitment of 
leading research professors. 
" Closure or merger of low rated departments. 
9 Encouraging group work and developing larger departments. 
" More collective planning and monitoring of research with research 
committees established at several levels. 
9 Creation of funds for special development initiatives based on 
internal competitive bidding. 
There is no instance of resource transfers from lower rated departments to higher 
rated ones, and the best way to increase funding is to raise the lower rated 
departments by one or two grades. This is consistent with the marginal utility 
analysis (see Chapter Four, Section 4.2). 
Undertaken for the HEFCE, the McNay (1997) study is conducted between July 
1995 and July 1996. From the case studies of 32 institutions on research 
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strategies, there has been an increased awareness of the importance of research 
within universities, especially the "new" universities. Since publications are the 
main basis for judgement by the RAE ratings panels, scholars are encouraged to 
publish in academic rather than professional journals. This has encouraged 
premature publications of research findings. The RAE 1996 attempts to avert 
this problem by requiring only the four best outputs rather than all publications 
of each staff. However, the evidence2 in this thesis suggests that premature 
publication and premature attempts to publish are still being practised. 
In his study, McNay identifies three trends among the U. K. universities: 
1. The first trend is the separation of teaching and research. In the 
former polytechnics, this is in the form of creating research centres 
that are distinct from departments. The staff in such research 
centres have lower teaching loads. 
2. The second trend is the expansion of team-based research, and the 
decline in the number of lone researchers. McNay reasons that this 
is needed for selective allocation of funds and that the synergy of 
group work produces better research and increases the chances of 
the work being familiar to others. Also, higher grades are awarded 
to work that the RAE panel members are more familiar with 
(Martin and Skea, 1992). 
2 See Chapter Eight for results of the survey of academic, and Chapter Seven for results of the 
editor survey. 
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3. The third trend is the emergence of offices to support, monitor and 
inform the work of researchers. This is evident in the "new" 
universities interviewed for this thesis. 
There are also behavioural differences between the "old" and "new" universities. 
The "old" universities have established research traditions and tend to focus their 
strategies at the devolved level. In many cases, departments with a potential for 
improvement are identified and SWOT 3 analyses is conducted. The changes 
wrought by the RAE are the most profound to those who are new to the RAE, 
and have to institute a research culture. 
Bourn's (1994a) description of the process at work in Southampton University 
highlights the pattern of decentralisation and devolution of control of resources 
that the new transparent funding mechanisms make possible, and indeed appear 
to demand. Organisational structure and process follow the strategy, and the 
strategy responds to environmental changes. In other words, significant changes 
in an organisation's environment are expected to lead to changes in its strategic 
stance. This in turn requires changes in its organisational process and structure. 
Changes to organisational structure and process are thus an indirect response to 
environmental changes. The development of schemes of devolution by 
universities is interpreted in this thesis as their indirect response to changes in the 
external environment, particularly those changes that lead to a more transparent 
funding system (Bourn, 1994a: p. 6). Arising from the turbulent changes 
promulgated by the funding cuts of 1981, the higher education sector is 
3 SWOT is acronym for Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats. 
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embracing a quasi-market stance that fosters greater transparency in its affairs. 
Universities now know for what and how much each academic unit earns, and 
within the dual funding system, financial resources from research councils, the 
HEFCE and elsewhere are readily identifiable. Bourn and Ezzamel (1986), 
however, argued that a devolved system must be based on units that are large 
enough to allow for some internal discretion to shape changes. Accordingly, 
schools and faculties are a better budget unit than departments, even if funding is 
distributed at the department level. 
An academic staff survey on the internal allocation procedures reveals that 
departmental cross-subsidisation within universities is taking place (Angluin and 
Scapens, -2000). The study analyses cross-subsidy with a horizontal dimension, 
by identifying three p ossible 1 evels in delegated budgets a cross which subsidy 
may occur: 
1. in the attribution of income; 
2. in charges against income; and 
3. in the use of surpluses or deficits. 
Firstly, in income attribution, a university may choose to attribute a greater or a 
lesser extent of the. income to budget centres. Universities can also choose to 
attribute income to academic budget centres on the same basis as it is earned, i. e., 
mirroring the HEFCE funding formula. This has three consequences. One, the 
university needs to charge central services against the attributed income. Two, 
the university would be importing and adopting externally defined systems of 
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rewards. Such an adoption can compromise university autonomy. Three, any 
cross-subsidy has to be explicit and may conflict with the imported system of 
rewards. Universities may wish to avoid these consequences and choose their 
own internal formulae for income attribution. In the survey, a frequently cited 
method for dealing with the cost of central services, which may create or 
accompany cross-subsidy at the level of income, is top-slicing. A quantum is set 
aside so that charges for central services do not appear on the academic budgets. 
Effectively, there is overhead recovery without a stated basis, and academic 
centres make a differential contribution to central services. 
The second horizontal dimension is that of charges against income. Apart from 
top slicing, the highly noticeable method is that of charging a flat percentage 
rate, akin to a tax. This standard overhead recovery charge across budget centres 
actually entails the cheaper departments cross-subsidising the more expensive 
departments. The third dimension on the use of surpluses has resulted in some 
universities clawing back surpluses from departments to meet unplanned deficits. 
This is a visible form of cross-subsidy, though not directly related to the RAE 
outcome. 
This section provided a brief review of past studies on the institutional impact of 
the RAE. The next section delineates the research issues and questions 
addressed in the case studies. 
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6.3 THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS/ISSUES 
One of the questions uppermost in many academics' minds is what impacts the 
RAE and its funding procedures have on the b ehaviour and strategies of both 
institutions and individuals. Developing upon past research described in Section 
6.2, this thesis gathers new information particularly subsequent to the 1996 RAE. 
The emergence of reshaped and new strategies reinforced by new realities and 
beliefs warrant a thorough scrutiny and analysis. This chapter also provides an 
insight into the cumulative effects of the RAE on institutions, while the 
cumulative effects on academics are discussed in Chapter Eight4. 
McNay's findings of differential impacts of the RAE on the ex-UGC universities 
and the ex-PCFC institutions do not come as a surprise, considering that the 
polytechnics became universities only in 1991 and the RAE 1992 is their first 
RAE. This chapter further contributes to the debate about whether abolishing the 
Binary-Divide has been successful in assimilating the former polytechnics with 
the "old" universities, or whether these ex-polytechnics have embarked on 
strategies that are distinct from the "old" universities. 
To facilitate the presentation in this chapter, Table 3.1 from Chapter Three is 
reproduced here as Table 6.1. We also briefly reiterate and detail the four main 
areas addressed in the interviews. 
4 Also see Talib, A., "The continuing behavioural modification of academics since the 1992 
Research Assessment Exercise", Higher Education Review, Vol. 33, No. 3, Summer 2001. 
Chapter 6: The Institutional perspective 
Table 6.1: Short-term and long-term objectives 
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Department objectives University objectives 
1. Submission strateQV. 
a) Short-term Funding level 
Reputation 
b) Long-term and staff morale. Reputation 
2. Allocation of RAE 
funding 
a) Short-term To maximise benefits. 
Not applicable (marginal implications) 
(distribution decision 
taken at university level) 
b) Long-term Equitable distribution and 
enhancement of reputation, 
in particular strategic 
areas. 
3. Hirin strategies. 
a) Short-term To fulfil teaching duties Teaching needs and 
inclusion in RAE 
submissions. 
b) Long-term Teaching duties and Teaching duties and 
research output, to enhance research performance to 
department reputation. enhance university 
reputation. 
6.3.1 SUBMISSION STRATEGIES 
RAE submission strategies have been analysed in Chapter Five and an optimal 
funding-maximisation submission strategy was developed. Chapter Five also 
illustrates the trade-off between quality and quantity in deciding which staff to 
submit as research active. The maximisation model is based on the objective of 
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maximising funds. The discussion in Chapter Three (section 3.3.2.1), however, 
raised other objectives such as ratings to be achieved from the submission. 
The analysis and discussions in Chapters Three and Five motivates the 
investigation of the submission strategies that universities adopt. The interviews 
uncover whether universities attempt to maximise research funding by selective 
submissions. Do universities attempt to optimise the coalition of staff to submit 
as research active? Is funding or the achieved rating more crucial to universities? 
An aspect covered in Chapters Three and Five is the choice of unit of assessment 
(UoA) under which to make the submission, i. e., the where decision, arising from 
the difference in values per point. Furthermore, it is believed that higher grades 
are given to submissions t hat the RAE p anel m embers are m ore familiar with 
(Martin and Skea, 1992). This means that the RAE panel membership influences 
the submission decision. This choice of panel factor is probed during the 
interviews. 
6.3.2 AUTONOMY: INTERNAL ALLOCATIONS AND CROSS-SUBSIDY 
There are three key problems in the funding of higher education: (1) how to raise 
the money; (2) how to allocate it to institutions; and (3) how institutions should 
allocate it internally.. The first problem is beyond the scope of this thesis. The 
research selectivity exercise is one mechanism for allocating funds to 
institutions. The HEFCE also has other forms of funds allocation (see Chapter 
Four). However, the focus of this thesis is the research selectivity exercise, viz., 
the RAE. The procedures for allocating funds to institutions can substantially 
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affect the way they are allocated internally. The block grants from the HEFCE 
are distributed to universities based on the performance of individual UoAs. 
However, universities are free to distribute the grant as they choose. This leads 
to differences in the way universities treat and allocate funds to the low rated and 
high rated departments (Johnes and Taylor, 1992). Some universities have to 
decide between supporting low rated departments and high rated departments. 
Other goals and internal policies would also determine the distribution of funds. 
Universities may cross subsidise departments because of the tightly constrained 
public funding and the relative inflexibility of their costs. As many academics 
are tenured, a large portion of the salaries is fixed, increasing with promotions 
and annual increments. The RAE funding mechanism has made funding more 
unpredictable. This can increase the need for cross-subsidy. To achieve the 
RAE's objective of creating centres of excellence, the funds earned from the 
RAE would have to be internally allocated in accordance with the formulae (see 
the discussion on policy objectives in Chapter Four). However, to maintain 
university autonomy, policy makers do not have explicit requirements on the way 
funds are allocated internally. We investigated the internal allocation methods 
which universities administer and examined if cross-subsidy of departments was 
practised. 
6.3.3 LABOUR MARKET EFFECTS (HUMAN RESOURCES 
MANAGEMENT) 
The endemic impact of the RAE has universities reviewing their human resource 
policies, including who to recruit for research, and how they should reward and 
retain existing staff (see Talib and Steele, 2000: p. 80). In the McNay (1997) 
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survey of academics, 12% of the recent appointees (those with less than one year 
in post) acknowledge that the RAE is the dominant factor in their appointment, 
with 30% admitting that it is a significant factor. 
The compensation for academics at the international level is the result of 
complex interactions among national legal systems, tax regimes, culture, 
employer and union organisations, government policy and so on (Wilson, 1993). 
In the U. K., the pay system is simpler. It is based on a grade scale that applies to 
all staff with a very limited discretion across all subjects. There is discretion, 
however, with the compensation of professors in most universities. 
There is no necessary connection between the funding system and the labour 
payment system. However, highly volatile funding that is unpredictable 
necessitates highly flexible payment systems, including for example, the use of 
short-term contracts or part-time work (Wilson 1993). The potential volatility of 
funding could also lead to the minimisation of contractual pay obligations, 
particularly the case of tenured staff inu niversities. T hus, itisa conceivable 
consequence of the research selectivity funding formula that universities use it to 
minimise contractual pay obligations through early retirement schemes. This is 
addressed in the interviews conducted in the case studies. 
Since the funding changes are done partly for the sake of efficiency, only 
efficient and productive staff will be maintained (Wilson, 1993). In practice, 
there is no equilibrium between the demand for and the supply of efficient and 
productive staff and universities may be forced by market conditions to offer 
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premiums to attract specific candidates. But a free market for academics is non- 
existent. The demand for academics is made up of a cartel of universities with a 
rigid pay structure. To circumvent the rigid pay structure, universities may be 
forced to offer the premium in non-monetary forms such as rapid promotions, 
appointments at a higher grade, reduced teaching loads, research project 
assistance or provision of avenues for additional income such as paid executive 
training. These different and new compensatory initiatives are investigated in the 
case studies. 
The fate of good teachers who are not productive in research hangs in the 
balance. The Teaching Quality Assessment (TQA), introduced in the 1990s, has 
changed the environment. Though the TQA has no direct funding outcome, it has 
a repetition value. It creates a need for good teachers. 
6.3.4 RESEARCH MANAGEMENT AND STRATEGIES 
Evidence from the McNay 1997 study suggests that the RAE has become a 
driver for institutional planning of research based on the RAE schedules, and has 
prompted some institutions to devise strategies for managing their research 
agenda. The 1997 study also notes that research has become a prominent item in 
annual staff appraisals and workload planning. There is a regular scrutiny of 
research productivity and output. Research is now given more management 
attention and central support. The Research Development Office and Pro-Vice- 
Chancellors responsible for research are now taking a more active role in 
supporting and directing research. Part-time and casual staff and PhD students 
are fulfilling the teaching tasks in order to free the core staff to focus on research. 
Chapter 6: The Institutional perspective page 178 
Not unusually, there is interest in swelling the numbers of PhD students because 
they contribute greatly to research and publications (McNay, 1997). 
The distinction between polytechnics and universities is abolished in 1991, and 
the former PCFC institutions (ex-polytechnics) are included in the 1992 RAE. 
The funding council in 1992 provided a total of £12.5 million as a special 
"devR" fund-meant to assist the development of research in the "new" 
universities. T hese "new" universities b egan the 1993-94 academic year with 
approximately thrice the amount of block grant research funding that was 
available to them in previous years (McKenna, 1996: p. 112). It is timely to 
reflect on how these institutions use the extra funding to alter their approach to 
managing research. Furthermore, the "new" universities cannot be expected to 
match the "old" universities easily. Despite the increase in funding of the "new" 
universities, the ratio of such funding in 1993-94 in the "old" versus the "new" 
universities is still more than 11: 1 (ibid., p. 113). 
Given the noticeable gap in research performance between "old" and "new" 
universities during the 1992 RAE, the ex-polytechnics face the challenges of 
narrowing the gap (McKenna, 1996). As the "new" universities of the 1990s 
have neither the funding base to achieve research excellence across a wide range 
of academic areas, nor the opportunity to recruit many new academic staff of 
high research calibre, a viable strategy would be to achieve research excellence 
in a small number of selected areas. Nevertheless, a "new" university with QR 
earnings of over £1 million in research grants has the necessary resources to 
develop one or two areas of research excellence and to recruit entire research 
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teams. But, this would require the senior university management to commit a 
significant amount of resources to the targeted areas. 
All the above personnel and research management strategies are probed in the 
interviews with the universities in the sample to identify trends and differences in 
strategies adopted by the "old" and the "new" universities. " 
6.4 METHODOLOGY 
The ensuing sub-sections detail the methodology involving the case study of 13 
universities. The basic design is a series of interviews conducted with senior 
administrators. 
6.4.1 THE SAMPLE 
The sample of universities interviewed consisted of eight "old" universities and 
five "new" universities. The "old" universities chosen are: Warwick, Bath, 
Birmingham, Bradford, Durham, Leeds, Liverpool and Reading. The "new" 
universities are: Bournemouth, Leeds Metropolitan, De Montfort, Middlesex and 
London Guildhall. 
The combination of "old" and "new" universities is chosen with the objective of 
identifying if there are differences between the two types as well as to study the 
common behavioural trends, as these pertain to institutional size and strategy, 
research excellence, and other responses to the RAE regimes since 1992. The 
"new" universities in the study are the former polytechnics funded by PCFC until 
1991, and RAE 1992 is their first RAE experience. 
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Even within the same institution type, there may be varying research cultures and 
levels of research excellence that encourage different strategies and represent 
different behavioural implications. For this reason, the sample includes a former 
polytechnic with limited scholarly research (Bournemouth) as well as with 
financial crisis (London Guildhall). 
Of the "new" universities, De Montfort is chosen for its emphasis on research 
and its high rating. Leeds Metropolitan and Middlesex are interviewed because 
they are renowned for their excellence in teaching accounting and other 
professional courses during their polytechnic years. While Bournemouth 
represents an institution with low research activity, London Guildhall is chosen 
for the financial crisis it is in. The "old" universities represent a range of 
research excellence, size and geographical locations. Though Warwick 
University is an obvious choice as it is the author's university, it is also chosen 
for its reputation and success as a research-led institution. Warwick University 
was created in the 1960s to be a teaching and research institution. With no pre- 
existing staff, the university's hiring policy ensures that all staff are research- 
oriented. Birmingham University is included in the study for its claim to have 
one of the most complete systems of devolved budget management of all the 
U. K. higher education institutions. 
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6.4.2 THE INTERVIEWS 
The in-person interviews, averaging two hours, are conducted at the participating 
universities during the summer of 1998. Only one interview is conducted over 
the telephone with the executive assistant to the Vice-Chancellor of Bath 
University. This telephone interview lasted around 40 minutes and is conducted 
after a visit to Bath University during which a two-hour interview is done with a 
planning officer. For Warwick University, the interview with the Vice- 
Chancellor of Warwick is held over two-and-a-half-days. 
Table 6.2 lists the interviewees, all of whom are competent to respond to issues 
-pertaining to the RAE. 
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Table 6.2: Person(s) interviewed. 
Position of Person(s) interviewed 
Warwick University 1. The Vice Chancellor 
2. Assistant Registrar 
3. Finance officer 
4. Professor responsible for the Business 
School RAE submission 
Bath University Executive Assistant to the Vice 
Chancellor 
Birmingham University Head of the Planning Division 
Bradford University Head of the Planning Division 
Durham University Deputy Registrar 
Leeds University Head of Research Office 
Liverpool University Senior Assistant Registrar, Planning and 
Development Division 
Reading University Acting Pro-Vice Chancellor 
Bournemouth University Research Development Manager 
Leeds Metropolitan University Head of Research Development Office 
De Montfort University Pro- Vice Chancellor 
Middlesex University Pro- Vice Chancellor 
London Guildhall University Senior Assistant Academic Registrar 
6.4.2.1 INTERVIEW STRUCTURE 
The issues for the semi-structured interviews are in Section 6.3. A checklist of 
questions and topics form the basis and the interviews are flexible enough to 
allow the discussion of other relevant issues (see Table 6.3 for the checklist). 
The checklist is not given unless requested by the interviewees before the 
interview. The checklist serves as an informal guide so as to enable the 
discussions to flow productively. The next section summarises the key findings 
of the interviews. 
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Table 6.3: Interview Checklist 
INTERVIEW CHECKLIST 
1. The methodology for internal allocation of RAE research funding block 
grants. 
2. Does cross-subsidy exist? 
3. Is there devolved budgeting? 
4. Is there an allocation strategy to support low rated departments or high rated 
departments? 
5. Does your university have any specific strategies to improve the ratings of 
low rated departments? 
6. Are there any funds earmarked for supporting RAE 2001? And, how are they 
utilised? 
7. What is the impact of the RAE on your university's hiring strategy? Does 
your university practise headhunting of researchers? Are they paid a 
premium? In what form? 
8. Are there any strategies to retain good researchers and/or good teachers? Is 
early retirement encouraged for non-performing staff? 
9. Are there staff that are not submitted as research active for the RAE 
submissions given an additional teaching load? Are there any strategies to 
encourage the productivity of staff, such as mentoring? 
10. What are the submission strategies? Is optimal coalition of staff considered? 
11. Is there a concentration on areas of research strength? 
12. Are there any other strategies and/or impacts from the RAE? 
6.5 DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS 
The key findings of the universities are summarised in Table 6.4. To maintain 
confidentiality, we have not identified the universities by name in the table. The 
universities are coded A to M: where universities A through H are the "old" 
universities and I through M are the "new" universities. From Table 6.4, the 
common trends and differences between the "old" and the "new" universities are 
categorised by the four primary areas of inquiry discussed in Section 6.3. 
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6.5.1 SUBMISSION STRATEGIES 
In the sample, three universities. left the submission decision to the departments, 
and one made the submission decision at the school level. One of the most 
common submission strategies is the exclusion of the tail ends from submissions. 
Figure 6.1 summarises the submission strategies, includirg the objectives and the 
choice of panel. 
Most of the "old" universities recognise the importance of having research 
excellence and consider it vital to obtain high ratings in the RAE and to submit 
research active staff in Category band A or B. Warwick University's central 
strategy is that of submitting, as far as possible, all staff at the Band A level. For 
the 1996 RAE, Warwick submits 750 staff from a total academic staff strength of 
762. With effect from the RAE 2001, this central decision will be changed to 
reflect the aim of a Category B submission, and more strategic thought will go 
into submissions to achieve higher ratings. In contrast, the "new" universities are 
not constrained by the proportion of staff to be submitted as research active. 
This could be due to the fact that they do not consider themselves as research- 
oriented universities where the staff need to be active in research. They regard 
the RAE as a funding exercise and the optimum coalition of staff they submit as 
research active would be with the objective of maximising funds. One "new" 
university has a maximising strategy similar to the model presented in Chapter 
Five. The "old" universities are more anxious about obtaining high ratings rather 
than high incomes, while the "new" universities placed higher importance on the 
funding aspect. The "old" universities are also conscious of the proportion of 
staff submitted as research active. On balance, the maximisation model 
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discussed in Chapter Five resembles the thinking in the "new" universities. 
University A, however, attempts to establish individual ratings for its staff to 
arrive at the optimum coalition to submit, with high ratings as its main objective. 
FIGURE 6.1 
(Alphabets in parenthesis represent the university) 
Decision left 
Higher rating to School Funding maximisation 
H) (I, J, K, L, M) (A, C, D, E, F, G, 
NV 
SUBMISSION 
STRATEGIES 
Objective from 
submission 
Choice of 
Panel decision 
Submission 
Strategies 
Decision 
left to 
School 
100% 
Submission 
(H and G) 
Value per 
point 
considered 
(C, J, K) 
Panel members 
considered (E, 
G, J, K) 
Omit tail- 
end (C, F, L, 
M) 
Optimum 
coalition Subjective (D) 
I Individual rating (A K) I 
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A working group in University C undertakes the submissions by establishing 
optimum coalitions that subjectively leave out the tail end of the staff. The 
overall objective of University C is for all departments to achieve a rating of at 
least 3. Besides the importance of ratings, consideration must be made regarding 
the choice of panels for the increased value per point. However, the overriding 
factor has been the "marketing" aspect as the choice of panel needs to be 
reflective of department. 
At University D, the Economics department submits under the Business and 
Management Studies (BMS) because its research is not quantitatively oriented 
and it does not expect their submissions to be well regarded by the economics 
panel. For University D, the composition of the panel members plays a role in its 
submissions strategy. 
The departments in University E have full autonomy, but have to adhere to 
central management guidelines of aiming for high ratings by eliminating the tail 
end of staff. The university had a 100% submission in 1992. In the case of its 
Engineering Department, the submissions are done under a different panel 
because it can capitalise on its good reputation in engineering. Furthermore, 
university E is less confident in the cross-referencing between panels; thus, it has 
decided that its departments' submissions would be to the panels that are familiar 
with the research by its respective staff. 
Universities F and E strategically considered the choice of panel for the 
submissions; with higher ratings as the objective rather than value per point. The 
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objective for University J, a "new" university, in its 1996 RAE is to secure funds 
that are much needed in order to'build their research capabilities that are in a 
state of transition. Their budget target is an average rating of 3.5 with 555 
submissions. Their objective for RAE 2001 is to elevate the rating to an average 
of 4. Departments submit the RAE returns to the Deans who report to the Pro- 
Vice-Chancellor. Submissions are reviewed with the help of external advisors 
who recommend on the coalitions to submit. These external advisors are mainly 
former RAE panel members. The choice of panel is an important consideration 
in their RAE 1996 submissions. Heads of departments give suggestions on how 
to package submissions in light of members of the panel. The value per point 
issue was considered and some thought went into submitting under high value 
panels but not much was done due to the uncertainty involved and because most 
staff did not feel comfortable -to submit under panels different from their natural 
panel. 
To London Guildhall, funding is more important than ratings because of the 
financial crises they had been experiencing. University M also has the 
maximisation of income ast heir goal, sot hey opt for 1 ower ratings with high 
volume as a strategy based on their mistaken assumption that a department rated 
2 would continue to receive funds. 
Only one university actually considered the "expected" value per point when 
considering the choice of panel. However, a number of universities do consider 
panel choice and were planning to consider it for RAE 2001. The factors 
influencing the panel choice does not appear to be the value per point 
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discrepancy, mainly due to the uncertainties involved in the value per point. The 
panel choice decision was more to do with panel members and the likelihood of 
obtaining a higher rating. It seems that universities were swayed by the Martin 
and Skea (1992) argument that RAE panel members are more willing to grant 
higher grades to work they are familiar with. 
The interviews reveal the trend of gaming in the submissions between 1992 and 
1996, with a propensity for greater strategic behaviour being planned for RAE 
2001 especially in regard to submissions to panels. 
6.5.2 AUTONOMY: INTERNAL ALLOCATIONS AND CROSS-SUBSIDY 
6.5.2.1 ALLOCATION METHODS AND CROSS-SUBSIDY 
As displayed in Table 6.4, eight universities in the sample have an internal fund 
allocation policy that takes into account the HEFCE allocation formula. 
However, the internal allocation does not exactly mirror the fashion in which the 
RAE funds are earned. A number of universities distributing funds directly to 
the departments or schools that earn the funds charge a tax or top-slice it. For 
instance, University D levies the departments a 40% top slice charge for central 
overheads, while University L imposes a top-slice tax of 6%. The funds from the 
top slicing are meant-for subsidising departments that do not get adequate RAE 
funding. University M allocates 70% of the research quality related funds to the 
schools, 25% to central overheads, and 5% to the research office. Cross- 
subsidisation exists in all the universities interviewed. Figure 6.2 illustrates the 
cross-subsidy and internal allocation methods applied by each university 
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interviewed. 
FIGURE 6.2 
Resembles way By Internal 
earned (with Formula 
variations) (B, H, F) 
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departments? 
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distribution 
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(A, B, E, F) 
Top-slicing 
(B, C, D, E, K, L, 
H. i. M) 
High 
As a strategy of 
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University A allocates the funds to the department earning them in the first 
instance, and then claws back any surplus. An example is its Department of 
Biochemistry, which submits 14 staff and obtains a grade 5. Initially the total 
amount of money earned. is allocated to the departments as income. However, as 
the Biochemistry department ends up with more income thwa its budgeted 
expenses, the funds are re-distributed to other departments. Hence, cross subsidy 
exists explicitly, in line with the Angluin and Scapens (2000) surplus treatment. 
The general desire in University E is to abolish cross-subsidisation in the long 
term, but it exists in order to avoid abrupt changes in funding of departments as a 
result of changes in the RAE ratings obtained. The policy is not to allocate 
research monies only to departments that are rated above 2. However, 
departments that receive a rating of 3a have their allocations withheld until they 
have submitted a report detailing how they will improve their ratings in the next 
round. In practice, all departments rated 3a have their allocations released. The 
university imposes a ceiling variance on the change of funding allocated to 
departments, which currently is set at 7%. Therefore, the 1996 RAE resultant 
funding for each department could not vary by more than 7% from the 1992 RAE 
funding. If a department did well in 1996 RAE relative to the 1992 RAE and 
receives more funding, then it is allocated only 7% more, and the difference is 
held b ack. If ad epartment did poorly and had its funding r educed, t hen itis 
reduced by only 7%, and the difference is subsidised by the monies held back 
from the other departments. The university can manoeuvre in this manner 
because its university-wide funding has increased. The next round of RAE is 
expected to widen the variance gap, and in fact it is intended that this gap widens 
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gradually until department funding is stabilised and the university reaches the 
stage where cross-subsidisation is -eliminated. The strategy of gradual elimination 
of the cross-subsidies is to soften the impact of fluctuating funds. 
The University of Warwick, Birmingh. un University, and University F use their 
respective internal distribution formulae to allocate the RAE funds. In Warwick 
University, the RAE funds are pooled centrally with other sources. The 
allocation incorporates an elaborate distribution formula, but identifies some 
specific research elements, and includes research levers relating to the quality, as 
assessed by the RAE. The department that earns "soft income", for example 
income earned by the Business School from the distance-learning MBA, retains 
and can spend such funds to hire staff, sponsor conference participation and so 
forth. Part of the income from overseas students goes into the main pool and part 
of it to the departments involved. The allocation of funds is done on the basis of 
student to staff ratios. A funding matrix decides this ratio in which the RAE 
rating is a variable in the formula. Departments that are rated high in the RAE 
are rewarded. However, this allocation can be subjectively amended. After each 
RAE, external specialists who tend to be members or former members of the 
RAE panels review the departments that obtain low ratings. The review 
recommends an action plan to improve ratings and some additional funds would 
be allocated to these departments to enable them to improve their ratings. This is 
manifestation of the steps taken to cross-subsidise weaker departments. 
Birmingham University's response to the autonomy in distribution of HEFCE 
funds internally is to have a devolved system of budgetary and management 
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responsibility. The schools within the university have complete autonomy in 
their decisions, and heads of schools are directly responsible to the Vice 
Chancellor for the management of their schools. It is vital to place management 
responsibility as close to the research and teaching activities of the university as 
possible in order to create responsive, innovative and well-informed local 
management that is able to integrate resource, space and academic planning. 
Heads of schools have to provide implementation plans that specify details for 
one year ahead and general objectives for the following five years in respect of 
academic staffing, and non-staff and capital plans for the units. Of importance is 
how the schools use the available funds to improve or sustain their RAE ratings. 
Although the general principle is that they will merely use the funds available to 
them, there is the occasional bargaining for additional funds. This is deliberated 
with the Vice Principal who is responsible to the Vice Chancellor on matters 
pertaining to the planning and resource allocation portfolio. These 
implementation plans are regarded as an important control tool by the 
university's central management. 
Birmingham University's internal formula driven Resource Allocation Model 
(RAM) and the Indirect Cost Allocation Model (ICAM) drive the internal 
allocation of funds. These formulae are used to allocate income to the schools 
and the costs of the services, administration and premises. 
The Resource Allocation Model (RAM) has four sections: 
" The first allocates the grants for teaching received from the HEFCE 
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and income from home/EU tuition fees. The basis of the calculation 
is home/EU teaching' load multiplied by a Unit of Resource weight. 
The Postgraduate teaching load is weighted by 1.2 to take into 
account the additional length and cost of such courses. 
9 The second allocates income from overseas tuition fees on the basis 
of overseas student load multiplied by the overseas fee appropriate to 
each school. 
" The third allocates the research element of the HEFCE grants. There 
are three elements to this section: (a) SQR (student and quality 
related); (b) DR; and (c) GR. The DR and GR are small allocations. 
The SQR element is comprised of SR (student related) and QR 
(quality related). 
SR = [A/Sum of A] x SR (with SR at 80% of funding council total QR 
allocation less DR sum) 
QR = [B / Sum of B] x QR (with QR at 20% of funding council total QR 
allocation less DR sum) 
Where 
A= [Actual load (i. e., UG +PGT+ (PGR x 4))] x Unit of resource weight 
for Research x 1996 RAE score 
(UG = undergraduate students, PGT = Taught postgraduate students, and 
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PGR = Research postgraduate students). 
B= [1996 RAE Research Active staff + (PGR Actual Load x 0.15) + 
((Research Assistants x 0.1) + (sum 4 years of charities Income/25,000) x 
0.05)] x 1996 RAE score x unit of resource weight for research 
(The formula translates the 1996 RAE score of 5* as 5.3, score 5 as 5, score 4 as 
4, score 3a as 3.3, score 3b as 2.6 and score 2 as 2. Each of these is then reduced 
by 1) 
Therefore, a department that is rated 2 gets no funding from the HEFCE but 
would still be allocated resources. Hence, cross-subsidy exists. The higher rated 
departments, however, get higher allocations based on the formula. 
The use of the RAM in allocating funds to schools means that all the incomes 
(except interest) have been allocated to the schools without top-slicing for central 
costs. The ICAM is the means of allocating central costs to the academic budget 
centres. The method of allocating costs to schools varies across the range of 
services and administrative budget centres. 
Internal budgeting and allocation of resources are controlled centrally in 
University F. There are two budgets: one is for salaries and the other for non- 
salaried items. The non-salaries budget is calculated by formula, where the 
RAE rating score is a variable. The research postgraduate students and academic 
staff are multiplied by the RAE score. Another variable in the formulae is the 
budget centre's cost factor that reflects the different costs of disciplines. T he 
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RAE, therefore, plays a small part in this budget allocation. 
The salary budget in university F is performed by negotiations. Discussions are 
held with department heads chaired by the Pro-Vice-Chancellor who examines 
the budget submissions by the departmental heads, the RAE obtained, and any 
potential for improvement. Hence, the RAE has a direct effect. As it permits 
cross-subsidisation, departments do not necessarily receive what they earn from 
the RAE. It is also difficult to establish exactly how the RAE money is spent as 
all the incomes are pooled together. 
University J, a "new" university, and University G do not directly allocate the 
RAE funds to their departments. University G allocates the funds subjectively. 
The Deans of faculties submit the faculty's budgets to the Vice Chancellor (VC) 
requesting for resources with details of their requirement and priorities. 
Basically, department heads submit to the Dean who collate the submissions and 
prioritise them. The VC chairs a committee with the deputy VCs and pro VCs. 
The committee and the deans decide on the allocation subjectively. The 
committee takes into consideration the university's overall policies and 
strategies. Though the RAE ratings do not directly influence the allocation, the 
committee utilises the RAE ratings to inform its final subjective decision. 
The RAE funds in University J are utilised for research development via a Senior 
Research Fellow Scheme (SRF). The block grants from the RAE are managed 
centrally. "Teaching" money and some external grants finance the department 
budgets. University J needs to ensure that the research selectivity formula 
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money is used to enhance research and is used effectively. Their strategy is one 
of niche concentration. University J initially identifies 20 units of assessment 
that can be improved and creates a SRF by using the RAE grants for their 
salaries. The. majority of the research fellows come from the "old" universities. 
In total, these universities appoint about 40 SRF based on the 1992 RAE funding. 
The SRF are appointed to increase research output, and the RAE ratings. The 
other leg of the strategy is to increase the number of research students. Around 
100 studentship schemes have been introduced. The university views research 
students as a means of increasing the research culture and publications, as well as 
increasing the volume multiplier in the funding formula. 
University J has a clear concentration of its areas of strength. However, to be a 
reputable university, they realize they must offer a wide range of subjects. The 
departments that are supported by the RAE 1992 funds have to submit research 
plans for the RAE 1996 which are reviewed and monitored. If the monitoring 
shows that some departments are not achieving targets, then the funding support 
may be withdrawn. The objective is to improve the quantity and quality of 
publications, and improve the gearing between RAE funds and external research 
funds from the current 1: 1 to the target of 1: 2. The university regards the ability 
to attract external research funding as one measure of their research capabilities. 
After the results of the RAE 1996, University J reviewed all the departments 
(units). Ex-panel members visited 15 units to give advice on each unit's 
potential and what could be done, identifying any strengths that could be built 
upon. About 20 units have been identified for improvement and are supported. 
Chapter 6: The Institutional perspective page 201 
In an 18-month period, 50 new senior research fellows were appointed. 
As discussed in Chapter Three, from the marginal utility analysis, resources 
should be distributed to departments that are rated low as opposed to high in the 
RAE. However, these interviews reveal that only three universities (D, H, M) 
that support the low rated departments. Four of the universities fund their high 
rated departments as a result of their distribution methodology, which results in 
more funds allocated to them. Three of the "new" universities have the strategy 
of supporting the high rated departments as a consequence of their niche 
concentration in research. This concentration is in line with the McKenna (1996) 
argument, mentioned in Section 6.3.4. 
6.5.2.2 AUTONOMY- 
One issue the research selectivity formula funding mechanism raises is the 
question of university autonomy vis-ä-vis accountability. U. K. universities have 
a formal status as autonomous corporations. Direct government regulations or 
interference is considered unlikely. Indeed, in response to the EC Commission's 
Memorandum on Higher Education (EC 1992), the Department for Education 
(DFE) states that it will resist standardised approaches to higher education 
policy, and that "the government opposes intrusion into what it sees as the most 
decentralised and autonomous higher education system in Europe" (THES, 15 
January 1993: p. 7). Nevertheless, while the policy of the government may be 
described as one that aims to increase the operational freedom of universities and 
their staff, this is paralleled by a policy of requiring more specific accountability 
by t hose universities and t heir staff (Bourn, 1994a: p. 7). An example oft he 
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increased accountability is the RAE and the resultant research funding allocation 
that is linked to performance. Another example is the TQA and accountability 
for teaching performance. 
Defining autonomy is an elusive undertaking. While autonomy may be 
described in relation to the authority of the state, all proposals implemented 
appear to result in residual control by the state (Wasser, 1995). The necessity of 
viewing autonomy as contextually and politically defined means studying the 
role of the state since it is the state that sets down the boundary within which 
autonomy may be exercised (Neave, 1988). Historically, there has been the 
Bologna model that applies the notion of autonomy to the student constituency, 
and the Paris model in which autonomy is the freedom to teach (which is applied 
mainly to academics). The more recent Humboldt model gives the state the right 
to intervene only to guarantee the universities' right to choose its staff and to 
guarantee their freedom to work. Tight (1988) sums up four slightly different 
forms of autonomy: (1) Kantian, where the state interferes only in certain 
subjects; (2) Humboldtian, where state has a largely facilitating role; (3) 
Napoleonic, where the state makes most of the decisions; and (4) British, where 
the property-owning corporations of scholars are supported by the state but are 
left on their own. 
Andersson (1985) describes an autonomous university not as one that is 
completely free from state control or totally independent of public funds. In this 
view, a university is autonomous, even if it is heavily dependent on public funds, 
as long as it has the freedom to govern itself. to set its own standards and 
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priorities in teaching, curriculum and research; to raise funds from other sources; 
and to decide on its own organisation. The increasing cuts in public funds could 
lead to more autonomy as universities seek other forms of funding more 
rigorously and eventually have less reliance on public funds; to such ad egree 
that they have the power to say "no" when necessary (Andersson, 1985). But, on 
the flip side of the coin (which might emerge soon) there are risks with this new 
freedom. The liberalisation from state controls and funds may turn into a 
reliance on other financial sources to an extent that gives rise to other restrictions 
on the autonomy. 
6.5.3 HUMAN RESOURCES MANAGEMENT 
An area in which the RAE would have a great impact in the consequences of its 
funding implications is the management of human resources (HR). It is not just 
about the direct effect of designating the appropriate staff as research active for 
the periodic submissions, but also an equally great concern about the 
materialization ofa transfer market for academic staff. T he greater and m ore 
explicit focus on research has led to significant revamps in job descriptions, 
recruitment criteria, and the creation of new posts, appraisal systems, career 
patterns, and rewards. 
Institutions have to make major decisions about the twin consequences of the 
RAE, viz., the nature and role of research in academia, and the strategic 
development of academic staff. Institutions would have to be more proactive in 
personnel decisions such as early retirement and recruitment. Nine of the 13 
universities have been headhunting researchers that can add value to their 
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capabilities as well as help boost their ratings for the sake of the RAE funding. 
Figure 6.3 summarises some of the strategic initiatives. 
Even if the RAE has increased staff movement, some observers have argued that 
it is constructive to increase the rewards to gifted researchers, most of whom are 
able to reciprocate with greater and high quality research. Academia's rigid 
compensation schemes (see Section 6.3.3) may have to begin incorporating 
incentives other than monetary ones. Some universities have instituted early 
promotions, additional research support, and so forth. Figure 6.3 depicts the 
modifications to the compensation plans by the universities interviewed. 
One of the concerns, however, related to the costs of movement, is the possibility 
that institutions might not be able to meet the targets of increased research if they 
do not subsequently receive sufficient research funding. University M was 
mindful of this concern. The 1992 RAE fund was distributed subjectively and 
used for recurring staff costs. University M took the view that this was risky, as 
the RAE funding was subject to changes. As a consequence, its distribution 
methodology was amended for the 1996 RAE, as described in section 6.5.1. 
Teaching funds support the department budgets, and pressure by the schools to 
use research money to hire teaching staff is resisted. But, one department did not 
have sufficient teaching funds for staff salaries and had to re-direct one-third of 
the research money for hiring lecturers. 
The results shown in Table 6.4, show that all "old" universities in the study 
engage in head-hunting. Only two "new" universities did not engage in 
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headhunting. Almost all the universities are aware of the need to introduce 
premiums in the compensation packages, sometimes in the form of additional 
research support. There are also cases of early appointments to take advantage of 
the RAE snapshot deadline. Some universities appointed visiting fellows to act 
as mentors. Although the "new" universities engaged in head hunting, they 
found it more difficult. This was partly due to the inability to pay premiums for 
most "new" universities. De Montfort University top-slices its teaching budget 
to pay the salaries of its researchers. 
Chapter 6: The Institutional perspective page 206 
FIGURE 6.3 
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University F has a policy of hiring people for the RAE submissions. For this 
purpose, its departments identify and headhunt the researchers that they need, 
and offer inducements and premiums to attract them. For example, in Medicine, 
staff were previously hired on the basis of their clinical experiences, but the 
present prerequisite is that they must also have relevant publications for the RAE 
submissions. As a part of its overall human resource strategy, visiting fellows 
from engineering and other industry sectors are sought for their potential to do 
collaborative research. However, no real attempts were made to bring forward 
appointments to meet RAE deadlines. On one particular occasion, the university 
hired a whole research team. On the other hand, there have been at least 10 staff 
from University F who have been "head-hunted" by other universities. 
Some appointments in University G have been brought forward, and others have 
been axed even more aggressively with enforced early retirements so that the 
university can meet the RAE deadline. As the early retirement scheme is meant 
to reduce the number of non-performers, especially those who are older, the good 
researchers who opt for it have been denied. Some good teachers in University 
G who have no research records are also encouraged to retire early. 
6.5.4 RESEARCH MANAGEMENT AND STRATEGIES 
The senior management of the "new" universities are committed to developing 
research as part of their institutional landscape. They are actively re-considering 
their missions, and the potential role that they might have in research. At these 
universities, the importance of nurturing a strong research culture is reinforced 
by the appointments of either Pro-Vice-Chancellors who are responsible for 
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research activities or the creation of Research Development offices. In some 
"new" universities, research centres-are created and operated by those who have 
lower teaching loads in order to concentrate on research. Others such as 
University J have Senior Research Fellow Schemes (see Section 6.5.2.1). 
University K implements the policy of hiring academics to complement their 
current research expertise. University L offers teaching scholarships for graduate 
students for direct impact on the research culture and to generate more funds via 
the volume multiplier effect on the RAE funding formula. Figure 6.4 shows the 
flow of the research management strategies. After the RAE 1996, many 
institutions carry out internal strategic reviews of their departments. The "new" 
universities enlist the help of external reviewers, including some who are RAE 
panel members, in the reviews to overcome their institutional disadvantage of 
being less familiar and experienced with the RAE. 
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The McNay (1997) study also observes that at the former PCFC institutions, the 
vision for research is often linked with other areas of strategic importance, such 
as relationships with industry, commerce and professional services. For 
University J, the objective is to improve the gearing between RAE research 
funding and external research funding, from a ratio of 1: 1 to 1: 2, i. e., to double 
the external funding relative to the RAE funding. It also uses the RAE funds to 
hire research fellows to enhance their niche research areas of strength. 
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University K also has a policy of focusing on its areas of strength. They support 
the departments that have been identified as their strong departments. University 
I supports its research centres by financing staff in the research centres to buy out 
their teaching commitments. 
After the 1996 RAE, universities began to review the ratings and to develop 
strategies for each of their departments. At University E this resulted in the 
identification of areas of concentration where research excellence may be 
established, and the need to hire senior researchers to act as mentors, to assist in 
promoting research activity, and to encourage publications. At University F, one 
department is closed down as a result of the review. 
At University C, where the RAE 2001 objectives are detailed and monitored by 
the annual research audit, the departments that performed poorly between the two 
RAEs had to explain the reasons for the decline. Its objective is to have 80% of 
staff submitted as research active. Non research-active staff are given heavier 
teaching loads, and there is an early retirement scheme to weed out specific non- 
performers prior to the RAE 1996. Furthermore, the hiring of new researchers is 
expedited to beat the RAE 1996 cut-off date. A number of these researchers had 
to be persuaded with incentives. 
A few universities have earmarked some funds for RAE 2001 in order to "buy 
out" teaching commitments so that those who are involved could publish in time 
for the RAE 2001. Additional research support would be provided in the form of 
sabbatical leave and conference funding. One "new" university's research office 
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even disseminates advice on how to publish. The expansion in the number of 
research students in order to instil a vibrant research atmosphere is noticeable in 
the "new" universities. The volume effect of research students is also a definite 
factor for the funding formula. 
6.6 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The environment in which universities operate has changed radically during the 
recent two d ecades. The government has introduced changes t hat include new 
regulations and authoritative advice (notably the Jarrat and Dearing Reports). 
The sources and methods of university funding have also changed. Formal 
quality assessments of teaching and research in the universities are now being 
undertaken as a standard practice. Because of these environmental shifts, not 
least of which are the budget cuts of the 1980s, universities have had to alter their 
structures, objectives, strategies and processes; in short, their entire modus 
operandi. 
It is difficult to isolate the impact of the research selectivity exercise, or the 
changes and new strategies the universities have adopted, in response to the new 
regime. Even where the RAE is seen to have improved the strategic 
development and the management of research, it may be erroneous to attribute 
any such improvements entirely to the RAE. Impacts from the policies of other 
funding agencies, not to mention the individual institution's internal 
development, growth and strategic intent that are independent of the RAE cannot 
be overlooked. 
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Teaching and research have always been important hallmarks and of all 
universities. The recent funding developments and the RAE have introduced 
unease. While there is now a strong link between the quality of research and 
research funding provided by the HEFCE, there is virtually no funding impact 
from the teaching quality assessments. This can lead to the unwholesome 
situation wherein the perception that there are not as much incentives and 
emphasis to improve the quality of teaching relative to the quality of their 
research, would result in passion to do research only for research's sake. While 
this may be viewed by some as merely creating additional stress and conflicts for 
those particularly in the "new" universities that have a strong tradition in 
teaching, the RAE has actually driven a wedge between the twin goals of 
academia. 
The "old" and "new" universities are adopting markedly different strategies. The 
former polytechnics concentrate their research resources in their areas of 
strength, and could devolve into specialised universities. This research niche 
concentration is also being adopted by some of the "old" universities. Since not 
all universities can undertake excellent research in all areas, this niche 
concentration is perhaps one of the positive effects of the RAE. This would be a 
step in the right direction in the endeavour to establishing centres of excellence 
given that research funds are scarce both in theory and practice. Moreover, the 
RAE has ensured that competition for research funds is no longer between 
institutions as a whole, but between discipline areas, thus encouraging 
specialisation. In this light, the "new" universities should be able to compete 
with the established "old" universities in a number of disciplines. The 
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experience of RAE 2001 should corroborate such success among the "new" 
universities. 
The commercial practice of headhunting for top executives has captured the 
imagination of academia that now actively seeks out researchers to help enhance 
their universities' reputation, ratings and research funding. The "new" 
universities find it difficult to attract well-published scholars because of the 
perceptibly greater interest in them even by the "old" universities. One solution 
for the "new" universities is to recruit new PhD graduates, something that the 
"old" universities would also continue doing for the sake of securing potential 
researchers. One trend to expect would be that of new PhD graduates joining 
"new" universities to gain experience in research and publishing, after which the 
more successful ones would-move on to the more research-oriented universities. 
At any rate, the more forward-looking PhD students would be attempting to 
publish in order to be noticed by the research centres and the more research 
oriented universities where the research resources and incentives are. The PhD 
students themselves would be important to the extent that they would form part 
of the volume measure for the purposes of the RAE. 
This chapter has addressed the impact of the RAE on institutions in regard to the 
four primary areas of the internal allocation of funds, submission strategies, 
labour effect and research management. The interviews verify the fact that the 
RAE has significantly influenced institutional behaviour. 
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The remaining chapters of the dissertation focus on the impact of the RAE on the 
reactions and behaviour of academics. 
CHAPTER SEVEN 
THE RAE AND PUBLICATIONS: 
THE VIEW OF JOURNAL EDITORS 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
THE RAE AND PUBLICATIONS: 
THE VIEW OF JOURNAL EDITORS' 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
While there has been substantial literature published on the Research Assessment 
Exercise (RAE), thus far there has been no attempt to survey journal editors for 
their views on the RAE. T his isan important t ask given t hat the RAE infers 
research quality in universities by assessing publications in academic journals, 
and that the RAE mechanism relies on journals and their editors. In the attempt 
to provide this relevant input, this chapter presents survey evidence from journal 
editors who are in a unique and good position to appreciate the implications for 
publications arising from the RAE. 
The chapter is organised as follows: the next section delineates the key questions 
and propositions addressed, and the survey design. Section 7.3 discusses the 
results obtained from the survey and these results are compared with the results 
of the survey of academics in section 7.4. Concerns about ethical publication 
issues are raised in section 7.5. 
1 This chapter has been published as: A. Talib, "The RAE and Publications: A view of Journal 
Editors", in Higher Education Review, Vol. 33 (1), Autumn 2000, pp 32-46. 
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7.2 METHODOLOGY 
A questionnaire is mailed to 130 journal editors in various disciplines to obtain 
their views regarding the impact of the RAE on publishing and publications. The 
other objective is to gather evidence to support findings from the survey of 
academics. This helps minimize the biases that are typical of self-administered 
surveys which is the data gathering methodology for the academics, although the 
large sample size and control questions aim to reduce bias by testing for 
consistency. A copy of the questionnaire mailed to the editors and the 
accompanying letter is in the Appendix to this chapter. 
7.2.1 KEY QUESTIONS ADDRESSED 
The survey addresses key issues such as the submission of manuscripts, research 
quality, management of publications, refereeing process, and proliferation of 
journals and in-house journals. 
7.2.1.1 RESEARCH QUALITY AND QUANTITY 
According to the Goodhart Law, when a performance indicator is defined, ways 
will be found to improve one's performance as measured by the indicator 
(Goodhart, 1975). With respect to the RAE, researchers will increase their 
publications since these are measured. As discussed in Chapter Eight, 48.5% of 
the respondents spend more time on research than they did six years ago before 
the RAE was introduced. 35% of the academics in the survey said that they were 
spending more time on research as a direct result of the RAE. Almost 40% of the 
sample claim that the RAE has had positive effects on their research 
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productivity, and 28% state that the quality of their research in universities has 
improved. 
HEFCE attempted to avoid the manipulation of quantity of publications in RAE 
1996 by limiting published papers to four per RAE and having the publications 
only as input into the informed peer review. However, one cannot ignore the fact 
that the reputation of the journal is taken into consideration when quality 
assessment is undertaken by the panel. It is speculated (and imperative) that the 
assessment panels do regard the journal review process as a preliminary quality 
evaluation. All this would lead to academics seeking to publish more, especially 
in prestigious journals. 
Those who have not been actively publishing feel the peer pressure the most. In 
fact, academics not included in RAE submissions in the "old" universities feel 
marginalized. Undertaking research is not the same thing as publication, which is 
the performance measure. For those who are playing catch up, to fulfil the four- 
paper requirement per RAE cycle may lead to premature attempts at publication 
especially by m iddle tier academics. While this four-paper effect seems most 
pertinent to those who are moderately active in research, the very active scholar, 
who is capable of producing more than four papers per RAE cycle, may not 
experience any undue effect from the RAE. On the other hand, the RAE will 
overwhelm the non-active researchers, because they already have difficulty in 
achieving the four-paper target. 
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Any academic submitting less than four papers in the RAE (returns) alludes that 
he/she has only produced the submitted papers during the RAE cycle period. 
Therefore, the marginal utility, to the academic, of the first, second or third paper 
is equivalent to one paper. However, the marginal return of the fourth published 
paper is infinite. The marginal return of the fifth paper is nil (for RAE purposes), 
as it is not counted in the submission. If an academic submits four papers in the 
RAE return, then the actual total number of papers that he/she has produced in 
the RAE cycle period is not explicitly known. This induces academics to achieve 
the "magic figure" of four papers, at least to alleviate peer pressure. By 
submitting less than four papers in the RAE return the academic exposes himself 
to pressure from his peers as it becomes apparent that he had not been 
productive. However, by submitting four papers he mitigates the peer pressure, 
particularly as the quality of the papers is "lost" in the department aggregate 
submission. This consequence will have most impact on the middle tier 
academics. 
Another consequence of the four-paper effect is academics smoothing the 
number of publications by scheduling the fifth paper to the next RAE round. 
This is investigated by the survey of academics in Chapter Eight. The four-paper 
effect could also lead to a lowering of the average quality of submissions and 
publications. The effect of the RAE on research quantity and quality can be 
visualised as a 2x2 matrix in Table 7.1. The RAE would probably have no effect 
on the quantity or quality of papers from the very active (good) researchers. The 
middle tier researchers would have to produce enough to achieve the target of 
four papers with a possible reduction of their quality. Overall, there would be an 
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increase in the aggregate quantity of papers, but at a lower average quality. As a 
result, a higher number of papers with a lower average quality would be 
submitted to journals. This could also prompt the increase of journals and other 
publication outlets to accommodate the potential increase in manuscripts. 
TABLE 7.1 
"Good" 
Researchers 
Middle Tier 
Researchers 
No RAE 6 8 
Number of papers 5 (rating) 2 4.75 
(6x5) + (2x4) 
Average Quality 4 8 
of papers 
RAE (no change) 
Number of papers 6 4 10 
Average Quality 5 (rating) 3 4.2 
of papers (6 x 5) + (4x3) 
10 
Humphrey et al (1995) argue that scholars may be discouraged from rendering 
services such as refereeing for journals and participating at seminars, or only 
undertaking supervision of PhD students as a means to tap research resources, or, 
in the extreme case, set up their own journals to assure outlets for departmental 
publications. 
The New Scientist editorial (November 9,1996) states: 
"what might help is for someone somewhere to curb the growing 
pressure on researchers to squeeze as many pages as they can out 
of each project.. . this emphasis on quantity rather than quality 
persists... leaving experienced scientists too busy keeping their 
own publications rolling off the press to spend much time checking 
the work of others. " 
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There is no doubt that the pressure to publish exists. The issue that arises is if 
middle-tier academics, who feel this pressure the most, will be induced to 
emphasise quantity rather than quality in order to achieve the four-paper target 
set by the RAE. In this respect, journal editors are in an excellent position to 
report the increased quantity and quality of submissions though only at the 
aggregate level. The increase in submissions at this level is likely to be caused 
by the moderately active scholars trying to raise their normal pace of publications 
to attain the four-paper target. The aggregate increase in submission is less likely 
to come from the good researchers because they would have maintained the same 
level of activity. As suggested above, the four-paper requirement could result in a 
reduction in quality. Academics who have already published four papers would 
be tempted to defer additional papers to future RAE rounds. This may not be the 
case with very active researchers whose average output per RAE cycle is six or 
more papers. Some researchers might just postpone submission of papers if their 
average output per RAE cycle is three to five papers. This smoothing of 
publications by academics is explained in Chapter Eight, and the role of the level 
of research activity in smoothing activities tested in Chapter Nine2. 
Proposition 1: Academics in their attempt to increase publications have 
placed emphasis on quantity in place of quality. 
This proposition is tested in the survey by direct questions on the increase of 
submission rates by British academics and the improvement in quality over the 
last six years. These two questions are asked again with the additional question 
2AIso see A. Talib "The Research Assessment Exercise and Motivation: A note on the difference 
in the impact on the active researchers and the non-active", Higher Education Review. Vol 34 (2), 
Spring 2002, pp 51-59. 
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of whether editors think that the increase in submission and/or quality is a result 
of the RAE. If the quantity increases are due to less able researchers trying to 
meet the target of four publications, then the average quality may decrease. The 
questions (and their numbering order) are: 
Q2: Has the rate of submissions of manuscripts by British academics 
to the journal increased in the last 6 years? 
Q3: Has the quality of the manuscripts submitted to the journal by 
British academics increased in the last 6 years? 
Q10: Do you think as a result of the RAE more manuscripts are being 
submitted by British academics? 
Q11: Do you think as a result of the RAE the quality of manuscripts 
submitted by British academics has improved? 
As an additional control question, the survey asks if the rejection rate by the 
journals has increased in the preceding six years. If there has been an increase in 
submissions, then the rejection rate should have increased in tandem unless there 
is a corresponding increase in the number of published articles. The survey, also 
asked for the reasons for any higher rejection rates. 
7.2.1.2 PUBLICATION MANAGEMENT 
Observing that the RAE has modified behaviour, Sir David Phillips, then Head of 
the Advisory Board for the Research Councils commented: 
I suspect many scientists have been changing their behaviour or 
even the natures of the research they do in order to optimise their 
performance in the RAE. If that leads to people always doing 
research that leads to publishable research in three years time, I 
certainly do not think it is a good thing. 
(Times Higher education supplement, 4 Dec. 1992) 
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Several strategies can be employed to increase publications. S ome academics 
could be tempted to "cut corners" or take advantage of the ethical ambiguities in 
the publication process, with methods such as: (1) making trivial changes to 
manuscripts to be submitted and published as different papers; (2) submitting 
substantially identical manuscripts simultaneously to two or more journals; (3) 
milking data in order to increase number of publications; (4) employing students 
to do significant parts of the research without assigning due credit; (5) altering 
data to fit theory or increase statistical significance; (6) joint authorships of what 
would otherwise be single-authored papers so as to increase the number of 
papers; and (7) re-writing or editing student assignments without assigning due 
credit. 
There is sometimes a rush of submissions in the run up to the next RAE. This is 
particularly since in RAE 1996 only published papers were included, with the 
exclusion of papers accepted for publication. Academics therefore have to 
publish before the deadlines. 
The following propositions are investigated: 
Proposition 2: Academics will increase collaboration with colleagues for 
increased publications. 
Proposition 3: The RAE deadlines and "requirement" of four publications 
will result in a rush of submissions just prior to the 
deadline. 
Proposition 4: Academics will attempt to "milk-out" as many papers as 
possible from the same research project. 
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7.2.1.3 REFEREEING 
Willmott (1995) suggests that research selectivity encourages academics to 
willingly restrict their work to those duties and activities that provide the greatest 
measurable output at the lowest risk and least effort. Humphrey et al (1995) 
concur and raise the following concerns: 
"... Is it implausible to see a future (in academic accounting) in 
which staff are actively discouraged from refereeing for research 
journals; seldom participate actively in research seminars or 
conferences; only undertake the supervision of PhD students if a 
publishable paper looks likely; are tempted to referee unfavourably 
(i. e., reject) papers which they suspect as emanating from rival 
institutions; or seek to set-up their own journals so as to provide a 
guaranteed outlet for departmental publications? " 
The survey of academics finds that 41% of them admit devoting less time to 
voluntary academic activities such as refereeing (see Chapter Eight). Also, 54% 
agree that they now concentrate less on activities that are not recognised by the 
RAE. Acting as a referee for a journal is an activity that is not "recognised" by 
the RAE as a research activity. Therefore, in accordance with Goodhart's Law 
(Goodhart, 1975), scholars focusing on activities that they will be assessed on 
will be reluctant to act as referees, among other activities not valued by the RAE 
process. 
Proposition 5: Academics will be reluctant to devote time for refereeing 
papers for journals. 
As a member of the academic community at large, scholars may not refuse 
outright to referee or review papers, but assignments such as refereeing would be 
given less priority. Thus, journal editors are surveyed to see if the turnaround 
time for papers under review has increased. 
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7.2.1.4 PROLIFERATION OF JOURNALS 
Another one of the unintended consequences of the RAE might be a proliferation 
of quantity to achieve the four-paper target. Here, it is predicted that the increase 
will come mostly from the middle tier academics, sometimes at the expense of 
quality. Quantity proliferation per se is not undesirable, but the journal rejection 
rate may increase if submissions are of inferior quality. The high rejection rate 
could lead to a proliferation of journals to accommodate the increase in papers 
seeking publication outlets. Another likelihood is the increase of in-house 
journals by university departments. This is also a consequence of the RAE, as 
having "in-house" journals could be perceived as influencing department RAE 
ratings. The proliferation or emergence of "in-house" journals however raises a 
concern that these journals favour papers by department staff. These issues were 
addressed in the survey. 
Although the proliferation of journals allows a wider dissemination of research, 
there are issues about the popularity and quality of the journals themselves. In 
this case, the market will probably act as an effective quality control mechanism. 
Journals publishing manuscripts of low quality will eventually be driven out of 
the market unless there is demand for them. Without a doubt, a few heavily 
subsidised low quality journals will remain in contention. 
Proposition 6: The RAE resulted in a proliferation of journals. 
The first survey question is set up to ask journal editors if they detect a 
proliferation of journals in their respective fields. The next question asks if the 
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editor regards this proliferation as due to the RAE. A further question allows the 
editors to cite the reasons or their opinions for the proliferation, bearing in mind 
for the thesis that there are multivariate reasons for the increase in journals, and 
not due just to the RAE. 
The emergence of in-house journals or journals produced by university 
departments creates several scenarios. Some departments may count on it to 
raise their research image to better their RAE ratings. It has also been suggested 
that it could be an additional outlet for departments' staff to publish their works 
(Humphrey et al, 1995). 
Proposition 7: Emergence/proliferation of in-house journals is attributed 
mainly to the RAE. 
Proposition 8: In-house journals favour publishing manuscripts submitted 
by in-house staff. 
7.2.2 THE SURVEY DESIGN AND SAMPLE 
The survey methodology involved sending a questionnaire to editors of British 
journals. The survey is used for its time and cost effectiveness. The survey 
instrument is in the Appendix to this chapter. 
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The questionnaire survey is mailed to 130 randomly chosen editors of British 
journals in various disciplines in. 1998. Only the British journals are surveyed 
because non-British journal editors may not be aware of the RAE and the 
associated impacts. Moreover, the middle tier academics tend to publish in 
British journals. A total of 72 replies are received for a 55% response rate, the 
breakdown of which is in Table 7.2. The sample of journal editors represents a 
variety of disciplines. This is essential as the research is on the general impact of 
the RAE across academics and disciplines. 
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TABLE 7.2: ANALYSIS OF EDITORS RESPONDING TO SURVEY, BY 
DISCIPLINE. 
Journal Area Total in 
Surve 
% Response % % 
Responded 
Education 15 11.5 9 12.5 60 
Public Policy 
& Mang. 
5 3.8 3 4.2 60 
Finance 7 5.4 5 7 71 
Business & 
Mang. 
12 9 9 12.5 75 
Economics 10 7.7 6 8.3 60 
Engineering 11 8.4 5 7 45 
Sciences 15 11.5 6 8.3 40 
Planning & 
construction 
6 4.6 6 8.3 100 
Social 
Sciences 
32 24.5 14 19.4 44 
Statistics & 
Maths. 
8 6 2 2.8 25 
Medical 9 7 7 9.7 78 
Total 130 - 72 - 55 
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TABLE 7.3: RESULTS OF SURVEY 
Q Total Yes Yes NO NO Unsure Unsure 
no. 
No. % No. % No. % 
2 increase in submission of 72 46 64 18 25 8 11 
papers 
3 increase in quality of 72 33 46 26 36 13 18 
submissions 
10 submission increase 72 39 54 15 21 18 25 
result of RAE 
11 quality improved as result 72 11 15 32 44 29 40 
of RAE 
6 rejection rate increased 72 42 58 20 28 10 14 
4 increase in co-authorship 72 16 22 39 54 17 24 
5 increase in co-authorship 72 11 15 42 58 19 26 
from same institution 
8 increase in not agreeing 72 17 24 48 66 7 10 
to referee 
9 increase in turnaround of 72 25 35 38 53 9 12 
referee report 
12 increase in submissions 72 31 43 16 22 25 35 
before RAE deadline 
13 proliferation of journals- 72 31 43 37 51 4 6 
14 proliferation of journals 49* 21 29 12 17 16 22 
due to RAE (43) 24 (33) 
16 manuscripts submitted 72 7 10 56 78 9 13 
are shorter 
17 research findings reported 72 28 39 22 31 22 31 
in a number of papers 
(milking papers). 
18 in-house journals favour 62* 17 24 21 29 24 33 
manuscripts submitted by (27) (34) (39 
de t. staff. 
19 in-house journals 72 21 29 7 10 44 61 
proliferation due to RAE 
* Not all respondents responded to the question. The percentages calculated are 
based on the total of 72, however the percentages based on the actual number of 
respondents is shown in the parentheses. 
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7.3 DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
Table 7.3 summarises the proportions of agreement to the survey statements and 
questions by journal editors. The ensuing discussion pertains to the four key 
areas under analysis. 
7.3.1 RESEARCH QUANTITY AND QUALITY 
Almost two thirds (64%) of the editors surveyed felt that submissions to British 
journals have increased in the last six years. A number of factors can account for 
this increase, one of which is the increase in research activities by British 
academics, but not all of this can be attributed to the RAE and only 54% of the 
responding editors believed the increase is due to the RAE. 
The issue of quality also meets with different responses. For instance, 46% 
perceive a quality increase as opposed to 36% who do not see any increase. 
Furthermore, when asked if the quality increase can be attributed to the RAE, only 
15% of them agree, 44% do not agree, and 40% are undecided. Even where the 
editors believe that quality of submissions has increased, they do not attribute it to 
the RAE. This perception differs markedly when compared with the surveys on 
academics. In the McNay 1997 survey, 64% of the responding academics are of 
the opinion that their research had improved, but only 34% claimed that this is 
due to the RAE. In, our survey of academics, only 39% felt the quality of their 
research has increased and 28% felt the quality of research in general in 
universities has increased. McNay attributes the difference between self- 
assessment and assessing quality of research in universities to academics being 
more positive with regard to direct experiences than about broader system issues 
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where views may have been gained via critical media. The media has been 
critical of the RAE (see Elton, 2000: p. 280). It is likely that the media and public 
opinions that are largely critical of the RAE have swayed the journal editors. The 
HEFCE may need to redress the undesirable perceptions through awareness, 
public relations and other promot-onal media. 
We further analysed the responses of the editors agreeing that the number of 
manuscripts by British academics has increased in the last 6 years. These were a 
total of 46 editors out of the total responses of 72. We analysed their responses 
to other questions in the survey. The results are produced in Table 7.4. 
Although 33 editors (46%) judge that quality of the manuscripts has improved, 
only 11 (15%) relate it to the RAE. Half of the editors, who felt quantity has 
increased, also felt that the RAE (a total of 23 editors) has not improved the 
quality. A total of 32 editors felt that the RAE did not increase quality (see Table 
7.2). However, a majority of editors felt that the RAE resulted in more 
manuscripts being submitted; this was a total of 39 editors (54%) but only 33 of 
them also responded YES to increase in manuscripts. 
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TABLE 7.4: ANALYSIS OF EDITORS WHO FELT THE NUMBER OF 
SUBMISSIONS HAS INCREASED 
SURVEY QUESTION ES NO UNSURE 
Has the quality of the manuscripts submitted 25 15 6 
increased in the last 6 years? 
Have you noticed an increase in the 12 24 10 
submission of co-authored manuscripts by 
British academics? 
Have you noticed an increase in the 10 25 11 
submission of manuscripts co-authored by 
British academics from the same institution? 
Has the rejection rate by the journal of 32 9 5 
manuscripts submitted by British academics 
increased in the last 6 years? 
Do you think that as a result of the RAE more 33 5 8 
manuscripts are being submitted by British 
academics? 
Do you think that as a result of the RAE, the 8 23* 15 
quality of manuscripts submitted by British 
academics has improved? 
* Includes two responses that felt quality had declined. 
Table 7.5 contains the cross-tabulation of responses between these two questions: 
Q3: Has the quality of the manuscripts submitted to the journal by 
British academics increased in the last 6 years? 
Q1l: Do you think as a result of the RAE the quality of manuscripts 
submitted by British academics has improved? 
The requested responses are "Yes", "No" or "Unsure" for Question 3, and "Yes", 
"No", "Unsure" or "Quality Declined" Question 11. From Table 7.5, it can be 
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seen that, according to 34 editors, the RAE does not improve the quality of the 
submitted manuscripts. 
TABLE 7.5: QUALITY INCREASE AND THE RAE 
QUESTION 11 
QUESTION 
3 
YES NO UNSURE QUALITY 
DECLINED 
TOTAL 
ES 10 10 13 33 
O 0 17 8 1 6 
SURE 1 5 6 1 13 
OTAL 11 32 27 2 2 
The editors are surveyed for their opinions for the high rejection rate. Of the 42 
editors who indicate incidence of a high rejection rate, one did not give reasons. 
On the other hand, two editors who responded as "not sure" on high rejection 
rate gave reasons for rejection. One was an editor of a reputable accounting 
journal while the other was an editor of a journal in social policy. The 
accounting journal editor cited stringent quality control and stringent refereeing 
as reasons, while the social policy editor cited high submission rates and poor 
quality as reasons. Respondents were asked to rank reasons for rejection. They 
were given four alternatives and were also given the option of including other 
reasons. The most cited reason (not surprisingly) was the high rate of 
submission. Out of the 43 respondents on this question, 24 cited the high 
submission rate as the main reason for the high rejection rates (out of which 6 did 
not rank the reasons). The second ranked reason was "stringent quality control" 
as cited by 18 respondents, followed by stringent refereeing (10 respondents 
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ranked as main reason) and only 3 cited the poor quality as the main reason. 
Table 7.6 below shows the reasons and their rankings. 
TABLE 7.6: REASONS FOR REJECTION 
REASON Total 
times 
RANKING 
cited NA 1 2 3/4 
High rate of submissions. 32 6 18 4 4 
Quality of submissions declined. 12 2 1 5 4 
More stringent referring. 25 4 6 3 12 
More stringent quality control 32 9 9 10 5 
applied by Journal. 
The NA column represents responses that did not rank the reasons. The results 
in Table 7.6 validate the high rate of submissions. 
While the majority of editors are willing to attribute the increase in submissions 
to the RAE, only a small handful would accept that it helps to raise the quality. 
7.3.2 PUBLICATION MANAGEMENT 
The RAE is shaping the nature of scholarship and publishing behaviour. Since 
"output" is basically journal articles in refereed journals. One responding editor 
reveals that: 
"Researchers try to get maximum publications from one piece of 
research. They often simply report findings rather than breaking 
new ground, or report others' research and the literature rather than 
innovative work". 
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Another educational journal editor also comments: 
"It is a pity that in trying to get their four publications authors will 
submit substandard articles to journals. It does not do them any 
good in the long run. The sheer volume of articles in 1994-1995 
did put pressure on editors and referees and if anything probably 
made journals even more conscious of the need to maintain quality 
control even at the risk of offending well-known authors. It also 
led to a pecking order of journals, i. e. those that carry most weight 
in the RAE. " 
Although there is speculation that the RAE would encourage joint authorships as 
a means to increase one's publishing track records, more than half of the editors 
responding to the survey do not believe that there was an increase in co- 
authorship. Only 22% felt there was an increase of co-authored manuscripts, and 
11% note that there is an increase of papers form joint authors from the same 
institutions. 
Some editors (28%) detect the trend of attempts to craft many papers from a 
single research project. Since the RAE requires certain performance within the 
time cycle, 31 (43%) editors notice the rush to publish prior to the RAE 
deadlines. One editor offers this observation: 
"There is certainly evidence of a bunching of submissions to meet 
the deadline and concern for exact citation of departments. " 
During the run up to the last exercise another editor cites an instance of receiving 
telephone calls from UK academics with forthcoming papers to request for the 
publication dates to be brought forward to meet the RAE deadline. 
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There is the impression that RAE panel members do not read all 
submissions and that they rely on the reputation and diversity of the 
journals. This could have prompted some academics to publish papers 
with similar content in different journals. Alternatively, some will use 
their data sets and research projects in such a strategic manner to develop 
more and sometimes shorter papers. 
An editor made this other observation: 
"There is a tendency to publish overlapping (similar) articles in 
other journals often without telling the editors. " 
From the academic survey, 46% of them agree that the RAE time scale has had 
an impact on their choice of research projects, and 31% avoid projects that would 
be protracted. Furthermore, 35% of the academic respondents acknowledge that 
they reject research that is speculative because of the lower chances of publishing 
and the longer time that would be required. This distancing from research 
activities pertaining to basic and speculative topic does not augur well. "Dolly 
the sheep" would not have ever been possible if the researchers had been worried 
about the time frame. Although research projects should culminate in 
publications, the imposition of a time schedule by the RAE is forcing researchers 
to focus on short-term projects. The stipulation for research projects to be 
completed within four years and the imposition of a four-paper target will force 
scholars to modify their work ethics and culture. Some schools are expanding 
their intake of doctoral candidates (see Chapter Six) and encouraging them to 
publish, especially jointly with their supervisors. 
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"There is an increase in PhD students submitting papers 
before the degree is examined; which I assume is increased 
eagerness to get published and a push from department 
staff to reap the credit. " 
7.3.3 REFEREEING 
About one-quarter (24%) of the responding journal editors sense the reluctance 
to referee journal papers, while two-thirds maintain there is no increase in 
academics not agreeing to referee papers. But, 35% are concerned about the 
increase in the turnaround periods, as it is symptomatic of the lack of enthusiasm 
to referee. The extension may be due to the need to focus on activities for which 
there are due credit and honours. In addition, since refereeing is not recognised 
by the RAE, there is no incentive to offer such a service. Another factor is the 
increase in submissions that results in the increase in the average refereeing 
workload. 
According to one editor: 
"UK academics expect to receive copious and full reviews of the 
manuscripts they submit for publication. However, when asked to 
review papers themselves they are increasingly reluctant to do it 
and turnaround times are very slow. This has got much worse over 
the last few years. " 
7.3.4 PROLIFERATION OF JOURNALS 
It is not clear if there is a proliferation of journals. One-third of the editors seem 
to notice the proliferation and attribute it to the RAE, while 17% do not agree to 
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this occurrence. But, 33% claim that the RAE is the impetus for the emergence 
and increase of in-house journals. Among the journal editors, one-quarter 
suspected that in-house journals featured papers by staff in the same department, 
while 29% disagreed that this is the objective. But given the pressure to publish 
more, there is also a need for more avenues. Journals produced "in-house" allow 
department staff a venue for publishing t heir work. T he survey asked editors 
their views and perceptions on in-house journals. When asked if they think that 
the emergence/proliferation of in-house journals was a result of the RAE, 29% of 
the editors responded by agreeing with the statement. Only 10% did not agree 
while the majority (61%) was unsure. 
A quarter of the editors responding to the survey felt that in house journals 
favoured publishing manuscripts submitted by staff of the publishing department. 
However, 29% did not agree to that statement, while one third were undecided. 
The reasons for proliferation of journals given by the editors in the survey are 
presented in Table 7.7. The reasons for "in-house" journals, in the editors' 
views, are in Table 7.8. 
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TABLE 7.7: REASONS FOR PROLIFERATION OF JOURNALS 
Reasons for the proliferation of journals in the UK. Number of 
times 
reason 
cited. 
Publishers' expansion to meet demand and for profitability. 12 
Pressure to publish (need for publication outlets) and RAE. 22 
Rise of specialist interests -º ä route for publication out of 7 
mainstream. 
Control ones own destiny/prestige /want of own journal. 6 
Cheaper to produce due to changes in publishing technology. 3 
Field growth. 2 
The proliferation of journals may be traced mostly to the RAE. Publishers 
increasing output tom eet t he g rowing d emand, which is RAE-related asw ell, 
compound this further. The growing demand is presumably from the increased 
submissions of manuscripts arising from the "publication culture" that has arisen 
from the RAE. 
As shown in Table 7.8, the most cited reason for the emergence of in-house 
journals is the RAE. Other common reasons include raising the department 
profile and ensuring that colleagues get published. These reasons are induced by 
existence of the RAE. In general, the editor survey finds that the RAE, directly 
and indirectly, is responsible for the proliferation of independent journals and in- 
house journals. 
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TABLE 7.8: REASONS FOR IN-HOUSE JOURNALS 
Reason for proliferation of journals in the U. K. Number of 
times reason 
cited. 
RAE 12 
To ensure colleagues get articles published. 7 
Department profile. 7 
Profits. 4 
Control and own voice. 3 
7.4 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE SURVEY OF EDITORS AND THE 
SURVEY OF ACADEMICS RESULTS 
One objective of the editors' survey is also to provide collaborative evidence for 
the survey of academics. Table 7.9 reports the results of the academic survey 
vis-ä-vis the editors' survey. The table contrasts the responses of the academics 
and the editors on similar issues. It helps to establish the similarity or otherwise 
of the responses, to provide additional reliability of the responses. 
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Table 7.9 
Academics Survey Results Editors Survey Results 
Question statement % Question statement % 
agree agree 
I now spend more time on 48.5 Rate of submission by British 64 
research than 6 years ago. academics increased in last 6 
years. 
I now spend more time on 35 As a result of the RAE, more 54 
research than 6 years ago as a manuscripts are being submitted 
result of the RAE. by British academics. 
RAE has had a positive effect 38.8 Quality of manuscripts submitted 46 
on my research output by British academics has 
increased in last 6 years. 
RAE has improved the 28 As a result of the RAE. the quality 15 
quality of research conducted of manuscripts submitted by 
in Universities. British academics has improved. 
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Academic survey Editors' survey. 
I now collaborate with (in 43.8 
research) overseas There is an increase in 22 
researchers more. submissions of co-authored 
manuscripts by British academics. 
I now collaborate less with 24 
English academics from other 
universities (in research). 
There is an increase in 15 
I now collaborate with (in 44.6 submissions of co-authored 
research) colleagues in my manuscripts by British academics 
department more. from same institution. 
I now give less time than 6 41 There is an increase in British 24 
years ago to "voluntary" academics not agreeing to referee 
academic activities - e. g. manuscripts in last 6 years. 
referee for journals. 
I now give less time _to 
54 Increase in the time period for the 35 
activities given no or low turnaround of British academics' 
recognition by RAE. referee report. 
Because of the RAE time- 40.4 There is an increase in the 43 
scales I have published some submission of manuscripts by 
outputs at an earlier stage British academics in the two years 
than I would prefer. prior to the RAE deadline. 
My research topics or 46 
projects are influenced by the Do you find that in the last 6 years 
RAE time-scale. British researchers tend to report 39 
" their findings in a number of 
Because of the RAE time- 31.7 smaller manuscripts dealing with 
scale I have avoided some different aspects of the findings; 
research projects because rather than a major manuscript 
they would have taken a long encompassing the overall 
time to complete. findings? 
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7.5 THE RAE AND UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES ON 
PUBLICATION ETHICS 
Commenting on the potential impact of the RAE on publication ethics, a survey 
respondent from another study supported the practice of simultaneous 
submission of the same paper to different refereed journals on the grounds that is 
rational to react to a system which provides explicit rewards to individuals and 
institutions based on research output. This consequently leads to a suspension of 
"ethical" beliefs and the adoption of an "anything goes" philosophy (Brinn et al, 
1998: p. 321). Has the RAE led to (or could possibly lead to) a suspension of 
ethical beliefs? 
The results and discussions in this chapter highlight the potential influences the 
RAE has had on publishing ethics. The issue with the RAE here is the time 
scale. The danger to academia that the RAE potentially poses is that it defines 
the time period for project completion as four years. It is even more extreme 
than that. The RAE requires four publications in a four/five year period. That is 
an average of one publication a year. The publishing time scale creates new 
problems. On average, papers with minor review adjustments would require 
between six and 12 months from initial submission to appear in print. 
If a project requires six months of data collection and analysis, then it would take 
about one to two years from commencement of the project to publication of the 
research results. This makes projects that take more than two years to complete a 
difficult option, in terms of the RAE. An increasing number of academics seem 
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to be resorting to publication of preliminary results in order to extract more than 
one paper out of the same project. . 
It is arguable. if the submission of more than one paper dealing with the same 
topic and data is ethical. It helps in knowledge dissemination, but it does not add 
to genuine knowledge creation. Several of the editors surveyed are aware of the 
fact that there is considerable re-hashing of papers and simultaneous submissions 
of papers to different journals. One only needs to make enough modifications 
and alter the title of the paper in a self-serving manner. The outcome is that it 
helps reduce the duration between submission and publication. 
Although a quick response on the fate of submissions is desired, even rejections 
take between three and six. months. Since submissions are increasing, as 
indicated by 64% of the editors to the survey, the replies from journals may take 
longer times. This is being compounded by the reluctance of academics to act as 
referees. According to the academic survey, 41% give less time to voluntary 
academic activities such as refereeing (see Chapter Eight). In this editor survey, 
24% of the respondents noted that there is an increase in the incidence of 
academics not willing to referee, and 35% noticed the increase in the turnaround 
rate. 
The protracted referee turnaround coupled with the typically sequential rejection 
format would result in research themes or data being outdated when they are re- 
worked for submissions elsewhere. Anxious for swift responses from journals, 
some authors resort to multiple submissions to short-circuit the waiting time. 
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While editors lament such behaviour, it should be noted that a six-month wait for 
a rejection reply delays the research cycle. If there were a subsequent similar 
rejection, it would mean a wait of one year before researchers can re-work their 
manuscripts. Then, when papers are accepted, there is often another wait of 
about six months to a year before appearing in print. Some papers are three years 
old from the time they are conceived to time they are published. 
Unless new arrangements can ensure more rapid turnarounds, it is speculated that 
researchers would continue with simultaneous submissions and submissions of 
modified papers. It would be useful to conduct longitudinal studies on research 
practices to establish if and how the RAE is shaping such behaviours. There is 
already stimulating discourses on the impact of the RAE on publishing behaviour 
(see also Brinn et al, 1998), but more needs to be done in order to foster a 
research culture that is vibrant and has integrity. 
7.6 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This study provided survey evidence from editors, a source that is extremely 
helpful in fully understanding the impact of the RAE. One of the obvious effects 
is that the quantity o- manuscripts has increased, and that RAE has resulted in a 
rush to publish to meet the RAE deadlines. The increased quantity is largely due 
to the middle tier scholars being pushed to publish more to achieve the target of 
four papers resulting in a publication culture amongst them. This is evident in 
the attempts to simultaneously submit papers to several journals, and to re-hash 
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manuscripts. Some scholars are also skilfully using data and findings from a 
single project to develop several papers. Others resort to collaboration where the 
strategy is to jointly author with colleagues outside their own department so as to 
avoid the "sharing" of the publication. Some are also tying up with foreign 
researchers to increase the research rate and outlets for publishing. 
The longer turnaround times for submissions is also forcing the strategic 
behaviours. This cannot be easily re-dressed if there is reluctance in the 
community to be more forthcoming to help out with refereeing of papers. At the 
institutional level, the need to publish more to meet the four-paper requirement is 
reason enough for more new journals including in-house ones for internal staff 
members to emerge. 
We acknowledge the limitation in drawing any conclusive results from the 
survey. Nevertheless, the survey results afford an insight into editors' 
perspectives vis-ä-vis the RAE. The results from the survey, as with other results 
in this thesis, indicate that the RAE has created a "publication culture". 
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APPENDIX: 
THE SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE 
i3O 
. 4'997'900. 
Dear Editor, 
I am undertaking a research project on the impact of the Research Assessment 
Exercise (RAE) on academics and research. 
Part of my research methodology comprise a survey of journal editors. I am 
seeking your help in this research project and would be extremely grateful if you could 
spare the time to complete the questionnaire and then return it in the reply paid 
envelope provided 
All information provided in the returned questionnaire will be treated as 
confidential and will only be used in aggregate form in combination with all other 
responses. 
I do hope that you will be able to participate in the survey and would be 
grateful if you could complete and return the questionnaire as soon as possible. 
If you have any queries please do not hesitate to call me at (01926) 313021 or at 
(0467) 621644 or email me at: ameentalib@msn. com 
I thank you for your assistance. 
Yours sincerely, 
akKC; ý 40-, A: ý Ameen Talib 
The University of Warwicl 
Coventry CV4 7AL 
United Kingdom 
Telephone +44 
(0)1203 524306 
Facsimile +44 
(0)1203 523719 
RESEARCH ASSESSMENT EXERCISE QUEsrIO QNAIRE. 
ALL RESPONSES WILL BE TRE4 TED AS CONFIDENTIAL. THE SUCCESS OF 
THIS STUDY IS DEPENDANT ON YOUR RESPONSE; I EXPRESS MY 
GRA 77TLUDE FOR THE TIME SPENT. 
1. Journal Title. 
Journal's subject area: 
How long have you been the editor of the journal? 
0 
years 
2. Has the rate of submission of manuscripts by British academics to the 
journal increased in the last 6 years? 
Yes No Unsure 
3. Has the quality of the manuscripts submitted to the journal by British 
academics increased in the last 6 years? 
Yes 0 No Unsure 
4. Have you noticed an increase in the submission of co-authored 
manuscripts by British academics ? 
Yes No 0 Unsure F-I 
5. Have you noticed an increase in the submission of manuscripts 
co-authored by British academics from the same institution? 
Yes 0 No 0 Unsure 0 
6. Has the rejection rate by the journal of manuscripts submitted by British 
academics increased in the last 6 years? 
Yes E=l No 0 Unsure 
7. If the answer to Question 6 is yes; what in your opinion are the reaso: ls 
for the high rejection rate? (please order the applicable reasons wit/i [1] 
beint; for the most releraºir reason). 
High rate of submission. 
0 Quality of submitted manuscripts has declined. 
More stringent refereeing. 
0 More stringent quality control applied by journal. 
vLuci 
0 
El I 
8. Has there been a noticeable increase in British academics not agreeing to 
referee manuscripts in the last 6 years? 
Yes 0 No [= Unsure 0 
I 
9. Has there been a noticeable increase in the time period for the 
turnaround of British academic's referee report ? 
Yes = No 0 Unsure 
10. Do you think that as a -es-u. 
10-4-RAE more manuscripts are being 
submitted by British academics ? 
Yes 0 No C Unsure 
It. Do you think as a result of RAE the quality of manuscripts submitted by 
British academics have improved? 
Yes No 0 Unsure 0 quality declined 
0 
I 
12. Is there an increase in the submission of manuscripts by British 
academics in the two years prior to the RAE deadline (i. e. in late 1994 
and in 1995)? 
Yes ý-. ý No L_i Unsure Li 
13. In your personal view, do you think there is a proliferation of journals 
appearing in the UK in the same area as your journal? 
Yes No 0 Unsure 
I 
14. Do you think this proliferation of journals in the UK is attributed to 
RAE? 
Yes = No 0 Unsure E7 
15. In your opinion what are the reasons for the proliferation of journals in 
The UK? 
16. Do you find that in the last 6 years the manuscripts submitted by British 
academics tend to be shorter pieces? 
Yes= No 0 Unsure 
17. Do you find that in the last 6 years British researchers tend to report their 
findings in a number of smaller manuscripts dealing with different aspects 
of the findings; rather than one major manuscript encompassing' he 
overall findings. 
Yes 0 No 0 Unsure F7 
18. Do you think journals published `in-house' by British university 
departments tend to favour publishing manuscripts submitted by staff of 
the publishing department ? 
Yes 0 No 0 Unsure F-I 
19. Do you think that the emergence/proliferation of `in-house' journals in 
The UK is a result of the introduction of RAE? 
Yes= No 0 Unsure 
20. What in your opinion is the reason(s) behind the emergence/proliferation 
of `in-house' journals in The UK? 
If you have any comments that you would like to make regarding any of the 
items on this questionnaire andior the research Assessment Exercise, please 
write them in the space below or attach a separate sheet. 
I 
I 
I 
THANK YOU FOR YOUR PARTICIPATION IN THIS STUDY. 
When complete, please return the questionnaire in the reply paid envelope 
provided to: 
Ameen '1'alib 
Warwick Business School 
University of Warwick 
Coventry 
CV4 7AL 
All comments will be treated as anonymous. All information provided in this 
questionnaire will be treated as confidential and will only be used in aggregate form in 
combination with all other responses. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
SURVEY OF ACADEMICS: 
THE RESULTS 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter discusses the exploratory results based on data from the survey of 
university academics in England in a bid to understand: "What are the 
behavioural consequences of imposing an outcome control (RAE) on 
professionals (academics) more suited to self-control? " This chapter addresses 
these behavioural responses and consequences, that are independent of the 
respondent characteristics such as age, post, self-assessed level of research 
activity, discipline (unit of assessment), qualification, experience, institution type 
(ex-UGC or ex-PCFC), and the RAE rating of the department to which the 
respondent belongs. 
The three objectives of this chapter are: 
i. to analyse the survey results for insights into behaviours of 
academics in response to the RAE; 
ii. to identify the personal characteristics, if any, that may influence the 
behavioural orientation, e. g., whether there are significant 
differences in the responses due to sub-group membership. The 
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independence and strength of association, including concordance 
and discordance, were tested by using measures of association; and 
iii. to compare the survey results with the McNay (1997) survey to 
identify changes in behaviour over time. 
8.2 THE SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE 
The survey statements and questions are modified mainly from the McNay (1997) 
study. Employing the same scales as the McNay report provides the basis for 
comparison. Survey respondents are requested to indicate for each statement their 
answers on aL ikert-type scale, with its ends anchored "1" for "strongly agree" 
and "6" for "strongly disagree". The ordinal scale is a set of six choices with the 
first three for agreement, and "4" through "6" for disagreement. The 
questionnaire is finalised after pilot testing and discussions with respondents 
across several academic disciplines to resolve ambiguities in the instrument. 
The questionnaire with a cover letter requesting for survey participation and 
assuring confidentiality was mailed to 1000 randomly chosen academics in 
various disciplines in English universities during spring 1998. A note explaining 
some of the questions and terms is also included. A stamped and addressed 
envelope is provided for respondents to submit their completed surveys. 
Appendix 8B shows the cover letter, the questionnaire and the note. A total of 
328 replies are collected, of which 305 are usable. Table 8.1 summarises the 
respondent characteristics. 
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TABLE 8.1: RESPONDENT PROFILE 
University Type Old New 
Totals 215 85 
Percentages 72 28 
Academic 5 yrs 5-10 yrs 10-15 yrs 15-20yrs >20 yrs 
experience 
Totals 25 57 58 42 123 
Percentages 8.3 18.7 19 13.8 40.2 
Age profile <30 30-40 40-50 > 50 
Totals 6 75 109 115 
Percentages 2 24.6 35.7 37.7 
Qualification PhD Master Prof. 1st degre e 
Totals 215 63 18 9 
Percentages 70.5 20.6 6 2.9 
Post Prof. Reader Prin. Lect. Sen. Lecturer Other 
Lect. 
Totals 65 27 21 104 82 6 
Percentages 21.3 9 6.8 34 26.9 2 
Research Activity Inactive Mod. Active Very Active 
Totals 27 67 78 133 
Percentages 8.7 22 25.6 43.7 
Included in RAE Def. Yes Prob. ves Prob. No Def No Unsure 
return 
Totals 240 17 18 28 2 
Percentages 79 5.6 5.6 9 0.8 
Dept rating 5* 5 4 3a 3b 
Totals 26 50 82 65 37 
Percentages 8.8 16.7 27.4 21.7 12.4 
TOTAL 
300 
100 
305 
100 
305 
100 
305 
100 
305 
100 
305 
100 
305 
100 
21 
32 7 299 
10.7 2.3 100 
The age profiles of the respondents are compared with the McNay sample and the 
HESA staff records. Though the age groups are slightly different, the data 
gathered for t his thesis come from as ample t hat is representative with as light 
skew towards older academics. 
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Thesis sample McNay study HESA records 
< 30 : 2.0% <30 . 4.6% < 34 : 29.0% 
30-40 : 24.6% 31-45 : 43.3% 35-49 : 45.6% 
40-50 : 35.7% 46-55 : 36.1% 
> 50 : 37.7% 56-60 : 10.7% 50-59 : 21.1% 
>60 . 4.8% > 60 . 4.0% 
100.0% 100.0%* 100.0%* 
* Rounding errors 
8.2.1 SAMPLE SIZE 
The sample size is guided by the traditional approach of statistical precision where 
it is expressed int erms of the m aximum s ampling error t hat isa cceptable ata 
given confidence level. In this study some consideration is also given to the time 
and cost to collect and process the data. For this study involving proportions, the 
100(1 - a) % confidence level is given by: 
CI =pt ZcV2 Sp 
And the required sample size for a given level of precision is obtained by finding 
the minimum ii such that 
za12 sp _< 
Error where S,, = 
PG A 
Since the McNay survey has 40% of the respondents agreeing to the statements, 
the a priori estimate of the proportion for this thesis would be 40% (or 0.4), but 
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the proportion for this thesis is established at a more conservative 50% (or 0.5). 
This is because the numerator of the standard error takes its greatest value for a 
given s ample s ize w hen the proportion estimated is0.5 and hence the required 
sample size will be largest. 
The confidence interval is set at a 10% chance of an error, i. e., 5% in each 
direction of the distribution. This 5% margin of error is deemed suitable for this 
study that involves social behaviour. Hence the minimum sample size must 
satisfy: 
za, 2sp _< 
Error where Sp = 
pal - p) 
ý1 
Where a/2 = 0.05 and Z 0.05 =-1.64 approx. 
The resultant sample size is: 
(1.64)(0.5) 2_ 
270 
( 
0.05 
As the response rates for postal surveys range between 25% and 40%1, adopting 
the lower bound translates to the need for 1080 (= 270 . 0.25) participants. A 
total of 1000 questionnaires are finally mailed to prospective academics in various 
disciplines across English universities. From the set of 328 replies collected, 305 
are usable, representing a high response rate for research of this nature. 
1 The Brin et al (1998) survey of accounting academics has a 33% response rate. As the RAE is 
of great interest to academics, response to the current survey should be similarly high. 
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To resolve the issue of non-response bias in this survey, the replies are dated as 
they are received. Based on the reasoning that late replies would be an indication 
of non-responses (Wallace and Mellor, 1988), a comparison is made between 
them and earlier replies. The differences in means are not statistically significant 
and so, non-response bias is not major problem for this research. 
8.3 INDEPENDENCE OF VARIABLES (MEASURES OF 
ASSOCIATION) 
The data for each respondent or observation is a set of 45 variables, of which 32 
are response variables, with the rest being respondent profile characteristics that 
are used as explanatory variables. A cross-classification matrix displays the 
frequencies of observations for each combination of levels of the variable. The 
analysis is carried out on tables with only two variables at a time i. e., a response 
variable and a characteristic variable. This 2-way contingency table has two 
dimensions, r rows representing categories of one variable and c columns 
representing categories of a second variable. The rc cells of the table contain 
frequencies of occurrence of the rc combinations of categories of the two 
variables. 
The cross-classification table provides information regarding the extent to which 
responses are related to the individual's classification on the explanatory 
variable. The collection of response proportions at a certain level of the 
explanatory variable is the sample conditional distribution. If nij denotes the 
number of observations cross-classified in the cell of the table that is in row i and 
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column j, and Pij denotes the proportion of the total sample belonging to that cell, 
then: 
P;; -n; /n 
where 
n=Z, Zjn;; is the total sample size 
so that, J: 1 
Pr; =1.0 
The set {Py} is the sample joint distribution. 
The sample marginal distributions are the row and column totals obtained by 
summing the j oint proportions. T wo variables are independent if all the j oint 
probabilities equal the product of the corresponding marginal probabilities, 
taking the form: 
7[ .y= 9r i+ 7I; 
for 
i=1 .. r 
and 
j=1... c 
Independence of two variables implies that the conditional distributions within 
the r rows are identical. Hence, if two variables are independent, the probability 
of making a particular response j in the column variable is the same in each row. 
8.3.1 Pearson and Likelihood Ratio (LR) Statistics 
The Pearson statistic or LR is used to test the null hypothesis of independence, 
(Ho). The Pearson statistic is an asymptotic approximation of the LR statistic. 
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PEARSON STATISTIC: 
1: 1](nri-my)2 
x2_ rr 
my 
LIKELIHOOD RATIO 
G2= 2ZEn log (ny 
) 
Ijm; 
where my are estimated expected frequencies 
When "Ho: independence is true", both statistics have asymptotic chi-squared, X2, 
distributions with degrees of freedom, df = (r-1)(c-1). For either statistic, larger 
values provide greater evidence against the null hypothesis. Thus the attained 
significance level is the right hand tail probability of getting a statistic value 
larger than the observed one, assuming Ho is true. 
Various guidelines have been given for how large the sample size should be in 
order for the x2 distribution to give a good approximation for the exact sampling 
distributions of the Pearson and Likelihood ratio statistics. A common guideline 
is that at least 80% of the cells should have estimated expected frequencies 
exceeding 5 (Cochran, 1954). Some studies suggest that this may be too 
stringent and should be relaxed (Everitt, 1977; Larntz, 1978; Koehler and Larntz, 
1980). 
These two statistics for measuring independence do not change under 
transposition of rows and transposition of columns. This means that both 
classifications are treated as nominal scales in these tests. If the variables are 
dependent, the asymptotic expectations of the x2 and GZ statistics are 
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proportional to the sample size, n. Hence, these statistics cannot be used alone to 
measure the strength of association, since even a trivial departure from 
independence, results in an impressively large x2 statistic if the sample size is 
large enough. One remedy is to adjust the statistic by dividing it by some 
multiple of the sample size, as done with the Phi coefficient, the coefficient of 
contingency and Cramer measure. These chi-squared based measures and other 
measures of association are detailed in Appendix 8A. 
8.3.2 OTHER MEASURES OF ASSOCIATION 
Nominal measures provide an indication of the strength of relationships between 
variables but not their direction (i. e., positive or negative). There are two types 
of measures: (1) those based on the chi-square statistic, and (2) those that follow 
the logic of proportional reduction in error (PRE). 
The widely used chi-square statistic, x2, itself is only a measure of independence. 
As it does not measure the degree of association between variables, other 
relational measures are required. These association measures modify the 
information from chi-square statistics to minimise the influence of sample size 
and degrees of freedom as well as to restrict the range of values of the measure to 
those between 0 and 1. Such statistical measures include the Phi coefficient, the 
coefficient of contingency, and Cramer statistic. 
With proportional reduction in error (PRE) measures, the meaning of association 
is clearer and easier to interpret. These measures are all, essentially, ratios of a 
measure of error in predicting the values of one variable based on knowledge of 
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that variable alone and the same measure of error applied to predictions based on 
knowledge of an additional variable (the explanatory variable). Lambda and 
G&K Tau are designed for cross-classification of nominal data while Gamma is 
appropriate for ordinal variables. As suggested by Agresti (1984: p. 25), these 
measures are superior to chi-square based measures. The measures are explained 
in more detail in Appendix 8A. 
Relationships among ordinal variables can also be examined using nominal 
measures. However, nominal measures do not reflect the additional information 
available from ranking of ordinal variables. Nominal measures do not answer 
questions such as "Does Y increase as X increase? " Ordinal variables do not 
have a defined metric, so the notion of linearity is not meaningful. Therefore, a 
linear regression relationship cannot adequately describe "the increase in Y as X 
increases" for interval scale variables using ordinal data. However, the inherent 
ordering of categories allows consideration of monotonicity, such as whether "Y 
tends to increase as X increases". Measures for ordinal variables, such as 
Gamma, describe the degree to which the relationship is monotone. 
The most commonly used measures of association for ordinal variables are those 
based on the numbers of concordant and discordant pairs of observations in the 
sample. A pair of cases is concordant if the values of both variables for one case 
are higher (or both lower) than the corresponding values for the other case. The 
pair is discordant if the subject ranking higher on variable X ranks lower on 
variable Y. When the two cases have identical values on one or on both 
variables they are tied. 
ný . 
1ý +, a 
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Several measures are based on the difference between the number of concordant 
and discordant pairs. If the majority of pairs are concordant, the association is 
said to be positive. As ranks of variable X increase (decrease) so do ranks of 
variable Y. If the preponderance of pairs is discordant, the association is said to 
be negative; as ranks of one variable increase (decrease), those of the other 
variable tend to decrease (increase). The measures computed for this research 
are: Gamma, Somer's d, Kendall's tau-b, and Spearman correlation coefficient. 
These measures are explained in Appendix 8A. The Gamma is most frequently 
used because it is easy to interpret (Agressti, 1984: p. 165). However, the value 
of Gamma tends to be more dependent than Kendall's tau-b on the number of 
categories and the way they are defined. For this characteristic, Kendall's tau-b 
is a superior measure. The Somer's d is a particularly useful measure for 2xc 
tables in which the column variable is an ordinal response variable, even if the 
rows are unordered. For completeness, measures for nominal as well as 
measures for ordinal data are computed. The measures of independence statistics 
are briefly described in Appendix 8A. 
8.4 DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
The association (independence) tested here is between the response variables and 
an individual characteristic (explanatory variable). Other factors are not 
controlled for when independence of a particular factor is tested. The results 
could vary when the interactions between factors are controlled for (Agresti, 
1984). Though care is required in interpreting these results, we feel it is useful 
for initial explanatory analysis. The detailed raw results are not displayed here; 
however, the summary of the results is displayed in Table 8.7. The survey 
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questions and the overall means of responses and the proportions agreeing to the 
survey statements are summarised in Table 8.2. The mean of the responses 
classified by the characteristics is shown in the Table 8.3 series while the 
proportions are in Tables 8.4 series. These results are also displayed in the chart 
format for ease of reference. These tables and charts are in the Appendix of the 
chapter. 
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TABLE 8.7: SUMMARY RESULTS FOR MEASURES OF ASSOCIATION 
Question UoA^ Exp. Years-in- Include Dept. Inst. Post PhD- Age Research 
Post in RAE- Rating type- Activity 
1 A P P A P N, 
2 A P N P A 
3 A P N 
4 A P P N 
5 A P 
6 A P P N 
7 A P P N N A A A 
8 P A 
9 P A 
10 P N N 
11 
12 N 
13 N N N P 
14 P N P 
15 A 
16 P 
17 A P N P A 
18 N N 
19 A P A P A 
20 P N P A 
21 A P A N N P 
22 A N N P A 
23 A P N A A 
24 A P P 
25 A A P N 
26 A 
27 N N P 
28 P N P 
29 P N 
30 
31 A N N N A P P 
32 A N N 
Research N N A 
Fixation 
Academic Freedom P N N* P A 
Res. Smoothing A N N A 
Time-Cycle P N N P A 
Mobility P N P 
Gaming P N N P A 
Significance 
level is 5% 
^= nominal 
= dichotomous 
all else is ordinal 
A= Association 
P= positive monotone 
N= Negative *= Si gnificant 
monotone at 5.3% 
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8.4.1 UNIT OF ASSESSMENT (UoA) 
The Units of Assessment, UoA, are classified into eight nominal groups that in 
order are: Science, Physics, Engineering, Business and Management Studies, 
Liberal Arts, Education, Business Related, and Others. The "Business Related" 
group is a combination of Accountancy, Economics and Statistics. 
There is a strong relationship between the UoA and the time spent on research as 
a result of the RAE. The extent to which research is published at an earlier stage 
than preferred is also influenced strongly by UoA. Similarly, the influence of the 
RAE time scale on the choice of research topic had a strong relationship with 
UoA. There is a 12% reduction in error when UoA is used to predict the 
influence of RAE on choice of topic. 
The UoA is a nominal measure. A monotone relationship is only for ordinal- 
ordinal measure of variables, and thus a monotone relation between an ordinal 
and a nominal variable would be meaningless. However, the results (see Table 
8.13) indicate a negative monotone relation between UoA and Research Fixation. 
Although, this might be meaningless, from classification of the UoA variable, it 
could be viewed it as an ordinal variable (with a "pinch of salt"). The 
classification starts with the "Science" discipline and proceeds to the "Art" 
discipline. These provide a crude ordinal measure. If acceptable, the negative 
monotone relation indicates that the "Science" academics have a lower Research 
Fixation. This may be due to the fact that the average publication per academic 
is related to the unit of assessment. 
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8.4.2 EXPERIENCE 
The ordinal measure for a monotone relation shows that the less experienced 
staff spend more time in research as a direct effect of the RAE. The measures 
(Gamma, Tau-b, and Somer's d) are stronger with a positive correlation for the 
response that increase in research time is due to the RAE. The more experienced 
the staff, the more they feel that the RAE time cycle is not appropriate. Among 
the less experienced staff, 60% spend less time on activities that have little or no 
recognition by the RAE. These staff have a strong belief that the RAE has 
positive effects on their research, and that the RAE improves the quality of 
research in universities even though some of the effort is oriented to basic and 
pure research. 
8.4.3 INCLUSION IN RAE-SUBMISSIONS 
Whilst this explanatory variable is closely related with the self-assessed research 
1- 
activity, it is regarded as important; as inclusion in the RAE submission is 
recognition of the individual's efforts and gives the individual a sense of 
belonging to the "clan". It is proposed that inclusion has a motivating effect and 
the impact of the RAE on behaviour will differ between those who are included 
and those who were not included in the RAE submission. Academics who 
believe they were probably not included in RAE submissions are the most 
influenced te increase research time, with 6 8.8% increasing research time and 
43.8% agreeing it is due to the RAE. This reinforces the discussion in Chapter 
Seven on the "four paper effect" and the RAE's impact on the middle-tier 
researchers. ý'. M'. 
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Those included in the RAE submissions were sp ending less time in voluntary 
academic activities and other activities given no or low recognition by the RAE. 
The association measures Gamma and Somer's d reflect a strong association. 
8.4.4 DEPARTMENT RATING 
The hypothesis of independence could not be rejected between department rating 
as an explanatory variable and time spent in research, time spent in teaching, 
collaboration and time spent in voluntary activities. The null Ho: independence 
was rejected for all the other responses. 
Academics from departments ranked 3a, 3b and 2 are likely to produce more 
research in response to the RAE than would staff from other departments. Over 
60% of respondents from departments rated 3a and 3b also devote more time on 
research. Forty-two per cent of academics from departments rated 3a and 60% 
from departments rated 3b also strongly agree that the greater time spent in 
research is due to the RAE. The greatest pressure to publish is felt by 
departments rated 3a (87.7% agreeing to the statement), departments rated 2 
(85%), departments rated 4 (80%), and departments rated 3b (75%). The effect 
of the pressure and extra time on research is seen in the staff of departments rated 
3a and 3b having the largest proportions agreeing that the RAE has a positive 
effect on their research output (40% in 3a and 59.5% in 3b). The RAE has 
resulted in the personal cost of increased stress on some staff. Over 70% of 
academics across departments rated 3a, 3b and 4 surveyed, claimed to face more 
intense stress. With respect to the effect on research quality, the RAE impact is 
felt by 35% of the staff from departments rated 3b compared to an overall 
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average agreement of 27%. 
A large percentage (73%) of staff in departments rated 5-star spend less time in 
teaching preparation, although about one-third of the staff attribute it to the RAE. 
This corroborates evidnce that departments utilise research funds to "buy out" 
teaching time (see discussion in Chapter Six). These results raise the prospect 
that the RAE has increased research at the expense of teaching. There is also 
anecdotal evidence that high rated departments have used postgraduate students 
to help out in teaching. 
Interestingly, although the association is not significant, the lambda measure is Zx 
significant for spending less time in voluntary academic work with a 7.6% 
reduction in e nor when department rating classification is used to predict t his 
behaviour. Similarly, there is a 9.3% reduction in error when department ratings 
are used to predict collaboration with foreign researchers, and an 8.6% decrease 
when the ratings are used to predict collaboration with colleagues within the 
same department. 
The choice of research topics is dependent on department ratings. Academics in 
lower rated departments are more likely to choose topics in line with the 
preferences of the RAE panel members. They were also more likely, because of 
the RAE time scale, to avoid research topics that would take a long time to 
complete or are speculative in nature. These results support the "four paper 
effect" discussed in Chapter Seven. Nevertheless, the statement that research 
topics are influenced by the RAE time scale does not exhibit a monotone 
. awn 
ýr> 
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association but displayed significant dependence as the Phi and the coefficient of 
contingency display a significantly strong association. 
The interviews with university administrators suggest a trend for universities to 
increase the number of research students to raise the research orientation and 
culture. About 50% of the survey respondents attribute the increase in number of 
research student to the RAE, although only one-third laments that the expansion 
is beyond the capacity for proper supervision. It seems that departments rated 3b 
have over expanded the number of research students. About 70% of their staff 
believe that this is due to the RAE formula, and 46% are concerned that such 
expansion may stretch the capacity to supervise well. The departments ranked 
low in the RAE may begin to expand the pool of research students to help 
improve their research income. The problem is that these departments may not 
have the necessary expertise to provide adequate supervision. 
The analysis of the number of research assistants and research students per 
research active staff by d epärtment ratings are summarised in the chart below. 
There is a positive near-linear increase between research ratings and supervisory 
load. 
i'-'' 
ýY` 
ý, 
i': 
ýý. 
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RESEARCH STUDENTS AND ASSISTANTS PER RESEARCHER BY 
DEPARTMENT RATING 
25 
2 
15 
1 
05 
0 
Source: Extracted from the 1996 Research Assessment Exercise database. 
8.4.5 TYPE OF INSTITUTION 
It is hypothesised that there will be a strong association between the responses 
and the i nstitution t ype as an explanatory variable. H owever the results w ere 
rather surprising that in many instances the H0 of independence could not be 
rejected. 
The response variables for which HO: independence is rejected are: 
" increase in time spent in research 
" less time spent in teaching preparation as a result of RAE 
0 giving less time to voluntary academic activities 
0 RAE effects on research output 
12 3b 33 455 
Deparhrent rating 
ý, + Research assistants per r smrtiha -U- r asth sedans per reseerd, er 
rr 
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" collaboration with colleagues in own department 
" choice of research topic 
" stress level 
" RAE impacts on appointments and pay 
8.4.6 POST 
The measures of association for this explanatory variable should be interpreted 
with care as in all of the cells the expected frequencies exceeding 5 were less 
than 80%, a contradiction of the commonly quoted guideline attributed to 
Cochran (1954). 
i5 {, 
ý 
The positive effect the RAE has on the research output is matched with the 
respondents' positions. The Ho: independence is rejected, although there is no 
evidence of a monotone relationship. The lambda shows an 8.4% reduction in 
error when the post variable is used to predict if the RAE has had positive effects '"'ý 
on research output. The G&K Tau and Uncertainty coefficient show a reduction 
of error of about 3%. 
It is observed that as we move down the seniority scale, the consensus that the 
RAE influences the choice of research topic of staff increases. The junior staff 
claim that their research is moving away from the applied topics towards more 
basic and pure areas. Their choice of topic is highly influenced by the perceived 
preferences of the RAE panels. Topics that are speculative in nature are being 
11: 
avoided because of the RAE time-scales. There is also a weak association, 
. *-ý 
r "'ý 
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significant at the 5.2% level that the junior staff are shunning research projects 
that would require a long time to complete because of the RAE time-scale. 
8.4.7 QUALIFICATION 
The percentage of academics without PhDs agreeing to the statement that they 
spend more time on research due to the RAE is 60%. They also disagree that 
salaries for academic researchers have increased as a result of recognition from 
the RAE. Those without PhDs are trying to collaborate with foreign researchers 
in the hope of increasing their performance. 
8.4.8 AGE GROUP 
Younger academics are spending more time in research as a result of the RAE. 
For example, 60% of staff below 30 years of age report that they are increasing 
their scholarly work as a result of the RAE. This deliberate reaction is 
symptomatic of the lack of job security and emphasis on research placed by 
universities. Universities have started encouraging early retirement among non- 
active researchers (see Chapter Six). 
Over 40% of the entire sample spend less time in voluntary work because of the 
need to focus their efforts on work that is favoured by the RAE. This is 
particularly evident . among the younger staff (66%). They practise research 
smoothing and research output management more than the older staff. There is a 
moderate monotonic relationship between age and research smoothing. Younger 
academics are publishing their work at earlier stages than they would have done 
ý _. 
because oft he RAE time scale. N of only are t heir choices ofr esearch topics 
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influenced by the RAE time-scale, they also avoid projects that require long 
durations or are speculative. 
8.4.9. RESEARCH ACTIVITY 
As the RAE is also an assessment of research quality, it is expected that research 
activity will be a significant explanatory factor. The response variable for which 
the Ho: independence is not rejected are these response statements: 
"I now spend less time in teaching preparation than 6 years ago as a 
result of the RAE's pressure on research. 
"I now collaborate less (in research) with academics from other 
English universities. 
"I now collaborate more (in research) with colleagues in my 
department. 
" In my view, RAE has a negative effect on inter-disciplinary research. 
" Because of the RAE time-scales I have deferred the publication of yy 
some research output. 
"I believe that the expansion in research student numbers is due to the 
RAE funding formula. 
" University appointments are now driven by the RAE. 
" Universities are now paying a "premium" to attract "star" researchers. 
" The RAE four year time cycle is not appropriate for my subject area. 
All other response variables exhibit significant association. However, not all 
associations had a monotone relationship (see results in Table 8.7). 
Although half of the respondents spend less time in teaching preparation, only 
one third claim this as the result of the RAE pressure on research. Of the active 
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researchers, 73% agree that they spend less time in teaching preparation. These 
findings imply that the correlation between research and teaching may be 
negative. It also suggests that research activities may be undertaken at the 
expense of teaching preparation. 
The less active researchers are more likely to respond to the perceived 
preferences of the RAE panels thus allowing their choices of research topics to 
be influenced. They also shift their orientation from applied to basic and pure 
research, and conduct a lesser amount of inter-disciplinary research. 
Research smoothing activities do not have a monotonic relationship with 
research activity, though the Ho: independence is rejected. A closer examination 
of the mean responses shows that the moderately active researchers are the key 
group that had the greatest tendency to practice research output smoothing. 
8.5 BEHAVIOURAL MEASUREMENT VARIABLES 
The survey is designed to measure the six variables described in Chapter Three. 
They are summarised here for convenience. In this section the association 
between these measure variables and the characteristics of the academics are 
discussed. The tests here are the null hypothesis of independence between the 
measure variables and the explanatory (characteristic) variable. 
By using the re-compute command in SPSS, the scores for each respondent for 
each question in the measure variable are aggregated and divided by 6. The 
resultant scores are re-computed into four ordinal scores, where: 
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Score 1 1.00 to 2.50 Strong Agreement 
Score 2 2.51 to 3.50 > Moderate Agreement 
Score 3: 3.51 to 4.50 > Moderate Disagreement 
Score 4 4.51 to 6.00 Strong Disagreement 
8.5.1 THE MEASURE VARIABLES 
The six measure variables that are detailed in Chapter Three are recapped in this 
section. 
i. RESEARCH FIXATION 
This variable measures the impact of the RAE on academics focusing on research ,I 
at the expense of other activities. The variable is derived from the responses to 
Questions 2,4,5,6,8, and 26 (see Appendix 8B for the questionnaire). 
ii. ACADEMIC FREEDOM 
Academic freedom refers to the freedom of selecting a research topic and the 
freedom to decide when to publish the research findings. The influence of the 
RAE on choice of research topic and on timing of publishing output is regarded 
as an indirect infringement of academic freedom. The variable is the average 
response from Questions 13,14,17,19,20, and 21. 
iii. SMOOTHING RESEARCH OUTPUT 
It is expected that many academics would practice research output smoothing in 
a similar fashion to that of "income smoothing" under the Agency Theory. As 
the RAE requires only four publications, academics could defer publication or 
Chapter 8: Survey ofAcademics page 272 
publish early in order to smooth their output. Questionsl7,18 and 22, measure 
this construct. 
iv. TIME CYCLE EFFECT 
This variable m. asures the behavioural impact arising from the time-cycle of the 
RAE. The components of this measure are similar to the smoothing measure and 
the academic freedom measure. Questions 17,18,19,20,21 and 22 measure it. 
v. MOBILITY 
There is anecdotal evidence that staff mobility has increased from the time the 
introduction of the RAE. There is also the issue of the premium the "star" 
researchers would command. This variable measures academics' perception 
about the effect of the RAE on staff mobility and salaries. Questions 25,29,30 
and 31 measure this variable. 
vi. GAMING 
This is an overall measure for gaming activities, including smoothing and short- 
termism, and it is measured by Questions 13,14,16,17,18,19,20,21 and 22. 
8.5.2 MEASURES OF ASSOCIATION FOR THE MEASURE VARIABLES 
"he results displayed in Tables 8.8 through 8.13 (in this chapter's Appendix) 
show strong positive monotone correlation between the responses of the 
combined variables. A respondent is more likely to have a strong (weak) 
agreement response for all the combined variables. This strong correlation 
"` 
ý,.,,; 
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supports the reliability and internal consistency of the questionnaire. The 
discussion and analysis of the results are provided below. 
8.5.2.1 RESEARCH FIXATION 
Research fixation is dependent on the level of self-assessed research activity, but 
there is no monotone relationship. Examining the means of the responses, it 
appears that this is due to the moderately active researchers being more likely to 
engage in research fixation than the non-active or the very active. This supports 
the "four paper effect" argument presented in Chapter Seven. 
There is a negative monotone correlation with "Post". The less senior the staff 
the more likely they would agree to the survey statement on research fixation. 
They spend more time on research at the expense of other pursuits. There is also 
a negative relationship with the UoA variable. 
The pressure to publish is felt by more than three-quarters of staff. This is 
consistent with the higher stress level being experienced by the majority (over 
70%). Respondents who are more likely to agree to research fixation behaviour 
would agree that the RAE four-year time-cycle is not appropriate for their 
respective disciplines. The use of research fixation responses to predict 
responses regarding the stress level reduces the error in prediction by 16%. 
8.5.2.2 ACADEMIC FREEDOM 
The p erceived p references oft he RAE p anel m embers influence the choice of 
research topic (Martin and Skea, 1992). Although policy makers can influence 
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scholarly work through signals from RAE panel members, the proportion of 
academics who admit that their research topics have been influenced by the RAE 
panels is only 20.4%. The percentage seems low, but taken together with the 
13.2% found in the McNay study, the trend is a source of concern to some in the 
academic community. This concern is compounded by the profile of the 
academics most influenced in their research topics by the RAE panels. They are 
the younger academics in the 30-40 age group (26.7%) who are from lower-rated 
departments, are in lecturer positions and are moderately active researchers. 
Another concern is the influence of the RAE time-scale on the choice of research 
topics. Overall, nearly half (46.9%) of the respondents concur that their research 
themes are influenced by the time-scale imposed by the RAE. One third of them 
have avoided doing research in areas that would have taken a long time to 
complete or are more tentative in nature. Among the younger staff, 60% refer to 
the time scale as an influence on the range of issues for research. 
The association measure results show a negative correlation with the Post 
variable is significant only at the 5.3% significance level. The association with 
the department rating was also negatively correlated. Academics in the lower 
rated departments were more likely to alter their behaviour, as a result of the 
RAE, to an extent that their academic freedom is infringed upon. The older staff 
and those longer in their current posts are more likely to disagree that they have 
altered their behaviour to the extent that academic freedom has been questioned. 
These two characteristics were positively correlated with the response on 
academic freedom variable. 
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8.5.2.3 RESEARCH SMOOTHING 
The journal editors who are surveyed for this thesis observe that some 
undesirable publication practices are emerging. Some authors have resorted to 
recycling papers and undertake what is k=nown as "salami slicing" (see Chapter 
Seven). In the McNay (1997) study, only 24.5% of the sample admit that 
because of the RAE they have published their research at earlier stages of 
development than would have been the case. For this thesis, the proportion is 
higher at 40.4%. 
As the RAE 1996 required four publications to be submitted for each cycle, the 
marginal utility of the fifth paper within each cycle is extremely low, almost nil 
if its quality cannot match that of the previous four papers. Not unexpectedly, 
19.5% of the survey respondents have deferred publication due to the RAE time- 
scale. This consequence is highest among the "quite active" category (25%). 
The very active researchers probably have little need or reason to defer their 
publication, while the non-active academics do not have the prodigality to defer 
publication. 
Research smoothing is not independent of the level of self-assessed research 
activity. There is also, no monotone relationship. This is because the moderately 
active researchers are more likely to smooth their publishing effort compared to 
the non-active or the very active. Smoothing practises are highest in departments 
rated 3b (61%). Two thirds of those from departments rated 1 have published at 
earlier stages than they would have desired. Research smoothing had a 
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significant and negative monotone relation with the post and department rating 
variables. The less senior the staff, the more likely they are to smooth out their 
output. This is even more aggressively pursued by staff in lower rated , 
departments. The hypothesis of independence is rejected for the UoA variable as 
there is a strong association. 
8.5.2.4 TIME-CYCLE 
Age and years in the teaching position display a significant positive monotone 
association. Older academics are less likely to agree that the RAE time-cycle has 
influenced their behaviour. The post and department rating variables exhibit a 
negative monotone association. Academics in lower-rated departments are more 
likely to accept that the RAE time cycle influences their work styles. Those 
whose behaviour is influenced by the time cycle are likely to agree that their pay 
has increased in line with recognition of their work accorded by the RAE. 
8.5.2.5 MOBILITY 
This mobility variable is the only variable that is independent of the self-assessed 
research activity. There is a positive monotone relation with age and experience. 
The older and more experienced academics either disagreed or agreed less that 
mobility is an issue. The younger and newer academics would readily agree that 
that the RAE has iicreased mobility and pay. This is seen in the negative 
monotone association with the Post variable. The less senior staff are more in 
agreement with the mobility measure. 
Almost two thirds (64%) of the respondents are of the opinion that the RAE has 
increased staff movements across institutions. This perception is higher among 
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younger staff (about 75%). Ninety percent are convinced that the RAE is an 
instrument capable of steering university appointments, and that universities are 
paying a premium to attract star researchers. However, only one-quarter believe 
that academics' pay have increased due to the RAE. Three quarters of staff in 
departments rated 4 agree that mobility has increased. Among non-active 
researchers, 2 5% are oft he a ssessment t hat t here is greater staff m obility that 
will intensify with the increase in research activity. A larger proportion - 70%, 
of the very active researchers - also anticipate this trend. However, no monotone 
relationship could be established from the survey data. The pay premium for star 
researchers is noticed by 85% of the very active group. They are evidently 
highly informed regarding t his issue, and are the ones who k now the level of 
premiums used as inducements to transfer jobs. The survey results and the 
interviews conducted with university administrators support anecdotal evidence 
that the RAE now drives university appointments and that salary premiums are 
used to attract star researchers. 
8.5.2.6 GAMING 
The hypothesis of independence could not be rejected for institution type, 
experience, UoA, and whether respondents are included in the RAE submissions. 
Independence is rejected for the self-assessed level of research activity, although 
no monotone relationship is evident (see Table 8.8). The means of the responses 
(Table 8.3H) show that the inactive and very active game less than the average 
researchers. From a policy perspective, the impact of the RAE on the average 
researchers is the most substantial. As the very active researchers are and have 
been productive for intrinsic satisfaction, policy makers have to stimulate the 
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performance of average scholars in the effort to attain centres of excellence. 
Thus the gaming behaviour exhibited by average researchers is now a source of 
concern for decision makers. 
The measures of association between research activity and a question on whether 
the RAE has positive effects on research output show an association that leads to 
rejection of the independence Ho, although there is no monotone relationship. 
For this query, the inactive group responds with a high mean of disagreement of 
4.86. The very active academics disagree with a mean of 4.11. The moderately 
active ones and the quite active group disagree with am can of4.25 and 3.71 
respectively. This provides some evidence that the quite active group is trying to 
increase their research and in the process, game to enhance their performance. 
There is a negative monotone correlation with the department rating, with more 
academics in lower-rated departments agreeing that they practise gaming. There 
is also a negative monotone correlation with the Post variable. It has been 
observed that the less senior the staff, the greater the admission that gaming 
strategies are b eing executed. T his is corroborated byt he positive m onotonic 
correlation between age and years in post. The younger academics with fewer 
years in post are those who have the highest tendency to game. 
8.6 COMPARISON WITH McNAY STUDY2 
This section elaborates on the cumulative impact of the RAE on academics' 
2 This section has been published in the paper: A. Talib "The continuing behavioural 
modification of academics since the 1992 research Assessment Exercise", Higher Education 
Review. Vol. 33 (3), 2001 pp 30-46. 
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behaviour by comparing the findings with McNay's (1997) analysis of the 
impact of the 1992 RAE. It is expected that new behaviours or a behavioural 
pattern would have ensued during the intervening period. While this may be 
especially the case with the ex-PCFC sector, it is noted that the 1992 exercise 
was a milestone for the changes it brought on and for the inclusion of the ex- 
PCFC Institutions (see Chapter Four for a discussion). 
The analytical approach is to compare the mean responses since similar surveys 
are conducted by the McNay study and for this research. Significant differences 
in the mean responses would suggest changes in behaviours. To decide whether 
µ, is significantly different from µ2, the null hypothesis, Ho, is that that µl = µ2. 
This Ho is equivalent to µ1- µ2 = µ = 0. If this value deviates from 0 then the 
hypothesis is rejected. The standard error, assuming independence of the 
samples, is given by: 
ß" =ß: + _S 
Vf ni n2 
And as the sample size is reasonably large, the sample standard deviation can be 
used to estimate the population standard deviation, c r,. 
The ex-PCFC sector was brought into the purview of the RAE in 1992. 
Consequently, academics in the ex-PCFC sector have modified their work ethics 
in order to conform with key requirements of the RAE in general. The set of 
hypotheses testing for behavioural changes in the ex-PCFC sector is analysed by 
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comparing responses to the M cNay study and to the s urvey conducted for t his 
thesis. In this case, the null hypothesis Ho of µI = µ2 is equivalent to jt - µ2 = 0. 
The differences in mean responses and their associated statistical significances to 
the two surveys are reported in Table 8.5. The differences in percentages 
agreeing by institution type are in Table 8-6. 
As there is no difference in time spent on research and teaching preparation, the 
responses to both surveys are somewhat similar. Thus, there is no evidence to 
support the belief that the RAE has induced biases. The differences in means are 
significant at the 5% level for these statements: 
"1 now give less time to activities given no or low recognition by the 
RAE. 
" The RAE has had a positive effect on my research output. 
91 am feeling more pressure to publish. 
"I now collaborate less (in research) with academics from other English 
universities. 
" Perceived research preferences of RAE panels have affected my choice 
of research topic. 
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9 Because of RAE time scales, I have published some outputs at an 
earlier stage than I would prefer. 
" Because of the RAE time -scales I have avoided some research 
p=ojects as they were speculative in nature (more risky in relation to 
security of output). 
The means of all other statements are not significantly different. All the 
responses (where the difference in means was significant) showed respondents in 
our survey agreeing more strongly to the statements than the McNay study. The 
only statement that the respondents in our survey disagreed with more strongly 
compared to the previous study, was the statement that the RAE had a positive 
effect on research output. The results indicate that academics are getting more 
disillusioned with the RAE over time. They are feeling more strongly that the 
RAE has not had a positive effect on their research output. 
Forty-four percent of the respondents in the current survey are collaborating with 
colleagues from their departments because the synergy in joint research may be 
more productive. The choice of research topics is increasingly being shaped by 
the panel as documented that panel members tend to favour research they are 
familiar with (see M artin and S kea, 1992). It is not unusual for u niversities to 
recruit those who share similar research interests as their existing staff. 
Consequently, the funding value of a mentor researcher outweighs the value of 
the lone researcher (Talib and Steele, 2000). 
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It has been further argued that empowerment of lower-level staff is necessary if 
the government is to adopt a performance orientation (Dixon et al, 1998), but over 
58% of the sample in the McNay study feel that their research agenda is being 
defined by sources other than their own. If the trend of selecting research topics 
is based on cues from the RAE's time scale and panel preferences, there may be a 
consequent reduction of intrinsic commitment with the concomitant issue whether 
research quality can be sustained. It should be noted that 81% of department 
heads in the McNay study claim that the quality of research by their staff has 
improved. In the McNay study, 64% of the academics surveyed consider their 
research quality has improved because of the RAE; the proportion is a lower 39% 
in the present survey. Only 34% of respondents in the McNay study agreed that 
the RAE improved the quality of research conducted in universities. (28% only in 
our survey agreed to same statement). 
8.6.1 THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN EX-UGC AND EX-PCFC 
The differences in the proportions agreeing between the McNay study and this 
thesis is significant for both types of institutions for these statements: 
"I now give less time to activities given no or low recognition by the 
RAE. 
" The RAE. has had a positive effect on my research output. 
91 am feeling more pressure to publish. 
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" Because of RAE time scales, I have published some outputs at an 
earlier stage than I would prefer. 
" Because ofR AE time sc ales, I have a voided some r esearch projects 
because they were speculative in nature (more risky in relation to 
security of output). 
The difference in proportion is significant for the ex-UGC sector but not for the 
ex-PCFC sector for just two statements. The RAE has raised the stress levels and 
lowered the incidence of voluntary academic activities. The proportion of ex- 
UGC staff devoting less time to voluntary academic activities such as reviewing 
and refereeing manuscripts has significantly increased from 32% to 42%, an 
increase of 10 percentage points. 
Apart from the significant differences in proportion in common with the ex-UGC 
sector, the academics in the ex-PCFC sector also had significant differences in the 
following statements: 
"I now collaborate less (in research) with academics from other English 
universities. 
" Perceived research preferences of RAE panels have affected my choice 
of research topic. 
"I now do less interdisciplinary research than 6 years ago. 
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" Because of the RAE time scale, I have avoided some research topics or 
projects because they would have taken a long time to complete. 
9 The RAE has improved the quality of research conducted in 
universities. 
91 now spend less time on consultancy work (including external 
lecturing) to concentrate on research. 
It is therefore inevitable that the ex-PCFC sector academics have adjusted their 
work's focus to suit RAE requirements. This includes the reduction of 
consultancy assignments to concentrate on research, as well as orientating their 
research towards the RAE requirements rather than to do pure research. The 
research topics are influenced by the RAE panel members' preferences and time 
scale. 
8.7 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This chapter explained the results and findings based on the survey data. It 
compared some aspects of the McNay (1997) study to extricate some of the trends 
that can be a source of concern. For example, there is an orientation towards 
doing research that may be favoured by the panel. Another is the issue of gaming, 
viz., to postpone the submission of drafts to subsequent RAE time-cycles once the 
fourth paper has been submitted. Various other statistics were also discussed. 
The initial exploratory step tests if the response variables are independent of the 
respondent characteristics by using cross-tabulation measures of association. If 
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the null hypothesis of independence is not rejected, then an academic staffs 
personal profile has no effect on the behavioural response. The hypotheses are 
developed from the expectancy theory and goal-setting literature that have been 
reviewed in Chapter Two. T he model d eveloped in Chapter Three shows the 
expected relationships between the dependent and independent variables. 
The null Ho: independence is not rejected for only Q11 and Q30 (see Table 8.7). 
There was no association present between the academics characteristics and 
collaboration with academics from other English universities, or the belief that 
universities are now paying a "premium". Responses to four questions (Q12, 
Q15, Q16, and Q26) have only relationships with one explanatory variable. 
Research collaboration with colleagues in the same department has some 
relationships with institution type. For example, ex-polytechnic staff are 
collaborating more with their current department colleagues. Though this 
strategy of collaboration is sub-optimal, it provides the encouragement and 
support that are needed especially by the less active researchers. 
There is an association, i. e., rejection of the null Ho: independence, between 
department RAE rating and the view that the RAE has negative effects on inter- 
disciplinary research (Q15). However, no monotonic relationship is evident. 
The self-assessed leyel of research activity is the only personal characteristic that 
is not independent ofs pending I ess time on consulting a ctivities (Q26) and is 
positively related with doing less inter-disciplinary research (Q16). All the other 
response variables have associations with two or more characteristic variables 
T ., (see Table 8.7). 
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The main characteristic factors that have a strong association (null Ho: 
independence rejected) with the response variables are age, post, department 
rating, and level of research activity. Post and department rating have negative 
monotone relationships with the "variable measures". Age has a positive 
monotone relationship, while research activity has strong association but no 
monotone relationship. This is because average researchers are greatly 
influenced by the RAE. 
The younger academics in less senior posts in lower rated departments are more 
likely to be influenced decisively by the RAE and are adopting more 
controversial behaviour, such as choosing projects favoured by RAE panels, 
avoiding projects that may be time-consuming and shunning topics that are less 
publishable. This is particularly the case with academics of average research 
calibre. Other questionable strategies include publishing to meet numbers rather 
than quality. The reactions to the RAE may culminate in a counter-productive 
effect of compromising quality for quantity since a "publication culture" may 
overshadow the "research culture". The need to meet the four-paper requirement 
is prompting some academics to re-align their tasks with the plausible effect that 
they reduce or avoid activities such as teaching preparation, public service and 
voluntary academic work. 
One effect of the RAE is its impact on research and publishing strategies. Forty- 
five percent of the survey respondents smooth their research output, and 51% 
cannot agree that the RAE time-cycle is appropriate for their disciplines or the 
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type of research they would conduct. The time scale and the RAE panel member 
preferences are increasingly steering the choice of research topics. This was also 
an observation in the McNay report. This development should cause some 
concerns. The over reliance on performance measures can stifle true innovation 
(Sinclair, 1995). The other worrying phenomenon is the proliferation of 
premature publication that arises because researchers are anxious to attain the 
quota of four p apers. S ome editors have alerted the f act t hat some p apers are 
being re-cast with minor modifications for simultaneous submission to different 
journals. In the same respect, there would be little interest in presenting 
comprehensive papers when it would be strategic to partition the research into 
smaller pieces to fulfil the quota. In the long run, there is the risk that a different 
and disreputable publishing ethic will emerge. 
Half of the moderately active and 67.5% of the quite active staff are spending 
less time in voluntary academic activities because of the RAE. Half of the quite 
active researchers have reduced their consulting projects such activities are not 
encouraged by the RAE. It is noted that two thirds of the staff in 5-star 
departments are allocating less time to areas not recognised by the RAE but only 
one-third have reduced their consulting commitments. Not unusually, voluntary 
activities experience the greatest drop. 
Average researchers spend more time in research because of the RAE. This 
increase in time and effort for research means adjustments or cutbacks in other 
activities such as teaching, consultancy, voluntary public service and personal 
leisure. While it seems ideal to policy makers for academics to divert time from 
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personal leisure to research, it may be futile or counter-productive. The increased 
stress could affect personal life and health, among other problems. Given that 
preparation time for teaching cannot be realistically reduced below some 
minimum, the other two categories where time can be and are being re-allocated 
are voluntary service and consultancy. In general, voluntary work is reduced. 
The average researchers reduce their c onsultancy time, though not as much as 
their voluntary work. This is consistent with the expectancy theory since 
consultancy has an intrinsic as well as an extrinsic value. To shift time and effort 
to consultancy, the extrinsic rewards that are relinquished have to be 
compensated. This can be and has been arranged for the research- active staff by 
providing an incentive premium in the funding formulae. 
rt 
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APPENDIX 8-A 
MEASURES OF ASSOCIATION , 
The various statistical measures of independence are briefly described in this 
appendix. 
Association Measures Statistics: 
1. Nominal Measures 
These measures assume that both variables in the two-way contingency 
table are nominally measured. These nominal measures provide an 
indication of the strength of association between variables but cannot 
indicate the direction of the relationship. The measures are of two types; 
those based on the chi-square statistic and those that follow the logic of 
proportional reduction in error. (PRE) 
Chi-square Based Measures. 
The chi-square statistic itself is only a measure of independence. It is not 
a good measure of the degree of association between variables. Its 
widespread use in tests of independence has encouraged the use of 
measures of association based upon it. These association measures 
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attempt to modify the chi-square statistic to minimise the influence of 
sample size and degrees of freedom as well as to restrict the range of 
values of the measure to those between 0 and 1. 
a) Phi coefficient 
The Phi coefficient modifies the chi square by dividing it by the sample 
size and taking the square root of the result: 
ýN 
For tables in which one dimension is greater than two (as in our case) phi, 
may exceed unity. To obtain a measure, which does not exceed unity, we 
can use the coefficient of contingency. 
b) The coefficient of contingency. 
Although the value of this measure is always between 0 and 1, it cannot 
generally attain the upper limit of 1. The maximum value possible 
depends upon the number of rows and columns. 
I x2 
c_ 2+N *. x 
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c) Cramer 
y- x2 N(k -1) 
where k is the smaller of the number of rows and columns. 
This statistic can attain the maximum of 1 for tables of any dimension. If 
one of the table dimensions is 2, Cramer and Phi statistics are identical. 
The chi-squared based measures are somewhat hard to interpret, as they 
cannot be expressed in terms of probabilities or odds. However they are 
useful for comparing strengths of association. Healey et al (1997) 
suggest measures of association less than 0.1 indicate weak association; 
values between 0.1 and 0.3 can be regarded as moderate in strength of 
association and worth noting, while values over 0.3 provide evidence of a 
strong relationship between the variables. 
Proportional Reduction in error measures. (PRE) 
With PRE measures, the meaning of association is clearer and easier to 
interpret. These measures are all, essentially, ratios of a measure of error 
in predicting the values of one variable based on knowledge of that 
variable alone and the same measure of error applied to predictions based 
on knowledge of an additional variable (the explanatory variable). 
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Lambda and G&K Tau are designed for cross-classification of nominal 
data while Gamma is appropriate for ordinal variables. These measures 
are superior to chi-square based measures. (Agresti 1984) 
a) Lambda. 
Lambda always ranges between 0 and 1. A value of 0 means the 
independent (explanatory) variable is of no help in predicting the 
dependent (response) variable. A value of 1 means the independent 
variable perfectly specifies the categories of the dependent variable. 
When the two variables are independent, lambda is 0; but a lambda of 0 
need not imply statistical independence. As with all measures of 
association, lambda is constructed to measure association in a very 
specific way. In p articular, lambda reflects the reduction in error w hen 
values of one variable are used to predict values of the other. For 
example, a lambda of 0.30 between variable A and B, with B as the 
dependent variable, means a 30% reduction in error is obtained when A is 
used to predict B. If this particular type of association is absent, lambda 
is 0. 
Other measures of association may find association of a different kind 
even when lambda is 0. 
¬{ " 
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a) G& K Tau. (also called the concentration coefficient) 
This measure is the proportional reduction in the probability of an 
incorrect guess obtained by making predictions on variable Y using the 
classification on variab13 X. A large value represents a strong 
association, in the sense that we can guess Y much better when we know 
X than when we do not. A difficulty with this measure is in determining 
how large a value constitutes a `strong' association. When the response 
variable has several possible categorisations, the measure tends to take 
smaller values as the number of categories increase. 
b) Uncertainty coefficient 
This is an alternative variation measure proposed by Theil (1970). It 
indicates the proportionate reduction in error when values of one variable 
are used to predict values of the other variable. Similar to G& K Tau, the 
values range between 0 and 1. The value of 0 is equivalent to 
independence. A value of 0.45 indicates that the knowledge of one 
variable reduces error in predicting values of the other variable by 45%. 
2. Measures of Association for Ordinal variables. 
Relationships among ordinal variables could be examined using nominal 
measures. However nominal measures do not reflect the additional 
information available from ranking of ordinal variables. Nominal 
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measures do not answer questions such as " Does Y increase as X 
increase? " Bivariate analyses of interval scale variables often summarises 
covariance by the Pearson correlation. Ordinal variables do not have a 
defined metric, so the notion of linearity is not meaningful. However, the 
inherent ordering of categories allows consideration of monotonicity; 
whether Y tends to increase as X increases. Measures for ordinal 
variables describe the degree to which the relationship is monotone. 
The most commonly used measures of association for ordinal variables 
are those based on the numbers of concordant and discordant pairs of 
observations in the sample. A pair of cases is concordant if the values of 
both variables for one case are higher (or both lower) than the 
corresponding values__ for the other case. The pair is discordant if the 
subject ranking higher on variable X ranks lower on variable Y. When the 
two cases have identical values on one or on both variables they are tied. 
Several measures are based on the difference between the number of 
concordant and discordant pairs. If the majority of pairs are concordant, 
the association is said to be positive; as ranks of variable X increase 
(decrease) so do ranks of variable Y. If the preponderance of pairs is 
discordant, the association is said to be negative; as ranks of one variable 
increase (decrease), those of the other variable tend to decrease 
(increase). 
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Generally dichotomous nominal variables can be used in methods 
designed for ordinal variables, since reversing the two categories changes 
the direction but not the magnitude of the association and does not 
produce different substantive conclusions (Agresti 1984 p167) 
a) Gamma 
Gamma can be thought of as the probability that a random pair of 
observations is concordant minus the probability that the pair is 
discordant, assuming the absence of ties. 
Gamma --ý y= 
`-rjd 
rle+fld 
where 
jHc/j1c+nd is the probability of concordance 
rj d/fl c+ fjd is the probability of discordance 
The range is from -1 to +1, with gamma being +1 if the discordant pairs 
are zero and -1 if the concordant pairs are zero. In the case of 
independence the gamma value is zero. However, a gamma of zero does 
not necessarily imply independence except in a2x2 table. Values close 
to zero imply little or no relationship. Positive values imply positive 
correlation (monotonicity) and negative values negative correlation. In 
the computation of Gamma no distinction is made between the 
independent and dependent variable. 
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b) Somers' d 
Somers (1962) proposed an asymmetric extension of Gamma for-which 
pairs untied on the independent variable serve as the base rather than 
those untied on both variables. The sample version of Somers' d (below) 
is the difference between the proportions of concordant and discordant 
pairs, out of the pairs that are untied on X. This measure is intended for 
use when Y is a response variable. 
dyx- 
(C-D) 
{n(n-1)/2-Tx} 
where 
T. -* tied pairs. 
and 
n(n-1)/2-Tx=C+D+(Ty-Txy)? C+D 
the denominator of dyx is at least as large as the denominator of y 
and hence dyx <y 
In order for Somers' d to equal 1 there must be stricter monotonicity than 
for Gamma, in the sense that C or D must equal zero and in addition none 
of the pairs that are untied on X can be tied on Y. 
c) Kendall's Tau-b. 
A measure that attempts ton ormalise C -D by considering ties one ach 
variable in a pair separately but not ties on both variables. 
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(C- D) 
Tn = 
[n(n-1)/2-Tx][n(n-1)/2-Ty] 
The sign of the coefficient indicates the direction of the relationship and 
its absolute value indicates the strength, with larger values indicating 
stronger relationships. Though possible values range from -1 to +1, a 
value of -1 or +1 can only be obtained from square tables. 
d) Spearman Correlation coefficient 
A measure of association between rank orders. The value ranges from -1 
to +1 where -1 is a perfect negative relationship and +1 is a perfect 
positive relationship. A value of 0 indicates no relationship. 
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ii. TABLE 8-3 B: inclusion in RAE submission. 
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TABLE 8-4: Series of tables for the proportions agreeing to survey 
questions classified by respondents' characteristic. 
Classified by: 
i. TABLE 8-4 A: years of experience. 
ii. TABLE 8-4 B: inclusion in RAE submission. 
iii. TABLE 8-4 C: department rating. 
iv. TABLE 8-4 D: post. 
v. TABLE 8-4 E: qualification. 
vi. TABLE 8-4 F: age. 
vii. TABLE 8-4 G: research activity. 
(Note: proportions agreeing to survey questions classified by 
institution type is shown in Table 8-2). 
" TABLE 8-5: Comparison with McNay study - Difference in means. 
" TABLE 8-6: Comparison with McNay study - Difference in proportion 
agreeing to questions classified by institution type. 
" TABLE 8-7: 
" TABLE 8-8: 
" TABLE 8-9: 
" TABLE 8-10: 
" TABLE 8-11: 
" TABLE 8-12: 
" TABLE 8-13: 
TABLE 8-1: Profile of Respondents to Survey. 
TABLE 8-2: Survey Results.. 
TABLE 8-3: Series of tables for survey results means classified by 
Respondents' characteristics: 
Summary results for Measures of Association. 
Measures of Association for Gaming. 
Measures of Association for Mobility. 
Measures of Association for Time Cycle effect. 
Measures of Association for Smoothing. 
Measures of Association for Academic Freedom. 
Measures of Association for Research Fixation. 
1/1 
Survey Results: moans dassif cd by years of exp Ionca 
0 No. Means (years of ex e xL____ 
5yrs. 5 to 10 10 to 15 15to20 ova20 
1 3.00 2.08 4.21 3.05 3.70 
2 3.71 3.55 4,00 4,00 4.31 
3 4.28 3.32 3,08 3 48 3.75 
4 4.29 4.02 4.30 4.43 4.54 
5 4.24 3.82 3.72 3.70 3,0O 
6 3.12 3.21 3,31 3,60 3.45 
7 3.16 3.55 4.64 4.10 4.30 
8 3.84 3.55 3.84 3.68 3.01 
9 2.30 2.44 2.52 2.10 2.52 
10 3.28 3.84 3.00 3.83 4.02 
11 4.28 4.48 4,54 4.24 4,38 
12 3.00 3.58 4.03 3.71 3.00 
13 4.38 4.75 4.79 4.68 4.70 
14 4.21 4.60 4,54 4.81 4,85 
15 3.00 3.30 2.74 3.13 3,02 
16 4.16 4.58 4,43 4.40 4,58 
17 3.71 3.68 3.80 3.01 4,02 
le 4.42 4.60 4.53 4.27 4.58 
19 3.30 3.88 3.80 3.70 4,03 
20 3.83 4,40 4.21 4.20 4.23 
21 4.00 4.30 3.84 3.05 4.20 
22 3.50 3.89 3.70 3.80 4.00 
23 2,72 2.93 2.78 3.05 2.84 
24 3.24 4.25 4.70 4.41 4,50 
25 2.60 2.80 3.32 3.02 3.28 
20 4.25 4.04 4.00 4,14 3,07 
27 3.76 4.00 4.14 3.71 4.25 
28 3.13 3.51 3.30 3,33 3,75 
29 1,92 1.88 1,05 1,70 2.11 
30 2.12 1.81 1.04 2,02 2.22 
31 4.70 4.05 4.00 4,37 4.62 
32 3.48 158 320 1 363 3 07 
TAUE 8-J A 
Survey Results: means classified by inclusion in RAE submission. 
i .ý 
Q No. Inclusion in RAE submission 
Def. Yes Prob Yes Prob N--; def No 
1 3.64 4.06 3.13 4.11 
2 4.20 4.59 4.00 4.41 
3 3.59 4.24 4.00 4.54 
4 4.27 4.76 4.19 5.07 
5 3.82 3.41 2.88 4.25 
6 3.20 3.94 3.31 4.61 
7 4.06 4.82 4.06 4.37 
8 3.66 3.94 3.63 4.81 
9 2.41 2.71 2.13 2.64 
10 3.75 4.29 3.88 4.61 
11 4.40 4.47 4.06 4.52 
12 3.82 3.81 3.31 3.74 
13 4.73 4.65 4.19 4.93 
14 4.64 4.94 4.31 5.15 
15 3.12 2.71 - 2.69 2.70 
16 4.55 4.13 3.47 4.74 
17 3.82 3.76 3.69 4.16 
18 4.50 4.88 3.94 4.62 
19 3.83 4.18 4.00 4.11 
20 4.20 4.24 3.63 4.74 
21 4.10 4.18 3.88 4.50 
22 3.84 3.88 3.56 4.54 
23 2.87 2.47 2.31 3.32 
24 4.34 5.18 4.69 4.60 
25 2.97 4.44 3.56 3.35 
26 3.96 4.47 3.13 4.43 
27 4.10 4.59 3.53 3.75 
28 3.52 3.63 2.93 3.70 
29 1.95 2.00 1.88 2.29 
30 2.05 2.29 1.56 1.92 
31 4.57 4.59 3.63 4.23 
32 3.31 2.88 3.06 3.60 
TABLE 8-3 B 
Survey Results: means classified by Department Rating. 
Dept. Ra ting in RAE 1996 
Q No. 5- 5 4 3a 3b 
2 1 
1 3.19 3.90 4.04 3.37 3.24 
3.38 5.00 
2 4.54 4.48 4.33 3.92 3.43 
4.50 5.00 
3 2.96 3.80 3.91 3.55 3.57 
4.00 4.71 
4 4.23 4.45 4.30 4.20 4.00 
5.07 5.00 
5 4.04 4.00 3.88 3.45 3.43 4.06 
4.29 
6 3.15 3.43 3.39 3.25 2.95 
3.63 4.71 
7 4.31 4.24 4.40 4.13 3.41 3.88 
4.00 
8 3.92 4.04 3.67 3.56 3.51 
4.03 4.29 
9 2.92 2.76 2.44 2.14 2.27 
2.38 1.86 
10 3.54 4.14 3.62 4.17 3.73 
4.06 3.43 
11 4.54 4.74 4.21 4.61 4.00 4.32 
4.29 
12 3.85 3.98 3.85 3.71 3.31 4.00 
2.29 
13 5.00 4.88 4.89 4.80 4.19 4.44 
3.29 
14 4.46 4.80 - 4.79 4.60 4.28 
5.09 4.57 
15 3.54 3.52 2.79 2.89 2.89 3.03 
2.71 
16 4.62 4.77 4.45 4.34 4.31 4.53 
4.14 
17 4.00 4.26 3.82 3.68 3.49 4.06 
2.83 
18 4.46 4.86 4.66 4.40 3.92 4.55 
4.67 
19 4.54 4.04 3.80 3.92 3.24 4.09 
3.14 
20 4.58 4.72 4.11 4.29 3.19 4.42 
4.14 
21 4.15 4.66 4.17 4.06 3.22 4.45 
4.14 
22 4.04 4.30 3.88 3.81 3.08 4.10 
3.67 
23 3.38 3.06 2.76 2.65 2.53 3.41 
1.71 
24 4.35 4.41 4.43 4.67 4.11 4.38 
4.43 
25 3.31 2.98 2.86 3.19 3.11 3.39 
3.43 
26 4.23 4.24 3.99 3.68 3.58 4.34 
4.43 
27 4.19 4.12 4.06 4.23 3.57 4.16 
4.43 
28 3.46 3.58 3.58 3.57 3.14 3.41 
3.86 
29 2.04 2.22 1.76 1.77 2.11 2.09 
2.29 
30 2.16 2.42 1.95 1.69 _ 
2.22 1.91 2.43 
31 5.08 4.74 4.46 4.50 3.75 4.31 
5.00 
32 3.27 3.50 3.26 3.30 2.97 3.52 
3.43 
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TABLE 8-3 C 
Survey Results: means classified by Institution Type 
Institutio n Type 
Q No. ex-UFC ex-PCFC 
1 3.80 3.33 
2 4.33 4.00 
3 3.61 3.95 
4 4.23 4.71 
5 3.71 3.99 
6 3.23 3.68 
7 4.30 3.68 
8 3.67 4.02 
9 2.51 2.26 
10 3.82 3.99 
11 4.40 4.42 
12 3.93 3.39 
13 4.82 4.43 
14 4.62 4.82 
15 3.04 - 3.02 
16 4.48 4.54 
17 3.86 3.77 
18 4.52 4.47 
19 3.88 3.79 
20 4.17 4.30 
21 4.10 4.18 
22 3.88 3.88 
23 2.76 3.06 
24 4.49 4.20 
25 3.10 3.18 
26 3.97 3.99 
27 4.07 4.13 
28 3.54 3.45 
29 1.87 2.19 
30 2.06 2.00 
31 4.60 t 4.21 
32 - 3.51_ 
 -, 
r, 
t~' ý. 
ý; 
TABLE 8-3 D 
ý- F 
Survey Results: Means classified by Respondents' Post. 
Q No. Prof. Reader Princp lect Sen. Lect. lecturer 
1 3.91 4.00 2.76 3.81 3.46 
2 4.64 4.85 3.35 4.34 3.74 
3 3.80 3.59 3.86 3.77 3.61 
4 4.71 4.15 4.45 4.39 4.06 
5 4.00 3.56 4.05 3.85 3.54 
6 3.51 3.41 3.57 3.45 3.09 
7 4.37 4.00 3.33 4.34 3.81 
8 3.85 3.56 4.10 3.97 3.34 
9 2.72 2.33 2.10 2.50 2.18 
10 3.91 3.56 4.05 4.02 3.77 
11 4.55 4.70 4.62 4.31 4.23 
12 4.05 4.04 2.86 3.84 3.67 
13 5.09 4.78 4.33 4.67 4.51 
14 4.91 4.81 4.62 4.70 4.45 
15 2.94 3.41 2.90 3.13 2.98 
16 4.63 4.64 4.67 4.51 4.27 
17 4.25 4.04 3.62 3.81 3.47 
18 4.77 4.85 4.14 4.49 4.30 
19 4.12 3.67 3.76 3.91 3.63 
20 4.52 4.19 4.00 4.20 4.01 
21 4.34 4.33 4.19 4.16 3.81 
22 4.33 4.26 3.38 3.79 3.60 
23 3.17 2.96 2.67 2.92 2.41 
24 4.25 4.30 4.10 4.67 4.32 
25 3.25 2.77 3.10 3.25 2.98 
26 4.28 3.63 3.48 4.07 3.89 
27 4.71 3.78 3.86 4.02 3.85 
28 4.17 3.04 3.38 3.34 3.41 
29 2.17 1.78 2.67 1.90 1.70 
30 2.23 2.07 2.10 1.98 1.94 
31 4.71 4.26 4.43 4.62 4.22 
32 3.67^ 3.58 3.52 º 3.21 2.91 
ný'i 
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TABLE 8-3 E 
Survey Results: Means classified by respondents' qualification. 
Q No. Ph. D. Masters Prof. Qual. BscBA 
1 3.89 3.17 3.22 2.56 
2 4.45 3.59 4.22 3.67 
3 3.75 3.65 3.89 3.11 
4 4.41 4.14 4.56 4.78 
5 3.88 3.59 3.12 3.89 
6 3.33 3.38 3.61 3.89 
7 4.21 3.97 4.11 3.00 
8 3.78 3.81 3.76 3.56 
9 2.47 2.40 2.67 1.89 
10 3.66 4.30 4.53 4.78 
11 4.33 4.42 4.88 5.11 
12 3.87 3.58 3.44 3.22 
13 4.73 4.56 5.00 5.11 
14 4.67 4.63 4.83 5.22 
15 2.97 3.25 3.00 3.11 
16 4.49 4.52 4.63 4.00 
17 3.77 3.76 4.61 4.78 
18 4.50 4.40 4.89 4.89 
19 3.96 3.49 4.06 4.33 
20 4.23 3.95 4.67 5.13 
21 4.13 3.92 4.72 4.88 
22 3.89 3.64 4.39 4.67 
23 2.78 2.90 3.61 3.22 
24 4.48 4.40 4.18 3.22 
25 3.10 3.27 3.33 2.22 
26 4.00 3.92 3.89 4.44 
27 4.11 3.87 4.35 4.44 
28 3.59 3.29 3.47 3.33 
29 1.88 . 2.02 2.94 2.00 
30 2.05 1.90 2.38 2.13 
31 4.58 4.25 4.61 3.50 
32 3.25 3.34 3.71 3.89 
TABLE 8-3 F 
Survey Results: classified by respondents' age group. 
AGE 
Q No. under 30 30-39 40-49 over 50 
1 4.17 3.53 3.67 3.72 
2 3.80 4.03 4.23 4.39 
3 4.33 3.65 3.70 3.76 
4 4.00 4.16 4.47 4.43 
5 3.00 3.89 3.76 3.77 
6 3.17 3.08 3.40 3.54 
7 3.60 3.79 4.27 4.22 
8 4.60 3.50 3.80 3.90 
9 2.33 2.24 2.40 2.63 
10 5.00 3.54 3.89 4.02 
11 5.00 4.22 4.50 4.39 
12 3.50 3.80 3.56 3.95 
13 4.83 4.59 4.66 4.86 
14 5.00 4.44- 4.71 4.81 
15 2.50 3.01 3.00 3.11 
16 4.00 4.44 4.55 4.50 
17 3.17 3.47 3.81 4.17 
18 5.17 4.38 4.56 4.53 
19 3.83 3.39 3.87 4.21 
20 4.20 3.91 4.17 4.48 
21 4.25 3.71 4.18 4.38 
22 3.20 3.63 3.86 4.12 
23 2.00 2.83 2.80 3.00 
24 4.67 4.22 4.52 4.41 
25 4.00 2.78 3.08 3.34 
26 3.83 4.10 3.90 4.03 
27 5.17 3.99 3.82 4.35 
28 4.20 3.17 3.41 3.80 
29 1.33 1.97 1.86 2.11 
30 2.20 1.96 1.83 2.28 
31 4.33 4.37 4.55 4.51 
32 3.60 3.32 3.35 3.27 
TABLE 8-3 G 
Survey Results: Means classified by level of self-assessed research activity. 
LEVEL OF RESEARCH ACTIVITY 
Q No. Quite inactive Moderately active Quite active very active 
1 4.59 3.96 3.17 3.58 
2 5.05 4.12 3.74 4.37 
3 4.27 4.03 3.60 3.49 
4 4.73 4.36 4.17 4.37 
5 3.82 3.30 3.26 4.27 
6 4.32 3.63 2.81 3.33 
7 4.86 4.25 3.71 4.11 
8 4.90 3.73 3.31 3.85 
9 3.05 2.09 2.14 2.68 
10 5.09 4.09 3.68 3.64 
_ 
11 4.86 4.16 4.16 4.57 
12 4.14 3.34 3.88 3.83 
13 5.41 4.13 4.41 5.06 
14 4.82 4.48 4.49 4.88 
15 2.95 2.83 2.88 3.23 
16 4.77 4.00 4.18 4.84 
17 4.50 3.59 3.55 3.99 
18 4.91 4.46 4.21 4.65 
19 4.86 3.58 3.50 4.05 
20 4.86 3.98 3.62 4.55 
21 4.82 3.80 3.56 4.50 
22 4.73 3.64 3.43 4.11 
23 3.73 2.28 2.51 3.19 
24 4.71 4.66 4.43 4.21 
25 3.57 3.36 2.96 2.99 
26 4.77 3.51 3.68 4.26 
27 3.77 3.82 4.08 4.31 
28 3.85 3.14 3.49 3.66 
_29 30 yI 
2.09 
1.91 
1.79 
1.94 
1.83 _ 2.11 
1.88 2.21 
31 4.29 4.24 4.28 4.78 
32 3.41 3.03 3.28 ý 3.46 
TABLE 8-3 H 
Survey Results: Classified by Academic Experience of respondent. 
Q No. PERCENTAGES AG REEING 
EXPERIENC E 
5YEARS 5tol 0 10 to 15 15 to 20 over 20 
1 64.0 63.2 37.9 33.3 48.8 
2 50.0 51.8 22.4 21.4 34.7 
3 32.0 58.9 37.9 47.6 48.8 
4 29.2 39.3 29.3 23.8 26.4 
5 24.0 41.1 39.7 38.1 46.3 
6 60.0 57.9 56.9 45.2 53.3 
7 72.0 50.0 25.9 38.1 33.3 
8 36.0 56.4 34.5 31.7 40.5 
9 76.0 82.5 75.9 85.7 75.6 
10 68.0 48.2 39.7 35.7 41.5 
11 20.0 21.4 21.1 24.4 27.0 
12 68.0 45.6 43.1 48.8 38.5 
13 28.0 17.5 20.7 19.5 20.3 
14 25.0 24.6 24.6 11.9 16.5 
15 56.0 51.8 68.4 59.0 61.5 
16 32.0 21.8 23.2 21.4 23.3 
17 37.5 43.9 43.1 48.8 35.2 
18 16.7 17.5 22.4 24.4 17.9 
19 60.0 45.6 46.6 40.5 44.7 
20 41.7 28.1 - 29.3 26.8 34.1 
21 41.7 33.9 39.7 29.3 35.0 
22 45.8 41.1 47.4 46.3 39.7 
23 76.0 71.9 70.7 64.3 70.5 
24 68.0 27.3 22.8 23.1 24.0 
25 76.0 71.4 55.4 61.0 63.0 
26 25.0 40.4 35.1 31.0 40.0 
27 36.0 32.1 32.8 38.1 29.5 
28 66.7 54.9 62.5 61.5 42.2 
29 92.0 91.2 87.9 90.5 89.4 
30 92.0 94.3 91.4 88.1 84.4 
31 8.0 34.5 19.3 31.7 24.2 
32 52.0 41.8 53.6 39.0 59.5 
TABLE 8-4 A 
Survey Results: classified by RAE inclusion. 
Q No. PERCENTAGES AGREEINGI 
Inclusion as researc h active in RAE submission 
Def Yes Prob Yes Prob NO Def NO 
1 48.3 41.2 68.8 39.3 
2 35.4 23.5 43.8 29.6 
3 50.2 35.3 43.8 25.0 
4 31.6 23.5 25.0 14.8 
5 40.6 47.1 62.5 28.6 
6 59.2 43.8 50.0 21.4 
7 40.8 11.8 37.5 33.3 
8 43.9 43.8 37.5 14.8 
9 78.8 76.5 87.5 75.0 
10 46.9 35.3 43.8 21.4 
11 24.5 23.5 25.0 22.2 
12 43.3 37.5 62.5 44.4 
13 21.3 23.5 25.0 11.1 
14 21.4 17.6 18.8 7.4 
15 58.3 76.5 68.8 59.3 
16 21.6 31.3 46.7 18.5 
17 40.8 47.1 43.8 32.0 
18 20.4 11.8 31.3 11.5 
19 46.3 41.2 56.3 39.3 
20 31.7 41.2 50.0 14.8 
21 36.7 47.1 31.3 19.2 
22 44.5 47.1 50.0 20.8 
23 70.3 82.4 87.5 57.1 
24 31.1 0.0 12.5 20.0 
25 68.1 18.8 56.3 61.5 
26 38.1 17.6 56.3 25.0 
27 32.1 23.5 46.7 35.7 
28 52.6 56.3 78.6 39.1 
29 89.6 100.0 93.8 82.1 
30 87.8 82.4 100.0 96.0 
31 23.4 29.4 37.5 26.9 
32 51.1 68.8 56.3 48.0 
TABLE 8-4 B 
Survey results: classified by Department RAE rating. 
Q No. PERCENTAGES AGREEING 
DEPT R ATING IN RAE 96 
5* 5 4 3A 3B 2 1 
1 53.8 40.0 37.8 61.5 62.2 50.0 28.6 
2 26.9 28.0 28.4 42.2 62.2 33.3 14.3 
3 73.1 44.9 43.9 49.2 45.9 40.6 28.6 
4 30.8 30.6 32.1 32.3 35.1 13.3 14.3 
5 30.8 38.0 40.2 50.0 43.2 37.5 28.6 
6 61.5 51.0 54.9 56.9 64.9 50.0 14.3 
7 38.5 28.0 32.9 40.6 59.5 43.8 42.9 
8 42.3 37.5 43.2 46.0 43.2 31.3 42.9 
9 61.5 70.0 80.5 87.7 75.7 87.5 85.7 
10 42.3 38.0 56.1 31.3 48.6 43.8 42.9 
11 11.5 20.0 29.3 20.3 34.3 22.6 28.6 
12 38.5 34.7 42.7 52.3 55.6 37.5 71.4 
13 11.5 20.0 15.9 18.5 33.3 25.0 57.1 
14 23.1 18.0 18.8 20.0 27.8 12.5 14.3 
15 46.2 46.0 71.8 65.6 56.8 54.8 71.4 
16 19.2 19.1 27.5 23.0 25.0 25.0 28.6 
17 38.5 28.0 37.8 47.7 48.6 41.9 66.7 
18 15.4 14.0 17.1 21.5 32.4 22.6 16.7 
19 15.4 38.0 51.2 43.1 67.6 46.9 71.4 
20 15.4 26.0 34.6 27.7 56.8 29.0 28.6 
21 30.8 24.0 35.8 32.8 62.2 32.3 42.9 
22 40.0 34.0 45.1 46.9 61.1 32.3 33.3 
23 53.8 64.0 79.3 70.8 77.8 59.4 100.0 
24 30.8 26.5 30.0 21.9 35.1 24.1 14.3 
25 61.5 67.3 75.6 61.9 62.2 48.4 57.1 
26 30.8 32.0 35.4 46.2 50.0 28.1 14.3 
27 30.8 28.0 33.3 32.8 45.9 25.0 28.6 
28 53.8 45.8 55.3 50.0 70.3 48.3 57.1 
29 88.5 86.0 95.1 90.8 89.2 93.8 71.4 
30 84.0 80.0 87.8 96.8 86.5 93.8 100.0 
31 7.7 22.0 27.8 22.6 36.1 34.4 0.0 
32 46.2 47.9 54.3 53.1 58.3 41.9 71.4 
TABLE 8-4 C 
Survey Results: classified by Post. 
Q No. PERCENTAGES AGREEING 
Classif ication based on Post 
Prof Reader rinc. Lectures SL Lecturer 
1 38.5 40.7 76.2 48.1 52.4 
2 23.4 23.1 65.0 31.7 45.7 
3 41.5 51.9 38.1 48.1 51.2 
4 23.1 30.8 25.0 31.7 33.3 
5 40.0 48.1 33.3 37.5 44.4 
6 50.8 48.1 47.6 53.8 61.7 
7 32.3 44.4 66.7 30.8 48.1 
8 38.5 48.0 28.6 34.6 54.4 
9 73.8 81.5 90.5 76.0 82.9 
10 41.5 55.6 38.1 38.5 49.4 
11 26.2 14.8 14.3 25.7 25.9 
12 32.3 37.0 76.2 40.8 51.9 
13 15.4 22.2 23.8 19.4 25.6 
14 17.2 14.8 14.3 18.8 26.8 
15 66.7 48.1 66.7 52.9 63.8 
16 18.8 20.0 19.0 23.0 30.8 
17 32.3 37.0 47.6 42.2 46.9 
18 12.3 7.4 23.8 23.5 24.4 
19 40.0 51.9 52.4 43.3 52.4 
20 26.2 33.3 38.1 33.0 34.6 
21 33.8 33.3 38.1 35.9 38.8 
22 32.8 40.7 61.9 42.2 50.0 
23 65.6 70.4 85.7 64.4 81.7 
24 36.5 33.3 28.6 21.2 28.4 
25 62.5 76.9 57.1 59.0 68.8 
26 26.6 51.9 47.6 36.3 38.8 
27 16.9 44.4 38.1 36.5 33.8 
28 31.7 75.0 61.9 57.1 55.4 
29 87.7 92.6 81.0 89.4 95.1 
30 84.4 81.5 90.5 90.2 91.3 
31 20.6 44.4 23.8 20.0 28.4 
32 43.8 38.5 47.6 55.4 62.5 
TABLE 8-4 D 
. 
Survey Results: classified by Qualification 
Q No. PERCENTAGES AGREEING 
Classification based on Qualification 
Ph. D. Masters Prof. BSc/BA 
1 43.3 60.3 61.1 66.7 
2 28.0 54.0 44.4 44.4 
3 44.9 54.0 33.3 77.8 
4 27.5 36.5 27.8 22.2 
5 38.6 44.4 52.9 55.6 
6 56.5 52.4 44.4 33.3 
7 37.7 38.7 44.4 55.6 
8 41.5 37.1 41.2 44.4 
9 77.2 81.0 72.2 100.0 
10 48.8 36.5 11.8 33.3 
11 25.8 24.2 5.9 11.1 
12 41.1 51.6 55.6 55.6 
13 21.9 19.4 11.1 11.1 
14 20.4 19.0 16.7 11.1 
15 62.6 54.1 50.0 66.7 
16 23.2 21.0 25.0 44.4 
17 42.3 41.9 22.2 22.2 
18 20.6 19.4 11.1 11.1 
19 43.7 55.6 44.4 33.3 
20 31.6 38.7 16.7 12.5 
21 36.3 39.3 16.7 25.0 
22 44.1 49.2 22.2 11.1 
23 73.4 63.5 55.6 77.8 
24 26.5 28.3 29.4 55.6 
25 66.2 55.0 61.1 77.8 
26 35.2 41.3 38.9 33.3 
27 32.2 39.7 17.6 11.1 
28 48.8 64.4 60.0 66.7 
29 90.7 93.7 61.1 100.0 
30 88.8 91.9 81.3 75.0 
31 22.7 31.1 11.1 62.5 
32 53.1 49.2 52.9 33.3 
TABLE 8-4 E 
Survey Results: classified by age groups. 
0 No. PERCENTAGES AGREEING 
Classification based on Age 
under 30 30 to 39 40 to 49 over 50 
1 33.3 50.7 48.6 47.8 
2 60.0 36.5 34.3 33.3 
3 33.3 51.4 44.0 47.8 
4 40.0 36.5 25.9 27.2 
5 66.7 33.8 40.4 45.2 
6 33.3 62.7 52.3 51.8 
7 40.0 49.3 35.8 34.8 
8 20.0 50.0 37.4 38.6 
9 83.3 84.0 78.9 73.9 
10 16.7 55.4 42.2 39.1 
11 0.0 24.3 22.4 26.3 
12 66.7 42.7 51.9 37.7 
13 16.7 26.7 18.5 18.3 
14 16.7 23.3 18.5 18.4 
15 66.7 60.8 61.7 58.0 
16 33.3 26.0 20.8 23.9 
17 66.7 48.6 41.7 32.5 
18 16.7 23.0 16.7 20.0 
19 33.3 60.0 44.0 39.1 
20 20.0 37.3 32.4 27.8 
21 50.0 42.7 35.2 30.4 
22 40.0 45.2 44.4 39.8 
23 100.0 69.3 73.4 66.7 
24 33.3 32.9 28.0 24.3 
25 50.0 74.3 62.0 59.6 
26 50.0 32.9 38.5 36.6 
27 0.0 33.8 38.5 27.2 
28 40.0 62.3 53.3 47.6 
29 100.0 89.3 90.8 88.7 
30 80.0 93.2 92.6 82.3 
31 33.3 24.0 24.3 25.5 
32 60.0 50.7 51.9 51.8 
TABLE 8-4 F 
Survey Results: classified by self-assessed level of Research Activity. 
Q No. PERCENTAGES AGREEING 
Classification based on Research activity 
Quite inactive [ModeratelY active Quite active Very active 
1 18.2 47.8 57.7 50.4 
2 13.6 36.4 48.1 31.3 
3 40.9 43.3 47.4 50.8 
4 22.7 28.8 31.2 30.5 
5 40.9 50.7 56.4 28.8 
6 36.4 43.3 67.5 57.1 
7 13.6 35.8 47.4 40.9 
8 19.0 41.8 50.6 39.2 
9 68.2 86.6 84.6 72.2 
10 22.7 35.8 47.4 50.8 
11 22.7 23.9 29.9 21.4 
12 36.4 55.2 39.0 44.4 
13 4.5 31.3 28.2 13.5 
14 18.2 21.2 23.7 16.7 
15 63.6 66.2 63.6 55.0 
16 18.2 31.3 32.9 15.4 
17 27.3 45.3 48.7 36.8 
18 18.2 20.0 24.4 17.3 
19 22.7 58.2 51.3 42.1 
20 18.2-- 37.9 44.2 24.8 
21 18.2 42.4 49.4 28.0 
22 18.2 50.0 57.9 35.6 
23 45.5 86.6 79.2 61.7 
24 14.3 17.9 26.7 36.2 
25 42.9 59.1 66.2 69.8 
26 22.7 49.2 48.7 26.5 
27 31.8 32.8 38.2 27.8 
28 45.0 63.5 56.2 47.2 
29 95.5 92.5 92.3 87.2 
30 95.5 92.5 90.8 84.6 
31 38.1 25.4 30.3 19.4 
32 54.5 59.7 53.3 46.2 
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Summary Results for Measures of Association. 
Question UoAA Ex . Yrs-in-Post Inclusion- Dept Rating Inst type- POST Ph. D. - Age Res. Activi 
I A P P A P N 
2 A P N P A 
3 A P N 
4 A P P N 
5 A P 
6 A P P N 
7 A P P N N A A A 
8 P A 
9 P A 
10 P N N 
11 
12 N 
13 N N N P 
14 P N P 
15 A 
16 P 
17 A P N P A 
18 N N 
19 A P A P A 
20 P N P A 
21 A P A N N P 
22 A N N P A 
23 A P N A A 
24 A P P 
25 A A P N 
26 A 
27 
_ 
N N P 
28 P N P 
29 P N 
30 
31 A N N N A P P 
32 A N N 
Research Fixation N N A 
Academic Freedom P N N' P A 
Research Smoothing A N N A 
Time-Cycle P N N P A 
Mobility P N P 
Gaming P N N P A 
Significance level is 5% 
A= Asscoiatlon A= nominal 
P= positive monotone -= dichotomous 
N= Negative monoton all else Is ordinal 
= Si nificant at 5.3% 
BLANK=no significant a ssociation 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
APPENDIX 8-B 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
V ERS 
1- 
O 
WARWICK 
Dear Colleague, 
I am undertaking a research project on the impact, and the `perceptions' of 
academics of the impact, of the Research Assessment Exercise (RAE). 
I am seeking your help in this research project and would be extremely grateful 
if you could spare the time to complete the questionnaire and then return it in the reply 
paid envelope provided 
The questionnaire does not request the identity of respondents. All information 
provided in the returned questionnaire will be treated as confidential and will only be 
used in aggregate form in combination with all other responses. 
I do hope that you will be able to participate in the survey and would be 
grateful if you could complete and return the questionnaire as soon as possible. 
If you have any queries please do not hesitate to call me at (01926) 313021 or at 
(0467) 621644 or email me at: ameentalib@msn. com 
I thank you for your assistance. 
Yours sincerely, 
Ameen Talib 
RESEARCH ASSESSMENT EXERCISE QUESTIONNAIRE. 
ALL RESPONSES WILL BE TREATED AS CONFIDENTIAL. THE SUCCESS OF 
THIS STUDYIS DEPENDANT ON YOUR RESPONSE; IF PRESSMY 
GRATITUDE FOR THE TIME SPENT. 
Please answer questions 1 to 32 on basis of how strongly you agree or 
disagree with the statements describing your individual behaviour/belief. The answers 
are on a scale of 1 to 6. Boxes I to 3 are for agreeing and boxes 4-6 for disagreeing. 
Please tick box [11 if you Y strongly agree, box [2] if you strongly agree, box [31 if 
you agree but less strongly and box [61 if you i strongly disagree. The scale is in 
order of strength of agreement; where box [11 represents the strongest agreement and 
box [6] represents the strongest disagreement. 
1.1 now spend more time on research than 6 years ago. 
Ia2a3E4E 5 E16E1 
2.1 now spend more time on research than 6 years ago as a result of the RAE_ 
E131 3EI 4111 5D60 
3.1 now spend less time in teaching preparation than 6 years ago. 
1 
E-I 
2E]3a4ED 5 6El 
4. I now spend less time in teaching preparation than 6 years ago as am wk 
of the RAF iw Beire an research. 
I020304 Cl 506 El 
5.1 now give less time than 6 years ago to `voluntary' academic activities- e. g. 
referring for journals. 
I02 E1 3D4 17 5 El 6E 
rr.... 
i kq,, i , i, c.... 2> YM 'Y"° ti} 
'`"w ý 1s 
.., 
ý`.: 3 x'=- e. ýe rýý . ýi .. t., i . 
N'r" ,s`?, - 
ý' 
?,. aý. k 
I 
l `sty . _., _ .. _... 
9`, 
a 
-: i: ý., 
ßA" 
., .5 
Act" 
' 
äi'"ä_ rm... T'Sa'; &. 'ý`:. ".: ,.. __ "»f1 
P'ns'ý` AYE ` ... ý. s, r , 
6.1 now give less time to activities given no or low recognition by RAE. 
12 1-1 3456 LI 
7. The RAE has had a positive effect on my research output. 
IF] 203 El 4056 LI 
8. Because of RAE. I now spend less time in voluntary academic work. 
I L1 2 C: ] 3 CI E- 15 4 5ED 6E-1 
9. I am feeling more pressure to publish due to the RAE. 
I6E F-I 
10.1 now (try to) collaborate more with researchers overseas to demonstrate 
international excellence. 
I Ll 2 L1 3 E-1 4 El 5 L1 6 L1 
U 
U. I now collaborate less (in research) with academics from other English 
universities. 
1 F-I 2 F-I 3 F-I 4 El 506 
12.1 now collaborate more (in research) with colleagues in my department. 
I L1 2 LL1 3 El 4 L1 5 L1 6 LI 
13. Perceived research preferences of RAE panels have affected my choice of 
research topic. 
1 El 203040 5F 7-1 6 El 
14. The balance of my research has moved away from the `applied' end of the 
spectrum towards more basic, `pure' research . 
102 EI 3 EI 405Q6 
15. In my view, RAE has a negative effect on inter-disciplinary research. 
1Q2030405Q60 
2 
16.1 now do less inter-disciplinary research than 6 years ago. 
Ia20304 5* E1 6a 
17. Because of the RAE time-scales I have published some outputs at an earlier 
stage than I would prefer. 
1 Ei] 2 EI 3 Ei] 45060 
18. Because of the RAE time-scales I have deferred the publications of some 
research output. 
I El 2L3 L1 4 LJ 5 ED 6 L1 
19. My research topics or projects are influenced by the RAE time-scale. 
12340S06 
20. Because of the RAE time-scales I have avoided some research topics or 
projects because they would have taken a long time to complete. 
I0203E: l 4 17 506 
21. Because of the RAE time-scales I have avoided some research projects because 
they were speculative in nature (more risky in relation to security of output). 
I El 2 71 304Q506 El 
22. I now manage my research publications by `smoothing' it over the RAE time 
cycle (i. e. in trying to ensure sufficient publications for the RAE I publish early 
if I do not have enough publications and/or I defer publication if I have 
published sufficiently so as to ensure enough publications in the next round of 
RAE) 
10203 1-1 45 73 6 Cl 
23. The RAE has increased my stress level. 
1 E1 2 El 304 EI 5 E1 60 
3 
N 24. The RAE has improved the quality of research conducted in Universities. 
4 L] 56 1 E3 2 Ell 3 1: 3 
25.1 believe RAE increases staff mobility between institutions. 
I El 2 El 3 LI 4 LI 5 LI 60 
26. I now spend less time on consultancy work (including `external' lecturing) to 
concentrate on research. 
102 EI 3405a60 
27. My department have expanded research student numbers beyond the capacity 
to supervise as well as we wish. 
I EI 203 EI 4 El 5060 
28. I believe that the expansion in research student numbers is due to the RAE 
funding formula. 
I FJ 2304 E-I 56 
29. University appointments are now driven by the RAE. 
10 203L4 L1 5 L1 6 LI 
30. Universities are now paying a `premium' to attract `star' researchers. 
10 2 E-1 3 E-1 4 E-1 5 LI 6 
31. Academic researchers pay has increased due to the recognition earned from the 
RAE. 
I0203E: l 4 ED 5060 
t 
4 
 tea` 
R"3 
ýd 
ýwi. 
"ii. All iý °i°. ` f ýM ýAý z,! yý'ý, ý _ _. ` ..,,. S2'. 1 i . k1F "` ý. r, ý . tja. . `.. _ . _. ._. 
32. (a) The RAE four year time cycle is not appropriate for my subject area research. 
113 2 3E3 45 E1 6 El 1 
(b) What, in your view, will be an appropriate RAE time cycle for your subject 
area? 
2 years 
E-I 4 yrs 
El 6 yrs 
El 8 yrs 
El Other (specify) El 
33. What is your Primary department? (i. e. what unit of assessment, per HEFCE 
classification, would you fall under? ). 
34. How many years have you been in academia? 
5 years 
0 5-10 years 
E-1 10-15 years 
0 15-20 over 20 years 
F-I 
35. How long have you been in current post? 
2 years 
0 2-5 years 5-10 years 
ýý 
over 10 years 
0 
36. Were you included in the submission as research active staff? 
Definite Yes EJ Probably Yes Probably No 
Definite No EI Not sure 
0 
37. What was your department's rating in RAE 1996? 
5* 05 El 4 E] 3a ED 3b El 2 El 1 
38. Was your department research rating higher or lower than the average rating 
for your institution? 
Higher 0 Lower 0 About average 
0 Not sure 
0 
5 
39. What proportion of staff were submitted by your department (subject area) in 
the RAE 1996? 
A (95-100%) 0B (80-94%) 0C (60-79%) 
D (40-59%) LI E (20-39%) 0F (less than 20%) L] 
Not sure 
ED 
40. Is your institution ex-UGC ('old) or ex- PCFC ('new )? 
Old El New Fl 
41. Post Held. 
Professor 0 Reader 0 Principal Lecturer 0 Senior Lecturer 
Lecturer L] Other (Please spec) 
42. Are you in a `permanent' position? 
Yes LI No 0 
43. Please tick the box against the gwlificatioddegree you have. (fick as many 
boxes as relevant). 
PhD MSc. /MBA 0 Professional Qualification 0 BSCJBA 
44. What is your age group. 
under 30 years 
0 30-39 0 40-49 0 over 50 years 
E] 
45. How would you rank yourself as a researcher? 
Not at all active 
0 Quite inactive ED Moderately active 
0 
Quite active 
LI Very active 
0 
,, 
6 
If you have any comments that you would like to make regarding any of the 
items on this questionnaire and/or the Research Assessment Exercise, please 
write them in the space below or attach a separate sheet. 
THANK YOU FOR YOUR PARTICIPATION IN THIS STUDY. 
When complete, please return the questionnaire in the reply paid envelope 
provided to: 
Ameen Talib 
Warwick Business School 
University of Warwick 
Coventry 
CV4 7AL 
All comments will be treated as anonymous. All information provided in this 
questionnaire will be treated as confidential and will only be used in aggregate form in 
combination with all other responses. 
7 
:: FRF + RCI? ENT EXERCISE Q UESTI0\ NAIRF EXPLANATORY 
'Voluntary academic work' (Q5 & 8) refers to unpaid work undertaken by 
academics on voluntary basis. An example is refereeing papers for journals. 
2. Question (6) refers to activities such as teaching and refereein;; which are not 
directly rewarded under the RAE mechanism. 
Question (11): English universities should read British universities. 
4. The term 'Department' in the questionnaire also refers to 'division', `subject 
area' or `unit of assessment' as appropriate. 
5. `Current post' in question (35) refers to the number of years in the same post 
(i. e. lecturer, senior lecturer etc. ) . 
This should be the total number of years in 
the same current post at present and previous institutions. 
6. Question (36) refers to the 1996 RAE submission. The answer is expected to 
be a definite yes or a definite no. However if you are not informed about your 
inclusion in the submission you have a choice of three responses. A `Probably 
Yes' indicates your belief that you should have been included based on your 
research output and the department rating. 
7. Question (39) refers to the proportion of full-time equivalent (FTE) staff 
submitted for assessment as described in the published ratings 
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CHAPTER NINE 
SURVEY OF ACADEMICS: 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
9.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter analyses the empirical results from the survey of academics. The 
descriptive results, tests for the independence of the variables, and the survey 
questionnaire of academics were introduced in Chapter Eight. Having established 
the association (degree of relationship) between the response variables and t he 
characteristic factors, the next step is to test whether there are differences between 
'a the groups. The basic methodology is the Analysis of Variances (ANOVA) for 
testing for significance in the difference of means between groups'. Then we 
investigated if the RAE has influenced the behaviour of academics and which of 
the characteristics have explanatory powers. In this chapter, the model developed 
in Chapter Three is tested with regression with optimal scaling (CATREG) and 
logistic regression. 
Respondents are requested to indicate their degree of agreement or disagreement 
to the questions on behaviour in the survey. Their choices are then dichotomised 
into two groups: (1) agree; or (2) disagree. These qualitative data are then used to 
estimate the logistic regression model. The model and the methodology were 
1 We also applied the Kruskal-Wallis test and the results from the Kruskal-Wallis test and 
ANOVA were similar. Hence, we decided to apply ANOVA. 
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described in Chapter Three and the results are discussed in Section 9.8 of this 
chapter. 
/ 
The chapter is organised as follows: the next section discusses the results of the 
ANOVA tests. The overall level of the behavioural impact of the RAE is 
analysed in Section 9.3. Categorical regression with optimal scaling and findings 
from the survey are explained in Section 9.4. The results of CATREG are 
compared to the ANOVA tests and the Measures of Association results in Section 
9.5. The validity and reliability of the survey instrument is tested in Section 9.6. 
The logistic regression is delineated in Section 9.7, with the empirical results in 
Section 9.8. A general discussion of the logistic regression results is provided in 
Section 9.9, followed by closing remarks in the final section. 
9.2 ANOVA 
The ANOVA is a statistical tool for investigating differences between the means 
of distinct groups of subjects. It extends the standard two-group t-tests to several 
groups. These groups can also be categories of a nominal variable (Hand & 
Taylor, 1987: p. 3). The ANOVA is based on the assumption that the variances 
of the treatment populations are equal, and is relatively robust to differences in 
variances between treatments. For this study, the null hypothesis represents that 
the means for the different groups are equal. The ANOVA results for the survey 
data are displayed in Table 9.1 at end of this chapter. 
As Table 9.1 shows, there is a significant difference in the responses between the 
groups, in particular for groups based on level of self-assessed research activity. 
9 
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The RAE and the four paper effect have the highest impact on the middle-tier 
academics. This was detailed in Chapters Seven and Eight. This effect is 
consistent with the expectancy and goal-setting motivation theories and REMM, 
which were discussed in Chapter Two. Applying the expectancy theory, the 
effort required to perform research work and the expectancy that the effort will 
lead to a particular outcome, and the intrinsic/extrinsic rewards associated with 
the effort will significantly influence the motivation and behaviour of the 
responding academic staff. Therefore, one expects the RAE to have less 
influence on the non-active academic than on the active researcher. However, the 
RAE is also expected to have minimal impact on the behaviour of the very active 
in research. This is because they derive much intrinsic rewards from research, 
and achieving the goal of four papers per RAE cycle is relatively easy for them. 
The level of goal difficulty also influences the level of motivation. As explained 
in Chapter Two, a difficult but attainable goal has the highest motivational 
influence on the achieving type. In this case, the middle tier academics are 
expected to exhibit the highest motivation. 
There are only three survey questions for which the responses are not significantly 
different between the groups. These questions are for focus on the following 
areas: pure research rather than applied research (Q14); interdisciplinary research 
(Q15); and deferring publication (Q18). The statement on research collaboration 
with academics from other universities in England (Q11) has an F-ratio 
significant only at the 5.3% level for Research Activity, but is insignificant for all 
other groups. 
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There are four responses with an F-ratio significant at the 5% level for only one 
factor grouping. The difference in means for spending less time in teaching 
preparation as a result of the RAE (Q4) is significant only for the Institution type. 
The level of research activity is the only factor for which the means of groups are 
significantly different for feeling more pressure to publish (Q9) and voluntary 
academic activity (Q5). Groups based on academic experiences are the only ones 
that show significant differences in the means for the belief that research quality 
in universities has improved (Q24). All the other questions have two or more 
factors for which the differences in means based on ANOVA are significant at the 
5% level (see results in Table 9.1). 
The ANOVA results exhibit the following as the (more) important characteristic 
factors where differences in means were significant: 
" Department rating 
" Institution type (ex-UGC and ex-PCFC Institutions) 
0 Post 
" Level of research activity 
The null hypothesis that the means for the different groups are equal is rejected for 
most response variables. Thus, the behavioural response to the RAE differs 
between academics of different characteristics. 
9.3 BEHAVIOURAL IMPACT OF THE RAE 
This section identifies the existence of the direct and indirect behavioural changes 
resulting from the RAE. A respondent agreeing to the survey question is an 
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i' +ý indication that the RAE has influenced his behaviour. A simple test statistic, the 
Z-value, is used to evaluate if the proportion agreeing to the survey are higher 
than one-quarter, one-third, or one-half of the total sample. The behaviour is 
termed prevalent (strong presence) if the percentage of respondents agreeing to 
the behaviour statement is greater than 50%; moderate if between 33% and 50%; 
and weak if the proportion agreeing is more than 25% but less than 33%. These 
terms and the specific percentages have no special significance, but are arbitrary 
percentages in order to provide some indication of the level of behavioural 
changes due to the RAE. 
The one-tailed test with the critical region in the upper tail is used to test the null 
hypotheses that the proportions of respondents agreeing to the survey statement 
1a are more than (a) 50%, (b) 33%, or (c) 25%. 
The null hypotheses are: 
First hypothesis Ho: it = 0.5 
Second hypothesis Ho: is = 0.33 
Third hypothesis H,: 7c = 0.25 
And, the corresponding alternative hypotheses are: 
First hypothesis H,: it > 0.5 
Second hypothesis H,: it > 0.33 
Third hypothesis H,: it > 0.25 
i\ 
/ 
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"° For the first hypothesis, if the proportion agreeing is too far above 0.5 as to be 
reasonably due to chance 2, then the H, is rejected. In rejecting Ho, the alternative 
hypothesis will be accepted, i. e., accepting the proposition that the proportion 
agreeing is higher than 50%. The rejection region is defined by the critical value 
of Z=1.64, which excludes 5% of observations in the right-hand tail area. The 
null hypothesis is accepted if the calculated Z value is less than 1.64; it would be 
rejected and strong/moderate/weak presence of the behaviour is existent if the Z 
value exceeds 1.64. 
The test statistic is calculated as follows: 
Sp 
where the sample standard error (Sp) is: 
° 
Sp= 
jr(1-; r) 
17 
The Z values for testing the three null hypotheses are displayed in Table 9-2, with 
the significant Z values (> 1.64) highlighted. Only the significant critical values 
at the highest proportion are shown. For example, for Q1, the alternative 
hypothesis that "p > 50%" is rejected but the alternative hypothesis that "p > 
33%" is accepted. This means the proportion of respondents agreeing to the 
statement is higher than 33%. Accordingly, there is a moderate impact on 
behaviour, viz.; academics have increased the time they spend on research. 
However, the direct impact of the RAE on this increase in time spent on research 
is weak. The alternative hypothesis that is not rejected has ap value of greater 
than 25%. 
9 
2 For the first hypothesis, and 0.33 and 0.25 for the second and -third hypothesis respectively. 
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j '0 The RAE has shaped the perception in the community that there has been an 
increase of staff mobility among institutions, given t hat the RAE isd riving an 
increasing number of university appointments and that specific premiums are 
being paid to attract "star" researchers. This perception is substantiated by the 
case studies of universities (see discussion in Chapter Five). However, academics 
do not believe that their salaries have increased as a result of the recognition they 
had earned from the RAE. They can easily point to the higher mobility and pay 
premiums enjoyed by the star researchers. 
The RAE has a strong impact on increasing the personal stress levels and the 
pressure to publish. This pressure led to a moderate influence to increase the time 
spent on research and correspondingly less time on teaching preparation and 
11) voluntary academic activities, there is a perceptibly higher influence on the 
reduction of time allocated to activities given low or no recognition by the RAE. 
Any measurement system that is linked to performance tends to create pressures 
for enhanced performance in the areas that are being measured and a matching 
neglect of the areas that are not being measured (Puxty et al, 1994). 
An unintended consequence of the RAE is that academics are publishing less in 
professional journals and are becoming less proactive in professional and public 
debates. In the long run, this could be detrimental because the gap between the 
fields of academia and profession, such as Accountancy, would widen unduly. 
The funding of research at the university level is directly determined by the 
evaluations in the RAE, and the teaching performance undergoes quality audits. 
Public Policy intervention by academics, on the other hand, is not formally 
(t 4 
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assessed and does not form part of the formal contract of employment. It does, 
however, constitute an established part of academic life. Invisible to the control 
processes of the state, public policy intervention is, by default, an unvalued 
feature of academic endeavour. It has been shifted even further to the margins of 
academic work by the RAE process. The monitoring of research places undue 
pressure on an academics' time. Public policy intervention is effectively 
controlled by not being recognised by any state assessment and remuneration 
process. The RAE also unintentionally generates peer pressure to restrict the use 
of valuable time on public policy intervention and other unmeasured activities. 
I ') 
This is due to the fact that the resources available to the group, department or cost 
centre depend on the use of that time as defined by the state's assessment 
instruments (Puxty et al, 1994: pp. 160-161). 
There is a disparity between academics' view of the impact of the RAE on 
themselves and its general impact. From the survey results, there is a strong view 
(> 50%) that the RAE has negative effects on inter-disciplinary research, but the 
survey also shows t hat 1 ess than o ne-quarter of the s ample are now doing 1 ess 
inter-disciplinary research. There is a moderate awareness (> 33%) that the RAE 
has increased research output, but its significance is not statistically greater than 
25%. 
Overall, there is a moderate incidence of research fixation behaviour. Many 
respondents believe that the RAE has increased mobility of good researchers, and 
that there is now a situation of gaming, infringement of academic freedom, 
i" 
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(I ' smoothing of research output, and myopic or short term orientation triggered 
largely by the RAE time-cycles. 
 
9.4 CATEGORICAL REGRESSION WITH OPTIMAL SCALING 
9.4.1 CATREG: AN OPTIMAL LINEAR REGRESSION EQUATION 
As the data are categorical, we applied categorical regression with optimal scaling 
(CATREG) and logistic regression (see Section 9.8). The latter is the more 
appropriate methodology for the reasons discussed in Chapter Three. The 
purpose of the CATREG analysis is to provide a basis for comparison. 
Furthermore, the use of CATREG simplifies the problem of predicting the 
probability of choice to that of predicting the value of the dependent variable. 
1 e) 
Regression with optimal scaling (CATREG) assigns numerical values to the 
categories, resulting in an optimal linear regression equation for the transformed 
variables. The standard linear regression analysis involves minimising the sum of 
squared differences between the response (dependent) variable and a weighted 
combination of the predictor (independent) variables for the model estimation 
step. Typically, regression variables are quantitative, with (nominal) categorical 
data recorded to binary or contrast variables. Categorical variables serve to 
separate groups of cases and their parameters. The estimated coefficients reflect 
how changes in the predictors affect the response. An alternative approach is to 
regress the responses on the categorical predictor values themselves. Each 
variable is estimated with one coefficient. However, for categorical variables, the 
r)ý 
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category values are arbitrary. Coding the categories differently would yield 
different coefficients. 
CATREG extends the standard regression approach by simultaneously scaling the 
variables. The procedure quantifies categorical variables such that the 
quantification reflects the characteristics of the original categories. The quantified 
categorical variables are then put through the same procedure as the numerical 
variables. The quantification is displayed in Table 9.7. 
9.4.2 THE CATREG MODEL 
The survey design was described in Chapter Three and a model of the factors 
influencing the behaviour (response) was derived. The behavioural responses are 
II regarded as a function of behavioural fixation and motivation, where: 
behavioural fixation =f (socialisation factors, age) 
socialisation =f (qualification, experience, post) 
motivation = f(age, post, job security, research activity level, 
perceived emphasis placed on research) 
An academic's job security is affected by whether the job position is permanent 
and whether they are included in the RAE submission. Those that are in non- 
permanent posts and are not included in the RAE submissions have less job 
security. The perceived emphasis on research is measured by Institution type 
(where it is assumed that ex-UGC institutions have more perceived emphasis) and 
1 "4 
Chapter 9: Empirical results and analysis page 311 
department rating (where it is assumed that departments with higher ratings have 
higher emphasis). 
The resultant model tested is linear because of the quantification by CATREG of 
the categorical variables. The model is written as: 
Y= ß1xI+ ß: x: + ß3x3 + ß. x. + ßsxs + ß6z6 + ß, x, + ß. x. + ß9x9 +e [Equation 9.1 ] 
where: 
Y= The behavioural response measure. 
There are 6 models, one independent variable for each model. The 
independent variables are: Gaming, Academic Freedom, Time cycle, 
Research Fixation, Smoothing, and Mobility. These measures have been 
described in Chapter Three. 
and where the following are the predictor variables: 
XI Experience (EXP) 
x2 Department rating (DR) 
x3 Research activity (RA) 
x4 Age 
xs Submission in RAE (SUB) 
xb Qualification (PHD) 
x7 Permanent position (PERM) 
X8 Post 
x9 Institution type (INST) 
1 *4 
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'1f The independent variables are the individual's views on mobility, research 
fixation and gaming, where gaming is separated into academic freedom, 
smoothing and the time-cycle effect. T hese constructs have b een explained in 
Chapter Three. The choice of the explanatory variables was explained in Chapter 
Three, but they are briefly mentioned here for convenience. The same 
explanatory variables are used for all the models to facilitate the direct 
comparison of the characteristics' effects on the independent variables. For 
example, if post is a significant explanatory variable for gaming, it would be 
useful to explore if it is also significant for perceptions of research fixation or 
mobility. Although the inclusion of irrelevant variables could result in 
specification errors, it is a less serious error compared to omitting variables. 
Furthermore, as this is also an exploratory study, it would be useful to relate the 
characteristics of academics (explanatory variable) to the different behavioural 
outcomes. 
Understandably, experience and age are related variables. Both the older and 
more experienced academics are expected to have higher behaviour fixations. 
The older academics are also less inclined to change their behaviour. Moreover, 
those in permanent positions are expected to have less behavioural effects. The 
post variable is expected to be negatively related with the independent variable, as 
post is arranged in descending order in the questionnaire. Academics in less 
senior posts are expected to alter their behaviour more. 
The higher the levels of research activity, the lower are the expected behavioural 
effects. The non-active researchers, however, are expected to be less affected by II 
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''' the goal such as the four paper target set by the RAE as they might perceive it as 
unattainable. 
 
9.4.3 ANALYSIS OF FINDINGS 
The F test is used to test th-- hypothesis that the coefficients in the model are 
jointly equal to zero. This is a test of the null hypothesis that none of the 
explanatory variables is significant (ß, --0, for all ßs). 
The F ratios summarised in Table 9.3 are all significant at the 5% level. 
Therefore, the null hypotheses are rejected. The independent variables and the 
regressors in equation 9.1 are correlated. It is crucial, however, to note that 
although the CATREG model (Equation 9.1) appears to be linear, it is not linear 
in the strictest sense because the scaling and quantification of the categorical 
variables would assign numerical values to the categorical variables. As evident 
from Table 9.7, these assigned numerical values can be positive or negative, and 
can change the sign of the relationship. For example, the gaming model 
(Equation 9.2) has a negative sign for the experience variable, implying a 
negative linear relationship between gaming and experience, which is contrary to 
prior expectations. It suggests that the more experience an academic has, the 
more likely he would practise gaming. However, the results imply otherwise. 
The quantification of the experience categorical variable in Table 9.7 assigns 
negative values to both the categories of those with less than 10 years experience 
and those with 10-15 years experience, while the category for those with over 15 
years of experience is positively signed. Therefore, those with less experience are 
more likely to disagree that they have been gaming. The direction of the 
11 
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#? b relationship depends on the quantification and could be different for each 
category of the same variable. In'that fashion, CATREG models are not restricted 
in assuming a strict linear relationship between the independent variable and the 
explanatory variable. 
9.4.3.1 DISCUSSION AND EVALUATION 
The summary statistics for the models are in Table 9.3. The coefficients and the 
standard errors shown in Table 9.4, where the partial coefficients are displayed 
alongside other statistics. The resultant models with the partial coefficients are 
presented below. 
GAMING= -0.107 (EXP) -0.2132 (DR) + 0.083 (RA) +0.171 (AGE) 
+0.119 (SUB) +0.0802 (PHD) -0.0373 (PERM) -0.179 (POST) 
-0.05117 (INST) + 0.96 [Equation 9.2] 
R2=0.108 F=3.512 
Academic Freedom = -0.0895(EXP) -0.203 (DR) + 0.186 (RA) +0.229 (AGE) 
+0.11(SUB) + 0.0166(PHD) + 0.0106(PERM) 
-0.0552(POST) +0.0849(INST) + 0.95 [Equation 9.3] 
R2=0.108 F=3.642 
Time Cycle = -0.121(EXP) -0.255(DR) - 0.167 (RA) +0.198(AGE) 
+0.0069(SUB) +0.0229(PHD) +0.02066(PERM) 
-0.168(POST) -0.1 15(INST) + 0.95 [Equation 9.4] 
i,, R2=0.123 F=4.258 
i ^IS 
15 
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Research fixation = -0.103(EXP) -0.207(DR) -0.207(RA) +0.0424(AGE) 
+0.0549(SUB) - 0.164(PHD) +0.0586 (PERM) 
-0.202(POST) -0.142(INST) + 0.95 [Equation 9.5] 
R2=0.124 F=4.172 
Smoothing = -0.118(EXP) -0.181(DR) -0.142(RA) +0.126(AGE) 
+0.0239(SUB) + 0.0343(PHD) -0.0199(PERM) 
-0.202(POST) -0.0379(INST) + 0.97 [Equation 9.6] 
R2 = 0.087 F=2.903 
Mobility = 0.0939 (EXP) -0.173(DR) +0.222(RA) +0.16(AGE) 
+0.0275(SUB) +0.0379(PHD) +0.00062(PERM) 
+0.068(POST) -0.0612(INST) + 0.96 [Equation 9.7] 
R2=0.118 F=3.906 
As mentioned, the signs of the model need to be reviewed with the signs of the 
quantification of the categorical variables in Table 9.7. For example, those with 
PhDs and those in permanent positions have a negative quantification. Therefore, 
those with PhDs are more likely to practise gaming. Those with permanent 
positions would be less likely to alter their behaviour. 
The results show that department rating, research activity, age group and post are 
the more important explanatory variables in predicting behavioural effects. The 
other explanatory variables do not seem to have a major influence in the 
/ 
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1 0,1% prediction except for qualification for research fixation. This result is similar to 
the measures of association results. The relatively more important explanatory 
variables in predicting each dependent behaviour variable are displayed in Table 
9.8. 
The Multiple R measures the degree of association between the dependent 
variable and all the explanatory variables jointly. The more meaningful measure 
would be R2. The coefficient of determination, R2, acts as a summary measure 
that explains how well the sample regression fits the data. It measures the 
proportion or percentage of total variation of Y explained by the regression 
model. The results show our model regressions explain about 10-12% of the 
response variable, except for smoothing where the explanation is only 8%. 
IV 
An important property of R2 is that it is a non-decreasing function of the number 
of explanatory variables or regressors present in the model. As the number of 
regressors increases, R2 almost invariably increases and never decreases. An 
alternative measure is the adjusted R2; it adjusts for the degrees of freedom 
associated with the sums of squares. Theil (1978) noted that it is a good practise 
to use adjusted Res instead of Res, because Res tend to give an overly optimistic 
picture of the fit of regression equation. However, Theil offered no general 
theoretical justification for the superiority of adjusted R2, and his proposition is 
not universally accepted (Goldberger, 1991). 
The relative importance assigned to each explanatory variable in the regression is 
shown inT able 9.5. T he zero-order c orrelation inT able 9.5 is the c orrelation 
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w between the explanatory variable and the dependent variable. It shows how 
important the explanatory variable is when it is used alone to predict the 
dependent variable. The larger the absolute values the stronger the relation. ý" 
But how important is each explanatory variable in predicting the response 
(independent) variable when used with the other explanatory variables? A method 
to assess the relative importance of independent variables is to consider the 
increase in RZ when a variable is entered into an equation that already contains the 
other explanatory variables. The increase is given by: 
R2 = R2 - RZ change (1) 
where R2(D is the square of the multiple correlation coefficient when 
all independent variables except the ith are in the equation. 
A large change in RI indicates that the additional variable provides more 
information about the dependent variable that is not available from the other 
independent variables in the equation. The signed square root of the increase is 
the part correlation coefficient. It is the correlation between Y and Xi when the 
linear effects of the other independent variables have been removed from Xi.. 
The results in Table 9.5 show that the inclusion of the Post independent variable 
in predicting the gaming variable results in an increase of R2 of 0.19, i. e., an 
increase ofa bout 2%in the prediction ability oft he r egression equation. T he 
increases in the R2 for smoothing and research fixation are 3%, and 2% for time- 
cycle. The increases in R2 are minimal for academic freedom and mobility. 
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The categories of professors and readers have negative quantifications. Therefore, 
they had less behavioural impact as the sign in the model for post is also negative 
except for mobility. The more senior staff are more definite in their view that the 
RAE has influenced mobility and pay. Academics in lecturer posts are the most 
likely to practise gaming and research fixation. 
Another significant explanatory variable is department rating. The part and 
partial correlation coefficients are significant. The inclusion of the department 
rating as a predictor variable for the time-cycle effect increases the RZ by 4.5% 
and by 3% for predicting research fixation behaviour. The Res for the other 
independent variables increase by around 2.5% when department rating is 
included as a predictor variable. Academics in departments rated 5 and 5* have 
"q negative quantifications (see i'able 9.7), implying that they have less research 
fixation and are less likely to practise gaming. 
The level of research activity as a predictor variable increases the R2 for 
predicting mobility by 4%, and by 3% for research fixation and academic 
freedom. The increase in R2 for the time-cycle effect as a result of the inclusion 
of research activity as a predictor variable is 2%, 1.4% for smoothing and 
minimal (0.05%) for gaming. Those who are very active in research practise less 
gaming. As anticipated, research fixation, smoothing and the time-cycle effect 
are virtually non-existent for the non-active researchers. 
The age group is an important predictor for academic freedom and the time-cycle 
effect; it increases the amount of prediction in the independent variable by 3% 
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N and 2%, respectively. There is an increase of 1.5% for gaming and mobility but 
research fixation and smoothing remain largely unchanged. As expected, the 
actions of the over 50-year-olds are the least affected by the RAE. The younger 
academics have a higher research fixation and practise gaming in all its forms. 
The inclusion of experience, permanent position, submission in RAE, 
qualification and institution type have only had minimal increases in the R2 for all 
independent variables. However, the inclusion of qualification as an explanatory 
variable in predicting research fixation increases the RZ by 2.3%. 
The square of the part coefficient tells only how much the RI would increase 
when a variable is added to the regression equation. It does not indicate what 
proportion of the unexplained variation this increase would constitute. A 
coefficient that measures the proportional reduction in variation is: 
PrZ=(R2 - R2( )/ (1 -R2( ) 
The signed square root of Pr"2 is the partial correlation coefficient. It is the 
correlation between the ith independent variable and the dependent variable when 
the linear effects of the other independent variables have been removed from both 
X. and Y. The results of the partial correlation coefficients are not significantly 
different from the part correlations. 
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The variability of the estimated regression coefficients must also be considered in 
evaluating the relative importance, of the independent variables. Coefficients with 
large standard errors would be unreliable. 
When the independent variables are correlated among themselves, the parameter 
estimates would also be correlated. High inter-correlation among the variables 
can affect the regression estimates in several ways. The estimated variance of the 
regression coefficient for the ith independent variable is: 
S2B = S2 / (1-RZ1)(N-1) S2, 
Here, R=, is the squared multiple correlation when the ith independent variable is 
considered the dependent variable and the regression equation between it and the 
other independent variables is calculated. A large value of R2, indicates that the 
ith independent variable is almost a linear function or a combination of the other 
independent variables. The proportion of variability not explained by the other 
variables is 1- R21. This quantity is called the tolerance of the variable. 
The measure of Tolerance is used to detect multicollinearity. These results are 
shown in Table 9.6. If the tolerance is 1, then X is not correlated with the other 
regressors, whereas if it is zero, then it is perfectly correlated. It is also observed 
that the smaller the. tolerance, the larger the standard error of the coefficient. 
Small tolerance values can cause computational problems for regression 
solutions. The results indicate high tolerance levels. Hence, multi-collinearity is 
not a problem and no computational problems arise from it. 
11 
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9.5 ASSOCIATION MEASURES, ANOVA AND CATREG RESULTS 
COMPARED 
The results from the `Measures of Association' (see Chapter 8), ANOVA and 
CATREG are consistent in identifying the main characteristic factors influencing 
the responses. 
As can be seen from Table 9.8, the main factors influencing behaviour: 
" Department rating 
" Post 
" Age 
" Research Activity 
cý 
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TABLE 9.8: COMPARISON OF RESULTS 
IMPORTANT EXPLANATORY CHATRACTERISTIC 
VARIABLES 
Independent Association ANOVA CATREG 
variable Measures 
(see chapter 8) 
Gaming " Department " Department " Department 
rating rating rating 
" Post " Post " Post 
" Age " Research " Age 
" Research 
Activity 
Activity 
Academic " Department " Department " Department 
Freedom rating rating rating 
" Age " Age " Age 
" Research " Research " Research 
Activity Activity Activity 
Time Cycle " Department " Department " Department 
rating rating rating 
" Post " Post " Post 
" Age " Age " Age 
" Research " Research " Research 
Activity Activity Activity 
Research " Post " Submission " Department 
Fixation 
" Research " Post rating 
Activity " Institute type " 
Post 
" Research " 
Qualification 
Activity " Research 
Activity 
Smoothing " Department " Department " Department 
rating rating rating 
" Post " Research " Age 
" Research 
Activity " Research 
Activity Activity 
Mobility " Post " Department " Department 
" Age rating rating 
" Experience " 
Institute type " Experience 
" Submission " Age 
" Research 
Activity 
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9.6 VALIDITY, RELIABILITY AND MULTICOLLINEARITY 
The Cronbach Alpha (a) is a statistic that tests for the internal consistency of a set 
of items based on their average inter-item correlations (Cronbach, 1951). This 11 
test is used to ascertain the reliability of the survey instrument. The Cronbach a 
coefficient is 0.8932, which suggests that the scale in the survey has a very high 
internal reliability (Nunnally, 1967). For purposes of construct validity tests, the 
principal components factor analysis is carried out (Kerlinger, 1964), and for the 
construct reliability tests, the Cronbach alpha statistics are calculated. 
The dimensionality of the scale items in the questionnaire is tested with 
explanatory factor analysis. The principal components method with varimax 
rotation is applied with Kaiser normalisation. There are eight factors with 
a 
eigenvalues exceeding 1. These factors explain 63% of the total variances and 
are shown in Table 9.9. Factors 2,5,7 and 8 are bloated specifics. Factor 6 is the 
view of the RAE. Factor 1 is the time-cycle effect, Factor 3 is the belief in the 
RAE rewards and mobility effect, and Factor 4 pertains to research fixation. 
The measurement constructs load onto the appropriate factors and the factor 
analysis results support our measure validity. It is noted that the time-cycle 
construct loads perfectly onto Factor 1. The nine questions making up the 
gaming construct and their component measures load onto Factor 1 except for 
Q16 (interdisciplinary research) that loads onto Factor 5. Q13 has a loading of 
0.494 on Factor 1 and represents the highest loading for Q13. The highest 
loading for Q14 is on Factor 5 but its loading on Factor 1 is only 0.317. Table 
9.10 summarises the measure constructs loading onto the various factors with 
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their associated Cronbach a statistics. The Cronbach a results show a high 
reliability for the six constructs in the survey. The only construct with a low 
reliability is mobility as the value of its Cronbach a is only 0.4921. Therefore, 
the results for mobility need to be interpreted carefully. The Cronbach a for the 
other constructs are all higher than 0.78. 
Prior to estimating the logistic regression model, it has to be ensured that the 
variables are free from multi-collinearity. This would be present if their tolerance 
values are small. The information in Table 9.6 shows that the tolerances range 
from 0.46 to 0.97, indicating that multi-collinearity is not an issue. Therefore, 
with the exception of mobility that might be unreliable, the remaining five 
constructs are valid and reliable. 
, Z) 
9.7 LOGISTIC REGRESSION 
The explanatory variables for the logistic regression model have been explained 
in Chapter Three. The model is repeated here: 
P; = E(Y =1/X; ) =1 
1+ez' 
where P, is the probability of agreement with a behaviour (i. e., the 
conditional probability), 
and, Zi = ßI + ß2(Discp) + (33 (EXP) + ß4(Dept Rating) + (3s (AVR) + ß6 
(INST) + (37 (PhD) + (38 (POST) + ß9 (AGE) + ßio (RESACT) 
A number of the predictor variables are represented by dummy variables. For 
modelling purposes, the value of a dummy variable is "1" if the attribute is 
present, and "0" if it is absent. As each dummy variable is assigned its own 
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I` coefficient, there are a total of 29 coefficients including the constant in the 
logistic regression. The results are tabulated as follows: Table 9.11 (Gaming), 
Table 9.12 (Research Fixation), Table 9.15 (Academic freedom), Table 9.17 
ý. 
(Smoothing), Table 9.19 (Time cycle), and Table 9.21 (Mobility). 
As the model estimation requires observations with complete responses, those 
with missing values are discarded. For the Gaming model, there are a total 305 
observations, but only 241 are usable as the other 64 are incomplete. The final 
sample sizes for the other models are: Research Fixation (246), Academic 
Freedom (250), Smoothing (254), Time Cycle (253), and Mobility (246). 
9.7.1 MODEL EVALUATION 
Although the dependent variable in logistic regression does not have `variances' 
in the same way continuous variables do in (classical) regression, maximum 
likelihood procedures provide model fit measures analogous to those from least 
squares regressions. To test the model significance, we compare a model knowing 
the independent variables to a model not knowing the independent variables, as in 
the F test for least squares regression. In standard regression, the total sum of 
squares follow from a model not knowing the independent variables, the error 
sum of squares from a model knowing the independent variables, and the 
difference indicates . the improvement due to the independent variables. In 
logistic regression the same principle is applied. 
The first step in evaluating the model is to test for goodness of fit. The goodness 
of fit test is performed with the likelihood ratio (LR) statistic, derived as: 
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i1% 
LR statistic, X= -2[log Ln = log Lm] 
t), 
The baseline log likelihood (La) multiplied by (-2) represents the likelihood of 
producing the observed data with parameters for the independent variables equal 
to zero, and is analogous to the total sum of squares in classical regression. The 
model log likelihood (L,, ) multiplied by (-2) represents the likelihood of 
producing the observed data with the estimated parameters for the independent 
variables in the model. This is analogous to the error sum of squares used in 
classical regression. The difference between the two log likelihoods represents 
the improvement in the model due to the variables. The test statistic, X, has a chi- 
square distribution (x2) with k-1 degrees of freedom (d. f. ). There are 28 d. f. for 
the models being tested here. ` The critical value is obtained from the chi square 
distribution and is used to test the hypothesis that all betas (excluding the 
constant) are equal to zero. The null hypothesis is rejected if the x2 value meets 
the 5% level of significance at k-1 degrees of freedom. The null hypothesis is a 
restricted model as it only has a constant as an independent variable. 
These two log likelihoods define an analogy to a proportional reduction-in-error 
measure in regression: 
RZ = [(-2 In Lo) - (-2 In L. )] / (-2 In Ln) 
However, the measure does not represent explained variance since log likelihood 
does not deal with variance in the form of sum of squared deviations. This 
measure is referred to as pseudo R2. Cox and Snell (1989) raised the ratio of the 
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likelihood values to the power 2/n and Nagelkerke (1991) suggested a further 
adjustment to the Cox and Snell measure to ensure a maximum of 1. These 
measures are also reported here, but they should be interpreted with caution as R2 
is of questionable value in dichotomous dependent variable models (Aldrich and 
Nelson, 1984). 
In addition to evaluating the LR statistic, the model is tested for its accuracy in 
predicting how the variables should be grouped. In theory, an independent 
holdout sample would be required for validating this predictive ability. But, as 
this would reduce the original sample size thereby compromising the significance 
test if the sample size is less than 100 (see Loong, 1997: p. 54), the entire dataset 
is used to estimate the logistic regression. Futhermore, it is acceptable to use the 
classification ability as its prediction ability (Valcarcel and Quintana, 1998: 
Pampel, 2000). Henceforth, the term prediction shall be used in place of 
classification. 3 
A more accurate model would require that the percentage of correctly predicted 
cases exceed the percentage predicted by choosing the percentage in the largest 
category of the dependent variable (Long, 1997: pp. 107-108). Therefore, for 
example, the prediction ability of the gaming dependent variable should exceed 
70%, the percentage of the surveyed academics who do not practice gaming. The 
prediction accuracy for each model is obtained by assigning the same weight to 
each individual variable and taking 50% as the cut-off point. This cut-off point is 
3 In this case, it is the classification ability of the model that is being developed. In theory, the test 
or the prediction ability requires it to be done on a holdout sample. 
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set as the a priori probability, which is the optimal prediction rule if the cost of 
both types of error is equal (Valcarcel and Quintana, 1998). The Type 1 Error, or 
false negative, refers to the prediction that an academic disagrees to adopting 
certain behaviour when he actually adopts it. The Type 2 Error, or false positive 
would be the case when the existence of a certain behaviour is predicted but does 
not actually exist. 
9.7.2 SIGNIFICANCE OF VARIABLES AND INTERPRETATION 
Similar to classical regression, the size of the coefficient relative to its standard 
error is the basis for testing the significance in logistic regression. The Wald 
statistic is used to test for significance of the coefficient. This statistic is equal to 
the square of the ratio of the coefficient divided by its standard error and has a 
chi-square distribution. A significant Wald statistic rejects the null hypothesis 
(Ho: ß= 0) and accepts the alternative hypothesis (HI: ß# 0). 
To interpret the results of the models, the odds ratios and their 95% asymptotic 
level of confidence are calculated. The odds ratio of the independent variable Xj 
is defined as the quotient of the ratio of probability of behaviour existence and 
non-existence of two individuals identical except with respect to XX, which is 
given an additional value of 1 for the first individual (Valcarcel and Quintana, 
1998: p. 96). In general, the antilog of the jth slope coefficient is the odds ratio. 
Subtracting one from the odds ratio and multiplying it by 100 yields the 
percentage change in the odds for a unit increase in the jth regressor, which for 
the dummy variables is the difference between the two groups. 
RL 
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9.7.3 MARGINAL EFFECT AND PROBABILITIES 
After evaluating the model and testing the significance of the betas jointly and 
separately, more information is extracted by investigating the odds ratios, 
marginal effect of the variables, and the probabilities for various combinations of 
attributes. 
9.7.3.1 MARGINAL EFFECT 
The marginal effect of the model is the partial derivative of the non-linear 
equation relating the independent variable to the probabilities. It represents a 
straight line that meets the logistic curve at a single point without crossing to the 
other side of the curve (Figure 9.1). The tangent identifies the slope only at that 
point and its slope shows the linear change in the probability for a one-unit 
change in the independent variable defined at a single point on the logistic curve. 
9.1 
The linear slope of the tangent line comes from an equation for the partial 
derivative. The marginal effect or partial derivative is written as: 
aPiOXk = ßk XP x (i - P) 
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The above formula demonstrates the non-additive and non-linear nature of the 
relationship with probabilities. The effect varies with P, and P varies with the 
values for the other independent variables. Given the difficulties of describing a 
non-linear and non-additive relationship with a single coefficient, statisticians 
disagree over whether it is worthwhile even to calculate a single partial derivative 
(DeMaris, 1990,1993; Roneck, 1993). However, given the tendency of 
researchers and published research to report in terms of proportions or 
probabilities, the marginal effect is used here to supplement other statistics. 
However, it is noted that it would be misleading to generalise on the basis of a 
singular marginal effect as it relates to a single point. The marginal effect is thus 
calculated at three separate levels. 
"! ' A "common" method for deriving the marginal effect (Gujarati, 1995; Enomoto, 
1999) is to calculate it at P= [odds ratio / (1 + odds ratio)] (see the "Est" 
columns in the tables). 
The partial derivative works best with continuous variables for which small 
changes in the independent variables that define the tangent are meaningful. For 
the dummy variables, the relevant change occurs from 0 to 1, and the tangent for 
small changes in X makes less sense since the explanatory variables are all 
categorical variables classified in sets of dummy variables. Instead, it is possible 
to compute the predicted probability for each group and the difference is the 
marginal effect. The calculated group difference in probabilities, like the partial 
derivative, varies with the point chosen on the logistic curve, the X values and the 
P values. Greene (1997), however, has shown that in a binomial logit model, the 
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I' marginal effect calculated by the "common" method gives a good approximation 
of the difference in the two probabilities when the Xs are evaluated at their 
respective sample means. Enomoto (1999) adopted this methodology in , 
examining the role of race, age, gender, income and education as factors affecting 
public attitudes towards the O. J. Simpson trial and the American criminal justice 
system. The only continuous variable in his model is age; all the other variables 
are binary variables. The same methodology as Enomoto's is used to calculate 
the `first' marginal effect for the "Est" columns in the tables. 
In addition to the "common" method, the marginal effect is computed at two 
other separate points. The second approach is the `mean' method for deriving the 
marginal effect for the "actual" column in the tables. This is done in the 
following four steps (Pampel, 2000): 
a) Obtain the predicted logit for the omitted group at Po equal to the 
sample proportion. For example, as Gaming has an observed 
frequency of 30% who practise gaming, set the P. value at 0.3. 
Therefore, L, = In (Po / (1 - P, ) = In (0.3 /0.7) = 0.4286. 
b) Obtain the logit for dummy variable group; Ld = Lo +(3 
c) Calculate the probability (Pd) for dummy group; 
Pd=1/1+e-L4 
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II d) Calculate the difference between probability (Pd) for dummy 
group and Po for omitted group. 
/ 
The difference in Step d is the marginal effect computed under the `mean' 
method. 
A third method for obtaining the marginal effect is to use the reference category 
as the probability for the omitted group. This is displayed in the tables under the 
column labelled (REF CAT). The probability is first calculated with only the 
constant, and is then calculated with the constant plus the dummy variable 
coefficients. 
1' As it may be misleading to rely on singular measures for the marginal effects 
especially for dummy variables, the marginal effects depend on the point on 
which they were calculated, as they are influenced by the other independent 
variables as well. However, the notion behind marginal effects and the further 
insight it can offer renders it difficult to neglect. That and the tendency of 
researchers to report marginal effects induced us to report them. We, 
nevertheless, did not wish to mislead the reader by reporting a singular measure 
for marginal effects. Therefore, we calculated the three separate measures for 
marginal effects and displayed the probability of an `agree' response for various 
combinations of the independent (dummy) variables. The probabilities were 
calculated by altering the characteristics (the independent variables) one at a time, 
to give further insight into the marginal effect on the probability by a one-unit 
change in the dummy variable(s). In this approach, we provided the reader with 
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1% alternative measures for the marginal effect in order to gain a better insight. We 
preferred to leave it to the reader fo decide for himself the degree of reliability to 
place on the m arginal effects and inferences t here. We have, however, m ade % 
inferences from the marginal effect measures, but primarily to corroborate the 
odds ratio measures. 
9.7.3.2 PROBABILITIES 
The probabilities for each behaviour measure under various combinations of 
attributes with a focus on academics from Business and Management Studies are 
computed and displayed in Table 9.29. The attributes are changed one at a time 
so that the marginal effects at that point could also be identified. The 
combinations are based on a lecturer in BMS with 15-20 years of experience, in a 
department rated 4 in the 1996 RAE and that is the average for the lecturer's 
university which is an ex-UGC institution. The lecturer is below 40 years old, 
has a PhD and is quite active in research. As each variable is changed, while 
holding others constant, the probability is calculated. 
9.7.4 MODEL SIMPLIFICATION (BACKWARD STEPWISE-LR) 
The final procedure is to obtain a simplified and parsimonious model. It is based 
on the premise that a model should be as simple as possible - with only a few key 
variables - to capture the essence of the phenomenon under study (Friedman, 
1953). Since specification errors due to irrelevant variables are less serious than 
the case where variables are omitted; the `full' model is first derived and tested. 
Then the irrelevant variables are removed by the backward stepwise-LR method4, 
4 The forward stepwise and Wald methods yield similar results. 
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`I where the variables are removed one at a time such that the chi-square value is 
improved to arrive at the final parsimonious model. Purists who argue that the 
model specification c eases tobe independent oft he data consider the s tepwise 
regression techniques somewhat dubious. However, the use of such techniques 
here is considered valid as an investigative tool to ouserve the influences that 
might be behind the responses. 
9.8 LOGISTIC REGRESSION EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
The results are presented for each of the dependent variable models in this 
section. A discussion of the interpretation of logistic regression models has been 
provided in Chapter Three. 
9.8.1 GAMING 
The diagnostics for this model are: chi-square statistic of 45.504 with 28 degrees 
of freedom, and a 0.0196 tail probability. These allow for the rejection of the 
hypothesis that all betas are equal, at the 5% significance level. The pseudo R2 is 
15% while the Nagelkere RZ is 24%. The model results are displayed in Table 
9.11. At the 50% cut-off point, the model correctly predicts 75% of the cases. 
This is an improvement from the 70% of the cases in the "no gaming" category. 
The model has high prediction accuracy for no gaming. If the cut-off point is set 
at the probability . of 30%, the prediction accuracy for gaming improves 
substantially. 
At the 5% level, the Wald statistic is significant for the level of research activity 
(RESACT). The only other variable where the Ho: ß=0 is rejected at the 5% 
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significance 1 evel, is the dummy variable for 3bd epartment rating in the 1996 
RAE. The coefficients are significantly different from zero at the 10% 
significance level for EDUC, BUZ, EXP3 (10-15 years), and AVR-higher. We 
could not reject the hypothesis that beta is equal to zero for all the other variables. 
The odds ratios for department ratings show that academics in the non-funded 
departments (1 and 2) have a lower propensity to game than those in the funded 
departments. The most striking case is that of academics in departments rated 3b; 
their 4.7304 odds ratio implies that they are 4.7 times as deliberate as academics 
in non-funded departments to game. Relative to non-funded departments, those 
rated 5 and 5* have odds ratios of 3.5 and 1.7, respectively. 
_Y 
Academics who are quite or moderately active in research are the ones most ready 
to game. The odds ratio of the quite active shows they are almost 10 times as 
likely (or almost 900% more) to game than if a researcher is inactive in research, 
although the confidence interval of 95% is broad, between 1 and 59. The odds 
ratio for moderate researchers is 500% higher. The 6.08 odds ratio for the 
moderate researchers implies that 608 moderate researchers practise gaming for 
every 100 inactive researchers who do so. The very active researchers are only 
twice more likely than the inactive to practise gaming, however the Wald statistic 
is not significant for the very active. 
The marginal effect of the research activity variable is very high when calculated 
by the mean method; 50% for the quite active, and 42% for the moderate group. 
However these marginal effects, calculated at different points are reduced to 20%. 
i"ý 
1I 
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The backward stepwise (LR) method in SPSS is used to arrive at a more 
parsimonious model. The only variable left in the model is the level of research ,% 
activity. The resultant model is: 
P; =E(Y=1! X; )= I 
1+ez' 
where: 
Zi = -2.1365 + 1.6256 (if RESACT = Moderate) + 1.8851 (if 
RESACT = Quite) + 0.8061 (if RESACT = Very) 
ýI 
. The simplified model has a prediction accuracy of 70.54%, with zero accuracy in 
predicting gaming, and 100% accuracy in predicting no gaming. However, on the 
basis of the a priori estimate of 30% as a cut-off value, the prediction accuracy is 
62%. The simplified model statistics and coefficients are in Table 9-12. 
9.8.2 RESEARCH FIXATION 
The model has a chi-square statistic of 39.835 with 28 degrees of freedom, and a 
0.0684 tail probability. Therefore, the hypothesis that all betas are equal to zero 
cannot be rejected at the 5% significance level, but is rejected at the 10% level. 
Since the chi-square does not exceed the critical value (at 5% significance), the 
independent variables do not significantly influence the dependent variables. But, 
at the 10% level of significance they do influence the dependent variable. The 
results should be viewed with this in mind. The pseudo R2 is 12% while the 
Nagelleere R2 is 20%. The model results are displayed in Table 9.13. It appears 
that research fixation, i. e., where academics concentrate on research at the 
1-1) 
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I' expense of the other relevant activities, is not significantly influenced by an 
academic attribute. 
/ 
The only variable where the Ho: ß=0 is rejected at the 5% significance level is 
the dummy variable for an academic in a senior lecturer post. The model 
correctly predicts 66% of the cases at the 50% cut-off point. This is an 
improvement from the 59% of the cases in the no agreement category. Setting as 
a cut-off point, the a priori probability of 41%, the prediction accuracy is 63% 
overall (as well as the specificity and sensitivity). These results need to be 
viewed with care as the model is significant only at the 10% level. 
The model is simplified by using the Backward Stepwise (LR) method where 
1 -1 variables are removed one at-a time based on improving the chi-square values. 
The resultant model has a chi square value of 14.7859 at 5 degrees of freedom. 
The summary results oft he model are inT able 9.14. The hypothesis t hat the 
variables in the equation are all equal to zero is rejected at the 5% significance 
level. The parsimonious model is: 
Pi = E(Y =1 jX; ) =1 
1+ezi 
where: 
Zi = 0.4484 -1.0251 (if Discp = Science) - 1.0255 (if POST = 
Prof. ) -0.85 (if POST = Reader) - 0.621 (if POST = Prin. 
Lecturer) - 1.05 (if POST = Senior Lecturer) 
The variables in the final equation are only the dummy variables for Post and the 
Science discipline. The results indicate that the academics in the Science 
I'l 
discipline are 65% less likely to have research fixation than academics in other 
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fields. On average, lecturers have the highest probability of having a research 
fixation; the odds of having a research fixation for other posts is about 60% 
lower. % 
9.8.3 SMOOTHING 
The model has a chi-square value of 49.309 with 28 degrees of freedom, and a 
0.0077 tail probability. Therefore the hypothesis that all betas are equal to zero is 
rejected at the 5% significance level. The pseudo R2 is 15%, while the Nagelkere 
R2 was 24%. The model results are displayed in Table 9.17. 
The model correctly predicts 68% of the cases at the 50% and 36% cut-off points. 
The o bserved frequencies oft hose who a greed to practise smoothing are 3 6%. 
The model has a high prediction accuracy for agreement to smoothing practices 
behaviour when the a priori cut-off point is used (74% prediction accuracy). 
The coefficients associated with the level of research activity (RESACT), the 
dummy variable for EXP3 (10-15 years) and Liberal discipline were significant at 
the 5% significance level. We could not reject the hypothesis that beta is equal to 
zero for all the other variables. 
The greatest tendency for smoothing is among academics who are moderately 
active or quite active in research. The odds ratio for the moderate active shows 
that smoothing is 14 times greater than if he is inactive in research (or 1300% 
higher), although the 95% confidence interval is very broad, between 2.5 and 
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I 'l 81.8. The 12.43 odds ratio for the quite active researchers implies that about 
1243 quite active researchers practise smoothing for every 100 inactive 
researchers who do so. The very active researchers are more than six times more 
likely than the inactive ones to practise smoothing. Unsurprisingly, this 
behaviour is not typical of the inactive researcher who barely has enough research 
capabilities to have such an option. It is the average researcher who aggressively 
smoothes the research output. 
When computed with the mean method, the marginal effect of the research 
activity variables is high, over 50% for the moderate and quite active and 42% for 
the moderate group. But, when calculated at the different points, the marginal 
effects are reduced to around the 20% region. 
1 *1 
The EXP variable reveals some interesting results. New academics (those with 
less than 10 years of experience) are less likely to practise smoothing. However, 
this finding conflicts with the results from the age group classification where 
younger academics are 170% more likely to game than academics who are over 
50 years of age. The marginal effects, at the mean, for EXP1 (less than 10 years 
experience) and aged below 40 are -0.072 and 0.243, respectively. It should be 
noted that these two variables are not significant at the 5% level. The null that 
Ho: ß=0 cannot be rejected. For Age Below 40, the Wald statistic is significant 
only at the 10% level. The difference could be due to respondents who are older 
but have less academic experience, having joined academia later in life. Another 
explanation might be that they do not have PhDs. Typically, a person who joins 
the academic profession without a PhD would start his academic career in his 
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I' mid/late twenties. He would then have over ten years experience and be below 
40 years old. Our results show that an academic without a PhD has an odds ratio 
of 1.1756 and marginal effect of 3.8% at the mean point, but have beta 
coefficients that do not significantly differ from zero. Academics below 50 years 
of age, especially those below 40, and particularly those with 15 to 20 years of 
experience, show a greater tendency to smooth their research output. Academics 
with 15-20 years of experience are five times more likely to practise smoothing 
than those with over 20 years of experience. This experienced group had the 
highest propensity to practise smoothing. This is probably because they are in the 
high-risk category of being asked to retire early. 
The Liberal discipline is the only variable that is significant and has an odds ratio 
II much higher than other disciplines. Academics in Liberal disciplines are over 
200% more likely to practise smoothing than academics in the other disciplines. 
The odds ratio is 3.3434 and the marginal effect, at the mean point, is 29%. This 
is probably due to the nature of published research of the liberal disciplines. 
The Backward Stepwise (LR) method in SPSS is used to arrive at a more 
parsimonious model. The resultant model is in Table 9.18. The improved model 
has a chi-square value of 36.9611, with 10 degrees of freedom. The hypothesis 
that the variables im the equation are all equal to zero is rejected at the 5% 
significance level. The prediction accuracy of 65%, at the a priori cut-off of 
36%, and 67% at the 50% cut-off is not much different from the observed 64% 
for those who claim to disagree to smoothing. 
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1 -0 9.8.4 TIME-CYCLE 
This model has a chi-square value of 56.38, with 28 degrees of freedom, and a 
0.0012 tail probability. Therefore the hypothesis that all betas are equal to zero 
cannot be sustained at the 5% significance level. The pseudo RZ is 16%, while the 
Nagelkere R2 is 27%. The results of the model are displayed in Table 9-19. 
The model correctly predicts 73% of the cases at the 50% cut-off point, and 68% 
at the 41% cut-off. This is an improvement from the 59% of the cases in the no 
agreement category. The model also has a high level of accuracy in predicting 
the agreement with behaviour arising from the time-cycle effect. 
The level of research activity (RESACT) is statistically significant at the 5% 
II significance level. The quite active category provides "positive evidence" 
(Raftery, 1995 grading) for inclusion as a variable in the equation. The dummy 
variable for the very active, however, is not significant. The other variable where 
the Ho: 0=0 is rejected at the 5% level is the dummy for department rating 3b, 
and Age group between 40 - 50 years. The hypothesis that the betas are equal to 
zero for all other variables, at the 5% level, cannot be rejected. 
The highest proclivity for the time-cycle effect is among academics who are 
moderately active or quite active in research. For the moderate active, the odds 
ratio suggests they are eight times or 700% more likely to be affected by time 
cycles than if the academic is inactive in research. The 12.82 odds ratio for the 
quite active means that about 1282 quite active researchers have a time-cycle 
effect for every 100 inactive researchers who do so. The very active researchers 
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1 13 are over three times more likely than the inactive to react to the time-cycle of the 
RAE. 
/ 
The RAE time-cycle has the greatest effect on academics from departments rated 
3b. The results also indicate that the younger the academic, the more likely he 
would agree that his behaviour is influenced by the time-cycle. Those in the age 
group below 40 have an odds ratio of 2.8480 and those between 40-50 an odds 
ratio of 2.1878. 
The variables are removed one at a time based on improvements to the chi-square 
value. The resultant model is shown in Table 9.20. The revised model has a chi- 
square value of 40.382, with 11 degrees of freedom. The hypothesis that the 
1 -1 variables in the equation are -all equal to zero is rejected at the 5% significance 
level. The prediction accuracy of 67% (with 41% cut-off), and 70% (with 50% 
cut-off) is not much different from the original model. Therefore, a simpler 
model based on only the Liberal discipline, RAE Ratings, Age, Research 
Activity, and the constant is possible without compromising the prediction ability. 
9.8.5 ACADEMIC FREEDOM 
The model has a chi-square value of 49.604, with 28 d. f., and a 0.0072 tail 
probability. Therefore, the hypothesis that all betas are equal to zero is rejected at 
the 5% significance level. The pseudo R2 is 16%, while the Nagelkere R2 is 25%. 
The results of the model are displayed in Table 9-15. 
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The model correctly predicts 74% of the cases at the 50% cut-off point and 70% 
at the 30% cut-off point. This is a slight improvement from the 70% of the cases 
in the no agreement category. 
The only variable where the Ho: 0=0 is rejected, at the 5% significance level, is 
the Age group. The odds ratio is 4.1529 for the below 40 years age group and 
2.4975 for the age group category between 40 and 50. The hypothesis that the 
betas are equal to zero for all the other variables (at the 5% significance level) 
cannot be rejected. 
The variables are removed one at a time one, based on improving the chi-square 
value. The final model's summary statistics are in Table 9.16. The improved 
model has a chi-square value of 35.75, with 10 degrees of freedom. The 
hypothesis that the variables in the equation are all equal to zero is rejected at the 
5% significance level. The prediction accuracy of 66% (cut-off at the 30% a 
priori cut-off) and 72%(at 50% cut-off) is not significantly different from the 
initial model. Therefore, with variables such as the RAE Ratings, Age, and 
Research Activity as predictors, and a constant, a simplified model is attained 
without losing prediction ability. 
In the final parsimonious model, the department rating 4 and 3b, as well as age 
are significant at the 5% significance level. Academics in departments rated 3b 
are six times more likely than academics in non-funded departments to adopt 
behaviour infringing on academic freedom. 
11 
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1 *1 9.8.6 MOBILITY 
The model does not fit well. The hypothesis that all betas are equal to zero, at the 
5% significance level, cannot be rejected. The only variable for which the 
coefficient is significantly different from zero, at the 5% significance level, is the 
dummy variable for the Principal Lecturer post. The results are displayed in 
Table 9.21. It seems that the belief in the mobility effect of the RAE does not 
depend on an academic's attributes. The high percentage (83%) of academics 
that agreed to the mobility belief indicates that academics across all attributes 
agree that the RAE has influenced mobility. 
The Backward Stepwise (LR) method is used to remove variables one at a time, 
based on improvements to the chi-square value. The summary results of the 
1' revised model are in Table 9.22. This model has a chi-square value of 18.632, 
with 7 degrees of freedom. The hypothesis that the variables in the equation are 
all equal to zero is rejected at the 5% significance level. The prediction accuracy 
is 64% (cut-off at the 83% a priori cut-off) and 83%(at a 50% cut-off rating). 
The variables that remain in the simplified model are only Post and Research 
Activity, and the constant. The hypothesis that the research activity betas are 
different from zero cannot be rejected. The results indicate that the quite active 
and inactive lecturers have the greatest belief that the RAE has influenced 
mobility. The odds of a lecturer agreeing that the RAE has increased mobility is 
higher by 80% compared to professors or senior lecturers, 87% vis-a-vis principal 
lecturers, and 55% in relation to readers. 
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9.9 DISCUSSION OF THE LOGISTIC REGRESSION RESULTS 
The models test six behavioural outcomes that are predicted to be influenced by 
the RAE. The same explanatory variables are used in estimating the models for 
all the behaviours in order to facilitate the comparisons between the models, and 
in identifying the profile of the academic who is most likely to be influenced by 
the RAE. For each behavioural category in Table 9.23 through Table 9.28, the 
table shows the profile of the academic with the highest probability and lowest 
probability for each institution type5 (ex UGC and ex PCFC) and also for BMS 
UoA for each institution type. 
The matrix in Table 9.30 shows the attributes of academics in the former UGC 
institutions with the highest probability for each behaviour measure. It is the 
1' young Lecturer who is less than 40 years of age, has no PhD, and in a Liberal 
discipline who would be most affected by the RAE. He would be quite active in 
research and most likely to be in a department rated 3a or 3b where the university 
average rating is similar. F or ease in viewing the t able, the attributes t hat are 
different are italicised. There are two caveats to the results. The first caveat is 
that it is unlikely that a lecturer who is less than 40 years old would have more 
than 15 years of academic experience. However, we maintained that combination 
to highlight the highest probability in each variable category. The second caveat 
is that the betas of some of the variables are not significantly different from zero, 
though the models themselves are significant. The exceptions are mobility and 
research fixation that are significant only at the 10% level. The probability 
analysis must take these caveats into consideration. 
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l1) 
TABLE 9-30 
Attribute Gaming Research 
Fixation 
Time 
Cycle 
Smoothing Academic Freedom Mobility 
Discipline Liberal Liberal Liberal Liberal Liberal Other 
Experience 15-20 > 20 15-20 15-20 15-20 15-20 
Dept. rating 3b 3a 3b 3a 3b 4 
Average rating Av. Av. Av. Av. Av. Lower 
Post Lecturer Lecturer Prof. Lecturer Prof. Lecturer 
PhD No No No No Yes Yes 
Age <40 40 - 50 <40 <40 < 40 <40 
Research Active Quite Quite Quite Moderate Quite Inactive 
. The probabilities of various attribute combinations for academics in BMS are 
summarised in Table 9.29 to show the differences in predictability between 
academics with different attributes, and also to aid in the analysis of the effects of 
different combinations on the odds of certain behaviours. The marginal effects 
can be calculated from Table 9.29, at that point. For example, the only difference 
between the first two rows is in the department rating. The first row is a 
department rated 1 or 2 while the second row a department rated 3b. The 
differences in the probability between the two rows are the marginal effects of 
being in a department rated 3b, at that point of reference. The marginal effects 
for the department rated 3b calculated from Table 9.29 are: Gaming (0.22), 
Research Fixation (0.156), Smoothing (0.094), Academic Freedom (0.1344), 
Time Cycle (0.1948), and Mobility (-0.002). The probability can be worked out 
for any combination and the corresponding marginal effects can be calculated. 
5 The principal lecturer post is applicable only at the former PCFC institutions, and they are 
assumed to be research inactive in this study. 
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9.10 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
I7 
Table 9.31 contains the summary of the significant variables for each of the 
models. 
TABLE 9.31 
/ 
Gaming Research 
Fixation 
Time Cycle Smoothing Academic 
Freedom 
Mobility 
AGE: AGE: 
40-50 <40 
Liberal 40 - 50 
Rating 3b Rating 3b 
Prin. 
Senior Lect. Lecturer 
EXP 
(15-20) 
Res. Active: - Res. Active: Res. Active: 
Moderate Moderate Moderate 
Quite Quite Quite 
Very 
Table 9-32 displays the variables in the final simplified model obtained by the 
Backward Stepwise LR method. 
EI 
I7 
II 
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TABLE 9.32 
Gaming Research 
Fixation 
Time Cycle Smoothing Academic 
Freedom 
Mobility 
Science Liberal Liberal 
BMS 
EXP 
RAE Rating RAE Rating 
Av. Rating 
POST POST 
AGE AGE 
Research Research Research Research Research 
Activity Activity Activity Activity Activity 
As can be seen from Table 9.32, research activity is clearly the most significant 
influencing factor. This is not surprising as the RAE measures research output. 
The final model for gaming shows that research activity is the main predictor 
variable. The prediction ability was 70% and 62% only when taken at an a priori 
cut-off. The results show that it is the average researchers who are most likely to 
game, and that the very active researchers would engage in such activities about 
two times more than the inactive ones. The RAE goal-setting has stimulated the 
search for task strategies (Earley et al, 1989; Locke and Latham, 1990), including 
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i 'I the adoption of dysfunctional strategy plans. The perceived level of goal 
difficulty influences the behavidural response. 
/ 
As mentioned earlier, the gaming measure incorporates the time-cycle effect, 
smoothing and academic freedom. The smoothing construct refers to the timing 
for the release of publications. The final equation for smoothing has a prediction 
accuracy of 67%. The average researchers are 12 or 13 times more likely than the 
inactive ones to smooth their output. The high odds ratio is due to the 
presumably almost non-existence of smoothing practices among the inactive. 
Examining the relative odds ratios for the average and very active researchers, the 
average ones are more likely to practise smoothing twice more than the very 
active staff, while for the gaming model, the odds ratios are almost three as to 
II one. This provides evidence of the four paper effect on the middle-tier 
academics. 
There seems to be a (qualified) linear relationship between smoothing practices 
and experience. Smoothing practices increase with experience, but drastically 
decrease for academics who have over 20 years of experience. These academics 
are presumably nearing retirement, and hence, generally have less drive to 
strategically schedule their publications. The more experienced academics are 
under more pressure to publish. The disciplines that staff belong to affect 
smoothing and this is the most apparent in the cases of the Liberal and BMS 
disciplines. 
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I 'V The other factors that influence gaming are the choice of research topic (academic 
freedom) and the time-cycle effect. Apart from the research activity level, the 
RAE rating and staff age are significant explanatory variables in the final model 
for both. The younger the academic, the greater the likelihood that he would be 
swayed by external factors when choosing research topics. Furthermore, his 
behaviour is also more liable to be influenced by the time-cycle. This is 
understandable, as older academics would have established their specialisation of 
research. A worrying possibility in this development is that policy makers 
through the RAE could determine the academic's choice of topic thus stifling any 
form of creativity or initiative. These concerns have been addressed in Chapter 
Eight. The scholars who are the most reactive would probably be in departments 
rated 3b since they exhibit an odds ratio of 6.01. This is also true for the time- 
cycle construct where the odds ratio for departments with a rating of 3b is 4.43. 
The consequence of the four paper effect is thus extended from the middle-tier 
academics to the middle-tier departments. 
The final model for research fixation shows that academics in higher positions 
exhibit a lower degree of this feature. Lecturers concentrate on research at 
expense of other activities, presumably because of the belief that it improves their 
career prospects. The final model for mobility belief confirms that lecturers 
would concur that the RAE influences mobility and pay. The younger academics 
focus on research and develop strategies, not only the functional but also the 
dysfunctional strategies, in order to enhance their research. 
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I's In conclusion, the RAE seems to have the greatest impact on the behaviours of 
the average or middle-tier academic. The major variables influencing behaviour 
are the level of self-assessed research activity, age, and RAE ratings. Despite the 11 
survey evidence that the RAE has been responsible for influencing many aspects 
of academic life, it is noted that these behaviours could also be due to other 
sources besides the RAE. Nevertheless, the purpose of the survey is to pin down 
the behaviours that the RAE is most likely to induce. 
1 110 
Appendix 9-A 
IA 
Units of Assessment in each classification. 
Frequency 
I10 
1. 
2. 
3. 
Science classification: 
Academics in the following Unis of Assessment were grouped under 
"Science": 
UoA No. UoA title 
1 Clinical Laboratory Science 
2 Community Based Clinical Subjects 
3 Hospital based clinical subjects 
4 Clinical Dentistry 
5 Pre-clinical studies 
6 Anatomy 
7 Physiology 
8 Pharmacology 
9 Pharmacy 
10 Nursing 
11 Other studies and professions Allied to Medicine 
12 Biochemistryt 
13 Psychology 
14 Biological Sciences 
15 Agriculture 
16 Food Science and technology 
17 Veterniary Science 
18 Chemistry 
20 Earth Sciences 
21 Environment Sciences 
25 
Physics. 21 
19. Physics 
ENGN (Engineering) 40 
25. Computer Science 
26. General Engineering 
27. Chemical Engineering 
28. Civil Engineering 
29. Electrical and Electronic Engineering 
30. Mechanical, Aeronautical and Manufacturing Engineering 
31. Mineral and Mining Engineering 
32. Metallurgy and Materials 
11% 
In 
N) 
4. BMS (Business and Management Studies) 
43. Business and Management Studies. 
Appendix 9-A 
53 
20 5. Liberal 
6. 
7. 
8. 
45 American studies 
46 Middle Eastern and African studies 
47 Asian Studies 
48 European Studies 
49 Celtic Studies 
50 English Language and literature 
51 French 
52 German, Dutch and Scandinavian languages 
53 Italian 
54 Russian, Slavonic and East European languages 
55 Iberian and Latin American languages 
56 Linguistics 
57 Classics, Ancient History, Byzantine and Modern Greek studies 
58 Archaeology 
59 History 
60 History of Art, Architecture and Design 
61 Library and Information management 
62 Philosophy 
63 Theology, Divinity and Religious studies 
EDUC (Education) 
68 Education 
BUZ (Business Related) 
24 Statistics and Operational Research 
38 Economics and Econometrics 
40 Social policy and Administration 
44 Accountancy 
Other (All other disciplines) 
22 Pure Mathematics 
23 Applied Mathematics 
33 Built Environment 
34 Town and Country Planning 
35 Geography 
36 Law 
37 Anthropology 
12 
26 
44 
Appendix 9-A 
41 Social work 
42 Sociology 
64 Art and Design 
65 Communications, Cultural and Media studies 
66 Drama, dance and performing Arts 
67 Music 
69 Sports related Subjects. 
VO 

ANOVA Results 
1 11,; 
Question UoA Exp. Inclusion Dept Rating Inst type Post Qualification Age Res. Activity 
df 40 4 4 6 1 5 3 3 4 
1 1.844 4.641 2.434 4.058 4.204 5.339 
2 4.57 2.522 4.448 4.719 4.789 
3 2.791 2.818 
4 5.687 
5 7.044 
6 1.581 5.288 4.496 7.232 
7 6.374 9.202 2.781 3.834 
8 2.965 2.673 5.02 
9 3.247 
10 2.907 5.312 2.623' 5.625 
11 2.370"" 
12 2.556 2.080" 7.853 2.948 
13 2.504 4.234 7.076 
14 
15 
16 2.963 6.242 
17 2.621 2.507"' 3.139 2.815 
18 
19 1.704 3.607 4.341 
20 3.612 5.455 
21 2.803 5.727 
22 2.618 3.895 
23 2.184 3.861 6.449 
24 5.526 
25 1.998 3.865 
26 1.65 2.393* 5.46 
27 1.704 2.861 3.283 
28 3.542 2.985 
29 4.373 4.602 4.51 
30 2.217 
. 
2.853 
31 2.597 3.062 4.879 2.622 
32 1.678 3.277 
NOTE 
All F ratios displayed are significant at the 5% level, unless Indicated otherwise 
F ratios not significant at 5% level are not dis la ed. 
' 5.1% Sinificance 
5.6% Significance 
" 5.9% significance 
"" 5.3% significance 
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CATREG: Model Coefficients 
Gaming Academi Time Research Smoothing Mobili 
freedom cycle fixation 
Experience beta -0.107 -0.0895 -0.121 -0.103 -0.118 0.0939 
SE 0.083 0.08 0.078 0.072 0.082 1 0.074 
F 1.654 1.256 2.425 2.041 2.082 1.608 
importance -0.087 -0.061 -0.082 0.019 -0.087 0.128 
Dept rating beta -0.213 -0.203 -0.255 -0.207 -0.181 -0.173 
SE 0.081 0.071 0.069 0.069 0.072 0.063 
F 6.981 8.268 13.739 8.912 6.412 7.512 
importance 0.303 0.321 0.377 0.197 0.312 0.277 
Research Activity beta 0.083 0.186 -0.167 -0.207 -0.142 0.222 
SE 0.067 0.065 0.068 0.071 0.069 0.065 
F 1.566 8.195 5.975 8.504 4.203 11.526 
importance 0.088 0.298 0.191 0.279 0.167 0.377 
Age group beta 0.171 0.229 0.198 0.0424 0.126 0.16 
SE 0.078 0.075 0.074 0.073 0.079 0.073 
F 4.76 9.423 7.057 0.335 2.58 4.7591 
importance 0.282 0.378 0.309 0.021 0.182 0.242 
Submission beta 0.119 0.11 0.0069 0.0549 0.0239 0.0275 
SE 0.066 0.064 0.071 0.073 0.072 0.064 
F 3.263 2.949 0.0095 0.562 0.109 0.183 
importance 0.04 0.023 -0.001 0.043 0.004 0.024 
PhD beta 0.0802 0.0106 0.0229 -0.164 0.0343 0.0379 
SE 0.062 0.06 0.061 0.062 0.062 0.061 
F 1.665 0.076 0.143 6.923 0.305 0.388 
importance 0.057 0.002 -0.005 0.131 0.013 0.009 
1 
Perm beta -0.0373 0.0106 0.02066 0.0586 -0.0199 0.00062 
SE 0.06 0.058 0.058 0.059 0.059 0.059 
F 0.383 0.033 0.128 0.995 0.115 0.00011 
importance -0.001 0.004 -0.003 -0.004 -0.002 0 
Post beta -0.179 -0.0552 -0.168 -0.202 -0.201 0.068 
SE 0.075 0.07 0.064 0.067 0.066 0.067 
F 5.74 0.618 6.656 9.052 9.336 1.046 
importance 0.331 0.062 0.221 0.249 0.43 -0.033 
Inst. Type beta -0.05117 0.0849 -0.115 -0.142 -0.0379 -0.0612 
SE 0.082 0.072 0.071 0.072 0.072 0.066 
F 0.393 1.376 2.633 3.888 0.277 0.87 
importance -0.012 -0.023 -0.006 0.065 -0.019 -0.023 
Table 9-4 
CATREG: Correlation Results 
Correlation Gamin Academi Time Researc Smooths Mobili 
freedom cycle fixation 
Experience zero-order 0.088 0.074 0.083 -0.023 0.064 0.161 
partial -0.079 -0.068 -0.094 -0.087 -0.087 0.078 
part -0.075 -0.064 -0.088 -0.082 -0.083 0.073 
importance -0.087 -0.061 -0.082 0.019 -0.087 0.128 
Dept rating zero-order -0.154 -0.171 -0.181 -0.118 -0.15 -0.189 
partial -0.162 -0.172 -0.219 -0.18 -0.151 -0.167 
part -0.155 -0.165 -0.21 -0.172 -0.146 -0.159 
Importance 0.303 0.321 0.377 0.197 0.312 0.277 
Research Activity zero-order 0.115 0.173 -0.14 -0.167 -0.102 0.2 
partial 0.077 0.183 -0.146 -0.176 -0.123 0.205 
part 0.073 0.176 -0.138 -0.168 -0.118 0.197 
Importance 0.088 0.298 0.191 0.279 0.167 0.377 
Age group zero-order 0.179 0.178 0.192 0.062 0.125 0.179 
partial 0.134 0.183 0.158 0.036 0.097 0.133 
part 0.128 0.176 0.15 0.033 0.093 0.126 
importance 0.282 0.378 0.309 0.021 0.182 0.242 
Submission zero-order 0.037 0.023 -0.023 0.097 0.015 -0.102 
partial 0.111 0.104 0.006 0.046 0.02 -0.026 
part 0.106 0.099 0.006 0.043 0.019 -0.025 
Importance 0.04 0.023 -0.001 0.043 0.004 0.024 
PhD zero-order 0.077 0.016 0.024 -0.099 0.034 0.027 
partial 0.08 0.017 -0.023 -0.16 0.033 0.038 
part 0.076 0.016 -0.021 -0.151 0.032 0.036 
importance 0.057 0.002 -0.005 0.131 0.013 0.009 
Perm zero-order 0.004 0.037 0.017 -0.009 0.009 0.026 
partial -0.038 0.011 -0.022 0.061 -0.02 0.001 
part -0.036 0.01 -0.02 0.057 -0.02 0.001 
Importance -0.001 0.004 -0.003 -0.004 -0.002 0 
Post zero-order -0.201 -0.121 -0.164 -0.153 -0.187 -0.058 
partial -0.147 -0.048 -0.154 -0.182 -0.182 0.063 
part -0.14 -0.045 -0.146 -0.173 -0.176 0.059 
Importance 0.331 0.062 0.221 0.249 0.43 -0.033 
Inst. Type zero-order 0.025 0.029 0.007 -0.0571 0.045 0.044 
partial -0.039 -0.071 -0.098 -0.12 -0.032 -0.057 
part -0.037 . -0.067 -0.092 -0.113 -0.03 -0.054 
importance -0.012 -0.023 -0.006 0.065 -0.019 -0.023 
Table 9-5 
r OD lf) Q) N- In CO' Q) r 
CO M A O O QO LO 'ci M 
't En CO LO N- OO O) (D U') 
Ö O O O O O 
Ö Ö Ö Ö 
in 
E 1 
, º- N IRt OD (0 N En 0) OD OD > 0 r ti CO N r 0 N- LU N 
U) co co N- t0 00 (3) C) r- r- 
ß Ö Ö O Ö Ö Ö Ö Ö Ö 
co 
N- Q) It C'r) OD 00 co I, - U') -* CO Er) OD Q) I M N 
Ö Ö 
C) 
co Ö O C l 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
d 
0 
CU 
C1 m E 
(D l) r .* CO LO r 11 r O 6 M (D co I-- 't 
0 Cý 0 CR CR 0 1l (D 0 
CO 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
E 
(L) 
= F- (1) Q 
0) co U 0) 0) U) (D 0) N 
N- lzr - C') N- (0 0) N N 0 U) (0 LU CO a) d CO to Ö Ö O O O O 0 0 
em Ö X 
w - 
LL m CU 
t 
E 
IT 
l 
Ln ( (0 U') r l\ M 'q i 
Cc 
0 C ) 
(D 
CO 
(O 
U) 
tP 
r 
(O 
r 
CD 
lf) 
(0 
lf) 
O 
V) 
I-: 
CO 
0 
d) L. C 0 0 0 Ö O O O O 
w a) so 
oc a 
F- a) -T cr) (o oo (o i- Lo t- Iq co LO CF) 00 0) qzr CV) 
° ý ý 0 0 0 
. 0 m i 
0 
>i 
C 
0 
N 
' 
U*) IT O) C") 
r 
co C") co) IT 
U s 
C ) 
ln 
N- 
cD 
co 
CD 
N- 
ln 
C ) 
cD 
(O 
ao 
CO 
rn 
I- 
lý 
(D 
ý 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
E a: L I 
1- < 
N r N Co d' CO (fl Q> d' 
r- LO LO N O OD C) -t ln 
G 
In 
Ö 
CO 
Ö 
U) 
Ö 
N- 
Ö 
OR 
Ö 
0 CD 
Ö 
0 
p 
Ö 
a °' 
2) 
L 
LL C ý CO ý T Ö (O O 
V E En 
( O 
D d 
Q ) 
U) OD 
Ö 
O O 
( O 
t0 00 
N 
E 0 O 
Ö Ö Ö Ö Ö Ö Ö 
d co 
-a C 
cri 
0 F- Q Q 
In Lo C') N Lo r C7 @7 
CO LO LO r ý M ý 
d ý O o i O t D 
C i 
I 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
C 0 i f E 
OD 11 O N CO C) (O In 
Q) O (D N N- LO O) 00 I r r 
C y 't to 1- to N- OD C) CO l[) 
O O O O O Ö O Q O 
N 
U 
a C 
C Ü 7 4) G) 
L 
ca. x CL O U) (D a) (m n 7 .C 4) O 
W 0 C < l U) CL 17.. a.. 
cs 
CD 
CATREG: Quantification of categorical variables. 
Gaming Academic Time Researc Smoothing Mobili 
Freedom Cycle fixation 
strong agreement . -1.553 -1.696 -1.289 -2.071 -1.465 -0.556 
moderate agreement -0.675 -1.134 -0.643 -0.119 -0.855 -0.217 
weak disagreement -0.675 -0.167 -0.483 -0.104 -0.197 1.322 
strong disagreement 1.191 1.05 1.253 1.21 1.209 4.353 
Experience (ordinal) less than 10 years -1.487 -1.387 -1.668 -0.848 -1.421 -0.86 
10 -15 years -0.453 -0.723 -0.043 -0.848 -0.676 -0.86 
15 -20 years 0.847 0.867 0.749 -0.848 0.86 -0.86 
over 20 years 0.847 0.867 0.749 1.18 0.86 1.163 
Department rating (ordinal) 5* -1.269 -1.652 -1.573 -1.921 -1.379 -1.719 
5 -1.014 -1.416 -1.513 -1.174 -1.379 -1.719 
4 -0.679 0.104 0.129 -0.316 -0.45 0.582 
3a 0.412 0.104 0.129 0.932 0.945 0.582 
3b 1.417 1.295 1.261 0.932 1.039 0.582 
land 1 1.417 1.295 1.261 0.932 1.039 0.582 
Research Activity (ordinal) not active -0.915 -0.908 -3.287 -3.274 -3.29 -0.908 
moderate active -0.915 -0.908 0.202 0.021 0.252 -0.882 
quite active -0.915 -0.908 0.334 0.384 0.319 -0.882 
ve active 1.093 1.101 0.334 0.384 0.319 1.129 
Age group ordinal below 40 -1.38 -1.297 -1.517 -1.578 -1.628 -1.258 
40-50 -0.287 -0.393 -0.115 -0.04 0.068 -0.375 
over 50 1.139 1.17 1.061 1.021 0.956 1.217 
Submission in RAE (nominal) YES -0.354 -0.352 0.363 -0.376 0.363 -0.364 
NO 2.828 2.84 -2.758 2.662 -2.758 2.744 
PhD (nominal) YES - -0.62 -0.614 -0.615 -0.629 -0.615 -0.61 
NO 1.612 1.628 1.625 1.589 1.625 1.64 
Permanent position YES -5.099 -4.954 -4.982 5.148 -4.982 -4.88 
(nominal) NO 0.196 0.202 0.201 -0.194 0.201 0.205 
Post (ordinal) professor -1.279 -1.428 -1.518 -1.649 -1.515 -1.45 
reader -0.995 -1.328 -1.245 -0.079 -1.304 -1.45 
principal lecturer 0.037 0.426 0.535 0.19 0.637 0.69 
senior lecturer 0.037 0.426 0.535 0.19 0.637 0.69 
lecturer . 1.417 1.044 0.901 1.191 0.76 0.69 
Inst. Type (nominal) Old -1.627 -1.657 -1.654 -1.618 -1.654 -1.655 
New 0.614 0.603 0.604 0.618 0.604 0.604 
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VALIDITY. AND RELIABILITY OF MEASURE CONSTRUCTS 
FACTOF loading 
Q No 
RESEARCH FXATION MEASURE Cronbach Alpha coefficient 0.7808 
5 4 0.701 
6 4 0.719 
8 4 0.732 
2 2 0.718 factor 4 loading was 0.285 
26 HIGHEST WAS 0.452 IN FACOR 1 
4 8 0.557 factor 4 loading was 0.384 
MOBILITY Cronbach Alpha coefficient 0.4921 
29 3 0.805 
30 3 0.801 
31 5 0.513 factor 3 loading was insignificant 
25 6 -0.675 factor 3 loading was -0.310 
GAMING Cronbach Alpha coefficient 0.8877 
17 1 0.747 
18 1 0.597 
19 - 1 0.805 
20 1 0.811 
21 1 0.795 
22 1 0.75 
13 1 0.494 
14 1 0.317 HOWEVER highest was 0.487 for factor 5 
16 5 0.52 
TIME-CYCLE EFFECT Cronbach Alpha coefficient 0.8958 
17 1 0.747 
18 1 0.597 
19 1 0.805 
20 1 0.811 
21 1 0.795 
22 1 0.75 
SMOOTHING Cronbach Alpha coefficient 0.7964 
17 1 0.747 
18 1 0.597 
22 1 0.75 
ACADEMIC FREEDOM Cronbach Alpha coefficient 0.8586 
13 1 0.494 
14 1 0.317 HOWEVER highest was 0.487 for factor 5 
17 1 0.747 
19 1 0.805 
20 1 0.811 
21 1 0.795 
TABLE 9-10 
Odds ratios and Marginal effect. 
i7 
1 1) 
-I 
GAMING B SE Wald odds ratio 95% Cl for odds ratio Marginal effect Marginal effect 
lower upper Est Actual REF CAT 
SCIENCE -0.478 0.669 0.5138 0.6200 0.1678 2.2912 -0.1129 -0.0901 -0.0160 
PHYSICS -0.3261 0.6785 0.2309 0.7217 0.1909 2.7287 -0.0794 -0.0638 -0.0117 
ENGN -0.3282 0.5741 0.3268 0.7202 0.2338 2.219 -0.0799 "0.0641 -0.0118 
BMS -0.2377 0.5416 0.1927 0.7884 0.2728 2.2789 -0.0586 -0.0474 -0.0089 
LIBERAL 0.5123 0.6299 0.6614 1.6691 0.4856 5.7363 0.1200 0.1170 0.0270 
EDUC -1.5597 0.9262 2.8355" 0.2102 0.0342 1.2914 -0.2239 -0.2174 -0.0340 
BUZ -1.2132 0.6978 3.0233" 0.2972 0.0757 1.1669 -0.2143 -0.1870 -0.0301 
EXP 1 -0.1208 0.6231 0.0376 0.8862 0.2613 3.0054 -0.0301 -0.0247 -0.0047 
EXP2 0.36&1 0.5331 0.4767 1.4450 0.5082 4.1084 0.0890 0.0824 0.0181 
EXP 3 0.8566 0.5152 2.7644" :. 3551 0.858 6.4643 0.1792 0.2023 0.0532 
RATING 5* 0.5773 1.2027 0.2304 1.7812 0.1686 18.8124 0.1329 0.1329 0.0314 
RATING 5 1.2332 1.1224 1.2073 3.4322 0.3804 30.9721 0.2155 0.2953 0.0914 
RATING 4 0.912 0.9117 1.007 2.4893 0.4169 14.8623 0.1865 0.2162 0.0581 
RATING 3A 0.7829 0.7952 0.9695 2.1878 0.4604 10.3966 0.1686 0.1839 0.0469 
RATING 3B 1.554 0.7607 4.1728* 4.7304 1.065 21.0089 0.2239 0.3697 0.1333 
AVR-HIGHER -0.9869 0.5056 3.8099" 0.3727 0.1384 1.0041 -0.1952 -0.1623 -0.0268 AVR-LOWER -0.5044 0.5067 0.991 0.6039 0.2237 1.6302 -0.1184 -0.0944 -0.0167 
EX UFC UNIVERSITY 0.3207 0.6924 0.2146 1.3781 0.3547 5.3542 0.0781 0.0713 0.0154 
PROFESSOR -0.1947 0.5962 0.1067 0.8231 0.2558 2.648 -0.0482 -0.0392 -0.0074 
READER -0.7328 0.7032 1.0858 0.4806 0.1211 1.907 -0.1607 -0.1292 -0.0221 
PRINCIPAL LECTURER 0.1489 0.8182 0.0331 1.1606 0.2335 5.7694 0.0370 0.0322 0.0066 
SENIOR LECTURER -0.4674 0.4864 0.9236 0.6266 0.2415 1.6255 -0.1107 -0.0883 -0.0158 
NO PHD QUALIFICATION 0.3602 0.4519 0.6351 1.4336 0.5912 3.4762 0.0872 0.0806 -0.3273 
AGE BELOW 40 0.6968 0.5865 1.4113 2.0073 0.6358 6.3365 0.1547 0.1624 0.0401 
AGEBETWEEN 40 AND 50 0.6725 0.421 2.5524 1.9591 0.8585 4.471 0.1505 0.1564 0.0382 
RESEARCHAC77VITY 
MODERATE 1.8048 0.9037 3.9887' 6.0788 1.0342 35.7308 0.2189 0.4226 0.1728 
QUITE ACTIVE 2.2701 0.9267 6.0015" 9.6804 1.5745 59.5225 0.1926 0.5058 0.2618 
VERY ACTIVE 0.725 0.918 0.6238` 2.0647 0.3416 12.4808 0.1554 0.1695 0.0423 
CONSTANT -3.0926 1.2141 6.4886* 
Initial -2 log likelihood 292.2001 
-2 log likelihood with variables 246.696 
Model chi square statistic 45.504 
df 28 
significance 0.0196 
Pseudo R^2 0.1557 
Aldrich And Nelson RA2 0.1888 
Cox & Snell R"2 0.1720 
Nagelkerke RA2 0.2450 
Weld (all df=1) 
" significant at 5% level 
"" significant at 10% level 
Prediction Acurracy(50% cut-off) 
Overall 74.69% 
No gaming 91.18% 
Gaming 35.21% 
Prediction Acurracy(30% cut-oft) 
Overall 69.71% 
No gaming 68.82% 
Gaming 71.83% 
TABLE 9-11 
GAMING Parsimonous Model 
B SE Wald* odds ratio 95% CI for odds ratio 
lower Upper 
LEVEL OF RESEARCH ACTIVITY: 
MODERATE 1.6256 0.8038 4.0900 5.0816 1.0515 24.5590 
QUITE ACTIVE 1.8851 0.7879 5.7252 6.5873 1.4063 30.8556 
VERYACTIVE 0.8061 0.7824 1.0613 2.2391 0.4830 10.3771 
Constant -2.1365 0.7465 8.1913 
Initial -2 log likelihood 276.822 
-2 log likelihood with variables 261.444 
Model chi square statistic 15.378 
df 3 
significance 0.0015 
Cox & Snell R^2 0.062 
Nagelkerke RA2 0.088 
Wald (all df=1) 
' All significant at 5% level 
Prediction Acurracy(50% cut-off) 
Overall 70.54% 
No Gaming 100.00% 
Gaming 0.00% 
Prediction Acurracy(30% cut-off) 
Overall 62.24% 
No Gaming 61.18% 
Gaming 64.79% 
ýÄ 
1 
,I 
TABLE 9-12 
Odds Ratios and marginal effect 
RESEARCH FIXATION B SE Waid Odds Ratio 95% Cl for odds ratio Marginal effect Marginal of 
lower upper Est Actual REF CAT 
SCIENCE -1.1584 0.6284 3.398" 0.3140 0.0916 1.0760 -0.2107 -0.2309 -0.2222 
PHYSICS -0.9558 0.6521 2.1486 
1 0.3845 0.1071 1.3802 -0.1917 -0.1991 -0.1922 
ENGN -0.1527 0.4964 0.0946 0.8584 0.3245 2.2710 -0.0380 -0.0364 -0.0356 
BMS -0.8127 0.4933 2.7144** 0.4437 0.1687 1.1666 -0.1730 -0.1744 -0.1686 
LIBERAL 0.1972 0.5770 0.1168 1.2180 0.3931 3.7736 0.0488 0.0484 0.0477 
EDUC -1.2347 0.7822 2.4920 0.2909 0.0628 1.3475 -0.2155 -0.2418 -0.2325 
BUZ -0.8571 0.5737 2.2319 0.4244 0.1379 1.3065 -0.1793 -0.1823 -0.1761 
EXP 1 -0.1993 0.5560 0.1285 0.8193 0.2755 2.4364 -0.0493 -0.0472 -0.0462 
EXP2 -0.6133 0.4891 1.5720 0.5416 0.2076 1.4126 -0.1398 -0.1J66 -0.1325 
EXP 3 -0.2373 0.4621 0.2638 0.7888 0.3189 1.9510 -0.0585 -0.0560 -0.0547 
RATING 5* 0.2948 1.0339 0.0813 1.3429 0.1770 10.1873 0.0721 0.0727 0.0719 
RATING 5 0.7231 0.9545 0.5740 2.0608 0.3174 13.3812 0.1591 0.1788 0.1785 
RATING 4 -0.1130 0.8148 0.0192 0.8932 0.1809 4.4106 -0.0282 -0.0270 -0.0265 
RATING 3A 1.1180 0.6889 2.6333 3.0587 0.7927 11.8018 0.2076 0.2700 0.2717 
RATING 3B 0.7044 0.6880 1.0481 2.0226 0.5251 7.7906 0.1559 0.1743 0.1739 
AVR-HIGHER -0.7228 0.4423 2.6710 0.4854 0.2040 1.1549 -0.1590 -0.1578 -0.1528 
AVR-LOWER -0.5234 0.4883 1.1493 0.5925 0.2275 1.5427 -0.1223 -0.1184 -0.1150 
EX UFC UNIVERSITY 0.6197 0.6139 1.0190 1.8584 0.5579 6.1897 0.1410 0.1536 0.1529 
PROFESSOR -0.8306 0.5481 2.2967 0.4358 0.1488 1.2758 -0.1756 -0.1776 -0.1716 
READER -1.1677 0.6251 3.4896** 0.3111 0.0914 1.0591 -0.2113 -0.2323 -0.2234 
PRINCIPAL LECTURER -0.3173 0.7270 0.1905 0.7281 0.1752 3.0270 -0.0774 -0.0740 -0.0722 
SENIOR LECTURER -0.9601 0.4428 4.7006' 0.3829 0.1607 0.9120 -0.1922 -0.1999 -0.1928 
NO PHD QUALIFICATION 0.0238 0.4043 0.0035 1.0241 0.4637 2.2617 0.0059 0.0058 0.0057 
AGE BELOW 40 0.1195 0.5501 0.0472 1.1269 0.3834 3.3122 0.0298 0.0292 0.0287 
AGEBETWEEN 40 AND 50 0.3568 0.3708 0.9259 1.4288 0.6908 2.9550 0.0864 0.0882 0.0873 
RESEARCH ACTIVITY: 
MODERATE 0.8491 0.6581 1.6649 2.3375 0.6436 8.4902 0.1782 0.2090 0.2091 
QUITE ACTIVE 1.0898 0.6640 2.6935 2.9737 0.8092 10.9279 0.2052 0.2639 0.2654 
VERY ACTIVE 0.5662 0.6522 0.7536 1.7616 0.4906 6.3249 0.1308 0.1404 0.1396 
CONSTANT -0.4539 0.9937 0.2086 
Prediction Acurracy(50% cut-off) 
Initial -2 log likelihood 332.3759 
-2 log likelihood with variable: 292.541 Overall 65.85% 
Model chi square statistic 39.835 No agreement 80.14% 
df 28 Agreement 45.00% 
significance 0.0684 
Pseudo RA2 0.1198 
Aldrich And Nelson RA2 0.1619 
Cox & Snell RA2 0.1490 Prediction Acurracy(41% cut-off) 
Nagelkerke RA2 0.2020 
Overall 63.41% 
Wald (all df=1) No agreement 63.70% 
' significant at 5% level Agreement 63.00% 
significant at 10% level 
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Odds ratios and marginal effect 
ACADEMIC FREEDOM B SE Wald odds ratio 95% Cl for odds ratio Marginal effect Marginal effect 
lower upper Est Actual REF CAT 
SCIENCE 
PHYSICS 
ENGN 
BMS 
LIBERAL 
EDUC 
BUZ 
EXP 1 
EXP2 
EXP 3 
RATING 5* 
RATING 5 
RATING 4 
RATING 3A 
RATING 3B 
AVR-HIGHER 
AVR-LOWER 
EX UFC UNIVERSITY 
PROFESSOR 
READER 
PRINCIPAL LECTURER 
SENIOR LECTURER 
NO PHD QUALIFICATION 
AGE BELOW 40 
AGEBETWEEN 40 AND 50 
RESEARCH ACTIVITY 
MODERATE 
QUITE ACTIVE 
VERY ACTIVE 
CONSTANT 
Initial -2 log likelihood 
-2 log likelihood with variables 
Model chi square statistic 
df 
significance 
Pseudo RA2 
Aldrich And Nelson RA2 
Cox & Snell RA2 
Nagelkerke RA2 
Wald (all df=11 
" significant at 5% level 
significant at 10% level 
-0.8226 0.6358 1.6739 0.4393 0.1263 1.5274 -0.1744 -0.1416 -00352 
-0.9971 0.6832 2.1299 0.3689 0.0967 1.4077 -0.1963 -0.1635 -0.0399 
-0.5413 0.5609 0.9315 0.5820 0.1938 1.7472 -0.1259 -0.1004 -0.0260 
-0.2938 0.5332 0.3035 0.7454 0.2621 2.1199 -0.0719 -0.0579 -0.0157 
0.1596 0.6147 0.0674 1.1730 0.3516 3.9130 0.0396 0.0345 0.0104 
-1.0057 0.8353 1.4493 0.3658 0.0712 1.8806 -0.1972 -0.1645 -0.0401 
-1.2188 0.6468 3.5503" 0.2956 0.0832 1.0502 -0.2146 -0.1876 -0.0447 
-0.2783 0.6079 0.2096 0.7571 0.2300 2.4922 -0.0682 -0.0550 -0.0150 
-0.1004 0.5264 0.0364 0.9045 0.3223 2.5380 -0.0250 -0.0207 -0.0058 
0.5233 0.5034 1.0806 1.6876 0.6292 4.5266 0.1223 0.1197 0.0399 
-0.8032 1.1429 0.4939 0.4479 0.0477 4.2070 -0.1716 -0.1390 -0.0347 
-0.2365 1.0333 0.0524 0.7894 0.1042 5.9823 -0.0583 -0.0472 -0.0129 
0.5082 0.8478 0.3594 1.6623 0.3156 8.7567 0.1192 0.1160 0.0385 
0.5564 0.7535 0.5454 1.7444 0.3984 7.6388 0.1289 0.1278 0.0430 
1.4312 0.7450 3.6906" 4.1837 0.9715 18.0193 0.2228 0.3420 0.1599 
-0.3018 0.4680 0.4158 0.7395 0.2955 1.8505 -0.0738 -0.0593 -0.0161 
-0.425 0.4804 0.7827 0.6538 0.2550 1.6763 -0.1016 -0.0811 -0.0215 
1.0168 0.6600 2.3738 2.7643 0.7583 10.0774 0.1984 0.2423 0.0959 
0.2192 0.5722 0.1467 1.2451 0.4056 3.8216 0.0541 0.0479 0.0146 
-0.1985 0.6383 0.0967 0.8200 0.2347 2.8650 -0.0491 -0.0400 -0.0110 
0.6165 0.8089 0.5808 1.8524 0.3795 9.0433 0.1404 0.1426 0.0489 
-0.1306 0.4663 0.0784 0.8776 0.3519 2.1889 -0.0325 -0.0267 -0.0075 
-0.0465 0.4460 0.0109 0.9546 0.3983 2.2878 -0.0116 -0.0097 -0.0037 
1.4238 0.5966 5.6959' 4.1529 1.2899 13.3714 0.2227 0.3403 0.1586 
0.9153 0.4168 4.8225' 2.4975 1.1034 5.6532 0.1869 0.2170 0.0827 
1.0185 0.7677 1.7603 2.7690 0.6150 12.4676 0.1985 0.2427 0.0961 
1.474 0.7816 3.5564" 4.3667 0.9437 20.2043 0.2235 0.3517 0.1674 
-0.0962 0.7828 0.0151 0.9083 0.1959 4.2130 -0.0240 -0.0198 -0.0056 
-2.6699 1.1315 5.5676' 
Prediction Acurracy(50% cut-off) 
307.1078 
257.504 Overall 74.40% 
49.604 No agreement 89.66% 
28 Agreement 39.47% 
0.0072 
0.1615 
0.1984 
0.1800 Prediction Acurracy(30% cut-off) 
0.2540 
Overall 70.00% 
No agreement 69.54% 
Agreement 71.05% 
TABLE 9-15 
ACADEMIC FREEDOM Parsimonous model (Backward LR) 
B SE Wald odds ratio 95% CI for odds ratio 
lower upper 
RAE RATING: 
RATING 5* 0.1501 0.7722 0.0378 1.1619 0.2558 5.2780 
RATING 5 0.4170 0.6717 0.3853 1.5173 0.4068 5.6602 
RATING 4 1.2315 0.5962 4.2657* 3.4262 1.0649 11.0240 
RATING 3A 0.9540 0.6060 2.4786 2.5962 0.7916 8.5142 
RATING 3B 1.7936 0.6435 7.7699* 6.0112 1.7031 21.2169 
AGE: 
BELOW 40 1.0360 0.3955 6.8626* 2.8180 1.2981 6.1176 
BETWEEN 40 AND 50 0.7443 0.3611 4.2486* 2.1049 1.0372 4.2714 
LEVEL OF RESEARCH ACTIVITY: 
MODERATE 0.9273 0.7225 1.6474 2.5277 0.6134 10.4160 
QUITE ACTIVE 1.2809 0.7108 3.2473** 3.6000 0.8938 14.4996 
VERY ACTIVE 0.0804 0.7067 0.0129 1.0837 0.2712 4.3302 
CONSTANT -2.9188 0.8148 12.8337* 
Prediction Acurracy(50% cut-off) 
Initial -2 log likelihood 307.1078 
-2 log likelihood with variables 271.357 Overall 72.00% 
Model chi square statistic 35.75 No agreement 92.53% 
df 10 Agreement 25.00% 
significance 0.0001 
Cox & Snell RA2 0.133 Prediction Acurracy(30% cut-off) 
Nagelkerke RA2 0.188 
Overall 66.40% 
Wald (all df=1) No agreement 66.67% 
' significant at 5% level Agreement 65.79% 
significant at 10% love 
ý1 
TABLE 9-16 
Odds ratios and marginal effect 
SMOOTHING B SE Wald odds ratio 95% CI for odds ratio Marginal effect Marginal effect 
lower upper Est Actual REF CAT 
SCIENCE -0.3619 0.6237 0.3367 0.6964 0.2051 2.3644 -0.0876 -0.0786 -0.0073 
PHYSICS -0.4879 0.6638 0.5403 0: 6139 0.1671 2.2548 -0.1150 -0.1033 -0.0094 
ENGN 0.3944 0.5191 0.5772 1.4835 0.5363 4.1038 0.0949 0.0949 0.0115 
BMS 0.3552 0.4987 0.5072 1.4265 0.5367 3.7907 0.0861 0.0852 0.0101 
LIBERAL 1.2070 0.5899 4.1873* 3.3434 1.0522 10.6237 0.2139 0.2929 0.0532 
EDUC 0.1135 0.7516 0.0228 1.1202 0.2568 4.8869 0.0283 0.0265 0.0029 
BUZ -0.3306 0.6041 0.2995 0.7185 0.2199 2.3477 -0.0804 -0.0722 -0.0068 
EXP 1 -0.3300 0.5715 0.3340 0.7189 0.2345 2.2038 -0.0803 -0.0721 -0.0068 
EXP2 0.4951 0.4891 1.0246 1.6407 0.6291 4.2785 0.1165 0.1199 0.0151 
EXP 3 1.0500 0.4703 4.9848' 2.8577 1.1368 7.1835 0.2016 0.2565 0.0426 
RATING 5' 0.6311 1.0614 0.3535 1.8797 0.2347 15.0513 0.1431 0.1539 0.0207 
RATING 5 0.7726 0.9890 0.6102 2.1654 0.3117 15.0432 0.1670 0.1891 0.0272 
RATING 4 0.7167 0.8081 0.7865 2.0477 0.4201 9.9797 0.1580 0.1753 0.0245 
RATING 3A 1.1119 0.7095 2.4558 3.0401 0.7567 12.2123 0.2071 0.2710 0.0466 
RATING 3B 0.7196 0.6955 1.0706 2.0536 0.5255 8.0261 0.1585 0.1760 0.0247 
AVR-HIGHER -0.8384 0.4546 3.4012** 0.4324 0.1774 1.0540 -0.1767 -0.1644 -0.0138 
AVR-LOWER -0.1484 0.4612 0.1035 0.8621 0.3491 2.1290 -0.0369 -0.0334 -0.0033 
EX UFC UNIVERSITY 0.0999 0.6215 0.0258 1.1051 0.3268 3.7363 0.0249 0.0233 0.0025 
PROFESSOR -0.4642 0.5383 0.7436 0.6286 0.2189 1.8056 -0.1100 -0.0988 -0.0090 
READER -0.8207 0.6280 1.7077 0.4401 0.1285 1.5071 -0.1742 -0.1616 -0.0136 
PRINCIPAL LECTURER 0.6912 0.7303 0.8957 1.9961 0.4770 8.3535 0.1537 0.1689 0.0233 
SENIOR LECTURER -0.1742 0.4359 0.1598 0.8401 0.3575 1.9740 -0.0432 -0.0391 -0.0039 
NO PHD QUALIFICATION 0.1618 0.4122 0.1541 1.1756 0.5241 2.6374 0.0402 0.0380 0.0042 
AGE BELOW 40 0.9948 0.5481 3.2940'" 2.7042 0.9236 7.9176 0.1961 0.2433 0.0393 
AGEBETWEEN 40 AND 50 0.2533 0.3868 0.4290 1.2883 0.6037 2.7493 0.0623 0.0602 0.0069 
RESEARCH ACTIVITY 
MODERATE 2.6719 0.8840 9.1349* 14.4674 2.5580 81.8254 0.1616 0.5306 0.2428 
QUITE ACTIVE 2.5203 0.8994 7.8524* 12.4323 2.1330 72.4691 0.1737 0.5149 0.2142 
VERY ACTIVE 1.8653 0.8903 4.3899* 6.4579 1.1280 36.9740 0.2166 0.4241 0.1155 
CONSTANT -3.6795 1.1689 9.9086* 
Prediction Acurracy( 50% cut-off) 
Initial -2 log likelihood 333.6901 
-2 log likelihood with variables 284.382 Overall 68.11% 
Model chi square statistic 49.309 No agreement 83.23% 
df 28 Agreement 41.94% 
significance 0.0077 
Pseudo RA2 0.1478 
Aldrich And Nelson R^2 0.1941 
Cox & Snell RA2 0.176 Prediction Acurracy(36% cut-off) 
Nagelkerke RA2 0.241 
Overall 68.90% 
Wald (all df=1) No agreement 65.84% 
' significant at 5% level Agreement 74.19% 
significant at 10% level 
,I 
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Odds ratios and marginal effect 
TIME CYCLE 
SCIENCE 
PHYSICS 
ENGN 
BMS 
LIBERAL 
EDUC 
BUZ 
EXP 1 
EXP2 
EXP 3 
RATING 5' 
RATING 5 
RATING 4 
RATING 3A 
RATING 3B 
AVR-HIGHER 
AVR-LOWER 
EX UFC UNIVERSITY 
PROFESSOR 
READER 
PRINCIPAL LECTURER 
SENIOR LECTURER 
NO PHD QUALIFICATION 
AGE BELOW 40 
AGEBETWEEN 40 AND 50 
RESEARCH ACTIVITY 
MODERATE 
QUITE ACTIVE 
VERY ACTIVE 
CONSTANT 
Initial -2 log likelihood 
-2 log likelihood with variables 
Model chi square statistic 
dt 
significance 
Pseudo RA2 
Aldrich And Nelson RA2 
Cox & Snell RA2 
Nagelkerke RA2 
Wald (all df=1) 
' significant at 5% level 
'" significant at 10% level 
B SE Wa! d odds ratio 95% CI for odds ratio Marginal effect Marginal effect 
lower upper Est Actual REF CAT 
-0.1302 0.5817 0.0501 0.8779 0.2807 2.7455 -0.0324 -0.0311 -0.0054 
-0.8106 0.6274 1.6693 0.4446 0.1300 1.5206 -0.1727 -0.1740 -0.0251 
-0.3975 0.5163 0.5928 0.6720 0.2443 1.8484 -0.0956 -0.0917 -0.0147 
-0.8007 C. 5152 2.4153 04490 0.1636 1.2326 -0.1712 -0.1722 -0.0249 
0.6614 0.5983 1.2220 1.9375 0.5997 6.2592 0.1485 0.1638 0.0396 
-1.5228 0.8203 3.4460" 0.2181 0.0437 1.0887 -0.2238 -0.2784 -0.0357 
-1.1958 0.6107 3.8336" 0.3025 0.0914 1.0012 -0.2132 -0.2363 -0.0317 
-0.2835 0.5793 0.2394 0.7531 0.2420 2.3443 -0.0695 -0.0664 -0.0110 
0.1891 0.4855 0.1517 1.2082 0.4665 3.1288 0.0469 0.0464 0.0091 
0.6294 0.4724 1.7754 1.8765 0.7435 4.7363 0.1427 0.1560 0.0371 
0.2230 1.0558 0.0446 1.2498 0.1578 9.8972 0.0551 0.0548 0.0109 
0.4636 0.9699 0.2285 1.5898 0.2375 10.6396 0.1099 0.1149 0.0253 
0.2956 0.8050 0.1349 1.3439 0.2774 6.5107 0.0723 0.0729 0.0149 
0.6924 0.7041 0.9671 1.9985 0.5028 7.9445 0.1539 0.1714 0.0420 
1.7142 0.7051 5.9112' 5.5522 1.3942 22.1106 0.2217 0.3842 0.1657 
-0.6903 0.4478 2.3761 0.5014 0.2084 1.2061 -0.1535 -0.1516 -0.0225 
-0.6336 0.4655 1.8526 0.5307 0.2131 1.3215 -0.1435 -0.1406 -0.0211 
0.6892 0.6341 1.1810 1.9921 0.5748 6.9037 0.1534 0.1706 0.0418 
0.0634 0.5338 0.0141 1.0655 0.3742 3.0335 0.0158 0.0154 0.0029 
-0.7285 0.6124 1.4150 0.4826 0.1453 1.6029 -0.1599 -0.1589 -0.0233 
0.5951 0.7429 0.6418 1.8132 0.4228 7.7764 0.1363 0.1475 0.0345 
-0.0250 0.4394 0.0032 0.9753 0.4122 2.3076 -0.0062 -0.0060 -0.0011 
0.5393 0.4195 1.6527 1.7148 0.7536 3.9017 0.1255 0.1337 0.0305 
1.0466 0.5550 3.5565" 2.8480 0.9597 8.4519 0.2013 0.2543 0.0750 
0.7829 0.3907 4.0146* 2.1878 1.0172 4.7052 0.1686 0.1932 0.0496 
2.1292 0.7764 7.5206' 8.4081 1.8358 38.5090 0.2023 0.4439 0.2431 
2.5512 0.7959 10.2740* 12.8225 2.6945 61.0230 0.1712 0.4891 0.3369 
1.1963 0.7807 2.3480 3.3079 0.7161 15.2788 0.2132 0.2868 0.0919 
-3.0279 1.0830 7.8171' 
Prediction Acurracy(50% cut-off) 
342.6858 
286.306 Overall 73.12% 
56.38 No agreement 82.55% 
28 Agreement 59.62% 
0.0012 
0.1645 
0.2228 
0.2000 Prediction Acurracy(41% cut-off) 
0.2690 
Overall 68.38% 
No agreement 69.13% 
Agreement 67.31% 
rl 
TABLE 9-19 
TIME CYCLE Parsimonous Model (Backward LR) 
B SE Wald odds ratio 95% CI for odds ratio 
lower upper 
LIBERAL 0.9624 0.4908 3.8452* 2.6181 1.0005 6.8512 
RAE RATING: 
RATING 5* 0.2072 0.6354 0.1063 1.2302 0.3541 4.2739 
RATING 5 0.1577 0.5801 0.0739 1.1709 0.3756 3.6500 
RATING 4 0.3217 0.5227 0.3788 1.3795 0.4952 3.8425 
RATING 3A 0.4666 0.5306 0.7733 1.5945 0.5637 4.5106 
RATING 3B 1.4886 0.5925 6.3122* 4.4309 1.3873 14.1524 
AGE: 
AGE BELOW 40 0.8790 0.3682 5.6989* 2.4084 1.1704 4.9561 
AGEBETWEEN 40 AND 50 0.6921 0.3331 4.3175* 1.9980 1.0401 3.8381 
RESEARCH ACTIVITY: 
MODERATE 1.7281 0.7125 5.8825* 5.6299 1.3932 22.7499 
QUITE ACTIVE 1.9345 0.7093 7.4388* 6.9207 1.7235 27.7901 
VERY ACTIVE 0.8943 0.6968 1.6476 2.4457 0.6242 9.5825 
Constant -2.6674 0.7727 11.9158* 
Initial -2 log likelihood 342.6858 
-2 log likelihood with variables 302.304 
Model chi square statistic 40.382 
df 11 
significance 0 
Cox & Snell RA2 0.148 
Nagelkerke RA2 0.199 
Wald (all df=1) 
' significant at 5% level 
" significant at 10% level 
Prediction Acurracy(50% cut-off) 
Overall 70.36°ä 
No agreement 81.88% 
Agreement 53.85% 
Prediction Acurracy(41 % cut-off) 
Overall 67.59% 
No agreement 71.14% 
Agreement 62.50% 
TABLE 9-20 
Odds ratio and Marginal effect. 
MOBILITY B SE Wald odds ratio 95% Cl for odds ratio Marginal effect Marginal effect 
lower upper Est Actual REF CAT 
SCIENCE -1.5011 0.8602 3.0452" 0.2229 0.0413 1.2030 -0.2237 -0.3088 -0.0381 PHYSICS -1.5044 0.7901 3.6255" 0.2222 0.0472 1.0451 -0.2237 -0.3096 -0.0382 
ENGN -0.4714 0.7218 0.4265 0.6241 0.1517 2.5686 -0.1115 -0.0770 -0.0068 
BMS -0.2296 0.6666 0.1186 0.7949 0.2152 2.9358 -0.0567 -0.0348 -0.0029 
LIBERAL -0.7896 0.8874 0.7917 0.4540 0.0797 2.5851 -0.1696 -0.1408 -0.0135 
EDUC -0.1343 1.2653 0.0113 0.8743 0.0732 10.4398 -0.0334 -0.0197 -0.0016 
BUZ -0.713 0.7601 0.8799 0.4902 0.1105 2.1745 -0.1574 -0.1246 -0.0117 
EXP 1 0.4833 0.7620 0.4023 1.6214 0.3641 7.2206 0.1140 0.0579 0.0044 
EXP2 0.17 0.6175 0.0758 1.1853 0.3534 1.9761 0.0422 0.0227 0.0018 
EXP 3 0.8476 0.6557 1.6711 2.3340 0.6456 8.4372 0.1780 0.0894 0.0065 
RATING 5' 0.0818 1.2509 0.0043 1.0852 0.0935 12.5982 0.0204 0.0113 0.0009 
RATING 5 1.0212 1.1851 0.7424 2.7765 0.2721 28.3318 0.1988 0.1013 0.0073 
RATING 4 1.5391 1.0437 2.1749 4.6604 0.6027 36.0409 0.2239 0.1279 0.0090 
RATING 3A 1.0938 0.9056 1.4590 2.9856 0.5061 17.6145 0.2056 0.1058 0.0076 
RATING 3B -0.0983 0.8824 0.0124 0.9064 0.1608 5.1101 -0.0245 -0.0143 -0.0012 
AVR-HIGHER -0.2153 0.5814 0.1371 0.8063 0.2580 2.5200 -0.0532 -0.0325 -0.0027 
AVR-LOWER 0.6622 0.7102 0.8695 1.9391 0.4820 7.8005 0.1486 0.0745 0.0055 
EX UFC UNIVERSITY -1.4124 0.8259 2.9246** 0.2436 0.0483 1.2292 -0.2224 -0.2867 -0.0340 
PROFESSOR -1.6357 0.8457 3.7408'" 0.1948 0.0371 1.0221 -0.2232 -0.3424 -0.0448 
READER -0.8893 0.9812 0.8215 0.4109 0.0601 2.8116 -0.1836 -0.1625 -0.0160 
PRINCIPAL LECTURER -2.4767 1.0203 5.8924" 0.0840 0.0114 0.6207 -0.1771 -0.5390 -0.1100 SENIOR LECTURER -1.4086 0.7575 3.4581** 0.2445 0.0554 1.0790 -0.2224 -0.2858 -0.0339 
NO PHD QUALIFICATION -0.8037 0.5553 2.0946 0.4477 0.1508 1.3293 -0.1717 -0.1438 -0.0138 
AGE BELOW 40 0.3845 0.7421 0.2684 1.4689 0.3430 6.2895 0.0927 0.0477 0.0036 
AGEBETWEEN 40 AND 50 0.3803 0.4887 0.6056 1.4627 0.5613 3.8116 0.0917 0.0472 0.0036 
RESEARCH ACTIVITY 
MODERATE -0.6521 0.9301 0.4916 0.5210 0.0842 3.2248 -0.1469 -0.1121 -0.0103 
QUITE ACTIVE -0.132 0.9593 0.0185 0.8763 0.1337 5.7445 -0.0329 -0.0194 "0.0016 
VERY ACTIVE -1.4294 0.9057 2.4908 0.2395 0.0406 1.4130 -0.2228 -0.2909 -0.0348 
CONSTANT 4.4553 1.5023 8.7957' 
Prediction Acurracy(50% cut-off) 
Initial -2 log likelihood 221.6761 
-2 log likelihood with variables 183.84 Overall 82.93% 
Model chi square statistic 37.836 No agreement 12.20% 
df 28 Agreement 97.07% 
significance 0.1015 
Pseudo RA2 0.1707 
Aldrich And Nelson RA2 0.1538 
Cox & Snell RA2 0.1430 Prediction Acurracy(83% cut-off) 
Nagelkerke RA2 0.2400 
Overall 72.36% 
Wald (all df=11 No agreement 73.17% 
' significant at 5% level Agreement 72.20% 
significant at 10% level 
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CHAPTER TEN 
CONCLUSION 
10.1 INTRODUCTION 
This final chapter evaluates the main findings and conclusions of the previous 
chapters in a broader resource allocation and performance control measure 
context. The evidence compiled in this thesis substantiates intuition and previous 
studies that the RAE has resulted in a number of consequences that are 
unintended and unconstructive. An increasing number of scholars are resorting 
to tactics such as gaming to enhance their research publications. The periodicity 
ýt 
of the RAE and the four paper effect have created a publications culture that is 
largely short-term in nature. The RAE's requirement that an academic's research 
performance has to be measured and evaluated has led to the emphasis on just 
those activities. As a result, output of academic nature is produced at the expense 
of other relevant academic activities such as voluntary services like refereeing 
for journals. 
As a resource allocation methodology, the RAE lacks coherence and consistency 
in its transparent objectives. It confirms the suspicion that the underlying 
objective of the RAE is nothing more than a formula-based resource allocation of 
constrained resources in order to reduce the political costs of the budget cuts for 
higher education. As discussed in Chapter Four, formula-funding models 
alienate the distribution decision from the aggregate decision. Therefore, the 
politicians who decide on budget cuts At the aggregate level can distance 
Chapter 10: Conclusion page 353 
themselves from the responsibility of the negative impact of the resulting 
aggregate constrained distributions. The blame for the distribution impacts, even 
if arising from budget cut constraints, can then be shifted to the funding bodies 
and the distribution methodology, exonerating the politicians of all wrong-doing. 
10.2 EVALUATION OF THE RAE 
The RAE is essentially a formula-based resource allocation mechanism. It 
measures research performance and the measured performance determines the 
resource allocation. Therefore, it is also a performance measure. The thesis 
investigated the consequences from these two angles of the RAE. This is 
illustrated in Figure 10-1. 
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10.2.1 RESOURCE ALLOCATION 
During the last twenty years, much political attention has been given to the 
organization and effectiveness of public services in the United Kingdom 
(Kitchener et al, 2000). Across the public sector, concern for the organisation of 
professional work has risen against a changing political economy that 
increasingly espouses "New Public Management" doctrines such as 
consumerism, the attempted reduction of government spending, the introduction 
of market forms (Hood 1991), accountability and value for money. These 
doctrines form part of a wider political project that is driven by the neo-liberal 
economic theory of new right Conservative politicians (see for example Clarke 
and Newman, 1997). The principal aim has been to "get more for less" from 
public services (Hood, 1991). The goal of this, from what is referred to as the 
"Thatcherite" social welfare function, is to improve the welfare of the best 
members of society. By rewarding and motivating the best, the marginal benefit 
of the returns will be highest. 
One of the difficulties for the RAE is defining what is the aggregate objective 
welfare function that captures the effect of university research funding -a very 
complex issue. If the intention of the RAE is to achieve value for money, then 
the resultant allocation distribution should aim to achieve the highest marginal 
returns, notwithstanding how it is measured, for each unit of resource. 
Fundamentally, the RAE allocation should resemble the basic capital rationing 
decision. If the allocation is Pareto efficient, then the extra unit of resource 
would have the same marginal returns irrespective of where it is applied. (Pareto 
efficiency is maximising the output from the unit of resource). The shadow 
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prices will be equal, where the shadow price is (extra benefit/unit of resource). 
The capital rationing allocation requires that the initial amounts be re-distributed 
to highly rated departments. Resources will only be provided to the lower 
departments if the returns from each additional resource to these lower rated 
departments are equal to the returns derived from the additional resource unit to 
the higher rated department. 
Figure 10-2 illustrates the above point. The figure assumes that marginal benefit 
will increase until the 8th unit of resources where marginal benefit starts to 
decrease. For the first 14 units of resource, the graph shows that the highest 
returns will be from allocating it to the 5* rated departments. The 15th unit of 
resource h as higher r eturns if allocated toa5 rated d epartment. The next 16 
units would have highest returns in departments rated 5. For a department rated 
3b to receive any funding, there must be at least 64 units available: 14 to 5*, 16 
to 5,16 to 4 and 18 to 3a. Though the graph in Figure 10.2 is hypothetical, the 
principle is illustrative. 
Thus, for lower rated departments to receive funds there needs to be a large 
enough amount of resources to distribute. With the continual rationing of total 
funds available and the constant improvement of high rated departments, it seems 
that departments that are rated low would receive progressively less or even no 
funding. This allocation philosophy implies that the low rated departments are 
encouraged not top ursue research. T his c ails to question ift here isa hidden 
agenda to return to a binary divide. 
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The RAE funds, however, are awarded to universities as a block grant and they 
have the autonomy to distribute the money as they wish. The internal allocation 
of the RAE funds by the universities can weaken the efficiency of the RAE 
rationing distribution. The shadow price of a unit of resource to the university is 
different from the marginal shadow price to the policy makers. Research quality 
output determines the shadow prices for the policy d ecision-makers, while the 
marginal returns to the universities are also determined by the additional funds 
that the department can obtain. 
This inefficiency in internal distribution can be explained in the context of 
agency theory. The reduction in the principal's welfare from the divergence 
between the principal's and the agents' interests is known as the "agency residual 
loss". The universities are agents for the principal, viz., the funding council. 
The goals of the agents conflict with the principal's. The agent has a "limited 
holistic" view. This view is limited insofar as it is only a holistic view of the 
institution while the funding council has an aggregated holistic view. The 
funding council is more interested in the quality of research at the aggregate per 
discipline while the institutions view it only at the level of institutions. 
Another inconsistency with the allocation process is the interference with the 
equivalence doctrine. The British higher education system is based on the 
premise that degrees awarded by all British universities are equivalent. This is 
the underlying principle for the external examiner system. However, the 
concentration of research in a limited number of institutions would not be 
consistent with the equivalence doctrine. , 
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10.2.2 PERFORMANCE MEASURE 
The review of the management control literature in Chapter Two has related the 
dysfunctional behaviours to the higher education context in Table 2.7 of Chapter 
Two. This thesis has established the existence of such dysfunctional behaviours 
arising from the imposition of an outcome control on an environment more suited 
to clan control or self-control. 
Several theories of motivation, including level of aspiration (Stedry, 1960), 
expectancy (Ronen and Livingston, 1975), agency (Chow, 1983), and goal 
setting (Hirst and Lowy, 1990) are used to predict, assuming the standard goal is 
attainable, that performance is an increasing function of standard difficulty. This 
has been discussed in detail in Chapter Two and argues that the level of increased 
performance is contingent on the level of perceived difficulty of the goal (see 
Figure 2.7 in Chapter Two). The set goal can have de-motivating effects if it is 
perceived as unattainable or an easy goal. Therefore, it is hypothesised that the 
middle-tier academics would yield the highest motivation from the four-paper 
goal and increased performance. This thesis' results support this hypothesis. 
However, the statistical results also indicate that the middle-tier academics also 
engage in gaming activities and generally have a short-term orientation. In 
general, academics, especially those in the middle tier, are striving to publish 
only for the sake of the RAE. This is coined in this thesis as the four paper effect 
and is discussed in detail in Chapters Seven and Eight. 
The short-term orientation is comparable to studies in the management literature 
that documents how an exclusive focus on accounting-based controls may bring 
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out the worst practices of management aiming for short-term profit maximisation 
at the expense of long-term effectiveness and competitive strengths (e. g., Hayes 
and Abetrnathy, 1980; Laverty, 1996; Merchant, 1990; Merchant and Bruns, 
1986). 
Agency theory, and expectancy and goal-setting theories predict that 
performance is an increasing function of performance-contingent incentives 
(Demski and Feltham, 1978; Locke and Latham, 1990; Ronen and Livingston, 
1975). Individuals are motivated to expend more effort when they believe that 
the additional effort will increase performance which, in turn, results in 
additional valued rewards. This is discussed in Chapter Two and illustrated in 
the motivational process circle in Figure 2-6, as well as the Porter and Lawler 
model (Figure 2-5 in Chapter Two). The practice of headhunting and 
compensation premiums is to the advantage of the very active researchers at the 
professorial level. This consequence of the RAE, to some extent, reduces the 
brain drain of academics leaving the UK for foreign locations, in particular the 
United States of America. 
An unintended consequence of the RAE is that of academics reducing their 
commitments to voluntary academic activities and becoming less proactive in 
public policy debates. Since voluntary academic activities and public policy 
participation by academics are not a part of the contract of employment, they are 
not formally assessed. But, they constitute an integral feature of academic life, 
something that is invisible and not evaluated by the RAE process. 
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The key finding of this thesis is that the behavioural consequences of imposing 
an outcome control in a task complex environment - more suited to clan control 
or self-control - is contingent on people's self-assessed level of performance. 
10.3 FURTHER RESEARCH 
The thesis' research can be extended to study the relationship between short-term 
orientation and performance over time. Also, while managerial short-term 
orientation is usually considered to be dysfunctional (Van der Stede, 2000: p. 
619), it may be situation specific. Short-term actions may be necessary, for 
instance to bring about an urgent recovery of poor performance (Merchant and 
Manzoni, 1989). It would be interesting to explore the impact of a short-term 
orientation on future performance. This would require longitudinal data to 
understand the effects on an individual's promotion, research quality, and 
publications track records. 
Societal and cultural values may have different effects. Thus, another possible 
use of the thesis' findings is to replicate the study in other countries such as 
Hong Kong where a similar Research Assessment Exercise is being adopted. 
Finally, as the RAE is essentially a resource allocation tool, the costs of and the 
value for money from, the allocation process are fundamental. Some research 
would be useful for understanding the costs of compliance to the RAE, akin to 
the compliance cost of taxation research. 
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10.4 FINAL CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Though the RAE is not coherent, there is some coherence in the overall strategies 
adopted by the funding council. The present environment in the higher education 
sector is that the RAE is the strategy to promote research excellence by 
rewarding it. This has, nevertheless, resulted in a number of unintended 
consequences such as gaming, smoothing and short-term orientation. The 
Research Councils continue to be the indirect mechanism for directing research 
towards national interests. 
The impact of the RAE on teaching excellence has been a source of concern, and 
the TQA has some safeguards for teaching competency so that it is not totally 
negated by the adverse effects of the RAE. But, the current deficiency of the 
TQA is that it lacks any funding implications. Universities look upon the TQA as 
important for its effect on student recruitment, thus some universities deliberately 
hire and retain good teachers. For example, Warwick University, while hailed as 
a research-led institution, has also promoted a limited number of academics 
based on their teaching excellence and is considering the appointment of 
academics to teaching-only positions. 
This overall policy has left exposed the other academic work, which is currently 
unmeasured. These include voluntary academic work, refereeing for journals and 
participation in public policy matters. To circumvent the reluctance of academia 
to p articipate in public policy debates, the government isi ncreasingly i nviting 
established academics to participate in government committees. 
Chapter 10: Conclusion page 362 
The goals of the RAE may be strategic and noble, but as a performance measure 
it comes up short in the sense t hat it does not fully capture nor recognise the 
totality of the activities of an academic who have to multitask between teaching 
and research; between service to the university and the public at large; between 
serving one's university and the academic community at large; and between 
personal goals and institutional goals. In this regard. the RAE is due for a 
thorough overhaul. However, the main aim of the RAE is the allocation of 
constrained resources and its failings should be seen in that context. 
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